Philosophical and theological doctrine of Thomas Aquinas. natural theology. Theology and Science Thomas Aquinas theology and philosophy
Thomas Aquinas(c. 1224, Rocca Secca, Italy - 1274, Fossanova, Italy) - medieval theologian and philosopher, Dominican monk (since 1244). He studied at the University of Naples, in Paris, from 1248 with Albert the Great in Cologne. In 1252–59 he taught in Paris. He spent the rest of his life in Italy, only in 1268-72 he was in Paris, arguing with the Parisian Averroists regarding the interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine of the immortality of the active mind-intellect ( noosa ). The writings of Thomas Aquinas include "The sum of theology" And "Sum against the Gentiles" (“The sum of philosophy”), discussions on theological and philosophical problems (“Debatable questions” and “Questions on various topics”), detailed comments on several books of the Bible, on 12 treatises of Aristotle, on “Sentences” Peter Lombard , on the treatises of Boethius, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, anonymous "Book of Reasons" and others. "Discussion Questions" and "Comments" were largely the fruit of his teaching activities, which included, according to the tradition of that time, disputes and reading authoritative texts. The greatest influence on the philosophy of Thomas was provided by Aristotle, largely rethought by him.
The system of Thomas Aquinas is based on the idea of the fundamental agreement of two truths - based on Revelation and deduced by the human mind. Theology proceeds from the truths given in Revelation and uses philosophical means to reveal them; philosophy moves from rational comprehension of the given in sensory experience to the justification of the supersensible, for example. the existence of God, His unity, etc. (In Boethium De Trinitate, II 3).
Thomas distinguishes several types of knowledge: 1) absolute knowledge of all things (including individual, material, random), carried out in a single act by the highest mind-intellect; 2) knowledge without reference to the material world, carried out by created non-material intelligentsia and 3) discursive knowledge, carried out by the human intellect. The theory of "human" knowledge (S. th. I, 79-85; De Ver. I, 11) is formed in polemic with the Platonic doctrine of ideas as objects of knowledge: Thomas rejects the existence of ideas as an independent existence (they can exist only in the divine intellect as prototypes of things, in individual things and in the human intellect as a result of the knowledge of things - “before the thing, in the thing, after the thing”), and the presence of “innate ideas” in the human intellect. Sensual cognition of the material world is the only source of intellectual cognition that uses “self-evident foundations” (the main of them is the law of identity), which also do not exist in the intellect before cognition, but are manifested in its process. The result of the activity of the five external senses and internal senses (“general sense”, synthesizing the data of external senses, imagination, preserving fantasy images, sensory evaluation - the ability inherent not only to humans, but also to animals, the ability to make specific judgments, and memory, preserving the evaluation of the image) are “sensory species”, from which, under the influence of active intellect (which is a part of a person, and not an independent “active intelligentsia”, as the Averroists believed), “intelligible species” completely cleared of material elements, perceived by the “possible intellect” (intellectus possibilis ). The final phase of the knowledge of a particular thing is the return to the sensual images of material things, preserved in fantasy.
Cognition of non-material objects (truth, angels, God, etc.) is possible only on the basis of knowledge of the material world: thus, we can deduce the existence of God, based on the analysis of certain aspects of material things (movement ascending to the immobile prime mover; cause-and-effect relationship ascending to the root cause; various degrees of perfection, ascending to absolute perfection; the randomness of the existence of natural things, requiring the existence of an unconditionally necessary being; the presence of expediency in the natural world, indicating its rational management (S. c. G. I, 13; S. th I, 2, 3; Compendium of Theology I, 3; On Divine Power III, 5) Such a movement of thought from what is known in experience to its cause and ultimately to the first cause does not give us knowledge of what this the first cause, but only about what it is.Knowledge of God is primarily negative, but Thomas seeks to overcome the limitations apophatic theology : “to be existing” in relation to God is a definition not only of the act of existence, but also of essence, since in God essence and existence coincide (different in all created things): God is being itself and the source of being for everything that exists. God as being can also be predicated transcendentals - such as "one", "true" (existing in relation to the intellect), "good" (existing in relation to desire), etc. The opposition "existence-essence", actively used by Thomas, covers the traditional oppositions act and potency And forms and matter : the form, which gives existence to matter as a pure potency and is the source of activity, becomes a potency in relation to the pure act - God, who gives existence to the form. Based on the concept of the difference between essence and existence in all created things, Thomas argues with the widespread concept of the total hylomorphism Ibn Gebirol, denying that the highest intelligentsia (angels) consist of form and matter (De ente et essentia, 4).
God creates numerous kinds and kinds of things required for the completeness of the universe (which has a hierarchical structure) and endowed with varying degrees of perfection. A special place in creation is occupied by a person, who is the unity of the material body and the soul as a form of the body (in contrast to the Augustinian understanding of a person as a “soul using the body”, Thomas emphasizes the psychophysical integrity of a person). Although the soul is not subject to destruction when the body is destroyed due to the fact that it is simple and can exist separately from the body, it acquires its perfect existence only in conjunction with the body: in this Thomas sees an argument in favor of the dogma of resurrection in the flesh (“On the Soul” , fourteen).
Man differs from the animal world by the ability to cognize and make, because of this, a free conscious choice that underlies truly human - ethical - actions. In the relationship between the intellect and the will, the advantage belongs to the intellect (a position that caused controversy between the Thomists and the Scotists), since it is he who represents this or that being as good for the will; however, when an action is performed in specific circumstances and with the help of certain means, volitional effort comes to the fore (De malo, 6). In order to perform good deeds, along with a person's own efforts, divine grace is also required, which does not eliminate the uniqueness of human nature, but improves it. The divine control of the world and the foresight of all (including random) events do not exclude freedom of choice: God allows independent actions of secondary causes, incl. and entailing negative moral consequences, since God is able to turn to good the evil created by independent agents.
Being the root cause of all things, God is at the same time the ultimate goal of their aspirations; the ultimate goal of human actions is the achievement of bliss, which consists in the contemplation of God (impossible, according to Thomas, within the present life), all other goals are evaluated depending on their orientation towards the final goal, the deviation from which is evil (De malo, 1). At the same time, Thomas paid tribute to activities aimed at achieving earthly forms of bliss.
The beginnings of proper moral deeds from the inside are virtues, from the outside - laws and grace. Thomas analyzes the virtues (skills that enable people to consistently use their abilities for good - S. th. I-II, 59-67) and the vices that oppose them (S. th. I-II, 71-89), following the Aristotelian tradition, however he believes that in order to achieve eternal happiness, in addition to virtues, there is a need for gifts, beatitudes, and the fruits of the Holy Spirit (S. th. I–II, 68–70). The moral life of Thomas does not think outside the presence of theological virtues - faith, hope and love (S. th. II-II, 1-45). Following the theological are four "cardinal" (fundamental) virtues - prudence and justice (S. th. II-II, 47-80), courage and moderation (S. th. II-II, 123-170), with which other virtues.
Law (S. th. I–II, 90–108) is defined as “any command of reason which is promulgated for the common good to those who care for the public” (S. th. I–II, 90, 4). The eternal law (S. th. I–II, 93), by which divine providence governs the world, does not make superfluous the other kinds of law that flow from it: the natural law (S. th. I–II, 94), whose principle is the fundamental the postulate of Thomistic ethics - "one must strive for the good and do good, evil must be avoided"; human law (S. th. I-II, 95), which concretizes the postulates of natural law (determining, for example, a specific form of punishment for committed evil) and whose force Thomas limits the conscience that opposes an unjust law. Historically, positive legislation - the product of human institutions - can be changed. The good of the individual, society and the universe is determined by divine design, and the violation of divine laws by man is an action directed against his own good (S. c. G. III, 121).
Following Aristotle, Thomas considered social life natural for a person and singled out six forms of government: fair - monarchy, aristocracy and "polity" and unjust - tyranny, oligarchy and democracy. The best form of government is a monarchy, the worst is tyranny, the fight against which Thomas justified, especially if the tyrant's rules clearly contradict the divine rules (for example, by forcing idolatry). The autocracy of a just monarch must take into account the interests of various groups of the population and does not exclude elements of the aristocracy and polity. Thomas placed ecclesiastical authority above secular.
The teachings of Thomas Aquinas had a great influence on Catholic theology and philosophy, which was facilitated by the canonization of Thomas in 1323 and his recognition as the most authoritative Catholic theologian in the encyclical Aeterni patris of Pope Leo XIII (1879). Cm. Thomism , Neo-Thomism .
Compositions:
1. Full coll. op. - "Piana" in 16 volumes. Rome, 1570;
2. Parma edition in 25 volumes, 1852-1873, reprinted. in New York, 1948–50;
3. Opera Omnia Vives, in 34 volumes. Paris, 1871–82;
4. "Leonina". Rome, since 1882 (since 1987 - republication of previous volumes); Marietti edition, Turin;
5. R. Bus edition Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia, ut sunt in indice thomistico, Stuttg. – Bad Cannstatt, 1980;
6. in Russian transl.: Debating questions about truth (question 1, ch. 4–9), On the unity of the intellect against Averroists. - In the book: Good and Truth: Classical and Non-Classical Regulators. M., 1998;
7. Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics" (book I. Introduction, Sent. 7-11). - In the book: Philosophy of Nature in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, part 1. M., 1998;
8. On the mixing of elements. - Ibid., part 2. M., 1999;
9. About the attack of demons. - "Man", 1999, No. 5;
10. About being and essence. - In the book: Historical and Philosophical Yearbook - 88. M., 1988;
11. About the board of sovereigns. - In the book: Political structures of the era of feudalism in Western Europe 6 - 17 centuries. L., 1990;
12. About the principles of nature. - In the book: Time, truth, substance. M., 1991;
13. Sum of theology (part I, question 76, v. 4). - "Logos" (M.), 1991, No. 2;
14. Sum of Theology I-II (Question 18). - "VF", 1997, No. 9;
15. Evidence for the existence of God in the Summa Against the Gentiles and the Summa Theology. M., 2000.
Literature:
1. Bronzov A. Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas in relation to their doctrine of morality. St. Petersburg, 1884;
2. Borgosh Yu. Thomas Aquinas. M., 1966, 2nd ed. M., 1975;
3. Dzikevich E.A. Philosophical and aesthetic views of Thomas Aquinas. M., 1986;
4. Gretsky S.V. Problems of anthropology in the philosophical systems of Ibn Sina and Thomas Aquinas. Dushanbe, 1990;
5. Chesterton G. Saint Thomas Aquinas. - In the book: He is. Eternal Man. M., 1991;
6. Gerty V. Freedom and moral law in Thomas Aquinas. - "VF", 1994, No. 1;
7. Maritain J. philosopher in the world. M., 1994;
8. Gilson E. Philosopher and theology. M., 1995;
9. Svezhavsky S. Saint Thomas, reread. - "Symbol" (Paris) 1995, No. 33;
10. Copleston F.Ch. Aquinas. Introduction to the philosophy of the great medieval thinker. Dolgoprudny, 1999;
11. Gilson E. Saint Thomas d'Aquin. P., 1925;
12. Idem. Moral Values and Moral Life. St. Louis-L., 1931;
13. Grabmann M. Thomas von Aquin. Munch., 1949;
14. Sertillanger A.D. Der heilige Thomas von Aquin. Koln-Olten, 1954;
15. Aquinas: A collection of Critical Essays. L. - Melbourne, 1970;
16. Thomas von Aquin. Interpretation und Rezeption: Studien und Texte, hrsg. von W. P. Eckert. Mainz, 1974;
17. Aquinas and Problems of his Time, ed. by G.Verbeke. Leuven-The Hague, 1976;
18. Weisheipl J. Friar Thomas Aquinas. His Life, Thought, and Works. Wash., 1983;
19. Copleston F.C. Aquinas. L., 1988;
20. The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. by N.Kretzmann and E.Stump. Cambr., 1993.
K.V. Bandurovsky
The Trinitarian teaching of Aquinas is of particular importance in connection with the dogma of the Filioque, which served as one of the reasons for the division of the Eastern and Western Churches.
Considering the question of the origin of Divine Persons, Aquinas refutes three objections to the very possibility of any “origin” in God (Summa. Part I. Question 27. P. 1):
1. Origin means moving outward from the original source; in God there is nothing "outside" into which movement could take place; there is also nothing in God that can be subject to movement.
In response to this argument, St. Thomas points out that it refers to a movement or action in space, directed from the original source to external matter or external result - this kind of origin, indeed, does not exist in God.
2. The second objection is that everything that has come into existence is different from that from which it originated. In God there are no differences, but absolute simplicity.
This objection is also based on the image of an external, material origin. To clarify the idea of "origin" in God, St. Thomas points out that in the case of an intelligible origin, what happens is not necessarily different from its source. The more fully a thing is understood, the closer the intellectual conception of it is to that rational factor which constitutes the intelligible form of the thing.
