The Cuban Missile Crisis was the climax in the history of the Cold War. He could start the Third World War, however, US President R. Kennedy and USSR Secretary General N. S. Khrushchev were able to agree on time. Let us examine in detail the question of how and why this event occurred.

Causes of the Caribbean Crisis

After the end of World War II, an arms race began between the United States and the USSR. In 1959, the revolutionary government of Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba, which began to seek contacts with the Soviet Union, which began to work closely with the Cuban people interested in building socialism. The essence of cooperation was that the USSR acquired the first ally on the other side of the ocean, and Cuba received support and funding from one of the most powerful powers in the world. The very fact of cooperation with the Soviet Union neighbor US could cause concern in Washington.

Rice. 1. Portrait of D. Kennedy.

In turn, in the early 60s, the United States had an advantage in the number of nuclear missiles. In 1961, the Americans established a military base in Turkey and deployed missiles with nuclear warheads in close proximity to the borders of the USSR. The flight range of these missiles completely reached Moscow, which created the threat of colossal losses among the Soviet army and command in the event of a war.

Kennedy himself believed that missiles stationed in Turkey were much more dangerous and more important than ballistic missiles located on American submarines.

N. S. Khrushchev understood the consequences of such a missile attack on the USSR. Therefore, the Soviet leadership decided to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba as a retaliatory step. Their movement and installation were carried out secretly, so the Americans, waking up in the morning and discovering the danger right on their shores, were in shock at first. Thus began the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which the United States, the USSR and Cuba became participants.

Rice. 2. Portrait of N. S. Khrushchev.

Events and results of the Caribbean crisis

In the fall of 1962, the Soviet troops carried out Operation Anadyr. Its content included the covert transfer to Cuba of 40 nuclear missiles and the necessary equipment. By October 14, the main part of the planned activities was completed.

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On October 15, CIA analysts established the ownership of the missiles and the danger emanating from them. The Pentagon immediately began to discuss possible measures to counter the emerging danger.

Rice. 3. Soviet troops in Cuba.

The report to President Kennedy offered options for a bombing attack on Cuba, a military invasion of the island, a naval blockade, or an amphibious military operation. However, all of them presented the United States as an aggressor in relation to the USSR or Cuba, so it was decided to create a quarantine zone of 500 nautical miles around the coast of Cuba, warning the world that the United States was ready for any development of events and accused the USSR of secrecy of its activities. On October 24, the blockade came into force, and, along with this, the armed forces of the Department of Internal Affairs and NATO were put on alert. On the same day, Khrushchev and Kennedy exchanged short telegrams about the ongoing blockade. Khrushchev, knowing that Soviet troops were deployed in Cuba and that reinforcements had arrived, assured F. Castro that the USSR would remain unshakable in its positions.

On October 25, in the UN Security Council, attacks began on the representative from the USSR Zorin regarding the presence of missiles on the territory of Cuba, which he was not aware of. Zorin only replied that he was not in an American court and was not going to give any comments on this matter.

On October 25, for the first and only time in the history of the United States, the US military was brought to the DEFCON-2 readiness level on the US Army readiness scale for a full-scale war.

Diplomatic negotiations, during which the whole world held its breath, lasted a week. As a result, the parties agreed that the USSR withdraws its forces from Cuba, and the United States abandons attempts to invade the island and removes its missiles from Turkey.

Speaking of chronology, it should be noted that the dates of the beginning and end of the Caribbean crisis are very close to each other. The crisis began on October 14 and ended on October 28.

What have we learned?

Speaking briefly about the Caribbean crisis of 1962, it should be noted that, almost causing the Third World War, it showed the danger of nuclear weapons and the inadmissibility of using them in diplomacy. It was after these events that the Cold War began to decline. The article information can be used to create a report in preparation for a class history lesson.

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Half a century ago, the Cuban Missile Crisis broke out: an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft discovered in Cuba launchers of Soviet nuclear missiles secretly delivered there.

According to historians, the world has never been so close to the Third World War.

Formally and legally, the USSR had the right to deploy its weapons on the territory of the allied states, which the United States systematically and quite openly did. Modern researchers are perplexed why the Soviet leadership needed to act in the strictest confidence and discredit itself with lies from the UN rostrum.

Some authors believe that Nikita Khrushchev was going to pull the missiles in Cuba at the right moment as a trump card from his sleeve and demand the withdrawal of American troops from Europe as a retreat, but the Americans learned about the redeployment of the missiles before the group was fully deployed.

The parties managed to reach a compromise, but, according to historians, the Soviet Union suffered a military-strategic and moral-political defeat. The unsuccessful operation served as one of the accusations against Khrushchev when he was removed from power two years later.

Paradoxically, the Cuban Missile Crisis served the cause of international stability. Realizing the fragility of the world, Washington and Moscow have embarked on measures to control arms and build mutual trust. It is the events of October 1962 that are considered the moment of the end of the most acute period of the Cold War.

Khrushchev: "hedgehog in pants"

By the early 1960s, humanity was faced with a new reality: the possibility of a global nuclear war.

John F. Kennedy, after a mandatory briefing for the president-elect with the secretary of defense, during which he introduced the new head of state to a course on secret military plans, bitterly remarked to Pentagon chief Robert McNamara: "Do we still call ourselves the human race?"

After the launch of the first Soviet satellite, Khrushchev bluffed recklessly, claiming that Soviet factories produce rockets "like sausages." The "missile gap" that the Republicans allegedly allowed was at the center of the 1959 American presidential campaign.

Meanwhile, in January 1961, the USSR had only one 8K71 intercontinental missile at the Plesetsk cosmodrome, theoretically capable of flying to America, and even that, due to technical flaws, was not on combat duty.

The thought ripened in Khrushchev's head that it would be a good idea, in his words, "to put a hedgehog in the pants of the Americans" by pushing the carriers of nuclear weapons to their borders.

Image caption Soviet cargo ship "Nikolaev" in the Cuban port of Casilda during the Caribbean crisis. The picture shows the shadow of an American reconnaissance aircraft

Having met Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961, the Soviet leader considered him an inexperienced, weak-willed youth who was easy to blackmail.

In fact, Kennedy, unlike Khrushchev, saw the Second World War not from the generals' dugouts, but fought in the Pacific Ocean as the commander of a torpedo boat, and despite his intelligent appearance, he did not suffer from a lack of decisiveness.

After Fidel Castro came to power, the word "Cuba" in the Soviet Union began to jokingly decipher "communism off the coast of America."

According to General Anatoly Gribkov, who led the task force of the Soviet General Staff in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the idea to use it as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" arose after the visit of Khrushchev's deputy Anastas Mikoyan to Havana in February 1960.

On a practical plane, the problem was raised in early May 1962 at a narrow meeting with the participation of Khrushchev, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU Kozlov and Mikoyan, the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs Malinovsky and Gromyko, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Missile Forces Biryuzov. As a result, Khrushchev instructed Malinovsky to "work through the issue."

Khrushchev asked Alexander Alekseyev, the Soviet ambassador in Havana, who was invited to the meeting, about the possible reaction of Fidel Castro. The diplomat suggested that "Fidel is unlikely to agree," since the provision of his territory for foreign bases would deprive him of the support of Latin American public opinion. Malinovsky sharply replied in the spirit that one should think not about Castro's interests, but about one's own.

Only after all members of the Soviet leadership put their signatures under the decision to conduct the operation, and it was given the code name Anadyr, did they ask the opinion of the Cubans. On May 29, a Soviet delegation headed by Marshal Biryuzov arrived in Havana.

Fidel Castro said that "Cuba is ready to take risks if it serves the fight against US imperialism," but Biryuzov got the feeling that the Cuban leader saw what was happening as a favor to Moscow, and not vice versa.

Details of the Soviet-Cuban agreement, which provided for massive economic and military assistance to Havana, were discussed during the visit of Raul Castro to Moscow on July 2-16.

In August, the text, finalized taking into account the wishes of the Cuban side, was printed on a special film, Che Guevara flew to Moscow and delivered it to Fidel in a container with a device that made it possible to instantly destroy the document in case of danger.

However, the agreement was never signed. One of the most dramatic military operations in world history was carried out on the basis of an oral agreement.

70 megaton warheads

The core of the grouping with a total strength of 50,874 people (in fact, about 42 thousand reached the island) was the newly formed 51st Missile Division under the command of Major General Igor Statsenko.

It included two regiments of R-14 (8K65) missiles (24 missiles with a range of 4000 km, equipped with 16 thermonuclear warheads with a capacity of one megaton and eight super-powerful charges of 2.3 megatons each) and three regiments of R-12 (8K63) missiles. (36 missiles with atomic charges and a range of 2000 km).

In addition, it was planned to send six Il-28A bombers with six atomic bombs with a capacity of six kilotons each, 36 unmanned FKR-1 projectiles and 80 nuclear munitions for them, as well as 12 tactical missiles ZR10 ("Luna") with atomic charges to Cuba. two kilotons each, and six coastal anti-ship missiles 4K87 ("Sopka"), also with atomic charges.

Image caption The range of Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba during the Caribbean crisis: long range - R-14, medium range - R-12, small radius - FKR-1

The total number of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba by the beginning of the open phase of the crisis was 164 units.

Four reinforced motorized rifle regiments (10 thousand soldiers and officers) were supposed to cover the launch positions.

The Air Force and Air Defense Forces consisted of 42 Il-28 light bombers, 40 MiG-21 fighters of the elite 32nd Guards Aviation Regiment, commanded by Vasily Stalin during the Great Patriotic War, 12 anti-aircraft installations with 144 missiles, 33 Mi-4 helicopters.