Since God knows Himself, His own essence, then in Him there is a thought adequate to Him, which is the personal Word of God — the Son of God. Since the Divine Act of understanding has an absolute character, the Divine Word, associated, according to Aquinas, with this act of absolute understanding, is completely one with Its Source, without any difference.
3. The third objection is that God, being the First Cause, cannot have any origin in Himself, since to be happening does not correspond to the nature of the First Cause.
Aquinas again answers this objection by pointing to the intelligible act that remains within the first cause. So, if the builder is called the root cause of the house being built, then the skill that comes from his mind, the understanding of his work also remains included in the concept of the root cause in relation to the house. The house itself, which has not an intelligible, but a material origin, can no longer be included in the concept of the root cause.
Scholastic reasoning of this kind does not mean that St. Thomas considered it possible to rationally comprehend the mystery of the Trinity: on the contrary, he attributed this mystery to the number of those truths that are given only in Revelation and cannot be comprehended by reason alone without faith. However, relying on faith and Revelation, our mind can achieve some speculative knowledge of God, since there is some analogy between the created mind and the higher Spirit (Summary, Part I, Question 32, Item 1).
Another kind of origin in God - the procession - Aquinas explains by analogy with an act of will. If birth is accomplished through the likeness of the begotten to the one who gives birth, then the act of will is performed not through similarity, but through motivation and movement towards the object (Sum. Ch. 16. Question 27. P. 4).
If the birth of the Divine Word is the result and expression of the absolute Divine Self-knowledge, then the act of desire in which God desires Himself signifies God's love for Himself. The source from which the Son-Word is eternally born is known as the Father, while the outgoing Love is known as the Holy Spirit (Summary, Part I, Question 34, Item 1).
Considering Divine Relations as absolutely real (I, 28, 1), Aquinas identifies these relations with the Divine Essence itself (I, 28, 2). At the same time, he points out that the concept of “relationship”, applied to created beings, only incompletely expresses the idea of an absolute relationship in God: in Him there is really nothing beyond the relationship.
Identifying the relationship with the essence in God, Aquinas at the same time distinguished them, referring to Boethius: “In God, the essence contains unity, and the relationship establishes a trinity” (I, 28, 3). Rejecting the heresy of Sabellius, who denied the reality of differences in God and therefore considered the trinity to be only a rational representation, Thomas points out that in accordance with the essence, the highest unity and simplicity reside in God, and in accordance with the relations there are real differences (I, 28, 3).
Origin by birth has an analogy in the creature and corresponds to the relationship of paternity and sonship, while origin by love has no proper name and is called “production” (literally, “exhalation”) for the Source, and “finding” (in Latin and "origin" and "origin" are the same word). Both last terms are not inherent in relation, but are inherent in origin (I, 28, 4).
Aquinas encounters great difficulties in the analysis of the concept of the Divine Person (Latin persona) (I, 29).
The term "hypostasis" used by the Eastern Fathers is closest to one of the meanings of the Latin term "substance", namely, not as a designation of the essence of a thing, but as a designation of the subject (suppositum). If the essence of a thing answers the question “what is it?”, then the hypostasis indicates “how it is”. In God, hypostasis means the same thing as essence, since for Him it is one and the same “what” He is and “how” He is.
“It will be correct to say,” says Aquinas, “that the name “person” directly means relation, and indirectly essence; but the relation is not as such, but as expressed by means of a hypostasis... In God, a hypostasis is expressed as being distinguished from another through a relation, and thus the relation as such enters indirectly into the concept of "person"" (I, 29, 4).
Used in such a sense as a term indicating the reality of intra-divine relationships, "face" when applied to God means something more than when applied to created beings - angels or people, for whom the term "face" does not contain the concept of relationship (I , 30, 4). Elsewhere, Aquinas develops the idea of the relation of person and essence in God as follows:
“While in creation relations are accidental, in God they are the divine essence itself. It follows from this that in God essence does not really differ from persons, while persons really differ from each other ... The relationship of a person related to essence does not really differ from it, but only in our way of thinking, while related to the opposing relation of another person, it has a real difference due to this opposition. So there is one essence and three persons” (I, 39.1).
Since the term “person” does not fully and directly mean the same thing as “essence”, but only the essence is that which determines the unity of God, Aquinas also has to consider the question of the legitimacy of using the same term “person” - as for the Father as well as for the Son and for the Holy Spirit. Thomas points out that the term "person" is used not to refer to the individual in terms of his nature, but to his original reality in this nature. For the Divine Persons, the common thing is that each of Them exists in the Divine Nature different from the others (I, 30, 4).
Considering the question of the relationship of Divine Persons, Aquinas notes that the name means that this person is different from other persons. Since it is "paternity" that distinguishes the Person of the Father from the other Persons of the Holy Trinity, it derives its proper name from this.
When applied to people, the name "father" does not mean a given person as such, but only a certain relation of a given person to another or others - "paternity". However, in God, as indicated above, the relationship is absolute and coincides with the essence, and since the Divine Person is an absolute relationship, the name expressing this relationship is the true Name of this Person (I, 33,2).
Since the eternal precedes the temporal, God is the Father of the Son from eternity, and in relation to the creature He is its Father in time. In this relation of one Person of the Holy Trinity to another, “paternity” is revealed in the full and perfect sense, while in relation to a creature whose nature is different from the Divine Nature, paternity is revealed only imperfectly and partially, as the creature approaches the realization of the true idea of sonship (1 ,33, 3).
If the proper name of the second Person of the Holy Trinity - the Son - is comprehended in the same way as the name Father, then in connection with another name of the Son - the Word (Logos) - Aquinas has to dispel some serious perplexities. So, even Anselm pointed out that it is essential for a word to be spoken or said; since there is the mind of the Father, the mind of the Son, the mind of the Holy Spirit, then it can be argued that the Father speaks, the Son speaks, the Holy Spirit speaks, and each of them can be not only a speaker, but also a subject of conversation; therefore, according to Anselm, the name "Logos" is not used in a personal sense, but as a term referring to a single Divine Essence (I, 34, 1, rev. 3).
Aquinas explains that the word in the primary sense is not the uttered sound, but the internal idea of the mind, as Damascene states: "The word is the natural movement of the intellect, by which it comprehends and thinks, as by light and dazzling brilliance." It is in this sense - as the idea of reason - that the "Word" remains within the intellect as an active factor, as Augustine wrote: , can comprehend a certain likeness of that Word, of which it is said: “In the beginning was the Word” ”(I, 34, 1).
To be the subject of conversation is characteristic of each Person of the Holy Trinity, and in this sense the entire Holy Trinity conceives the Word and is pronounced in the Word, as well as everything created, included in Divine Comprehension. But if all the Persons of the Holy Trinity speak and are the subject of conversation as comprehended in the word or comprehending in the word, then only one Person is comprehended, and is comprehended as the Word, proceeding from the intellect, in the primary sense of the term "word." In this primary sense, only one Person speaks, the Father, although all Persons are spoken, comprehended, and comprehended by means of the Word.
Being an emanation of the intellect, the Word is the Son, since it is precisely such an origin that can be called a birth (I, 34, 2).
The name of the third Person of the Holy Trinity - the Holy Spirit - Augustine substantiates on the basis of the assertion that the Holy Spirit is Divine Love, and the act of bringing forth the Holy Spirit is an act of Love, through which God loves Himself just as through the Word he knows Himself. In bodily things called "spirit" (wind, breath), this name indicates an impulse, a push, a movement, but it is love that tends to move and induce the will of the lover to the beloved object (I, 36, 1).
Referring to the words of Gregory the Theologian: "The Holy Spirit Himself is love", Aquinas believes that "Love" is the proper personal name of the Holy Spirit, just as the Word is the personal name of the Son. It must be said that in reasoning about Love as an intra-divine relation, Aquinas loses that distinctness and confidence that are characteristic of his arguments about the Divine Word. Thomas himself notes this lack of complete clarity, stating that "there are two origins in God, one through the intellect, and this is the origin of the Word, and the other through the will, and this is the origin of Love", but at the same time "the first is more known to us" ( I, 37, 1). “As regards the will,” writes Aquinas, “with the exception of the word “love,” which expresses the relationship of the lover to the beloved thing, there are no other terms for expressing the relationship of the imprint of the beloved object, which is created in the lover through the fact of love, to the cause of this imprint, and vice versa. Therefore, due to the poverty of our vocabulary, we express all these relationships with the word “love” in exactly the same way as if we were to call the Word “begotten intelligence” or “born wisdom” ”(I, 37, 1).
Aquinas distinguishes between love as an essential act and as an action - "exhalation" (spiratio) - of love.
With the essential understanding of love, it is necessary to affirm that the Father and the Son love each other not by the Holy Spirit, but by their essence, according to Augustine: “Who dares to say that the Father loves himself, the Son and the Holy Spirit only by the Holy Spirit?”
In the second sense of the term "love" - the "exhalation" ("exhalation") of love - we can say that the Father and the Son love each other and us with the Holy Spirit, or tormented love in the same way as the Father "pronounces" ("says") Himself and creation by the begotten Word or Son. This understanding corresponds to another statement of Augustine: “The Holy Spirit is the One through whom the Born is loved by the Begotten and loves His Parent” (I, 37, 2).
The rejection of the recognition of Love as a universal personal (and not only essential) principle of Divine Relations and the recognition of such a principle only of relations of origin necessarily lead Aquinas to the assertion of the Filioque.
Indeed, in the absolute (essential) sense, the Divine Persons do not differ from each other—the Holy Trinity is consubstantial and inseparable. The difference of Divine Persons takes place only in the sense of relations.
The relationship of the origin of the Son and the Holy Spirit to the Father does not in itself create a reciprocal relationship and thus a principle of distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit. The relationship of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and thus the principle of difference between Them, can only be established if there is also a relationship of descent between Them. This leads to the conclusion that in relation to the Father, a different order of origin of the Son and the Holy Spirit is established: if the Son comes (is born) from the Father directly, then the Holy Spirit comes (or comes) from the Father and the Son. As authority, Thomas cites the words from the symbol of St. Athanasius the Great: “The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, not created, not created, not begotten, but proceeding” (I, 36, 2).
Aquinas also does not object to the formula used by some Fathers: "From the Father through the Son", meaning that the Father, who gave birth to the Son, will also endow Him with the power to induce (together with the Father) the Holy Spirit. But this is the same power of production that the Father Himself possesses, so that the Son is not a secondary or instrumental cause of the origin of the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit proceeds equally from the Father and from the Son (I, 36, 3).
The doctrine of the Holy Spirit as the hypostatic love of God also serves to justify the Filioque by analogy with human love: before loving something, we must have in our mind an idea, knowledge of what becomes the object of our love. The "inner word" thus participates in the act of love.
An important provision for Catholic mysticism is the teaching of Thomas about the Holy Spirit as God's Gift (I, 38). This teaching is also important for clarifying the relationship between Thomism and Eastern Orthodox mystical consciousness, expressed in the Palamite synthesis. Namely, if St. Gregory Palamas asserts that the grace gifts of God are real Divine Energies, outpourings of Divine nature, then Thomas Aquinas considers these gifts, or collectively - the Gift of God, as the Person of the Holy Spirit. At the same time, Aquinas refers to Augustine, who asserted: "Just as the body of flesh is nothing but flesh, so the gift of the Holy Spirit is nothing but the Holy Spirit." Aquinas concludes from this that "an intelligent creation may possess a Divine Person." This possession is called the Gift, because the own power of creation cannot do anything to achieve this possession, which can only be bestowed from above. “Thus,” Thomas concludes, “the Divine Person can be bestowed and can be called the “Gift”” (I, 38.1).
The doctrine of the Holy Spirit as the Gift of God is also related to the Filioque, according to Augustine's statement: "Just as for the Son to be begotten means to be from the Father, so for the Holy Spirit to be the Gift of God means to proceed from the Father and the Son." Therefore, Aquinas believes that the word "Gift" can be used as a personal name of the Holy Spirit, expressing His intra-divine relationship with the Father and the Son (I, 38, 2).
It will be interesting for us to hear the judgment of the reigning Pope John Paul II, who in one of his conversations says the following on the issue of Filioque:
“Confessing our faith “in the Holy Spirit, the Lord who gives life,” we add “who comes from the Father and the Son.” As you know, these words were introduced into the Nicene symbol later, while earlier it was only: "I believe in the Holy Spirit." At the Council of Constantinople (381), it was added to the explanation “outgoing from the Father”, which is why the symbol is called Niceo-Tsaregradsky. The corresponding member of the Creed after the Council of 381 was: "I believe in the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father." A more complete formulation: “Which proceeds from the Father and the Son”, already found in early texts, was proposed by the Synod in Aquisgrana in 809 and finally adopted in Rome in 1014 ... After that, it spread throughout the West and was admitted by the Greeks and the Latins at the Ecumenical Councils - II of Lyon (1274) and Florence (1439). The addition did not change anything in the essence of the original faith, but out of respect for the universally accepted Symbol, also used in St. Peter's, the Roman Pontiffs themselves accepted it reluctantly. Without much resistance, the words “and the Son” adopted by the West, however, aroused disagreement and disputes among our Eastern brethren, who accused the West of distorting the essence of dogma. Today we can thank the Lord for the fact that both in the West and in the East both the meaning of the added words and the relativity of the question itself are being clarified...
The question of the "beginning" of the Holy Spirit in the triune life of the one God was the subject of a long and varied theological comprehension of Holy Scripture. In the West, St. Ambrose in his work "On the Holy Spirit" and St. Augustine in the treatise "On the Trinity" contributed a lot to its clarification. Attempts to penetrate into the mystery of the hidden life of God the Trinity, undertaken by them and other Fathers and Doctors of the Church, both Latin and Greek (St. Hilary, St. Basil the Great, St. John of Damascus), undoubtedly prepared the ground for the introduction into the Creed words about the Holy Spirit, "proceeding from the Father and the Son"...
And one more clarification (to which St. Thomas Aquinas already dedicated the section “Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father through the Son” in the “Summa”):
“We declare,” says the Council, “that the affirmation of the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son inspires and means that the Son, like the Father, is the cause, according to the Greeks, or the beginning, according to the Latins, of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. And since everything that the Father has, except Fatherhood, the Father himself gave to the Son with His birth, then the Son himself has this procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son eternally from the Father, by whom we eternally beget.
Even today, this announcement of the Council serves as a useful basis for dialogue and agreement between the brothers of East and West, and it is important that this Definition I, signed by both parties, ended like this: in the Creed for the clarification of the truth and according to the then urgent need "...
But since the Second Vatican Council, a fruitful ecumenical dialogue has been going on, which, it seems, has led to the conclusion that the Filioque is no longer the main obstacle to dialogue and its further development, which we all desire and for which we call on the Holy Spirit ”(“Catechism at a General Audience ", November 7, 1990, in: John Paul II. Unity in diversity // Christian Russia. Milan-Moscow).
Text by Thomas Aquinas Objections to the Filioque and Answers to These Objections.
That the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son appears from the following:
Objection 1. Dionysius writes: “We should not dare to say anything about the existing Deity except what was divinely revealed to us through sacred prophecies” (On Divine Names / Patrologia Graeca. T. 3, 588). But we are not told in Holy Scripture that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; it says only that He proceeds from the Father: "The Spirit of truth, which proceeds from the Father" (John 15-26). Therefore, the Holy Spirit does not come from the Son.
Objection 2. In the Creed of the Council of Constantinople, we read: "We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the Giver of Life, who proceeds from the Father, who is worshiped and glorified with the Father and the Son."
Therefore, in our Symbol, it was not necessary to add that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; it seems that those who made this addition should be excommunicated.
Objection 3. Damascene writes: “We say that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father, and we call Him the Spirit of the Father; but we do not say that the Holy Spirit originated from the Son, although we call Him the Spirit of the Son (Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith / Patrologia Graeca. Vol. 94, 832). Therefore, the Holy Spirit does not come from the Son.
Objection 4. Nothing comes from that in which it continues to be. But the Holy Spirit rests in the Son. In the legend of St. Andrew is told thus: "Peace be to you and to all who believe in one God - the Father, and in His only Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, and in one Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father and indwelling the Son." Therefore, the Holy Spirit does not come from the Son.
Objection 5. The Son originates as the Word. But our breath does not appear to us as coming from our word. Therefore, the Holy Spirit does not come from the Son.
Objection 6. The Holy Spirit is entirely from the Father. Therefore, it is superfluous to assume that He is descended from the Son.
Objection 7. Aristotle says: "The real and the possible in infinite things do not differ" ("Physics"). However, they are different in God. But it is possible for the Holy Spirit to be different from the Son, even if He is not descended from Him. For Anselm of Canterbury says: “The Son and the Holy Spirit have their being from the Father, but each in a different way: one through Birth, the other through Origin, so that they are thereby different from each other” (On the Origin of the Holy Spirit / Patrologia Latina. T. 158, 292). And then he adds: “Even if for no other reason the Son and the Holy Spirit were different, this alone would suffice. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is different from the Son, not proceeding from Him.
Reply to Objection 1. We must not say anything about God that is not in Holy Scripture, either explicitly or implicitly. But although we do not find in it the literally expressed proposition that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, nevertheless we find it concluded in the sense of Scripture, especially where the Son says of the Holy Spirit: "He will glorify Me, because He will take from Mine" (John 16:14). In addition, one must know the rule of Holy Scripture that everything said about the Father applies to the Son even if an exclusive or restrictive term is added to the text. And this rule does not apply only when speaking of the opposing relationship by which the Father and the Son differ from each other. An example of the operation of this rule can be, for example, such words of the Lord: "No one knows the Son except the Father." Despite the presence of the restrictive words "except" and "no one", this phrase does not exclude the idea that the Son knows Himself. Therefore, when we say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, even if “only from the Father” or “from the Father alone” is added, the Son is not excluded by this, since in relation to the cause of the Holy Spirit, the Father and the Son are not opposed in terms of relationship to each other. Their opposing relationship is only that one is the Father and the other the Son.
Reply to Objection 2. At every Church Council, a Symbol is drawn up in order to meet fully armed some error that prevails at a given time, condemned at this Council. Therefore, subsequent Councils should not be considered as constituting a new Symbol. They were explained by some addition, directed against the insurgent heresies, only what was implicitly or obscurely contained in the previous Symbol. Therefore, in the decision of the Council of Chalcedon, it is said that those who gathered at the Council of Constantinople passed on to posterity the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, not considering that there is something insufficient in the teaching of their predecessors who gathered in Nicaea, but explaining, taking into account opposition to heretics, that the fathers of this Council of Constantinople comprehended in this issue. Therefore, since in the age of the ancient Councils the error of those who asserted that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son did not yet arise, there was no need to make any clear declaration on this point. But later, when these errors arose, the question was clearly decided at another Council, namely the Western Council (the Council of Rome under the presidency of Pope Damasus), and it was decided by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority other ancient Councils were convened and affirmed. Nevertheless, it can be said that the same truth is already implicitly contained in the belief that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father.
Reply to Objection 3. The Nestorians were the first to mislead that the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, as is evident from the Nestorian symbol condemned at the Council of Ephesus. This error was accepted by Theodoret, a Nestorian, and after him by several other persons, among whom was also Damascene (Accurate statement of the Orthodox faith. I, 3 / Patrologia Graeca T. 94, 832). Therefore, in this matter, his opinion does not need to be followed. Although some argue that Damascene did not confess the origin of the Holy Spirit from the Son, there is no denial of this in his words either.
Reply to Objection 4. When the Holy Spirit is said to rest in the Son, this does not mean that He does not proceed from Him, for the Son is also said to dwell in the Father, although He proceeds from the Father. The Holy Spirit is said to rest in the Son, as the love of the lover rests in the beloved. Or, as in regard to the human nature of Christ, we are told: “On whom you see the Spirit descending and resting on him, this is the one who baptizes” (John 1:33).
Reply to Objection 5. The word about God is not understood by us in resemblance to a sound word, from which breathing does not proceed, for such an assimilation is only a metaphor, but in resemblance to a mental word, from which love proceeds.
Reply to Objection 6. Since the Holy Spirit is wholly derived from the Father, it is not only not redundant to speak of His origin from the Son, but rather absolutely necessary. Because one power is inherent in the Father, and because everything that is from the Father must also be from the Son, unless it is opposed to the property of sonship, for the Son is not from Himself, although He is from the Father.
Reply to Objection 7. The Holy Spirit is personally different from the Son, because the origin of the one is different from the origin of the other, but the very difference of origin comes from the fact that the Son is only from the Father, while the Holy Spirit is from both the Father and the Son. . For otherwise their origins would not differ from each other, as explained above in this paragraph and in Question 27.
The article is cited from the publication Essays on the History of the Roman Catholic Church. Archpriest Vladimir Rogozhkin. M., 1998. Spiritual Library. Page 158-168
Boethius Anicius Manlius Torquat Severin (480-524) - consul and minister of the Ostrogoth king Theodoric. He translated into Latin and commented on the writings of Aristotle and was himself the author of a number of works on logic, philosophy and theology. In the era of Aquinas, the works of Boethius were the only source on the logic of Aristotle.
“It comes” and “it happens” are the same word in Latin.
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Thomas Aquinas (Aquinas) - one of the prominent thinkers of medieval Europe, philosopher and theologian, Dominican monk, systematizer of medieval scholasticism and the teachings of Aristotle. Born in late 1225 or early 1226 in the castle of Roccasecca, a family castle near Aquino, in the Kingdom of Naples.
Thomas received an excellent education. First, in the Benedictine monastery at Monte Cassino, he takes a course in the classical school, which gave him an excellent knowledge of the Latin language. Then he goes to Naples, where he studies at the university under the guidance of mentors Martin and Peter of Ireland.
In 1244, Aquinas decides to join the Dominican order, refusing the post of abbot of Monte Cassino, which caused a strong protest from the family. Having taken the monastic vows, he went to study at the University of Paris, where he listened to the lectures of Albert Bolstedt, nicknamed Albert the Great, who had a great influence on him. Following Albert, Foma attends lectures at the University of Cologne for four years. During classes, he did not show much activity, rarely took part in disputes, for which his colleagues nicknamed him the Dumb Bull.
Upon his return to the University of Paris, Thomas consistently goes through all the steps necessary to obtain a master's degree in theology and a licentiate, after which he teaches theology in Paris until 1259. The most fruitful period in his life began. He publishes a number of theological works, commentaries on the Holy Scriptures and begins work on the Sum of Philosophy.
In 1259, Pope Urban IV summoned him to Rome, as the Holy See saw in him a person who had to fulfill an important mission for the church, namely, to give an interpretation of "Aristotelianism" in the spirit of Catholicism. Here Thomas completes the Sum of Philosophy, writes other scientific works and begins writing the main work of his life, Sum of Theology.
During this period, he waged a controversy against conservative Catholic theologians, fiercely defending the foundations of the Christian Catholic faith, the defense of which became the main meaning of Aquinas' life.
During a trip to participate in the cathedral convened by Pope Gregory X, which was held in Lyon, he fell seriously ill and died on March 7, 1274 in the Bernardine monastery in Fossanuov.
In 1323, during the pontificate of Pope John XXII, Thomas was canonized. In 1567, he was recognized as the fifth "Doctor of the Church", and in 1879, by a special encyclical of the Pope, the teachings of Thomas Aquinas were declared "the only true philosophy of Catholicism."
Major works
1. "The sum of philosophy" (1259-1269).
2. "The Sum of Theology" (1273).
3. "On the reign of sovereigns."
Key Ideas
The ideas of Thomas Aquinas had a huge impact not only on the development of philosophy and theological science, but also on many other areas of scientific thought. In his works, he combined the philosophy of Aristotle and the dogmas of the Catholic Church into a single whole, gave an interpretation of the forms of government, proposed to provide secular authorities with significant autonomy, while maintaining the dominant position of the Church, drew a clear line between faith and knowledge, created a hierarchy of laws, the highest of which is the divine law.
The basis of the legal theory of Thomas Aquinas is the moral essence of man. It is the moral principle that serves as the source of law. Law, according to Thomas, is the action of justice in the divine order of human community. Aquinas characterizes justice as an unchanging and constant will to give to each his own.
Law is defined by him as a general right for the attainment of an end, a rule by which someone is induced to act or to abstain from it. Taking from Aristotle the division of laws into natural (they are self-evident) and positive (written), Thomas Aquinas supplemented it with a division into human laws (determine the order of social life) and divine (indicate the path to achieving "heavenly bliss").
Human law is a positive law, provided with a compulsory sanction against its violations. Perfect and virtuous people can do without human law, natural law is enough for them, but in order to neutralize vicious people who are not amenable to convictions and instructions, fear of punishment and coercion are necessary. Human (positive) law is only those human institutions that correspond to the natural law (the dictates of the physical and moral nature of man), otherwise these institutions are not law, but only a distortion of the law and deviation from it. This explains the difference between a just human (positive) law and an unjust one.
Positive divine law is the law given to people in divine revelation (in the Old and New Testaments). The Bible teaches what kind of life God considers right for people.
In the treatise "On the Rule of Sovereigns" Thomas Aquinas raises another very important topic: the relationship between church and secular authorities. According to Thomas Aquinas, the highest goal of human society is eternal bliss, but the efforts of the ruler are not enough to achieve it. The concern for this supreme goal rests with the priests, and especially with the vicar of Christ on earth - the pope, to whom all earthly rulers must obey, as to Christ himself. In solving the problem of the relationship between church and secular authorities, Thomas Aquinas departs from the concept of direct theocracy, subordinating the secular authorities to the church, but distinguishing their spheres of influence and granting significant autonomy to the secular authorities.