The fleet was supposed to send 26 warships to the coast of Cuba, including two cruisers, 11 diesel submarines, 30 Il-28T sea torpedo bombers. True, in reality, the squadron did not manage to reach the Caribbean Sea.

On June 10, Malinovsky presented Khrushchev with several candidates for the post of head of the operation. The choice fell on the commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Isa Pliev, whose troops had shot the rebel workers in Novocherkassk a week earlier.

One of the motorized rifle regiments was commanded by the future Minister of Defense of the USSR and a member of the State Emergency Committee Dmitry Yazov.

For the transfer of troops and equipment, 86 merchant ships were involved, allegedly carrying agricultural equipment to Cuba and sailing from six ports from Severomorsk to Sevastopol. Even the captains and military commanders did not know the destination and opened the secret packages only in the ocean.

Verbal volleys

At 3:00 am on October 14, a U-2 of the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, piloted by Major Richard Heizer, took off from Edwards Air Force Base in California. At 07:31 Heizer reached Cuba and photographed the R-12 launch sites and the missiles themselves in the San Cristobal area for 12 minutes.

It took two days to decipher and analyze the information. At 08:45 on October 16, the pictures with the corresponding commentary lay on Kennedy's desk. He immediately summoned 14 military and political advisers, including his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, to a meeting and ordered an increase in the intensity of reconnaissance flights over Cuba by 90 times; from two per month to six per day.

Image caption Gromyko and Dobrynin assure Kennedy of the absence of Soviet missiles in Cuba

Ministers and military leaders considered the bombardment of Cuba premature and recommended that they limit themselves to a naval blockade of the island and diplomatic measures.

On October 18, Kennedy received Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who arrived at the session of the UN General Assembly. During a conversation that lasted 2 hours and 20 minutes, he argued that "our assistance is solely for the purpose of promoting the defense capability of Cuba and the development of its peaceful economy," and military cooperation is limited to "training Cuban personnel in the handling of certain defensive weapons."

Kennedy knew for sure that Gromyko was lying to his face, but he did not escalate the conversation.

The president was also cunning when he told Gromyko that "we have no intention of attacking Cuba," although the corresponding plan, codenamed "Mongoose," was by that time completely ready and needed only his approval to be put into effect.

On October 22 at 7:00 pm Washington time, Kennedy made a televised statement about "the treachery of the Soviets in planting missiles in Cuba," "the danger hanging over the United States," and "the need to fight back."

The President demanded the convening of the UN Security Council, announced the creation of a crisis headquarters and measures to isolate Cuba.

Contrary to popular belief, he did not introduce a complete naval blockade of the island, but the so-called "quarantine": the inspection regime for ships heading to Cuba with permission to proceed if there was nothing suspicious on board.

An hour before the speech, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin was given a personal message to Kennedy Khrushchev: "I must tell you that the United States is determined that this threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere be eliminated. I do not allow you or any sane person to push into our nuclear age peace into a war which, as it is absolutely clear, no country can win."

A few hours later, Malinovsky sent a telegram to Pliev with instructions to "take all measures to increase combat readiness and to repel the enemy, together with the Cuban army and all its forces, with the exception of General Statsenko's [missiles] and General Beloborodov's cargo [warheads].

Military analysts point out that the Soviet troops, who were thousands of kilometers from their homeland, could not repel a possible massive attack by the American army without the use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, in the event of a loss of communication in a combat situation, such a decision could well have been made independently by the commanders of the divisional and even regimental level.

The official response was the Statement of the Soviet Government, read out over the radio the next day at 16:00 Moscow time. The US actions were called "provocative" and "aggressive". It was reported about bringing the Armed Forces of the USSR to combat readiness and canceling vacations for personnel.

For Soviet citizens, the statement sounded like a bolt from the blue, especially since it was announced by "special purpose announcer" Yuri Levitan, who during the war read the reports of the Sovinformburo, and in April 1961 announced to the country and the world about Gagarin's flight.

An hour earlier, a message from Khrushchev Kennedy was delivered to US Ambassador to Moscow Foy Kopper: "The statement of the Government of the United States of America cannot be assessed otherwise than as open interference in the internal affairs of the Cuban Republic, the Soviet Union and other states. The Charter of the United Nations and international norms do not give the right to any state to establish inspection of ships in international waters.

Khrushchev's concern was understandable, since on the way to Cuba there was a dry-cargo ship "Alexandrovsk" with another portion of nuclear weapons.

On October 23, Kennedy issued an ultimatum to Khrushchev: “I think you recognize that the first step that started the current events was the action of your government, expressed in the secret supply of offensive weapons to Cuba. I hope that you will immediately instruct your ships to comply with the quarantine conditions, which will enter into force at 2 pm GMT on 24 October.

Image caption The engine of the U-2 plane shot down on "Black Saturday" in the Museum of the Revolution in Havana

The next day at 11:30 p.m. Moscow time, the US embassy received Khrushchev's reply, replete with expressions like "outright robbery" and "the madness of degenerate imperialism" and threatening: take such measures as we deem necessary and sufficient.

On October 25, Aleksandrovsk arrived at the port of La Isabella without hindrance, but the remaining 29 ships were ordered to change course and not approach the coast of Cuba.

On the same day, an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council was held, at which an unprecedented scandal erupted. After Soviet representative Valerian Zorin firmly assured the world community that there were no missiles in Cuba, US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson spectacularly displayed aerial photographs.

In a message to the Soviet leader, delivered to the embassy at 01:45 am and read in Moscow around 2:00 pm local time, the president wrote: "I express regret that these events have caused a deterioration in our relations. I called for restraint by those in our country who which called for action. I hope that your government will take the necessary actions to restore the situation that existed before."

In a reply handed to Ambassador Kopper at 4:43 pm, that is, less than three hours after receiving Kennedy's letter, Khrushchev spoke in the same vein: "I felt that you have an understanding of the current situation and awareness of responsibility. I appreciate this. We should not succumb to intoxication and petty passions.

In a huge document sent to the State Department in four pieces, Khrushchev put forward the terms of the compromise for the first time: "If assurances were given from the President and Government of the United States that the United States would not take part in an attack on Cuba if you withdraw your fleet, that would change everything at once."

However, the next day there was a new aggravation of the situation. He was called by Fidel Castro, who was eager to take part in world events.

On the morning of October 26, he ordered Cuban air defenses to shoot down American reconnaissance aircraft, and in the evening he handed a letter to Khrushchev to Ambassador Alekseev, in which he assured of the inevitability of an American attack on Cuba "in the next 72 hours" and urged the USSR to show firmness. Khrushchev, busy at that moment with more important matters, bothered to read it only on October 28.

On the morning of October 27, the Cubans began to intensively fire at U-2s, but none of them were hit.

The commander of one of the Soviet anti-aircraft missile divisions, Captain Antonets, reported to the headquarters of the group that a U-2 was seen in his area of ​​​​responsibility and asked for permission to support Cuban comrades with fire.

He was told that the Soviet troops had not received the corresponding order and that Pliev's sanction was required, and that at the moment he was not in place. Since the U-2 was about to leave Cuban airspace, the captain made his own decision and shot down the plane at 10:22 local time. Pilot Rudolf Anderson died.

According to other sources, Antonets still secured the consent of someone from his superiors.

It became clear that the war could start at any moment due to chance and against the will of the first persons.

Historians call October 27, 1962 "Black Saturday" and consider the day of the culmination of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Upon learning of the destruction of the U-2, the Soviet leadership took an unprecedented step. In order not to waste time transmitting the text through diplomatic channels and deciphering it, Khrushchev's next message to Kennedy was read out directly on the radio: "I am making a proposal: we agree to remove those weapons from Cuba that you consider offensive weapons. Your representatives will make a statement about that the United States, for its part, will withdraw its equivalent funds from Turkey."

A few hours later, Kennedy replied: "Key elements of your proposal are acceptable."

The final coordination of positions took place on the night of October 27-28 during a meeting between Robert Kennedy and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in the building of the Ministry of Justice.

The American interlocutor said that his brother was ready to give guarantees of non-aggression and the lifting of the blockade from Cuba. Dobrynin asked about missiles in Turkey. "If this is the only obstacle to reaching a settlement, then the president sees no insurmountable difficulties in resolving the issue," Kennedy replied.

The next day, at 12:00 Moscow time, Khrushchev gathered at his dacha in Novo-Ogaryovo the presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. During the meeting, his assistant Oleg Troyanovsky was asked to speak to the phone. Dobrynin called, relaying the words of Robert Kennedy: "We should get an answer from the Kremlin today, on Sunday. There is very little time left to resolve the problem."

Khrushchev immediately invited a stenographer and dictated his last message to the White House: “I respect and trust your statement that there will be no invasion of Cuba. an order to dismantle the weapons that you call offensive, pack them up and return them to the Soviet Union."

At 15:00, Malinovsky sent an order to Pliev to start dismantling the launch pads.

At 16:00 Soviet radio announced that the crisis had been overcome.

Within three days, all nuclear warheads were loaded onto the Arkhangelsk dry cargo ship, which headed for Severomorsk at 13:00 on November 1.

In total, the withdrawal of the Soviet grouping took three weeks.

The version about the key role of intelligence in resolving the Caribbean crisis is widely circulated in the literature.

Back in May 1961, at a diplomatic reception, Robert Kennedy approached Georgy Bolshakov, a Washington resident of the GRU, who worked under the guise of a cultural attache at the embassy, ​​and suggested that they meet regularly for a confidential exchange of views.

With the approval of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Bolshakov met with the president's brother in an informal setting more than 40 times in a year and a half.

On October 16, immediately after the meeting at the White House, Robert Kennedy invited Bolshakov to his home, but since he insisted that there were no missiles, he lost confidence in him.