He is the first to draw a clear line between faith and knowledge. Reason, in his opinion, only provides a justification for the consistency of revelation, faith; objections to them are considered only as probable, not damaging their authority. Reason must be subordinated to faith.
The ideas of Thomas Aquinas about the state are the first attempt to develop the Christian doctrine of the state on the basis of the Aristotelian "Politics".
From Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas adopted the idea that man by nature is a "social and political animal." The desire to unite and live in the state is inherent in people, because the individual alone cannot satisfy his needs. For this natural reason, a political community (the state) arises. The procedure for creating a state is similar to the process of creating the world by God, and the activity of the monarch is similar to the activity of God.
The goal of statehood is the "common good", the provision of conditions for a decent life. According to Thomas Aquinas, the realization of this goal involves the preservation of the feudal-class hierarchy, the privileged position of those in power, the exclusion of artisans, farmers, soldiers and merchants from the sphere of politics, the observance by all of the God-given duty to obey the upper class. In this division, Aquinas also follows Aristotle and argues that these different categories of workers are necessary for the state by virtue of its nature, which, in his theological interpretation, turns out to be, in the final analysis, the realization of the laws of Providence.
The protection of the interests of the papacy and the foundations of feudalism by the methods of Thomas Aquinas gave rise to certain difficulties. For example, the logical interpretation of the apostolic thesis “all power is from God” allowed for the possibility of the absolute right of secular feudal lords (kings, princes and others) to govern the state, that is, it allowed this thesis to be turned against the political ambitions of the Roman Catholic Church. In an effort to lay the foundation for the intervention of the clergy in the affairs of the state and to prove the superiority of spiritual power over secular, Thomas Aquinas introduced and substantiated three elements of state power:
1) essence;
2) form (origin);
3) use.
The essence of power is the order of relations of domination and subordination, in which the will of those at the top of the human hierarchy moves the lower strata of the population. This order is set by God. Thus, in its primordial essence, power is a divine institution. Therefore, it is always something good, good. Concrete ways of its origin (more precisely, taking possession of it), certain forms of its organization can sometimes be bad, unfair. Thomas Aquinas does not exclude situations in which the use of state power degenerates into abuse of it: “So, if a multitude of free people is directed by the ruler to the common good of this multitude, this rule is direct and just, which befits free people. If the government is directed not to the common good of the multitude, but to the personal good of the ruler, this government is unjust and perverse. Consequently, the second and third elements of power in the state sometimes turn out to be devoid of the seal of divinity. This happens when a ruler either comes to the helm of power through unrighteous means or rules unjustly. Both are the result of the violation of the commandments of God, the dictates of the Roman Catholic Church as the only authority on earth representing the will of Christ.
As far as the actions of the ruler deviate from the will of God, as far as they contradict the interests of the church, so subjects have the right, from the point of view of Thomas Aquinas, to resist these actions. The ruler who rules contrary to the laws of God and the principles of morality, who exceeds his competence, intruding, for example, into the area of the spiritual life of people or imposing excessively heavy taxes on them, turns into a tyrant. Since the tyrant cares only about his own benefit and does not want to know the common good, tramples on laws and justice, the people can rise up and overthrow him. However, the final decision on the admissibility of extreme methods of combating tyranny belongs, as a general rule, to the church, the papacy.
Thomas Aquinas considered the Republic a state paving the way to tyranny, a state torn apart by the struggle of parties and groups.
He distinguished tyranny from monarchy, which he regarded as the best form of government. He preferred the monarchy for two reasons. Firstly, in view of its similarity with the universe in general, arranged and led by one god, and also because of its similarity to the human body, the various parts of which are united and directed by one mind. “So one governs better than many, because they are only getting closer to becoming one. Moreover, what exists by nature is arranged in the best way, because nature in each individual case acts in the best way, and the general government in nature is carried out by one. After all, the bees have one king, and in the whole universe there is one God, the creator of everything and the ruler. And this is reasonable. Verily, every multitude comes from one.” Secondly, as a result of historical experience, which demonstrates (as the theologian was convinced) the stability and prosperity of those states where one, and not many, ruled.
Trying to solve the problem of delimiting the competence of secular and church authorities, which was relevant for that time, Thomas Aquinas substantiated the theory of the autonomy of authorities. The secular power should control only the external actions of people, and the church power - their souls. Thomas envisaged ways of interaction between these two authorities. In particular, the state should help the church in the fight against heresy.
[lat. theologia naturalis], a term that outlines a special area of philosophical and theological reflections and research, a common characteristic feature of which is the recognition as a starting fact that every person naturally (naturaliter), that is, by virtue of his very being a man, possesses some true knowledge of God, or at least is able to possess such knowledge. The content of E. t. in a broad sense is the whole set of experiences of comprehending, systematizing and defining the boundaries of natural knowledge of God in its difference from knowledge about God acquired with the help of divine Revelation. In a narrow sense, E. t. is understood as a section of theoretical theology, within the framework of to-rogo traditions. theological questions concerning God, the world, and man are resolved primarily with the help of rational-philosophical reasoning, which does not imply an appeal to divinely revealed truths. The main theological themes, during the development of which the historical deployment of E. t.
Throughout the centuries of development of the ideas of E. t., it received various names and designations. In lat. The philosophical and theological tradition of E. t. was defined as “theologia physica” (natural theology), “theologia philosophica” (philosophical theology), “theologia mundana” (secular theology), “theologia rationalis” (rational theology). In accordance with this, additional characteristic features of E. t. are distinguished, which, however, often overly narrow the boundaries of this concept, reducing E. t. to only one of its historical manifestations. Some researchers are trying to derive the definition of E. t. from the concept of “pure reason”, considering only the data of non-presuppositional thinking related to the field of its study. However, the question remains whether it is possible, under this condition, to obtain at all c.-l. knowledge about God. Others see the "center" of E. T. in an attempt to build convincing evidence of the existence of God, recognizing the most important function of E. T. apologetic, that is, the function of rational support of certain religions. beliefs (Barr. 1993. P. 2-3). In this regard, even definitions of E. t. are proposed, taking as a basis precisely this direction of it; for example, W. Alston defined E. t. as “an attempt to provide support for religious beliefs by accepting as starting points provisions that are not religious beliefs and are not related to them” (Alston WP Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Ithaca ; L., 1991. P. 289).
The possibility of a different understanding of “naturalness” itself, which is rooted in the difference in the initial interpretation of the concept of “nature” within the framework of religions, has a serious impact on the branching of ideas about E. t. consciousness and beyond. For Christianity, the nature of man is a creation of God, although distorted as a result of the fall, it has retained the abilities and talents laid down in him by God. In this sense, the "natural abilities" of a person can be interpreted as "original grace", which removes the sharpness of the opposition of nature and grace, natural and supernatural. The lack of a single and generally accepted definition of E. t. Offenbarungstheologie: Ein theologiegeschichtlicher Überblick // NZSTh 1961 Bd 3 S 279-295)
The origins of the rational approach to knowledge of God, characteristic of E. t., can be traced already in antiquity. Pointing to the limitations of human abilities and the inaccessibility for a fallen person of the fullness of the knowledge of God before the coming of Christ, Christianity at the same time recognizes that certain elements of knowledge about God could be available even within the framework of ancient pagan religions to those who actively sought such knowledge of God, including on the ways of rational comprehension of the surrounding world. This approach is confirmed by the words of the Book of Wisdom of Solomon: “Truly all people who had no knowledge of God, who, from visible perfections, could not know Jehovah and, looking at deeds, did not know the Creator ... if they could understand so much that they were able to explore the temporary world, why did they not immediately find its Lord? (Wis 13. 1-9), as well as the testimony of ap. Paul, who spoke of the Gentiles: “What can be known about God is clear to them, because God has shown them. For His invisible, His eternal power and Divinity, from the creation of the world through the consideration of creatures are visible, so that they are unanswerable ”(Rom 1. 19-20; cf. also: Acts 14. 17). In this regard, the so-called natural knowledge of God acquires special significance in the historical development of natural knowledge of God. philosophical theology of antiquity, i.e., the totality of ideas about the divine, inspired by non-religious. by the views of their authors, but by certain philosophical prerequisites formed in the course of attempts to theoretically comprehend the world.
Within the actual Christ. a theology based on the idea of divine Revelation, but emphasizing the need for active human efforts to assimilate it, including efforts of an intellectual nature, the boundaries between the content of E. t. and revealed theology were often quite mobile. The main criterion for distinguishing them is seen in the fact that E. t., which had an apologetic character in its initial orientation, proceeded and should have proceeded not from Revelation, but from some real and rational data available to every person, and only in the end led to the content revealed knowledge, but did not provide its completeness. At the same time, the starting point of E. t. divine prototype. On the contrary, revealed theology proceeded from the testimonies of St. Scriptures and Traditions of the Church, from the living and direct experience of church life, only as needed, turning to rational argumentation. Thus, in Christianity, the content of E. t. has traditionally been regarded as a kind of propaedeutics for frank (theologia revelata) and mystical knowledge of God (theologia mystica).
E. t. has gone through several significant stages in its historical development. An important organizing milestone is the emergence of E. t. as a relatively autonomous theological discipline (in Western Christianity). One of the earliest evidence of this is written ca. 1330 Nicholas Bonet treatise "Natural Theology" (Theologia naturalis). On the whole, the history of the development of E. t. .
Although Christ. tradition of E. t. is the main one, comparative studies make it possible to find correspondences to it in other monotheistic traditions, primarily in Muslim kalam (in the VIII-IX centuries within the framework of the teachings of the Mutazilites, from the XI century - Asharis, from the XII century - Arabic-speaking peripatetics , followers of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd) and from some Jewish authors (Maimonides). Mn. elements of E. t. can be traced beyond the limits of monotheism, for example. in Neoplatonism or in Indian Ishwaravada (mainly in Nyaya, partly in Vedanta and classical yoga).
Lit.: Swinburne R. The Existence of God. Oxf., 1979; Faith and Rationality: Reason Belief in God / Ed.: A. Plantinga, N. Wolterstorff. Notre Dame (Ind.), 1983; Schröder W. Religion bzw. Theologie, natürliche bzw. vernünftige // Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie / Hrsg.: J. Ritter, K. Gründer. Basel, 1992. Bd. 8. S. 714-727; Barr J. Biblical Faith and Natural Theology. Oxf., 1993; Sparn W. Natürliche Theologie // TRE. 1994. Bd. 24. S. 85-98; Pailin D. A. Natural Theology // Companion Encyclopedia of Theology / Ed.: L. Houlden. L., 1995. P. 388-412; Shokhin V. K. Intercultural natural theology and Indian physical and theological arguments // Bulletin of the Russian Philosophical Society. 2007. No. 3. S. 112-116.
V. K. Shokhin
E. t. in antiquity
The word "theology" (θεολοϒία) - Greek. origin and literally means a story, a story about the gods, being formed from the words θεός (god) and λόϒος (speech, word). Initially in ancient culture Dr. Greece "theology" was called that in present. time is defined as "mythology" - an oral and written tradition about the gods, telling about their origin, deeds, metamorphoses, relationships to each other and to people. It was precisely such “theological stories”, along with certain rituals and mystery practices, that constituted the main content of the traditions. Greek religion. Since such content remained very flexible and, unlike the content of Christianity and other monotheistic religions, it was never rigidly dogmatized, it was open to all sorts of modifications and attempts at reinterpretation and original understanding, including philosophical. As a consequence of this, from the moment of the origin of ancient Greek. philosophy in the writings of the pre-Socratics, many began to be problematized in it. questions, to-rye retrospectively can be attributed to the content of E. t. The philosophical thought of the pre-Socratics was Ch. arr. aimed at the knowledge of "nature" (φύσις), and this knowledge was understood very broadly. The most important task of the early Greek. philosophy was an explanation of the origin (or creation) of the world, its necessary orderliness, the origin of life, the nature of man and his soul, etc. All these topics have already been appropriately interpreted by the Greek. religious mytho-poetic consciousness, therefore, the philosophical intuitions of the pre-Socratics were often built in the form of a controversy with traditions. theological explanations of the world and what is happening in it (see: Vlastos. 1952. P. 97-99). At the same time, although the pre-Socratics tried to give not a mythological, but a philosophical answer to key questions about the universe, although they tried to proceed not from religions. traditions, and from the data of direct observations and their analysis, their answers very often have an obvious theological coloring and, therefore, set a new theological dimension, where the divine principle is not comprehended as something given, but is constituted in a special way in the process of philosophical reflection. It is this focus on the rational constitution of the divine that allows us to speak of ancient Greek. philosophical E. t. as about something different from “everyday” religions. the theology of the Greeks. The word "god" (θεός) itself is used in the writings of the Pre-Socratics even more often than the word "nature" (see index DK). Presocratics are characterized by a sharp rejection of tradition. religious values of the Greeks: for example, Xenophanes criticized the theology of Homer and Hesiod (DK. 21B11, 12), Heraclitus besides this (see: DK. 22B40) spoke derogatoryly about the traditions. Greek mysteries and sacrifices, which he called "impious" and "mad" (DK. 22B14; B5). As an alternative to the "gods" of mythology, pl. the pre-Socratics proposed the concept of a special "philosophical" god, which they often identified with nature as a whole. According to Aristotle, Xenophanes, "turning his eyes to the whole sky, claimed that the one is God" (Arist. Met. 986b 24). Heraclitus proposed an original philosophical doctrine of the god-logos, knowledge of which is available only to a philosopher on the paths of mental activity. According to the doxographer Aetius, Parmenides identified God with a motionless and homogeneous being, the doctrine of which he developed in the poem "On Nature" (DK. 28A31). At the same time, knowledge of such a god was often presented as a “divine revelation” (Compare: DK. 22B50; 28B1 [Art.] 22), so that the idea of E. t. (and above all - a clear recognition of the very possibility of achieving true knowledge about God through the mental efforts of man) were developed by them quite carefully and developed in the subsequent Greek. philosophy, where, starting with Plato, philosophical reflection on the "divine principle" was brought to a qualitatively new level.
Plato
in the dialogue "State" (Plat. Resp. II 379a 5), following the tradition, he used the word "theology" to describe the stories and myths about the gods created by the epic and meli poets Dr. Greece - Homer, Hesiod, Pindar. He criticized these myths on the grounds that they depict the gods in an inappropriate way: as doing reprehensible acts, creating injustices and being the source of all kinds of disasters both for each other and for mortals. Wishing to expel such ideas from the ideal state, the philosopher proposed to establish a kind of “models of theology” (τύποι περ θεολοϒίας), i.e. rules by which myth-creating poets should be guided when writing stories about the gods. The proposed rules should be based on a philosophical understanding of the nature of God as a good, just, unchanging and completely blissful being. Based on this understanding, Plato ordered the poets to depict the gods as the givers of all kinds of blessings, not to blame them for evil, but to present all their actions towards people as fair and beneficial to people (Ibid. 379d - 380c), and also to refuse to attribute to the gods all kinds of transformations, since a simple and being in the best condition cannot change its appearance and introduce people into deception in words or deeds (Ibid. 383a). According to Plato, only that theology, which is guided by these rules, could be called true. Thus, the mytho-poetic and mystical Greek. theology (which, nevertheless, is often reflected in the myths set forth by Plato in various dialogues, both traditional and his own), is contrasted with a kind of idealized E. t., which is essentially a theoretical construction of an “ideal god” by means of reason.
Aristotle
He also ranked among theologians the most ancient myth-creating poets - Homer, Hesiod, etc. However, he tried to reinterpret the "theology" contained in their writings from the v. sp. E. t. as a reasonable doctrine of the divine cause of things. According to Aristotle, poets used stories about the gods to tell about the causes of eternal and transient things. They called Oceanus and Tethys the originators of the birth, implying that everything came from water (Arist. Met. I 3. 983b 30); or they deduced the origin of everything from Night, understanding by "night" a chaotic mixture of things in which it is impossible to distinguish anything separately (Ibid. XII 6. 1071b 27). In the words of Hesiod about nectar and ambrosia, which make the gods immortal, Aristotle saw an attempt to explain the existence of eternal and transient things in the world (Ibid. III 4. 1000a 9), and in the lengthy genealogies of the gods cited by him - a general philosophical idea of an endless chain of causes and effects in the physical world (Ibid. XII 10. 1075b 26). Thus, the philosopher did not reject traditions. Greek mythology, but offered its rationalistic explanation, believing that behind the images of the gods there is an indication of the natural causes of the emergence and destruction of things. Aristotle considered the lack of evidence to be a disadvantage of such a “theological” approach to explaining phenomena: “The followers of Hesiod and all theologians thought only about persuasiveness for themselves, but they didn’t care much about us ... their explanations through these reasons (i.e. through the gods. - Auth.) beyond our understanding” (Ibid. III 4. 1000a 9-15). Therefore, following Plato, as opposed to the theology of myth-making poets, he proposed the theology of philosophers, which should be theoretical and rigorous, i.e. based on evidence, science.
In Metaphysics, when classifying theoretical sciences, the subject of the “first philosophy” (which is essentially the Aristotelian version of natural, or philosophical, theology) is defined as follows: this is the doctrine of an eternal, immovable and existing entity separate from matter (Ibid. VI 1. 1026a 10-20). Since such an essence is something divine, the science that studies it must naturally bear the name of the science of the divine, that is, theology. It is noteworthy that Aristotle obtained the definition of the subject of theology as a result of an analysis of the subjects of two other theoretical sciences: physics and mathematics. The 1st, according to him, studies things that exist independently and are motionless. The 2nd, on the contrary, deals with things, although they are motionless, but do not exist separately, but only in a certain swarm of matter. As a result, objects that exist separately from matter and are motionless are not covered. Therefore, if such subjects exist, then there must be a theoretical discipline that studies them, namely theology. The latter, in comparison with mathematics and physics, is the first and highest knowledge, because: firstly, it deals with the best and most worthy kind of being (Ibidem); secondly, it contains the beginnings of all other sciences, since it investigates the first and main cause of everything that exists (Ibid. XI 7. 1064b 1); thirdly, it is the most accurate kind of knowledge, since it can prove what other sciences accept as unprovable premises; finally, fourthly, it provides a rationale for the essence and being of the subject of study, answering the question of what it is and whether it exists, while other sciences take the essence and existence of the subject as initially given, proving only what is inherent in it as such ( Ibid. VI 1. 1025b 8-18).
Like any theoretical science, theology is knowledge based on evidence, and its content should be the necessary truths about the divine nature, obtained with the help of syllogisms on the basis of positions that are self-evident to the senses or reason. As the first and highest of the theoretical sciences, theology must not only establish the properties of its object, but also give a justification for its existence, i.e., prove that an eternal, immovable and separate entity from matter really exists. This kind of proof is given in the XII book. "Metaphysics" and VIII book. "Physics", where Aristotle postulated the need to admit the existence of God as a result of the search for the ultimate cause of world movement. Having answered the question whether there is a God, theology turns to the question of what He is, that is, to the elucidation of the necessary attributes of the divine essence. The latter can be directly derived from the fact that God is the eternal, immovable and separate from matter mover of the world. From the immaterial nature of the divine nature, it follows that God is pure reality, completely devoid of possibility, as well as pure form, which has reached full realization (Ibid. XII 7. 1072a 26). His stillness testifies to His immutability and simplicity, and also to the fact that he moves as an object of desire and goal, because only in this way can one be set in motion while remaining motionless (Ibid. 1072b 1-5). Since the goal is usually called that which seems good and beautiful to the mind, then God is something that seems good and beautiful to the mind. But only thinking can be like that, which means that God is a contemplative Mind. Since the most perfect subject of thought is God himself, His thought should be directed not to the knowledge of something external, but to Himself. As a result, Aristotle came to the conclusion that God is the eternal non-material activity of the Mind, knowing itself. Since the activity of the Mind is life, and the best, the resulting definition of the divine nature is in full agreement with the definitions given to God by previous philosophers, in particular Plato: “God is the eternal and best living being, which has life and uninterrupted eternal existence” ( Ibid. 25-30).
Stoics
considered the doctrine of the divine as one of the sections of physics, meaning by "physics" (φυσικὸν λόϒον) that part of philosophy, which is engaged in the study of the sensually perceived cosmos with all its contents, including people and gods. Thus, according to Chrysippus, the subject of the physical part of philosophy is "the cosmos and that which is in it" (SVF. Bd. 2. Fragm. 35). According to Stoic ideas, theology is the doctrine of the organizing and ruling principle of the universe, and this principle can be designated as God. Unlike other sections of "physics", it focused not on the study of individual natural processes and parts of the cosmos, but only on finding their agreement and expediency, as well as on the desire to discover providential design in everything (see: Algra. 2003. P. 153 -179).
Against the extremes, to which Berengaria reached in his passion for the logical method, the influential theologian Lanfranc, archbishop. Canterbury. Although Lanfranc did not deny the usefulness of logic, including in theology, he opposed its indiscriminate application to the sacraments of faith. Logical arguments, according to Lanfranc, are only one of the ways of argumentation; another stronger way remains a direct appeal to the text of the Holy. Scriptures.
Anselm, archbishop Canterbury, a student of Lanfranc, was convinced that a person has 2 sources of knowledge: faith and reason. Faith should be the starting point in the search for truth: "I do not try to understand in order to believe, but I believe in order to understand" (Anselmus. Proslog. 1 // PL. 158. Col. 227). In contrast to the extreme dialecticians, he defended the primacy of faith and refused to subordinate the Holy. Scripture to the dialectic mind. However, according to Anselm, once a Christian is established in the faith, he can legitimately try to understand what he believes. Anselm considered it possible to prove the necessity of the Trinity and the Incarnation, while warning that logically proving the necessity of these sacraments does not mean fully knowing them. The specific fruit of Anselm's rational theology was the development of the first in the app. Christianity of the proof of the existence of God and the rational doctrine of divine attributes based on it. The purpose of this proof, according to Anselm, is to give the already firm believer an understanding of the truth that God exists. But the evidence, taken by itself, is able to convince the unbeliever, that is, they have the power of a full-fledged logical argument. Based on the proof of the existence of God, Anselm developed the doctrine of the Divine attributes, or properties. According to Anselm, it can be deduced from the concept of God that He is the highest Being, that is, the fullness of being. This is also the source of Divine omnipotence, simplicity, eternity, immutability, etc. But this productivity reveals itself only if a person, regardless of the argument itself, already has an idea of what exactly God is as the greatest being.
Bud contributed a lot. organizing theology into a science the theologian and logician Peter Abelard. He recognized that the human mind is unable to fully comprehend the mysteries of faith. Abelard's influence on the development of E. t. was expressed in the fact that he determined that ideal of the technical and intellectual rigor of theological studies, which was fully realized in the doctrinal syntheses of the next period. A concrete example of the application of logical constructions to the knowledge of God can serve as Abelard's doctrine of universals in the Divine intellect. According to Abelard, these universals are different from those general concepts that form the human intellect through sensory experience, just as a cause differs from an effect. Being the source and formal basis of the similarity of created things, the universals in the Divine mind, i.e., the ideas of things, turn out to be at the same time the formal means by which God can comprehend each individual thing created by Him.
In the XII century. the Chartres school of theology was formed, the focus of which was the study of nature and the development of cosmological concepts. Its representative Gilbert Porretansky in the doctrine of God relied on the concepts of Boethius and formulated the basic concepts of his own E. t. . According to Hilbert, God is a pure essence (essentia), everything else receives its essence from Him, and therefore the divine essence is the being of all creatures. But nothing that God creates is pure being: every creature is a composite being, which breaks down into “what is” (id quod est) and proper “being” (esse). The divine essence communicates itself to creations, endowing them with being through their generic essences (corporality, animality, etc.). In God Himself, His essence and divinity are one and the same. Theodoric of Chartres taught about God as the threefold cause of the universe. At the same time, he established the relationship between those designations of the beginning, which are accepted in natural knowledge of God, and the names of Divine Persons: God is the producing (Father), formal (Son, God's wisdom) and target (Holy Spirit, God's goodness) cause of the world. Clarembald of Arras, a student of Theodoric, believed that the main object of theological knowledge is God as form and act. God is an absolute form and, consequently, an absolute act: not an act of something, but simply an "act". Pure and absolute actuality has a necessary character, which means it is unchanging and eternal. In this perspective, Clarembald also understood the meaning of the divine name "Being": God is a "form of being", not involved in anything. From this the doctrine of the divine attributes comprehended in a natural way is derived: absolute unity and omnipresence. Pure actual being means pure unity, therefore plurality is always outside God. God is omnipresent because He is the absolute form and is present wherever Ph.D. the form. As wherever there is whiteness, there is a form of white, so wherever there is something, there is a form of being. Therefore, God is present everywhere, and in this sense He is the form of all things.
Alan of Lille made an attempt to completely renew the method of theology and directly prove the basic philosophical truths leading to the acceptance of Christ. faith. Based on the peculiarly interpreted provisions of the treatise of Boethius "On the Trinity", he believed that theology can and should be built by means of a deductive method from predetermined terms and axioms. Alan's methodological principles were most fully expressed in the treatise "The Art of the Catholic Faith" (Alanus de Insulis. De arte seu articulis catholicae fidei // PL. 210. Col. 593-618), which is similar in structure to a treatise on geometry and contains terms, postulates, axioms, proofs. The purpose of the treatise is to demonstrate to unbelievers that the arguments of reason with all their might testify to the truth of Christianity. Alan taught that the soul is by nature innate with theological maxims, directly obvious propositions. The first theological maxim defines the Monad, that is, God: “The Monad is that through which every thing is one” (Idem. Regula theologiae // Ibid. Col. 623). Proceeding from this, Alan developed the theology of the One, unfolding it as a doctrine of 3 levels of being: “heavenly”, to which God corresponds as absolute Unity; “heavenly”, to which angels correspond, at this level otherness and variability appear; "celestial", to-rum corresponds to the world of bodies and multiplicity. Being the beginning and at the same time the end of everything, the divine Monad is likened to a circle. To give an idea of this paradoxical divine reality, Alan used the well-known formula: "God is an infinite sphere, the center of which is everywhere, and the circumference is nowhere" (Ibid. Col. 627).