Then the Americans decided to use Alexander Feklisov, a KGB resident, as an additional communication channel.

During a "historic" meeting at Washington's Occidental Hotel on October 26, Scali conveyed to Feklisov Kennedy's terms: the withdrawal of missiles in exchange for a promise not to touch Cuba.

The Russian historian, former head of the Archive Department under the President of the Russian Federation, Rudolf Pikhoya, believes that the significance of the negotiations between Skali and Feklisov is greatly exaggerated.

During the crisis, 17 different communication channels operated between Washington and Moscow, he points out.

Dobrynin did not endorse Feklisov's cipher telegram, saying that official statements were needed to inform the leadership in Moscow, and not the words of some journalist, and the resident sent it without the ambassador's signature.

Much ado about nothing

Most military analysts consider the Caribbean operation a gamble.

For a long time it was impossible to hide the presence of missiles in Cuba, and when the secret became clear, Khrushchev had no choice but to back down.

In terms of the number of nuclear weapons, the United States at that time surpassed the USSR by 17 times. Their territory remained almost invulnerable, while American air bases surrounded the Soviet Union along the entire perimeter of the borders.

The total capacity of the charges imported to Cuba was about 70 megatons, but even theoretically only 24 could be used.

The main striking force was made up of heavy R-14 missiles, but only the warheads managed to deliver, and the carriers were still sailing across the ocean.

The R-12 missiles had half the range, and before launch they had to be brought to a vertical position and prepared for two and a half hours, and the flight time of the American bombers, who were constantly on duty in the airspace around Cuba, was 15-20 minutes. Soviet air defense, of course, would not doze off, but the superiority of the US Air Force was overwhelming.

Almost half of all charges came from FKR-1 unmanned projectiles, but they could only reach Florida, moreover, like the Il-28A bombers, they flew at subsonic speeds, and their chances of breaking through to targets through the screen of American supersonic fighters were close to zero.

Tactical missiles "Luna" with a range of 80 km were generally suitable only for strikes on Cuban territory in the event of an amphibious landing.

Who outplayed whom?

The 15 U.S. Jupiter medium-range missiles stationed in Turkey were obsolete and in 1963 were still subject to scheduled decommissioning.

Kennedy's commitment not to invade Cuba was not recorded on paper and had no legal force for subsequent presidents.

Soviet ships, which were taking troops out of Cuba, escorted ships of the US Navy at close range in the Atlantic. According to the recollections of the participants in the events, "they went home under the hooting of an American sailor spitting overboard."

The existence of the Mongoose plan became known many years later. In 1962, Kennedy appeared in the guise of an honest partner who fell victim to blatant lies and treachery.

It would seem that the leaders of Cuba, whose country, in the event of a war, would be the first to turn into radioactive dust, should have rejoiced most of all at the peaceful resolution of the crisis. The official position of the USSR has always boiled down to the fact that the only goal of the operation was the defense of Cuba, and this goal was achieved. However, Fidel Castro and his colleagues were very offended that they were not consulted when deciding on the withdrawal of missiles.

"We realized how lonely we would be in the event of a war," Fidel said in a speech to his comrades-in-arms.

On November 5, Che Guevara told Anastas Mikoyan, who urgently flew to Havana to reassure his conceited partners, that the USSR had "destroyed Cuba" with its "erroneous" step, in his opinion.

Maoist China did not fail to extract propaganda dividends. Employees of the PRC embassy in Havana staged "going to the masses", during which the USSR was accused of opportunism, and a demonstrative blood collection for the Cubans.

"Confusion has affected not only the common people, but also a number of Cuban leaders," Ambassador Alekseev reported to Moscow on November 3.

Anatoly Chernyaev, a senior official of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, recalled how in 1975, while working in Zavidovo on the Report to the XXV Congress of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev suddenly remembered the Cuban Missile Crisis.

“I will not forget how Nikita, in a panic, either sends a telegram to Kennedy, or demands to delay it, withdraw it. But why? Nikita wanted to fool the Americans. He shouted at the Central Committee presidium: “We will hit a fly in Washington with a rocket!” And this fool Frol Kozlov echoed him: "We hold the pistol to the Americans' heads!" Khrushchev's successor said.

In October 1962, the US and the USSR spent 13 days in intense political and military confrontation over the installation of nuclear weapons in Cuba, just 90 miles from the US coast. In a televised address on October 22, 1962, President John F. Kennedy (1917-1963) notified the Americans of the discovery of missiles, announced his decision to impose a naval blockade around Cuba, and made it clear that the United States perceived the act of planting missiles as a threat and was ready to use military force if necessary. force to protect national security.

After this message, many began to fear that the world was on the brink of nuclear war. However, disaster was averted when the US agreed with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971) to remove the Cuban missiles in exchange for the US promising not to invade Cuba. Kennedy also secretly agreed to remove US missiles from Turkey.

Missile detection

After the seizure of power in 1959 by a left-wing revolutionary leader (1926-2016), the Caribbean island nation of Cuba joined the socialist camp. Under Castro, Cuba became dependent on the USSR for military and economic assistance. During this time, the US and the Soviets (and their allies) were involved in the Cold War (1945-1991), consisting of a series of political and economic clashes.

Did you know that:

Actor Kevin Costner starred in Thirteen Days (2000), a film about the Cuban Missile Crisis. The teaser for the film was: "You'll never believe how close we got."

In one of the most significant confrontations of the Cold War, the two superpowers plunged after the pilot of an American U-2 spy plane flew over Cuba on October 14, 1962 and photographed a Soviet medium-range ballistic missile R-12 (US-designated SS-4) in the process. assemblies.

Briefed on the situation on October 16, he immediately convened a group of advisers and officials, calling it the "executive committee", or ExCom (executive committee). For nearly two weeks, the president and his team have been battling a diplomatic crisis of epic proportions, just like their counterparts in the Soviet Union.

New US threat

For US officials, the situation has become very serious due to the proximity of nuclear missile sites in Cuba, just 90 miles south of Florida. Positioned at such a distance, they were able to reach targets in the eastern United States very quickly. If the missiles were put into action, it would fundamentally change the balance of power in the nuclear rivalry between the US and the USSR, which was previously dominated by the Americans.

Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev went for broke by sending missiles to Cuba with the express purpose of increasing the possibility of a nuclear attack on the enemy's country. The Soviets had long been uneasy about the number of nuclear weapons that were aimed at them from Western Europe and Turkey, and they saw the deployment of missiles in Cuba as a way to level the playing field. Another key factor in Soviet missile policy was the hostile relationship between the US and Cuba. The Kennedy administration had already launched one attack on the island, the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961. Both Castro and Khrushchev saw the missiles as a deterrent to further US aggression.

Weighing the Options

From the start of the crisis, Kennedy and ExCom determined that the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba was unacceptable. The task facing them was to organize their elimination without igniting a more serious conflict, much less a nuclear war. In discussions that lasted almost a week, they considered many options, including the bombing of missile sites and a full-scale invasion of Cuba. But Kennedy ended up taking a more balanced approach: First, use the US Navy to create a blockade or quarantine of the island to prevent the Soviets from supplying additional missiles and military equipment. Secondly, to issue an ultimatum to remove the already installed missiles.

In a television broadcast on October 22, 1962, the President notified the Americans of the presence of the missiles, explained his decision to impose a blockade, and signaled that the United States was prepared to use military force if necessary against a clear threat to national security. After this television broadcast, people all over the world anxiously awaited the answer of the Soviet Union. Some Americans, afraid that their country was on the brink of nuclear war, stocked up on food and fuel.

Collision at sea

The critical moment in the unfolding of the crisis came on October 24, when Soviet ships bound for Cuba approached the line of US ships enforcing the blockade. An attempt by the Soviets to break the blockade would likely trigger a military confrontation that could quickly escalate into a nuclear one. But the Soviet ships stopped.

Although the events at sea gave hope for the prevention of war, they did not in any way affect the solution of the problem with those missiles that were already in Cuba. A tense confrontation between the superpowers continued for a week, and on October 27, an American reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over Cuba, and US invasion forces were mobilized in Florida (35-year-old pilot of the downed aircraft, Major Rudolf Anderson, is considered the only American combat victim of the Cuban missile crisis).

“I thought it was the last Saturday of my life,” recalls US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (1916-2009), quoted by Martin Walker in his book. Other key players on both sides felt the same sense of doom.

Agreement and way out of the impasse

Despite enormous tensions, Soviet and American leaders found a way out of this situation. During the crisis, letters and other messages were exchanged between the Americans and the Soviets, and on October 26, Khrushchev sent a message to Kennedy offering to withdraw Cuban missiles in exchange for a promise from US leaders not to invade Cuba. The next day, the Secretary General sent a letter in which he promised to dismantle Soviet missiles in Cuba if the Americans removed their missile installations in Turkey.

Officially, the Kennedy administration decided to accept the terms of the first message and completely ignore Khrushchev's second letter. Privately, however, US officials have also agreed to withdraw their missiles from Turkey. US Attorney General Robert Kennedy (1925-1968) personally conveyed the message to the Soviet ambassador in Washington, and on October 28 the crisis came to an end.

Both sides - Americans and Russians alike - were sobered by the Cuban missile crisis. The following year, a hotline, a direct line of communication, was established between Washington and Moscow to help defuse such situations, and the superpowers signed two nuclear weapons treaties. However, the end of the Cold War was still far away. In fact, after the Caribbean crisis, the USSR became firmly established in its desire to intensify work on intercontinental ballistic missiles so that they would be able to reach the United States from Soviet territory.

55 years ago, on September 9, 1962, Soviet ballistic missiles were delivered to Cuba. This was the prelude to the so-called Caribbean (October) crisis, which for the first time and so close brought humanity to the brink of nuclear war.