One of the most prominent representatives of the Saint-Victor Abbey school, Hugh of Saint-Victor, proposed the division of theology into 2 parts: mystical and philosophical. In the treatise "Didaskalikon" (Hugo Vict. Didascalicon // PL. 176. Col. 739-838) he talked about philosophical theology (theologia, philosophia intellictibilis, philosophia divinalis) as one of the theoretical philosophical disciplines; it enters this highest category of philosophical knowledge along with mathematics and physics. The goal of philosophical theology, like other theoretical disciplines, is the search and acquisition of truth, and the path leading to this goal is the natural light of reason and systematic training, which is based on traditions. "free arts" trivium and quadrivium.
E. t. in classical scholasticism
In the beginning. 13th century an influential Franciscan school of theology emerges. The early Franciscans sought to create a theological-philosophical synthesis, focusing on the general spirit of the original Augustinism. One of the first representatives of Franciscan thought, Bonaventure, developed many topics E. t. within the general doctrine of God the Creator. The main areas of Bonaventure's research in this area were: the philosophical justification of creation, an attempt to build an analogy between God and the things He created, the interpretation of God as the cause and model for creations. Bonaventure believed that it was possible to prove the absurdity of the eternal existence of the world and rationally justify its creation. The entire existence of the world depends on God and needs the sustaining action of a divine cause at every moment. God Himself is a pure form of light; creations are also based on the primary form of light, which is similar to divine light and represents the beginning of activity in bodies, the source of their initial energy. Ideas, according to which God creates creations, do not really differ from Himself. The difference between ideas and God Himself arises only in our way of thinking and naming ideas. More precisely, ideas are those possible ways in which creatures are able to imitate the perfection of God.
Thomas Aquinas is the central figure of this period. In The Sum of Theology, he was the first to clearly distinguish between 2 kinds of theology: philosophical theology, or "divine science" (scientia divina), and divinely revealed theology, or "sacred teaching" (sacra doctrina). 1st enjoys the natural light of the mind; The 2nd, more sublime and perfect, refers to the light of divine Revelation: “All things are spoken of in philosophical disciplines, including God; therefore, one of the parts of philosophy is called theology, or divine science ... But nothing forbids that the same things about which the philosophical disciplines treat in accordance with the fact that they can be known by the natural light of reason, were also treated by another science, in accordance with the fact that they can be known by the light of divine Revelation. Therefore, the theology belonging to the sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology, which is supposed to be part of philosophy ”(Thom. Aquin. Sum. th. I 1. 1). The subject matter of both theologies is somewhat the same. Both explore the divine being, but the adequate subject of revealed theology are those truths about God that are learned from Revelation, and only from it (for example, the truth about the Incarnation, about Jesus Christ as the Savior, etc.); the subject of philosophical theology are those truths which, although they relate to the divine being and belong to the content of Revelation, can also be known apart from Revelation, thanks to the natural light of reason alone (God as the beginning and cause of the world, the infinity and simplicity of the divine essence and etc.). Thus, Thomas Aquinas first approved E. t. as a science in the Aristotelian sense of the word. According to him, E. t. is the highest speculative science, which has its own subject, which is different from the subjects of other sciences both in content and formally. It uses its own adequate method of studying the subject (ascent by analogy from created effects to the divine root cause) and is built as a sequence of true statements, each of which can be rationally justified.
According to the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, it is impossible to directly ascend in thought from creations to the inner essence of God, because the human intellect is incommensurable with the infinity of Divine being. The only way of knowledge of God available to man is the way of analogy. God is a pure and simple act of being; in Him essence and existence coincide. On the contrary, creatures have being only through participation in Divine being - insofar as God endows them with being. In created things, the essence, being their own property, is different from existence, which is a gift of the Divine First Cause and is accepted according to the perceiving ability of each specific creation. Thomas Aquinas calls this relationship between the original Divine source of all being and the being of creatures analogia entis (the analogy of being). Accordingly, the knowledge of God within the boundaries of E. t. is also possible only by analogy between the created effects and the Divine cause.
The concept of E. t. as a science was established in the Thomistic school of the XIV-XV centuries. A vivid example of serious attention to the issues of E. t. language in the 2nd floor. 16th century Raimund built a system of sciences, relying primarily on the inner psychological experience of the subject. In his opinion, the testimony of a person's own consciousness is the best argument in the search for truth about divine things and gives rise to such a deep inner confidence that it cannot be shaken. However, unlike Thomas Aquinas and many others. other authors Raimund refused to separate revealed and philosophical theology as different sciences. Seeing in man a link between the natural and the supernatural, Raymond erased the boundary between the two theological sciences and considered it possible for a person to directly come through the study of himself and his nature to the knowledge of the deepest secrets of Revelation.
Following. such a radical expansion of the field of application of E. t., she gradually began to have new opponents, reminiscent of the limited abilities of the human mind. Thus, according to Durand of Saint-Pourcin, any kind of theology is not a science, and the provisions of faith are not the foundations of science. Theology relies solely on faith in Revelation; dogmatic propositions are not rational and cannot be reduced to self-evident principles. Faith has nothing to do with a priori knowledge, nor with knowledge gained from experience. The subject of theology always has a supernatural character and therefore cannot be investigated by man with the help of his natural cognitive faculty. In the state of a "wanderer" a person is called to follow the Holy. Scripture, which speaks the language of metaphors and teaches not so much knowledge as moral teaching.
William of Ockham also denied the status of science to both types of theology for the reason that theology is based on faith and authority, and not reasonable evidence (Guillielmus de Ockham. Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Prol. 7 // Idem. Opera theologica. NY, 1967. Vol.1) Science in the proper sense is knowledge based on evidence. Since in relation to God man cannot achieve such evidence, Occam denied the possibility of rationally proving the existence of God. According to Occam, the certainty that there is a God is entirely based on faith in Revelation and obedience to the authority of St. Scripture, but not on evidence. It can be shown that in every series of causes operating in the created world there must be some first cause; but it cannot be proved that this first cause necessarily lies outside the created world itself (Idem. Quodlibeta septem. 1. 1 // Ibid. 1980. Vol. 9). It logically follows from this that it is impossible to substantiate the presence of c.-l. in a rational scientific way. attributes in God. Thanks to the natural mind, we can only know 2 attributes of God - His wisdom and His goodness, since they are revealed to our mind as the universal attributes of existence. All other divine attributes are known only by faith (Idem. Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. I 2. 1 // Ibid. Vol. 1).
E. t. in the period of the "second scholasticism" (XVI-XVII centuries)
The beginning of a new flowering of Thomistic E. t. is associated with the names of the Dominican theologian Kard. Cayetana and Francesco Ferrari, major commentators on Thomas Aquinas. Both commentators systematized and significantly revised Thomas's teaching on analogy. According to Cajetanus (Cajetanus. De nominum analogia. De conceptu entis / Ed. N. Zammit. R., 1934), there are 3 types of analogy: analogy of inequality (analogia inaequalitatis), analogy of attribution (analogia attributionis) and analogy of proportionality (analogia proportionalitatis) . The first two kinds are improper analogies, and only the last kind is an analogy in the proper sense. It is to this that the analogy of being belongs. It establishes a proportional relationship between the Divine being and the being of creatures (created being relates to the essence of each creature in the same way that uncreated being relates to the essence of God) and allows the concept of being to be used in relation to God and creatures, while at the same time preserving the transcendence of the Divine being. Cajetan and Ferrari marked the beginning of one of the two powerful currents in Thomism of the 16th-17th centuries. The followers of this trend were Ch. arr. Italian Dominicans, and the main genre is comments on the texts of Thomas Aquinas.
Dr. the current was represented by the Spanish Jesuits, whose influence increased significantly after the Council of Trent. Peru of the Jesuits owns the first systematic treatises on metaphysics, the crown of which was called to be E. t. The Spanish Jesuit F. Suarez in the monumental treatise Metaphysical Reasonings Parisiis, 1861. Vol. 25-26) formulated the methodological principles and main provisions of E. t. causes of existence in general. Yielding primacy to beings as such in the logical order of predication, Divine beings remain unconditionally first in the ontological order (Disputationes metaphysicae. 1-2). As absolutely transcendent to creation, it cannot be known in the usual way, on the basis of various kinds of causes operating within the created world. Therefore, Suárez, because of his physical nature, rejects the Aristotelian and Thomistic way of proving the existence of God through movement, which corresponds to the principle "everything that moves, is moved by another", and asserts instead the metaphysical principle "everything that is produced is produced by another" (Disputationes metaphysicae. 29.1.20). According to Suarez, the Divine being is one of the 2 primary modes of being in general, namely, being simple, beginningless, infinite, measureless, perfect, unchanging; he is opposed by a created being that does not possess any of the listed attributes (Ibid. 28). Each of these properties of the Divine essence is subject to strict rational justification: if E. t. is a part of metaphysics, i.e., the highest of the speculative sciences, it must be able to confirm each of its provisions in accordance with the requirements for this category of sciences. Thus, Suarez tried to elevate E. t. to the level of rigor that the era of the new natural science and mathematics aspired to. He managed to realize his plan, avoiding immersion in fruitless logicism, since the natural knowledge of God grows in him from the ontology of the created world, accessible to observation and assimilation in sensory experience.
Among the representatives of the next generation of theologians and philosophers, the treatises on E. t. gradually lost their leading position and took the form of a brief supplement to the extensive "Courses" on general philosophy. The content of E. t. as a part of metaphysics began to be limited to the analytical derivation of certain characteristics of the Divine essence from its formal concept: for example, from the definition of the Divine essence as a being in itself, not dependent on anything else, its attributes are derived, as eternity, immutability, actual existence, etc., included in the essential concept of the first being. Another common theme of this metaphysical theology was the question of whether the Divine being can be classified as a substance, or whether God should be placed outside the categorical divisions of being. The discussion of such questions was carried out in accordance with the tried and tested method of rational metaphysics, that is, the method based on the logical analysis of concepts.
Lit.: Berthaud A. Gilbert de la Porrée, évêque de Poitiers, et sa philosophie. Poitiers, 1892; Baumgartner M. Die Philosophie des Alanus de Insulis im Zusammenhang den Anschauungen des 12. Jh. dargestellt. Münster, 1896; Heitz Th. Essai historique sur les rapports entre la philosophie et la foi de Bérenger de Tours a S. Thomas d "Aquin. P., 1909; Cottiaux J. La conception de la théologie chez Abélard // RHE. 1932. T. 28. P. 247-295, 533-551, 788-828 Giacon C Guiglielmo di Occam Mil 1941 2 vol idem La seconda scolastica Mil 1946 2 vol Kleinz J The Theory of Knowledge of Hugh of Saint-Victor. Wash., 1944; Moretti-Costanzi T. L "ascesi di coscienza el" argomento di S. Anselmo. R., 1951; Di Vona P. Studi sulla scolastica della controriforma. Firenze, 1968; Andr é s M. La teología española en el siglo XVI. Madrid, 1976. 2 vol.; Piclin M. Philosophie et théologie chez St. Thomas d "Aquin, P., 1983; Wolter A. B. The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus. Ithaca (N. Y.), 1990; Riva F. Analogia e univocita in Tommaso de Vio. Mil., 1995; Walz M. D. Theological and Philosophical Dependencies in St. Bonaventure "s Argument against an Eternal World and a Brief Thomistic Reply // American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. 1998. Vol. 72. N 1. P. 75-98; Gilson E. Thomism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas: Per from French M., St. Petersburg, 2000, aka Philosophy in the Middle Ages, M., 2004, Berger D. Thomismus: Grosse Leitmotive der Thomistischen Synthese, Köln, 2001, Shmonin D. V. Focus of Metaphysics: The Order of Being and Experience of Cognition in the Philosophy of Francisco Suarez, St. Petersburg, 2002.
G. V. Vdovina
E. t. in the period of modern and recent times
Starting from the early modern times, in the general context of inter-confessional polemics, the discussion of questions about the subject, method, sources, and place of E. t. from the other side.
Thematization of E. t. in the 17th century.
Despite the fact that J. Calvin directly denied the importance of E. t., believing that the inner evidence of the human spirit is quite sufficient for the knowledge of God, the Calvinist was the first to discuss the problems of E. t. school philosophy in the person of I. G. Alsted (1588-1638). In his treatise Natural Theology (Theologia naturalis, 1623) and in a number of other writings, Alsted (in contrast to Catholic theologians) separated ET from metaphysics, without at the same time separating it from philosophy as a whole. The subjective source of knowledge for E. t. is the natural light of reason (lumen naturae), and the objective source is the order of the created world, the “book of nature” (liber naturae); it relies on elements of the teachings of the Bible accessible to rational discernment, but at the core of Christ. the mysterious teaching (mysteria) must not and cannot enter. It has a necessary and feasible propaedeutic task for it - to help prepare the mind for the perception of supernatural theology, to lead the mind to an understanding of Scripture, thereby preparing a person for the perception of divine grace and to serve as a source of argument for apologetic polemics. Following. confessional attitudes, Alsted interpreted the latter task as a justification for the doctrine of predestination. Dr. Calvinists of that time (I. Scharf, P. Voet) developed the idea of separating E. t. from metaphysics, seeing in it the science of proper spiritual objects (God, angels, souls), A. Heerebord even defined it as “pneumatology”.
Despite the strong in the Catholic thought the tradition of including E. t. in the composition of metaphysics, some Catholic. theologians also began to separate them. This is evidenced by the example of T. Reynaud, the author of the treatise "Natural Theology" (Theologia naturalis, 1622), who considered metaphysics as a doctrine of beings as beings, and E. t. - as a science of non-material substances (God, intelligentsia) . Nevertheless, the final separation of E. t. and metaphysics was not possible, because in the same century they began to divide metaphysics into a general one (metaphysica universalis), in which “existing as existing” was considered in its “generic”, abstract meaning, and special (metaphysica specialis), which included the doctrine of God, angels and human souls, that is, the subject of E. t. The position of E. t. university philosophy of J. B. Duhamel (1624-1706). Op. “Philosophy ancient and new” (Philosophia vetus et nova ad usum scholae accommodata, 1678), he proposed the division of metaphysics into 3 components: ontology, “etiology” (the doctrine of the causes and non-material foundations of things) and E. t. - the doctrine of God and souls.
The first Lutherans showed a more wary attitude towards E. t. authors, for which the decisive was the installation of M. Luther to eliminate from religion. life of philosophy and speculative theology. Nevertheless, J. Gerhard in Theological Places (Loci theologici, 1610-1622) singled out a certain place for E. t., based on the teachings of St. Paul on natural knowledge of God. In the future, E. t. gradually secured a place for itself in the Lutheran system. theology. Although its cognitive potential after. the doctrine of the human mind damaged by sin, which is important for Lutheranism, was not highly regarded, and the saving power was reduced to a minimum, nevertheless A. Kalov (1612-1686) recognized it as a “pedagogical theology” and an apologetics tool. Like Alsted, he saw its sources, on the one hand, in the "innate ideas" of the mind, on the other, in the objective world order. He considered the difference between these sources of knowledge sufficient to divide E. t.
In England, the most consistent attempt to separate E. t. from revealed theology and metaphysics was made by F. Bacon in his unfinished work On the Dignity and Growth of the Sciences (The Proficience and Advancement of Learning, 1605). Bacon proceeded from the division of philosophy into 3 main parts - the doctrine of God, nature and man. E. t., she is also “divine philosophy”, responsible for the 1st, there is such knowledge “that can be obtained about God with the help of the light of nature itself and the contemplation of His creations” (Bacon F. Op.: In 2 vol. M ., 1977. T. 1. S. 204). Its goal should be considered the refutation of atheism and the identification of the laws of nature, but not knowledge about God himself, “just as the creations of a master reveal to us his talent and skill, but in no way can draw his image” (Ibid.). The study of creations, which is the subject of E. t., can demonstrate the existence of God, His control of the world, His attributes (power, wisdom, goodness, justice), however, attempts to move from E. t. to direct knowledge of God can give rise to “both religious heresy and and empty and false philosophy” (Ibid., p. 205).
The development of E. t. in the XVIII century.
marked by the rapid growth of literature devoted to it as a special discipline of theological knowledge. The most common was its interpretation as an apologetic propaedeutic to "superreasonable" theological teachings, which, in turn, required replenishment through biblical theology. A good example of such an approach is the "Theodicy" by G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716), in which the author argued that a person "does not need faith based on Revelation in order to know whether there is a single beginning of all things perfectly good and all-wise." Leibniz was convinced that the question of “how the beginning of a single, all-good, all-wise and all-powerful could allow evil” falls within the competence of E. t. (Leibniz G. V. Soch.: In 4 vols. T. 4. S. 102-103).
The follower of Leibniz H. Wolf (1679-1754) and his school actually returned to the traditions. interpretation of E. t. as one of the components of metaphysics. Wolf's attempt to build an E. t. on the basis of his general deductive method is reflected in the 6th part of Op. "Reasonable thoughts about God, the world and the soul of man, and also about all things in general" (Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt, 1720), entitled "On God" (§ 928-1089 ). The ontological correspondence of the concept of God in Wolf's metaphysics is the concept of a "necessary thing". This ontological principle is an independent entity (selbständiges Wesen) containing the grounds for the existence of all things. Its predicates are the predicates of God, who, according to her, is eternal, immeasurable, first and last, incorruptible, incorporeal, simple essence, dependent on nothing and self-sufficient (§ 947). Wolf paid special attention to the omniscience and perfection of the will of God, since this is "sufficient reason" for the assertion that the world He created is the best of the worlds. Divine omnipotence, according to Wolf, consists in the ability to translate the possibilities of things into their reality, but is limited by the fact that God cannot change these possibilities themselves according to His disposition or desire (§ 994). God acts in the world in accordance with His purposes, the main of which is to reveal His greatness in the world. Evil in the world is partly explained by God’s plan regarding the harmony of the parts of this world, partly by our lack of understanding that what seems to us evil is actually good, and partly by our free will, which God cannot change without changing its essence, which “would contradict his wisdom and sufficient reason why he created just such people” (§ 1061). E. t. in Wolff ends with the deduction of divine goodness and an attempt to determine the essence of God based on the concept of him. Wolf considers the most appropriate definition, according to which God is “an entity that represents all possible worlds at once and with the highest degree of distinctness” (§ 1069). This image of the Creator corresponds to the characteristic of His creation, which is most correct and most useful to think of as an optimally arranged mechanism, since if you think of it differently, you can lose the knowledge of the unity of God (§ 1081). Wolf set forth the same subject more systematically in Lat. treatise "Natural theology, stated by the scientific method" (Theologia naturalis methodo scientifica pertractata, 1736-1737), where he noted that the task of E. that is, one should consider the rationale for the insufficiency of natural religion and the need to supplement it with a religion revealed by God. Here Wolf acted as an opponent of deism, whose representatives insisted on the complete sufficiency of natural religion for the realization of higher human goals.
I. Kant (1724-1804) became the most important figure in the history of the development of E. t. In the pre-critical period of creativity, in a special work “An investigation of the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality” (Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral, 1764), Kant equated E. t. to “philosophical knowledge of God in general” or “metaphysical knowledge of God" and argued that it should be based on "the greatest philosophical evidence" (Kant I. Sobr. soch.: In 8 vols. M., 1994. Vol. 2. S. 185, 187). The subject of E. t., considered by Kant, following the Wolfians, as one of the parts of metaphysics, is a single root cause, the definitions of which are in no way similar to the definitions of other things. The basic concept applied here to God is the concept of the unconditionally necessary existence of a being. All other definitions can be deduced from this definition, e.g. definitions of God's omnipresence and His timelessness. The philosopher considered these 2 predicates of God to be reliably established within the framework of E. t., while the rest (divine freedom, providence, justice and goodness) were recognized as requiring further clarification and research.
After the “Copernican revolution” in philosophy proclaimed by Kant, which meant, first of all, a decisive rejection of the main dogma of all previous metaphysics, according to which the data in our mind must correspond to the order in the things themselves, Kant’s approach to E. t. changed. In a special section of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled: “Criticism of any theology based on the speculative principles of reason” (I 2.2.3.7), Kant narrowed the scope of E. t. Defining theology in general as the knowledge of the primordial essence, he distinguished a theology based on revelation (theologia revelata), and a theology based on reason alone (theologia rationalis). Further, within the boundaries of rational theology, there is a distinction between a theology that thinks its subject matter only through transcendental concepts, such as “primary essence”, “superreal essence”, “essence of all essences”, denoted as transcendental (die transcendentale Theologie), and theology proceeding from the concept, borrowed from the nature of our soul, thinking in accordance with this God as a “higher intelligentsia” (spiritual rational essence), designated as E. T. (die natürliche Theologie). At the same time, one who allows only transcendental theology and sees in the Primary Essence exclusively the cause of the world should be called a deist, and one who admits, in addition to this, E.T., thinking the Primary Essence is also the Creator of the world, is called a theist. E. t. is further subdivided by Kant into 2 directions: if it ascends from this world to the existence of its Creator as to the principle of all natural order and perfection, then it can be called natural theology (Physikotheologie), and if as to the principle of all moral order and perfection , then - moral theology (Moralstheologie) (Kant I. Gesammelte Schriften. B., 1904. Bd. 3. S. 420-426).
Kant's verdict on transcendental theology and E. t. the foundation of reason about causality, conceivable only in the designated area of experience. All synthetic principles of the mind have only "immanent application", while for the cognition of the highest essence their transcendental application is required, to which the human mind is not adapted. The one who tries to hold on to tradition. metaphysical evidence of the existence of God, should convincingly show “how and through what insight he undertakes to fly over every possible experience on the wings of ideas alone” (Kant. 1994, vol. 3, p. 479). Kant, however, did not postulate the complete uselessness of speculative theology: in the event that one manages to reach the existence of a higher essence in some other way, this theology can be useful for clarifying the source of knowledge about it; the negative results of theology can serve as a "constant censorship of our mind" (correcting any ideas, be they atheistic, deistic or anthropomorphic); she finally convinces that although the very concept of the highest essence, which remains only an ideal, but an “irreproachable ideal”, cannot be substantiated by speculative reason, it cannot in any way be refuted by it, and the fundamental transcendental predicates of necessity, infinity, unity etc., may well be needed by rational theology if they are "cleansed" of metaphysical content. Rational theology as a whole has a positive perspective only if it is guided by moral laws instead of the speculative application of reason.
In the preface to the 1st ed. “Religions within the limits of reason alone” (1793) Kant outlined the boundaries separating E. t. and revealed theology. Here, too, he calls the subject of the first of these disciplines of knowledge a “philosophical theologian,” the second, a “biblical theologian.” According to Kant, a specialist in E. t. can use "within the limits of reason alone" any - linguistic, historical and even biblical - materials, but should not introduce his teachings into the body of biblical theology and try to change it. In those cases when he transgresses these boundaries, the biblical theologian, especially as a clergyman, has the right to point out to him that he has gone beyond the competence of his faculty. At the same time, Kant urged to take into account another extreme - the ambiguity of the position of that biblical theologian, to-ry, using the "property of philosophy", insists that in religion. affairs "to have, if possible, no connection with the mind." According to Kant, “religion, which without hesitation declares war on reason, will not be able to resist it for a long time” (Ibid., vol. 6, p. 13). Proceeding from this, Kant recommended that the compilers of university programs, after completing the academic study of biblical theology, also provide for a special course in "a purely philosophical doctrine of faith."
E. t. in the XIX-XX centuries.
Kant's critique of tradition. evidence of the existence of God had a decisive influence on the further clarification of the position of philosophers and theologians in relation to E. T. in the XIX century. Some of them developed Kantian criticism, others tried to restore the meaning of E. t., taking into account Kant's position, subjecting it to critical analysis. After "Speeches on Religion" (1799) by F. Schleiermacher, the break with E. t. became for several. generations of evangelical theologians inevitable. F. Schlegel in Op. "Christian Faith" (1821-1822) insisted on the need to break all ties between dogmatic theology and E. T. F. Schelling in the Munich lectures "On the History of a New Philosophy" (1827) argued that the very sequence of 3 proofs of the existence of God (ontological, cosmological and physical-theological) testifies to the insufficiency of each of them separately. He also found flaws in the definition of God's attributes: eternity, infinity and self-existence do not allow Him to be distinguished from the substance of B. Spinoza, and the transition from these predicates to those that only make God God - freedom, rationality, will, foreknowledge, etc. ., is not provided with anything. As a result, the “school metaphysics” responsible for E. t. .
G. V. F. Hegel in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (read since 1821, published in 1832) also opposed the philosophy of E. t., which he sometimes called "the rational theology of the Enlightenment", finding rational thinking in the first about God, and in the second only rational metaphysics. E. t. comprehends God only as "abstraction, i.e., empty ideality, which is opposed by the finite, which is outside of it," while "the thinking mind - as concreteness, fullness of content, ideality, spirit, love and trinity" (Hegel G V. F. Philosophy of Religion: In 2 vols. M., 1975. T. 1. S. 228, 258). That is why Hegel believed that his philosophy is much closer to positive religion and to church teaching than rational theology and rational interpretation of the Holy. Scriptures. At the same time, he was not satisfied with Kant's agnosticism, according to which human knowledge is limited to the world of phenomena. The Hegelian position in relation to E. t. is specified in the Lectures on the Proof of the Existence of God: it is emphasized here - in contrast to Kant, Schelling and the Protestant. philosophy of "immediate faith" - that the falsity of its positions does not follow from the insufficiency of its attitudes. The methodology of E. t. connections with the world, in which the properties in fact do not go beyond the definition of the concept itself (Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 375-376). Although, according to Hegel, this method deserves only to be abandoned, its limited “affirmative” side, connected with the elucidation of the “universal formal nature of the concept,” needs further reflection.