"Metallurg Anosov" with deck cargo - eight missile transporters with missiles covered with tarpaulin. During the Caribbean crisis (blockade of Cuba). November 7, 1962 Photo: wikipedia.org

The Caribbean Crisis itself, or rather its most, lasted 13 days, from October 22, 1962, when a missile attack on Cuba, where an impressive Soviet military contingent was stationed by that time, was almost agreed in American political circles.

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on the eve published a list of official losses of Soviet citizens who died on the island from August 1, 1962 to August 16, 1964: there are 64 names in this mournful register.

Our compatriots died during the rescue of Cubans during the strongest hurricane "Flora", which swept over Cuba in the autumn of 1963, during combat training, from accidents and diseases. In 1978, at the suggestion of Fidel Castro, a memorial to the memory of Soviet soldiers buried in Cuba was built in the vicinity of Havana, which is surrounded by maximum care. The complex consists of two concrete walls in the form of mournfully bowed banners of both countries. Its content is supervised in an exemplary manner by the country's top leadership. By the way, the Soviet military, who, together with the Cubans, were involved in the coastal defense of the island in the fall of 1962, were dressed in Cuban uniforms. But on the most stressful days, from October 22 to 27, they took out vests and peakless caps from their suitcases and prepared to give their lives for a distant Caribbean country.

Khrushchev made the decision

So, in the autumn of 1962, the world faced the real danger of a nuclear war between the two superpowers. And the real destruction of mankind.

In official US circles, among politicians and in the media, at one time the thesis became widespread, according to which the cause of the Caribbean crisis was the alleged deployment of "offensive weapons" by the Soviet Union in Cuba, and the Kennedy administration's response, which brought the world to the brink of thermonuclear war, was "forced" . However, these statements are far from the truth. They are refuted by an objective analysis of the events that preceded the crisis.

Fidel Castro inspects the armament of Soviet ships on July 28, 1969. Photo: RIA News

Sending Soviet ballistic missiles to Cuba from the USSR in 1962 was an initiative of Moscow, and specifically Nikita Khrushchev. Nikita Sergeevich, shaking his shoe on the podium of the UN General Assembly, did not hide his desire to "put a hedgehog in the pants of the Americans" and waited for a convenient opportunity. And this, looking ahead, he brilliantly succeeded - Soviet lethal missiles were not only located a hundred kilometers from America, but the United States did not know for a whole month that they had already been deployed on Freedom Island!

After the failure of the operation in the Bay of Pigs in 1961, it became clear that the Americans would not leave Cuba alone. This was evidenced by the ever-increasing number of acts of sabotage against the Island of Freedom. Moscow received almost daily reports of American military preparations.

In March 1962, at a meeting in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, according to the recollections of the outstanding Soviet diplomat and intelligence officer Alexander Alekseev (Shitov), ​​Khrushchev asked him how Fidel would react to the proposal to install our missiles in Cuba. “We, Khrushchev said, must find such an effective deterrent that would deter the Americans from this risky step, because our speeches at the UN in defense of Cuba are clearly not enough anymore.<… >Since the Americans have already surrounded the Soviet Union with their military bases and missile installations for various purposes, we must pay them in their own coin, give them a taste of their own medicine, so that they can feel for themselves what it is like to live under the gun of a nuclear weapon. Speaking of this, Khrushchev stressed the need for this operation to be carried out in strict secrecy so that the Americans would not discover the missiles before they were put on full alert.

Fidel Castro did not reject this idea. Although he was well aware that the deployment of missiles would entail a change in the strategic nuclear balance in the world between the socialist camp and the United States. The Americans had already deployed warheads in Turkey, and Khrushchev's retaliatory decision to place missiles in Cuba was a kind of "missile leveling." A specific decision on the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba was made at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on May 24, 1962. And on June 10, 1962, before the July arrival of Raul Castro in Moscow, at a meeting in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal Rodion Malinovsky presented a project for an operation to transfer missiles to Cuba. It assumed the deployment of two types of ballistic missiles on the island - R-12 with a range of about 2 thousand kilometers and R-14 with a range of 4 thousand kilometers. Both types of missiles were equipped with one-megaton nuclear warheads.

The text of the agreement on the supply of missiles was handed over to Fidel Castro on August 13 by the USSR ambassador to Cuba, Alexander Alekseev. Fidel immediately signed it and sent with him to Moscow Che Guevara and the chairman of the United Revolutionary Organizations, Emilio Aragones, ostensibly to discuss "topical economic issues." Nikita Khrushchev received the Cuban delegation on August 30, 1962 at his dacha in the Crimea. But, having accepted the agreement from Che's hands, he did not even bother to sign it. Thus, this historic agreement remained formalized without the signature of one of the parties.

By that time, Soviet preparations for sending people and equipment to the island had already begun and were irreversible.

The captains did not know about the purpose of the mission

Operation "Anadyr" for the transfer of people and equipment across the seas and oceans from the USSR to Cuba is inscribed in golden letters in the annals of world military art. Such a jewelry operation, carried out under the nose of a super-powerful enemy with his exemplary tracking systems at that time, world history does not know and did not know before.

The equipment and personnel were delivered to six different ports of the Soviet Union, in the Baltic, Black and Barents Seas, having allocated 85 ships for the transfer, which made a total of 183 flights. Soviet sailors were convinced that they were going to northern latitudes. For the purpose of secrecy, camouflage robes and skis were loaded onto the ships in order to create the illusion of a "sailing to the North" and thereby exclude any possibility of information leakage. The captains of the ships had the appropriate packages, which had to be opened in the presence of the political officer only after passing through the Strait of Gibraltar. What can we say about ordinary sailors, even if the captains of the ships did not know where they were sailing and what they were carrying in the holds. Their astonishment knew no bounds when, after opening the package after Gibraltar, they read: "Keep a course for Cuba and avoid conflict with NATO ships." For camouflage, the military, who, naturally, could not be kept in the holds for the entire trip, went out on deck in civilian clothes.

The general plan of Moscow was to deploy in Cuba a group of Soviet troops as part of military formations and units of the Rocket Forces, Air Force, Air Defense and Navy. As a result, more than 43 thousand people arrived in Cuba. The basis of the Group of Soviet Forces was a missile division consisting of three regiments equipped with R-12 medium-range missiles, and two regiments armed with R-14 missiles - a total of 40 missile launchers with a range of missiles from 2.5 to 4.5 thousand kilometers. Khrushchev later wrote in his "Memoirs" that "this force was enough to destroy New York, Chicago and other industrial cities, and there is nothing to say about Washington. A small village." At the same time, this division was not tasked with delivering a preemptive nuclear strike against the United States, it was supposed to serve as a deterrent.

Only decades later, some, until then secret, details of the Anadyr operation became known, which speak of the exceptional heroism of Soviet sailors. People were transported to Cuba in cargo compartments, the temperature in which, at the entrance to the tropics, reached more than 60 degrees. They were fed twice a day in the dark. The food spoiled. But, despite the most difficult conditions of the campaign, the sailors endured a long sea passage of 18-24 days. Upon learning of this, US President Kennedy said: "If I had such soldiers, the whole world would be under my heel."

The first ships arrived in Cuba in early August 1962. One of the participants in this unprecedented operation later recalled: “The poor fellows were walking from the Black Sea in the hold of a cargo ship that had previously transported sugar from Cuba. The conditions, of course, were unsanitary: hastily knocked together multi-storey bunks in the hold, no toilets, underfoot and on teeth - remnants of granulated sugar. From the hold they let out to breathe air in turn and for a very short time. At the same time, observers were put on the sides: some watched the sea, others - the sky. The hatches of the holds were left open. In the event of the appearance of any foreign object, "passengers" had to quickly return to the hold. Carefully disguised equipment was on the upper deck. The galley was designed to cook for several dozen people who make up the crew of the ship. Since there were much more people, it didn’t matter, to put it mildly. About any hygiene, of course, it was out of the question. In general, they spent two weeks in the hold with practically no daylight, without minimal amenities and normal food. "

Slap for the White House

The Anadyr operation was the biggest failure of the American intelligence services, whose analysts kept counting how many people could be transported to Cuba by Soviet passenger ships. And they got some ridiculously small number. They did not realize that these ships could accommodate significantly more people than it should be for a regular flight. And the fact that people can be transported in the holds of dry cargo ships could not even occur to them.

In early August, the American intelligence agencies received information from their West German colleagues that the Soviets were increasing the number of their ships in the Baltic and Atlantic almost tenfold. And the Cubans who lived in the United States learned from their relatives who were in Cuba about the importation of "strange Soviet cargo" to the island. However, until the beginning of October, the Americans simply "passed this information past their ears."

Hiding the obvious for Moscow and Havana would mean even greater American interest in sending cargo to Cuba and, most importantly, in their contents. Therefore, on September 3, 1962, in a joint Soviet-Cuban communiqué on the stay in the Soviet Union of the Cuban delegation consisting of Che Guevara and E. Aragones, it was noted that "the Soviet government met the request of the Cuban government to provide Cuba with arms assistance." The communiqué said that these weapons and military equipment are intended solely for defense purposes.

A list of official losses of Soviet citizens from August 1, 1962 to August 16, 1964 has been published. There are 64 names in the mournful register

The fact that the USSR delivered missiles to Cuba was an absolutely legal matter and permitted by international law. Despite this, the American press published a number of critical articles about the "preparations in Cuba." On September 4, US President John F. Kennedy announced that the United States would not tolerate the deployment of surface-to-surface strategic missiles and other types of offensive weapons in Cuba. On September 25, 1962, Fidel Castro announced that the Soviet Union intended to establish a base in Cuba for its fishing fleet. At first, the CIA did believe that a large fishing village was being built in Cuba. True, later Langley began to suspect that, under his guise, the Soviet Union was actually creating a large shipyard and a base for Soviet submarines. American intelligence surveillance of Cuba was strengthened, the number of reconnaissance flights of U-2 aircraft, which continuously photographed the territory of the island, increased significantly. It soon became obvious to the Americans that the Soviet Union was building launch pads for anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAMs) in Cuba. They were created in the USSR several years ago in Grushin's highly classified design bureau. With their help, in 1960, an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, piloted by pilot Powers, was shot down.

The hawks were for hitting Cuba

On October 2, 1962, John F. Kennedy orders the Pentagon to put the US military on alert. It became clear to Cuban and Soviet leaders that it was necessary to accelerate the construction of facilities on the island.

Here, bad weather played into the hands of Havana and Moscow, concerned about the speedy completion of ground work. Due to heavy cloud cover in early October, U-2 flights, suspended for six weeks by that time, did not begin until 9 October. What they saw on October 10 amazed the Americans. The photographic reconnaissance data showed the presence of good roads where until recently there was a desert area, as well as huge tractors that did not fit into the narrow country roads in Cuba.

Then John Kennedy gave the order to activate photo reconnaissance. At that moment, another typhoon hit Cuba. And new pictures from a spy plane loitering at an extremely low altitude of 130 meters were taken only on the night of October 14, 1962 in the San Cristobal area in the province of Pinar del Rio. It took days to process them. U-2 discovered and photographed the starting positions of the Soviet missile forces. Hundreds of photographs testified that not just anti-aircraft missiles, but ground-to-ground missiles had already been installed in Cuba.

On October 16, presidential adviser McGeorge Bundy reported to Kennedy on the results of the overflight of Cuban territory. What John F. Kennedy saw fundamentally contradicted Khrushchev's promises to supply Cuba with only defensive weapons. The missiles discovered by the spy plane were capable of wiping out several major American cities. On the same day, Kennedy convened in his office the so-called working group on the Cuban question, which included senior officials from the State Department, the CIA and the Department of Defense. It was a historic meeting at which the "hawks" put pressure on the US President in every possible way, inclining him to an immediate strike on Cuba.

General Nikolai Leonov recalled how then Pentagon chief Robert McNamara told him at a conference in Moscow in 2002 that the majority in the US political elite in October 1962 insisted on a strike on Cuba. He even clarified that 70 percent of the people from the then US administration held a similar point of view. Fortunately for world history, the minority view prevailed, which was held by McNamara himself and President Kennedy. "We must pay tribute to the courage and courage of John F. Kennedy, who found a difficult opportunity to compromise in defiance of the vast majority of his entourage and showed amazing political wisdom," Nikolai Leonov told the author of these lines.

There were only a few days left before the climax of the Caribbean crisis, which RG will tell about ...

Nikolai Leonov, retired lieutenant general of state security, author of biographies of Fidel and Raul Castro:

The CIA frankly missed the transfer of such a large number of people and weapons from one hemisphere to another, and in close proximity to the coast of the United States. To secretly move an army of forty thousand, a huge amount of military equipment - aviation, armored forces and, of course, the missiles themselves - such an operation, in my opinion, is an example of headquarters activity. As well as a classic example of enemy disinformation and disguise. Operation "Anadyr" was designed and carried out in such a way that the mosquito would not undermine the nose. Already during its implementation, it was necessary to make urgent and original decisions. For example, rockets, already transported on the island itself, simply did not fit into the narrow Cuban rural roads. And they had to expand.

In February 1962, the KGB informed the leadership of the Soviet Union that the United States planned to put an end to the government of F. Castro: "The main blow to Cuba is planned to be delivered from the American military base of Guantanamo Bay with the support of the Navy ships located in the Caribbean Sea. The actions of the ground forces will be supported by the Air Force based in Florida and Texas...". On March 13, 1962, Operation Northwoods was approved.

In May 1962, N. S. Khrushchev, in a conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, noted the seriousness of the situation around Cuba: "It is necessary to place a certain number of our nuclear missiles there. Only this can save the country ...". All participants in the meeting at the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU supported Khrushchev. The General Staff developed the Anadyr operation to transfer to Cuba the Soviet group (up to 44 thousand people) and the 51st separate missile division, which had 40 R12 and R14 launchers.

In the chronicle published by Rodina, there is a denouement of dramatic events on the threshold of the Third World War.

Mid September 1962

Special TASS statement: "The Soviet Union does not need to transfer to any country, for example, Cuba, the means it has to repel aggression ...

Our nuclear weapons are so powerful ... that there is no need to look for a place to deploy them somewhere outside the USSR."

October 9

Message from the USSR military attache in the USA: US special troops will be increased from 4,000 to 6,639 people, and Cuban mercenaries will be enrolled in the "anti-Castro expeditionary force."

Kennedy creates a special "crisis group" ... Some of them propose to strike at the positions of Soviet missiles in Cuba

October 14

A US reconnaissance aircraft photographed two Soviet missiles in the San Cristobal area.

October 16

Kennedy creates a special "crisis group" of senior officials. Some of them propose to strike at the positions of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

October 18

14.00-18.00

A. Gromyko's meeting with President D. Kennedy. The Soviet minister noted that the USSR "would not play the role of an outside observer." Kennedy offers a deal: "The United States will not attempt an armed invasion of Cuba. Soviet offensive weapons must be removed from Cuba."

The 20th of October

President Kennedy decides to declare a naval blockade of Cuba.

22 of October

Secretary of State Rusk conveys a personal message from the American President to NS Khrushchev and the text of his latest address to the American people: "The United States is determined to eliminate this threat to the security of our hemisphere."

President Kennedy announces on TV and radio the introduction of October 24, from 1400 GMT, "quarantine" on all types of offensive
weapons imported into Cuba.

The meeting of the leadership of the Soviet embassy in the United States and the meeting of Ambassador Dobrynin with the leaders of the Soviet intelligence services. Taking the necessary precautions and destroying certain documents.

Message from the GRU resident in Washington: "1) Establish a strict quarantine against the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba. All ships carrying such weapons on board will not be
be admitted to Cuba; 2) increased surveillance of military construction in Cuba...; 3) an attack by nuclear weapons from the territory of Cuba on any other country in the Western Hemisphere will be regarded as an attack by the USSR on the USA; 4) the Guantanamo base is being strengthened, a number of military units are put on alert... 6) The US demanded an immediate meeting of the Security Council. In the Caribbean, under the pretext of maneuvers, there are 45 ships with 20 thousand people, including 8 thousand sea
foot soldiers."

October 23

Statement of the Soviet government: the naval blockade of Cuba is "unprecedented aggressive actions." In the USSR, the dismissal of older ages from the army has been delayed, vacations have been canceled, and the troops have been put on high alert.

October 24

Khrushchev's second personal message to President Kennedy: "We will ... be compelled ... to take measures that we deem necessary and
precise in order to protect their rights."

Morning

GRU radio intercept data on the order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the US Air Force Strategic Air Command (SAC): "prepare for a nuclear attack."
A message from the GRU resident in Washington: "During the day of October 23, 85 strategic aircraft were flying over the United States.
Of these, 22 are B-52 bombers. 57 B-47s flew from the US to Europe."

Meeting of an employee of the embassy G.N. Bolshakov with the American journalist C. Bartlett, where the Americans are trying to find an additional channel of communication with the Soviet leadership.

Around 14.00

American TV channels show how a Soviet tanker crossed an imaginary line, but the American warships did not fire and let it go further. Another Soviet ship "Alexandrovsk", carrying 24 nuclear warheads for medium-range missiles and 44 atomic charges for land-based cruise missiles, managed to moor in the Cuban port of La Isabella instead of the port of Mariel.

Around 18.00

The second meeting between Bartlett and Bolshakov, at which the American for the first time voiced the variant of the deal - "the elimination of Soviet missiles on the territory of Cuba in exchange for the closure of the American missile base in Turkey."

the 25th of October

Message from the GRU resident in New York: "The first echelon of the invasion of Cuba has been prepared, which will go to sea in the next few hours." A note by GRU chief I.A. Serov: "According to KGB intelligence, the invasion of Cuba is supposedly scheduled for October 26."

The first half of the day

Cuba's civil defense systems, nuclear shelters are brought to full readiness, the population in a panic buys food and other essential goods.

After 21.00

Kennedy's personal message to NS Khrushchev, in which the President proposes to return "to the previous situation."

Khrushchev's message to Kennedy: We will... be compelled... to take action as we see fit

October 26

Two meetings between A.S. Feklisov, an adviser to the embassy, ​​and A.B.C. island. President Kennedy receives a letter from N.S. Khrushchev with a proposal from the Soviet side: it announces the rejection of military supplies in general, and the American side - the rejection of intervention in Cuba.

27th October

6.45. Moscow

Telegram from BAT (military attache), VMAT (naval attaché) and BAT air attaché) of the USSR in the USA: an American invasion of Cuba is possible in the next 5-7 days.

Message from the GRU resident in Washington: "The United States really decided to seek ... the destruction of missile bases in Cuba, up to the invasion ... Everything is ready for the invasion of Cuba; it's a matter of pretext, and the best pretext is the bases, their ongoing construction ... Invasion to Cuba could take place later this week."

Top secret

"Simulate the downing of a US military aircraft..."

In 2001, the details of the provocation planned by the American side were declassified in the United States.

1. Sabotage in and around the American military base in Guantanamo Bay (arson of an aircraft and sinking of a ship; it is necessary to publish a list of non-existent "dead" in the media).

2. The sinking of the ship with Cuban refugees.

3. Organize terrorist attacks in Miami, other cities in Florida and Washington, directed at Cuban refugees. Arrest "Cuban agents" and publish false documents.