Starting from ser. 19th century the status of E. t. among the theologians of Germany is sharply reduced. Although some thinkers defended the importance of such theological disciplines close to it as “philosophical theology” (Schleiermacher considered it as the foundation of 2 other main sections of theology - historical and practical theology), apologetics (K. R. Hagenbach), the doctrine of first principles or fundamentals of theology (L. Pelt), a Protestant. there was a tendency in circles to distance themselves from E. t. etc., but also to mention this area of theological research.
The discussion about the meaning of E. t. received a powerful impetus after the appearance of the formulation of the Vatican Council I (1869-70), according to which God, as the source and goal of all things, can be known reliably (certo cognosci posse) through created things through the natural light of the human mind (see. dogmatic constitution "Dei Filius"). At the same time, the same Council adopted documents that were directed not so much against atheists as against fideists (L. Boten, A. Bonetti, and others), who, under the influence of Kant's critique of reason, opposed in principle the natural knowledge of God.
A reaction from Protestantism soon followed. The influential liberal theologian A. Ritschl in his 3-volume fundamental work “The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation” (Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung, 1870-1874) expressed the idea that positive theology cannot in any way proceed from natural or rational knowledge of God, but only from the teachings of Christ. communities, to-paradise should just protect itself from the claims of rationalism. Among the followers of Ritschl, as a critic of E. t., his students Yu. Kaftan, T. Goering had a great influence; the same attitude is found later in E. Troeltsch.
However, E. t. met with opposition not only from liberals, but also from conservatives, first of all - K. Heim, and then - the founder of dialectical theology K. Barth, who is still considered the most famous and consistent of her critics. In Christian Dogmatics (1927) he argued that Christ. God is so different from the things of this world that no argument from their existence can in any way prove or disprove His existence. Thus, there is no “analogy of being” through which one could draw a bridge between being created and uncreated, and there is only an “analogy of faith”, that is, similarity based on faith - the ability to learn through the Holy. Scripture applies to God such predicates as “wise”, “good”, etc. An attempt by G. E. Brunner, close to Barth, in his work Nature and Grace (1934) to find a place for a certain natural knowledge of God in Christ. theology caused an immediate reaction from Barth (“No! Answer to Emil Brunner” - 1934), who saw here the “violent arrogance” of reason, which dared to measure the biblical revelation with a philosophical scale. Bart was also supported by R. Bultman, in Art. “On the Question of Natural Revelation” (1941), who identified E. t. as an attempt to apply pre-Christianism to Revelation as a critical scale. concept of God, which is fraught with the loss of "the exclusivity of Christian Revelation." Although Bultmann recognized in the same essay the legitimate task of E. t. to demonstrate the problematic nature of "unbelieving existence", and Brunner did not abandon his positions, Barth's radicalism (which led to a split in dialectical theology) is perceived in the present. time as perhaps the most authoritative Protestant. position on the issue under consideration.
The anti-modernist oath of 1910 and the encyclical Humani generis of 1950 testify to the fact that Popes Pius X and Pius XII saw in the documents of the First Vatican Council evidence not only of the natural knowability, but also of the provability of Divine existence. On the significant relevance of the topic of E. t. for the Catholic. Thought is evidenced by the work of E. Gilson "God and Philosophy", which is a concise historical panorama of the reasonable search for God. Gilson distinguished between "spontaneous E. t.", which is expressed in the fact that people think about the possibility of the existence of "such an invisible being that we call God", and the real one, corresponding to metaphysics, the most perfect variety of which is existential theology. He emphasized that “natural theology does not depend on the method of positive science, but on the method of metaphysics” (Gilson E. God and Philosophy // He. Selected: Christian Philosophy. M., 2004. P. 633-635).
A consistent defender of E. t. was a German. Catholic theologian and philosopher V. Brugger, to-ry in the articles placed in Sat. “Kant and Scholasticism Today” (1955), criticized Kant for the fact that he, having correctly formulated the goals and objectives of E. t., did not appreciate its possibilities, passing by a very real “transition” from empirical things to the Absolute. In a special monograph "Natural Theology" (1964), Brugger, like some other neo-Thomists, developed the proof of the existence of God, proceeding from "the natural spiritual striving of man." According to Brugger, the mind can know not only what God is, but also what exactly He is. E. t. was also recognized in the monumental "Encyclopedia of Theology" by K. Rahner, where it was interpreted as a natural continuation of human self-knowledge, a sign of "openness to being as a whole, and therefore the absolute basis of everything" (Rahner K. Encyclopedia of Theology. L ., 1975. P. 1023).
The current state of E. t.
In present time E. t. is very modestly represented in university courses and in acad. theology. In Anglo-Amer. In the traditional tradition, its problems (it is increasingly referred to as philosophical theology) are actually “absorbed” by the philosophy of religion, and in the continental one it is supplanted by fundamental theology.
Official Catholicism continues to take a loyal position in relation to E. t., as evidenced by the provision of the "Catechism of the Catholic Church" (1994), according to Krom, the mind has ways to achieve knowledge about God, which can be considered modified evidence of His existence. But these proofs, which have the meaning of "persuasive arguments", must be distinguished from the proofs used in natural science (Art. 31, 36, 47, 286). Some Catholic philosophers, for example. N. Lobkowitz, believe that the “five ways” of the natural knowledge of God by Thomas Aquinas can be defended at the present time, provided that the scientific and empirical base of the arguments is clarified.
The relevance of E. t. is evidenced by the thorough work of the English. theologian and philosopher of religion R. Swinburne "Faith and Reason" (2005). In it, Swinburne (Orthodox by religion) offered a refutation of the major Protestant authorities. theologies that denied the importance of E. t. for the knowledge of God. Although rational knowledge of God is not necessary for every believer, it becomes so for everyone who wants to consciously and convincingly profess faith. At the same time, the very scope of the concept of E. t., according to Swinburne, should be expanded. The general feature of E. t. as such should be considered “argumentation from public data” (public evidence), accepted by both believers and non-believers, with the help of which the truths of theism are substantiated. However, the same “argument from publicly available data” is applicable to the justification of specific dogmas of Christ. creeds, primarily concentrated in the gospel narrative of the life of Jesus Christ, which can also be considered from the standpoint of historical science. According to Swinburne, although the general theistic argumentation supports the concrete dogmatic one (the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ are much better explained under the assumption that God exists than under the opposite), one can distinguish between E. t. in connection with theism as such - this is E t. in "pure form" (bare natural theology), and in connection with specific dogmas - this is a "branched" E. t. (ramified natural theology - Swinburne R. Faith and Reason. Oxf., 2005. P. 92, 107).
In present time there are discussions regarding the most important parameters of E. t. as a discipline. Some authoritative researchers insist on the possibility of interpreting E. t. as a rigorous science in the classical sense, corresponding to the Aristotelian conditions of a demonstrative (i.e., demonstrative) science, believing that its truths must be either self-evident, or based on sensory perception, or derived from them according to the rules of strictly deductive proofs. Others (for example, Swinburne) put special emphasis on the fact that E. t. uses predominantly dialectical arguments - inductive, probabilistic, by analogy, according to the principle of the best explanation, etc. Positions also diverge regarding the methodology of E. t .: traditional the approach proceeding from the fact that its main task should be to substantiate the existence of God and other theological truths on the basis of generally accepted data (public data), is opposed by the direction of "reformed epistemology" (A. Plantinga, N. Walterstorf, etc.), within to-rogo belief in the existence of God is considered as one of the "basic beliefs" characteristic of man and should not be the final, but the starting point of natural theological reasoning. Finally, in connection with the disciplinary definition of the boundaries of E. t. more traditional. the positions of those authors who primarily include apologetics in it are opposed by those who single out its predominantly speculative nature. According to this t. sp., E. t., which performs, along with the “clarifying” (clarifactory) function, also the “justifying” (justifactory) function, can be included as one of the species in the general genus of philosophical theology.
Lit.: Wundt M. Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jh. Tube., 1939; Bouillard H. Le refus de la théologie naturelle dans la théologie protestante contemporaine // L "existence du Dieu. P., 1961. P. 95-108; Vollrath E. Die Gliederung der Metaphysik in eine Metaphysica generalis und eine Metaphysica specialis // Zschr f philosophische Forschung 1962 Bd 16 S 258-284 Pannenberg W Natürliche Theologie LTK Bd 7 S 811-817 Zhuchkov V A From the history of German philosophy in the 18th century : Preclassical period, Moscow, 1996; Lobkowitz, N. Evidence for the existence of God ex rebus creatis: Sketches of the sources of observations and logical reflections, VF, 2006, No. 2, pp. 42-55.
V. K. Shokhin
The intellectual movement developing at the end of the 12th and 13th centuries in the countries of Western Europe, the philosophical inspiration of which was the Aristotelian teaching, led to the growth of a tendency to separate science from theology, reason from faith. This point of view was in clear contradiction with the interests of the church, and therefore it was necessary to look for ways to resolve the issue of the relationship between theology and science. This was not an easy task, for it was a question of developing a method that, without preaching a complete disregard for knowledge, would at the same time be able to subordinate rational thinking to the dogmas of revelation, that is, to preserve the primacy of faith over reason. This task was carried out by Thomas, relying on the Catholic interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of science. Therefore, Catholic historians of philosophy are convinced that Thomas Aquinas autonomized science, turning it into a field completely independent of theology.
Due to the fact that theology is the highest wisdom, the final object of which is exclusively God as the "first cause" of the universe, wisdom independent of all other knowledge, Thomas does not separate science from theology. In essence, Aquinas' concept of science was an ideological reaction to rationalistic tendencies aimed at freeing science from the influence of theology. True, it can be said that he separates theology from science in the epistemological sense, that is, he believes that theology draws its truths not from philosophy, not from particular disciplines, but exclusively from revelation. Thomas could not stop at this, for this was not what theology required. Such a point of view only confirmed the superiority of theology and its independence from other sciences, but it did not solve the most significant task for that time that faced the Roman curia, namely the need to subordinate the developing scientific trend to theology, especially the trend with a natural science orientation. First of all, it was about proving the non-autonomy of science, turning it into a "servant" of theology, emphasizing that any human activity, both theoretical and practical, ultimately comes from theology and is reduced to it.
In accordance with these requirements, Aquinas develops the following theoretical principles that determine the general line of the church on the issue of the relationship between theology and science:
- 1. Philosophy and particular sciences perform auxiliary functions in relation to theology. The expression of this principle is the well-known position of Thomas that theology "does not follow other sciences as higher in relation to it, but resorts to them as to its subordinate servants." Their use, in his opinion, is not evidence of the lack of self-sufficiency or weakness of theology, but, on the contrary, follows from the wretchedness of the human mind. Rational knowledge in a secondary way facilitates the understanding of the well-known dogmas of faith, brings closer to the knowledge of the "first cause" of the universe, that is, God;
- 2. The truths of theology have their source in revelation, the truths of science - sensory experience and reason. Thomas claims that from the point of view of the method of obtaining the truth, knowledge can be divided into 2 types: knowledge discovered by the natural light of reason, such as arithmetic, and knowledge that draws its foundations from revelation .;
- 3. There is an area of some objects common to theology and science. Foma believes that the same problem can serve as the subject of study of various sciences. But there are certain truths which cannot be proven by reason, and therefore they belong exclusively to the realm of theology. To these truths, Aquinas referred the following dogmas of faith: the dogma of the resurrection, the history of the incarnation, the holy trinity, the creation of the world in time, and so on;
- 4. The provisions of science cannot contradict the dogmas of faith. Science must indirectly serve theology, must convince people of the justice of its principles. The desire to know God is true wisdom. And knowledge is only the servant of theology. Philosophy, for example, relying on physics, must construct evidence for the existence of God, the task of paleontology is to confirm the Book of Genesis, and so on.
In connection with these, Aquinas writes: "I think about the body in order to think about the soul, and I think about it in order to think about a separate substance, I think about it in order to think about God."
If rational knowledge does not fulfill this task, it becomes useless, moreover, it degenerates into dangerous reasoning. In case of conflict, the decisive criterion is the truths of revelation, which surpass in their truth and value any rational evidence.
Thus, Thomas did not separate science from theology, but, on the contrary, completely subordinated it to theology.
Aquinas, expressing the interests of the church and the feudal strata, assigned science a secondary role. Foma completely paralyzes the scientific life of his day.
During the Renaissance and at a later time, the theological concept of science, created by Thomas, becomes a pre-crinal and ideological brake on scientific progress.