4. Carry out an air raid on the territory of states adjacent to Cuba.

5. Simulate attacks on passenger planes and shoot down an unmanned American plane or blow up a radio-controlled ship. To simulate attacks, use an F-86 Saber fighter repainted as a "Cuban MiG" ... Publish in the newspapers a list of those killed in a downed plane or blown up ship.

6. Simulate the downing of a US military aircraft by a Cuban MiG"

28 of October

16.00. Washington

29th of October

October 30

R. Kennedy confirmed the President's consent to the elimination of American military bases in Turkey, but without mentioning the connection with the Cuban events.

27th October

Morning. Washington

"Black Saturday"

Kennedy receives another letter from Khrushchev. The Soviet leader declares that the USSR agrees to withdraw "those assets from Cuba that you consider offensive" and proposes "to withdraw similar American assets from Turkey."

The first half of the day

The next meeting of the "crisis group": it was decided that the United States will not mention Turkey in the official dialogue.

Afternoon

Kennedy responds to Khrushchev: The USSR must stop all work on missile sites and, under international control, render all offensive weapons in Cuba inactive.

27th October

Evening

A.F. Dobrynin meeting with R. Kennedy in connection with the downed American reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba. At the end of the conversation, R. Kennedy, in response to a question about Turkey, said: “If this is now the only obstacle to achieving the above-mentioned settlement, then the president does not see insurmountable difficulties in resolving this issue either. The main difficulty for the president is a public discussion of the issue of Turkey. missile bases in Turkey was formalized by NATO's official decision... However, the president... is ready to negotiate behind the scenes on this issue as well."

27th October

Around 24.00

Message from the GRU resident in Washington: "1) The situation at 24.00 27.10 remains tense. The next 24 hours are considered decisive. 2) US Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered the Secretary of the Air Force to transfer 24 airborne squadrons with support units from the reserve. The squadrons are intended to transfer the first assault echelon during the landing. 3) increased movement of troops on the roads of Florida completed. 4) On Saturday, up to 50% of the personnel continued to work at the Pentagon. "

Head of the GRU I.A. Serov: “I ask you to urgently find out and report by all available means: 1) the number of troops, equipment and their belonging in Florida and Guantanamo; 2) the concentration of counter-revolutionary forces that were previously in Latin America and transferred to Florida and Guantanamo ; 3) the number of vehicles in the Florida area adapted to the landing of troops."

28 of October

Message from the GRU resident in Washington: “The United States is building up its grouping of forces in the Caribbean Sea. 1) The 19th air group arrived on October 17 at MacDill Air Force Base (Florida) ... includes from 50 to 75 aircraft, including RF-100 supersonic fighters and RF‑101 and KB‑66 aircraft. ships, 3 submarines, anti-submarine defense ships.The exercises are scheduled to continue until October 30. 3) Marine units (25 thousand people) and an infantry battalion (1200) have been transferred from California to the east coast ... ".

28 of October

16.00. Washington

Telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "The issue of dismantling missile bases in Cuba under international control does not meet with objections and will be covered in detail in Khrushchev's message." The Soviet leader agreed not to publicly discuss the elimination of American missile bases in Turkey.

Khrushchev's message was delivered to the President of the United States.

R. Kennedy confirmed the president's consent to the liquidation of American military bases in Turkey, but without mentioning the connection with the Cuban events.

Above one of the tables of the fashionable Washington restaurant "Occidental" there is a sign with several lines on the metal: "During the tense period of the Caribbean crisis (October 1962), the mysterious Russian Mr. X handed over a proposal to remove missiles from Cuba to a correspondent of the ABC television company "To John Scali. This meeting served to eliminate a possible nuclear war."

Political Intelligence Resident

Next to the tablet is a portrait of the correspondent. But there is neither a name nor a portrait of his interlocutor. With whom did John Scali, the star of American television journalism, a man close to the Kennedy family, communicate at this historic table? Russian Mr. "X" - a resident of the Soviet political intelligence in Washington, Alexander Fomin.

Real name - Alexander Semenovich Feklisov.

Let's go back to that day, October 26, 1962. A 40,000th contingent of our military has already been deployed to Cuba, and the installation of 42 missiles with nuclear warheads aimed at the United States has almost been completed. The world is on the brink of a third world war. Colonel of foreign intelligence Alexander Feklisov is one of those very few people who managed to prevent the catastrophe.

His daughter Natalia Alexandrovna Feklisova-Asatur learned about her father's secret work as an adult.

Only at the age of forty-nine, she tells me, I first heard that my father was engaged in intelligence, worked with people like Julius Rosenberg and Klaus Fuchs ... I was stunned. At school, we were told about the cruelty and bias of the American court that sent young people to the electric chair. I could not even imagine that my father met with them and even considered Julius Rosenberg his friend! There was never a word or a hint about this at home. My sister and I clearly knew one thing: my father was an employee of the Foreign Ministry. He was very fond of the film "Seventeen Moments of Spring", when it was shown, he always called my sister and me, wanted us to watch together. We thought: this is how dad likes the picture. Only many years later I began to understand that his life, work in New York, London and Washington - the material for several of these films!

Single trainee

As Feklisov himself said in the documentary "The Caribbean Crisis Through the Eyes of a Resident", he became a scout by accident. "My father is a switchman on the railroad, and as a child I dreamed of becoming a machinist's assistant, well, maybe even a machinist." But when Feklisov was graduating from the Institute of Communications Engineers, he was offered to continue his studies at the SEON - School for Special Purposes. And a year later, in 1941, they began to prepare for a business trip to the United States.

Natalia Alexandrovna is still surprised: how could her father be sent to America? Too young. Language is weak. Didn't have a family. Finally, deaf. In his youth, when the house where the Feklisov family lived caught fire, he saved people all night and collapsed to sleep on cold boards in the barn in the morning. When I woke up, I did not immediately realize that one ear was not hearing.

But the leadership of SHON saw something more important in him: Feklisov is able to work around the clock and always achieves his goal. The first task for a novice intelligence officer is to establish two-way radio communication with Moscow. How? He must decide this himself, on the spot. According to legend, an intern at the USSR Consulate General in New York, Alexander Fomin, is given a room in a low-rise building surrounded by high-rise buildings. A guy from Rogozhskaya Zastava finds and buys several bamboo poles (those athletes use), fastens them with couplings, puts the resulting antenna on stretch marks - and from now on New York and Moscow are connected by an invisible strong thread.

Quite quickly, Alexander corrects the column "not married" in the questionnaire. Natalia Alexandrovna shows a photograph of a pretty young woman:

This is the mother of the year they met. Ten girls who graduated from foreign language in Moscow were sent to New York to work in Amtorg. Father said that Zina Osipova immediately fascinated him with her cornflower blue eyes. Zinulya, as her father called her mother, became not only a wife, but also a good helper. Fluent in English, she could speak and take any American wife aside so that the men could discuss their problems in private.

The father knew how to win over almost any person. During his work, we later found out, he had 17 foreign agents, - continues Natalia Alexandrovna. Some he called friends. Much later, in his Moscow apartment on Bolshaya Gruzinskaya, my father set up a "cache of expensive things" (as he called it), apparently in case thieves got into the house. Somehow, with my sister and I, he took out an old shabby wallet: "A gift from an American friend." But he didn't say what.

Working with "friends" brought the scout more than once to the center of important, truly historical events.

Great Negotiator

On October 22, 1962, Fomina invites John Scali, a well-known political television observer, for breakfast at the Occidental restaurant. The scout had been meeting with him for a year and a half.

Scali looks flustered. Without preamble, he begins to accuse Khrushchev of an aggressive policy: "Is your general secretary crazy?" Feklisov objects: "The arms race was initiated by the United States!"

The two part, dissatisfied with each other. The situation is becoming more and more explosive with each passing hour. Secret information is leaking into the residency: the American army will be ready to land on Cuba on October 29th. And at the same time, no important instructions are coming from Moscow...

Father, - says Natalia Alexandrovna, - was silent about the events around the Caribbean crisis for many years. Once there was only something like a hint, but then, because of my youth, I did not understand anything. He gave me two tickets to the Theater of Satire for a performance based on Burlatsky's play The Burden of Decisions. He said: "It might be interesting. It's about American affairs, President Kennedy is played by Andrei Mironov. I can't go." My friend and I ran only because of Mironov. The play was about the Caribbean Crisis, there was a Soviet employee named Fomin, and I, since I was born in New York, had the same surname as a child! She could, it seems, think about something ... But, frankly, we were not interested in watching the performance.

On the morning of October 26, Fomin decides to invite Skali to lunch at the same restaurant in the hope of getting fresh information from him. In the book "Danger and Survival" McGeorge Bundy (US national security adviser) will later write that Scali's upcoming meeting with a Soviet intelligence officer was reported to the president. Kennedy ordered Fomin to be told: "Time is short. The Kremlin must urgently make a declaration of its consent, without any conditions, to withdraw its missiles from Cuba."

The intelligence officer's memory preserved this meeting in all its details. Alexander Semenovich spoke about her in the book "Confession of a Scout" (published in 1999; the second edition, prepared by her daughter, was published in 2016):

Rubbing his hands and looking at me with a smile, Scali said:

Khrushchev apparently considers Kennedy a young, inexperienced statesman. He is deeply mistaken, of which he will soon be convinced. The Pentagon assures the President that in forty-eight hours it will be able to do away with the Fidel Castro regime and Soviet missiles.

Invading Cuba is tantamount to giving Khrushchev free rein. The Soviet Union could strike back at a vulnerable spot for Washington.

Scali did not seem to expect such an answer. He looked into my eyes for a long time, then asked:

Do you think, Alexander, it will be West Berlin?

As a response, it is quite possible ... You know, John, when a thousandth avalanche of Soviet tanks goes into battle, and ground attack aircraft attack from the air at a strafing flight ... They will sweep away everything in their path ...

This is where our polemic with Scali ended ... Here I must say that no one authorized me to tell Scali about the possible capture of West Berlin. It was the impulse of my soul ... I acted at my own peril and risk. "

Khrushchev's informant

The scout could not guess what happened next. His words were immediately communicated to the owner of the White House, and after three hours Kennedy handed over to the journalist a compromise proposal to resolve the crisis.

Scali called Fomin to a new meeting.

"Wasting no time, he announced that, on behalf of the "highest authority," he conveys the following conditions for resolving the Caribbean crisis: the USSR dismantles and removes rocket launchers from Cuba under UN control; the United States lifts the blockade of the island; the United States publicly undertakes not to invade Cuba " .

The intelligence officer asked to clarify what the term "highest power" means. "Minting every word, the interlocutor said: "John Fitzgerald Kennedy is the President of the United States of America."

Fomin assured Scali that he would immediately report the proposal from the American side to his ambassador. "But it's one thing to promise, and another thing to do." Ambassador Dobrynin studied the stunning text for exactly three hours, then invited Feklisov. He said in an apologetic voice: "I cannot send such a telegram, because the Foreign Ministry did not authorize the embassy for such negotiations."

"Surprised at the ambassador's indecisiveness," Feklisov recalled, "I signed the telegram myself and handed it over to the cryptographer to send to my boss."

Khrushchev's positive answer came on Sunday, October 28, at ten o'clock in the morning. The USSR withdrew its missiles from Cuba, the US lifted the blockade from the island, and six months later removed its missiles from Turkey. The earthlings breathed a sigh of relief.

Doctor of Philosophy Hakob Nazaretyan, head of the Euro-Asian Center for Megahistory and System Forecasting of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, claims that these two men - Feklisov and Skali - saved not just millions of lives, but the civilization of the planet Earth. "These were days and hours of world history, very modestly imprinted in Russia by ungrateful descendants."

Mysterious Mr. "X"

The American scientist James Blythe, author of the book On the Brink ("On the verge"), in 1989 in Moscow handed over to the scout his book with the inscription "Alexander Feklisov - the person with whom I always wanted to meet; the person who played a key role in the greatest event our time".

According to the book "13 Days" by Robert Kennedy, then the Minister of Justice, a film of the same name was shot, where one of the main characters was introduced under the name Alexander Fomin. When it became clear that the possibilities of official diplomacy have been exhausted, the political adviser to the American president (played by Kevin Koestner) comes up with a happy idea to involve a TV journalist who is friends with a certain Alexander Fomin in the negotiations. "His real name is Alexander Feklisov," the adviser says. "He's a super spy! The chief intelligence officer of the KGB!"

The film was released in 2000, Feklisov managed to watch it. Natalia Alexandrovna recalls:

My father liked the movie. The only thing that annoyed me was the way they dressed "Alexander Fomin" - the collar of his sweater peeked out from under his jacket. He said: "Only farmers wore sweaters, but I always wore a shirt and a tie!" But in general, he said, the film accurately reflects the events.

Private Alexander Fedotov, a telephone operator-dispatcher, was selected for a mysterious "task" from a separate company at the headquarters of the 21st Air Defense Division in Odessa. Place of deployment - the village of Limonar in the province of Matanzas, the territory of the former American driving school. The combat mission is to control all aircraft in the Cuban sky.

Some details from the story of Alexander Grigoryevich about the Cuban business trip were recorded by our correspondent in St. Petersburg, Anna Romanova.

Duty

The entire map of Cuba was divided into a coordinate grid with secret codes that changed once a week. I accepted encrypted applications and entered them into the "Flight Plan" - this was necessary in order to exclude civil aircraft from the category of air targets.

Since the beginning of September, the Americans have been especially active in "ironing" the Cuban sky in F-104 fighters. "Couple of Americans at low level, wait" - a typical call from the radar post. Radars catch the target, they receive coordinates at the headquarters, the planners put the target on the tablet ...

Life

Changing of the guard at night. Machine guns under the cloaks, you are constantly waiting for the "contra" bullets from around the corner. A dozen meters from the guard post, behind the fence in a wretched hut, lives an old Cuban who sneaks along the fence at night with a candle in his hand. He scares the hell out of us - what is he doing there at night? Who is looking for? Later we found out that it was a harmless madman.

Our people went to the Cubans with concerts - they sang, played out funny scenes from army life. During such "tours" I saw a sight not for the faint of heart on the coast of the Gulf of Florida! There are hundreds of American ships on the road, desperate young Cubans are brandishing Colts on the shore. "Patria o muerte!" - the slogan of the revolution. It was evident how their support for such a power as the USSR inflames them.

During the harvest season, ours helped local farmers pick tomatoes - but only green ones for export, so that they could ripen on the way. Eaten to the stomach...

denouement

The night of October 26-27 passed in monstrous tension. In the evening, all the women from our territory - civilian radio operators, telephone operators were taken to karst caves, which served as shelters. The personnel were ordered to carry weapons. Our radars have spotted targets - dozens of US aircraft rush to the Cuban borders. Fidel Castro ordered: "Cuban borders are sacred and inviolable, destroy any violator!" Immediately an order comes from Moscow: "Categorically do not take any action against American aircraft in violation of Cuban borders!"

The planes flew to the border and began loitering along it. The whole night and the whole next day became a test of strength and endurance - what will happen next? Who will give in? Who can't stand it? Only later did we learn that ours had shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft with a missile.

At home, Alexander Fedotov was waiting for the bride - a Leningrad student. In Cuba, he collected for her a herbarium of exotic flowers and plants from Cuba. Of course, he made "applications" by phone to his colleagues - they sent him rarities with an opportunity from different parts of the island. That girl became his wife, they have been living together in St. Petersburg for more than forty years.

Junior Sergeant Felix Sukhanovsky: The Cubans tried to persuade us: "Kamrad, launch a rocket!"

My father, Felix Alexandrovich Sukhanovsky, junior sergeant of the engineer company of the 181st missile regiment of the 50th Red Banner Missile Division of the 43rd Red Banner Missile Army, spoke for the first time about his Cuban epic only at the end of the 80s. I only spoke recently. I wrote down his story, excerpts from which I offer Rodina.

Alexey Sukhanovsky, Arkhangelsk

The silence of word of mouth

I was drafted into the army from the first year of the Arkhangelsk Forest Engineering Institute, already at the age of 22. He graduated from "Education" as a junior sergeant, head of a radio station, and ended up serving in an engineering company. The head of our division was Lieutenant Colonel Gerasimov, a Suvorovite, a polite, tough, figured drill soldier.

The omniscient "word of mouth" turned out to be either deaf or dumb: no rumors about where we were being sent circulated. Just one of the nights at the end of September 1962, we were alerted and sent to the port of Nikolaev on covered trucks. From there, in ignorance, sailed for seventeen days, having no idea about the destination. We unloaded into the pitch night, passing to the pier to the trucks through the corridor of submachine gunners. Some, completely killed by the rolling of the sea, were dragged in their arms. Where we are is unknown. Darkness is total. Constellations - do not understand what ...

At six in the morning the sun rose and we saw palm trees. Only later did we learn that we were camping in the countryside at Los Palacios near San Cristobal, southwest of Havana.

"Comrade-comrade, press!"

Settled in a fairly large perimeter, surrounded by barbed wire. Guards were carried by Cuban soldiers, who, as our company commander, Captain Kologreev, said, were told by Fidel himself: "If something happens to at least one of the Russians, I will shoot." But for all the time there were no sabotage or provocations in our places. Only every day American reconnaissance planes flew over the location.

The mood of the guys was different. Who hung his nose, saying, they say, here is our grave, we will not get out of here forever. Who, not at all discouraged, silently did their job, and the noisy Leningraders completely set off in search of adventure: they made contacts with the guards and then boasted of their acquaintance with local girls, admired Cuban rum and even got hold of a guitar. I think everything except the guitar was a lie and a boast.

On the fourth day after the landing, they assembled the launch pads, docked the warheads of nuclear warheads to the missiles, refueled them, put them in a combat position, pointed them at targets - and from October 25 they were waiting for the order to launch in full readiness.

This is how our combat position near San Cristobal was captured for history by American reconnaissance aircraft: two launch pads, long tents, a command post, cable lines, a fleet of tractors and tankers with TM185 fuel and AK27I oxidizer, columns of cars, rain-soaked roads among thinned palm forest. ..

We did not feel the full tension of the situation, although we understood that the launch of just one R-12 would begin a worldwide hell. Each rocket with a capacity of one megaton is 50 Hiroshima. The Cubans, seeing our power, happily persuaded: "Comrade-comrade, press-press, launch a rocket! Let's show these Americans!" They were very offended that we would not hit the States with our club. There was no order. And we waited.

Company International

Back in the Union, we were told that we must be wary of the components of rocket fueling, otherwise "there will be no children." I remember standing at the guard post of the fuel depot, and the sun was baking the tanks, and yellow clouds of gas would periodically puff out through the safety valves...

Meanwhile, information reached us that after the installation of our missiles in Florida, a wild panic began. The entire population of the peninsula rushed deep into America with fear. Of course, it will hurt anyone here when nuclear missiles are ready under your nose...

All this did not last so long, but I remember it as if through a fog. Even on the approach to Cuba, I began to have arrhythmia of the heart. True, I didn’t understand what was happening to me - everything was shaking, pounding, my pulse was crazy ... My entire Cuban epic passed in such a state of health. My comrades were not in the best condition either. Perhaps the conditions of the sea passage affected, perhaps the tropical climate with a sharp difference in night and day temperatures. Constant contacts with fantastic insects did not add to the mood - they are hefty, poisonous and disgusting there. So I didn’t really frolic in Cuba, I spent more time in a tent. Memories remain vague and heavy.

Life proceeded in the location of the company, in which there was a complete Soviet international: Ossetians, Armenians, foremen-Chechens, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Tajiks, and of the Slav brothers in great numbers. They lived together. They had no losses. Nobody got sick. Even without lice. Leisure time was spent as best they could, and in fact it was replaced by political information, which was carried out by the political officer or battalion commander: the situation is difficult, but stable, and therefore soon - home! We did not see the famous Cuban cigars, and there were only a couple of smokers in our company. We were not given any money, but the soldiers' salaries were already received in full in the Union.

"Give them a rustle!"

There was no work for our company - they stood ready for the entire Cuban special operation.

On October 28, we received the order to roll up and load onto ships. On October 29, our regiment was removed from combat duty.

We arrived at the port of Nikolaev in early December. They felt like winners, rejoiced that they returned alive and healthy. "Give them a rustle!".

Three days later, the radio operators said that on the Voice of America radio, they conveyed congratulations to Lieutenant Colonel Gerasimov on his return and new intercession on combat duty. I don’t think that our command was pleased with such awareness of the enemy ...

At home I didn't say anything about Cuba. I am very sorry that I soon lost my flashlight, issued before the operation "Anadyr" - the only thing that remained my memory of the Island of Freedom.

Next year, Permian Alexander Georgievich Gorensky will turn 80. And during the Caribbean crisis, the 24-year-old lieutenant technician ended up in Cuba as part of the 584th separate aviation engineering regiment. Dislocation - base "Granma". The main firing sector is in the northeast and north directions, the additional one is in the direction of the island of Pinos.

The memoirs of Alexander Georgievich about the October days of 1962 were recorded by our correspondent in Perm, Konstantin Bakharev.

FEES. Operation Checkered Shirt

In the spring of 1962, my colleagues and I in 642 OAPIB (separate fighter-bomber air battalion), stationed at the Martynovka airfield of the Odessa military district, were offered a business trip to "a country with a maritime subtropical climate." I agreed. Five people were sent from our regiment: Major Anatoly Andreevich Orlov, Lieutenant Vladimir Borisov, Senior Lieutenants Sergei Cherepushkin, Valery Zaichikov, and myself.

They issued uniforms - a sand-colored technical suit, boots with thick soles with high lacing - berets, a khaki panama with wide brim and sand-colored T-shirts. They also gave out civilian clothes: shirts, a hat, a light raincoat, shoes and suits. The shirts were all the same style - short-sleeved and plaid. Someone joked that we were members of Operation Checkered Shirt. It took root, and we no longer called the business trip in a different way.

During the training camp, I saw that girls from the library were burning books in the courtyard of the headquarters. They were ordered to write off the most dilapidated copies. I selected for myself "Quiet Flows the Don", "Twelve Chairs", "Walking Through the Torments", a collection of O Henry and Nekrasov. I took the books with me. Then, in Cuba, they were borrowed from me to read, and in the end the books sold out. Only "Quiet Don" remained. And when there was nothing to read, we dismantled his volumes into notebooks, numbered them, and so we all read - one after another.

SEA TRIP. Aviaexport containers

The regiment arrived in Baltiysk, where it began to load on the ship "Berdyansk". We settled in the hold, and on the deck, in addition to truck cranes and other apparently civilian equipment, we installed two huge containers with the inscriptions "Aviaexport". Four camp kitchens were hidden in one. Food was prepared for us in them and then lowered into the hold in thermoses. The second container was a toilet. During the day it was possible to walk only 2-3 people. If the number of visitors is increased, then someone might notice that water is constantly flowing from the air container. At night, the toilet was allowed to visit without restrictions.

September 16, 1962 set sail. Went 18 days. As we approached Cuba, American warplanes began flying around us. First, large twin-engine, then fighters appeared. They made each flight according to a certain program: they descended very low (up to 15-20 meters above the sea), entered from different courses - from the stern and bow across the course of the ship, then along the course - also from the bow and stern. They flew only during the day, but very often: up to six times a day. We took a lot of pictures, you could see how the photo hatches were opening, sometimes you could even see the brilliance of the optics. After the flight, some pilots waved affably and showed that they were flying home, to the west.

For a possible rebuff, if the Americans decide to search the ship, four platoons were created, armed with knives, pistols and grenades. Two platoons are on duty in the bow and stern cabins, two are in reserve. In addition, machine guns and machine guns are in reserve, if it comes to them. The platoons were mostly made up of officers, but there were also soldiers, who were the most physically strong and athletic.

DISLOCATION. "Black Widow"

Our regiment was stationed at the former American military base, now it was called "Granma". In addition to us, there was an anti-aircraft missile division, a regiment of Mi-4 transport helicopters, and in early October an artillery division appeared with four 80-mm guns. The regiment commander was Colonel Alexei Ivanovich Frolov, the chief of staff was Lieutenant Colonel Damir Maksudovich Ilyasov. The structure is simple: two combat squadrons, which were engaged in guiding and launching missiles, and one technical squadron, which was supposed to prepare missiles for firing.

We were armed with FKR-1, front-line cruise missiles capable of carrying high-explosive and nuclear charges. The missiles were transported in plywood-lined containers with the inscription "Aviaexport" in Russian and English. Our regiment had 48 of these missiles. And at the PRTB - a mobile missile and technical base - nuclear warheads for missiles were stored. We had to build a storage facility for them with a special temperature regime.

Unloaded in the port of the city of Mariel. After unloading, the chief of staff ordered me to lead the guard guarding five containers with missiles. They were immediately taken from the pier into the jungle so that no one could see. I was scared because I was afraid that it was full of snakes. On the spot we were instructed by a Cuban. I tried to understand it with the help of a pocket phrase book, but I did not understand anything. The containers stood on a clearing area of ​​approximately 200x200 meters. I posted three. The night passed quietly.

In the morning, one of the Cuban trailer drivers (they were used to transport containers) came up to our car - a gas truck, and suddenly jumped up and shouted: "Negro! Negro!" I look, on the floor of the "gazik" there is a black tarantula-type spider, large, five to six centimeters in diameter. I was not afraid of tarantulas, there are many of them near Odessa, and they are harmless. I took a rag from the driver, grabbed this spider through it and threw it out of the car. The negro spider furiously trampled underfoot. And then we were told that this spider, the "black widow", can kill a person with one bite.

THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS. Waiting for the bombing

On October 25, 1962, the regimental chief of staff announced that the Americans would bomb us. After that, of course, we had a slight jitters. The Americans flew very low over us, five or six times a day. In the evenings they came from the west, from the setting sun. They are not visible, so they sneaked up. The MiGs began chasing them, driving them aside. And when their reconnaissance plane was shot down, the Americans began to appear less often.

We lived in anticipation of war. They were inclined to believe that hostilities would still begin. But we were ready for it. We were told by the commanders that, according to all estimates, after the start of the war, we will live for half an hour, no more. Then we will be covered. But during this time, our regiment could fire 3-4 missiles with nuclear warheads. So from Florida, namely where we were aimed, there would also be little left. Our regiment would have dealt with it in 20 minutes. And the second regiment with the FKR would have smashed all the American troops on Guantanamo Bay.

NIGHT GUEST. Salvo on a submarine

At night, we were awakened by a salvo from the artillery battalion, commanded by senior lieutenant Sergei Yakovlev, we called him Yashka the artilleryman. A very determined and meticulous officer. Before that, at his request, we made a raft and dragged it across the sea. The gunners aimed at it, spent the whole day and then smashed the raft with one shot. And that night, the starley looked through binoculars, looked (he told us this later), saw a silhouette. Quietly woke up the staff. He personally aimed all four of his guns and gasped in one gulp! There, he says, sparks, fire. Well, it was not in vain that he set up sights on our raft. Hit without a miss.

In the afternoon divers arrived from Havana. And we also put on masks, fins and began to dive. And there, about two hundred meters from the shore, there are pieces of metal at the bottom. The submarine approached at night. And our starley artilleryman slammed her. She apparently sank nearby. The divers then lifted the corpses onto their boat. I counted seven dead people, they were stacked at the stern.

MORE NIGHT GUESTS. Post attack

We had about fifteen positions in the regiment that had to be guarded. And almost every night sentries fired. Apparently, someone really wanted to determine what our regiment was armed with. The attacks began. Cubans were standing nearby, their sentry was shot dead at night. They also attacked the post where I was the head of the guard.

At about 11 pm I went to take a nap. And suddenly a long burst from a machine gun! You can hear the bullets clicking on the leaves of the trees. I shouted: "Sentry, with a gun!" They rushed into the trenches and returned fire. They were beaten with machine guns and light machine guns. There was the sound of a running engine, like a truck, and soon it died away. My assistant, Sergeant Alexei Fedorchuk, wanted to pursue them. I forbade. It is hard to see at night, maybe there is an ambush.

In the morning we examined the place from where they shot at us. It turned out, from a dirt road, about a hundred meters. The fire was fired through a small forest. It can be said at random, but in our direction. We found a bunch of shell casings with a caliber of about 12.7. They gave it to the special officers who arrived in the morning.

LIFE. Sharks for lunch

The rear units of the regiment were still in the USSR. We ate dry rations, so we learned to fish. We went spearfishing with friends. A net was also found here, they put it at the mouth of the Santa Laura River. Once, four tons of mackerel were taken out at one time. And then the network disappeared. They found her, all torn apart, near the shore. Two sharks are entangled in it. We also ate these sharks, and threw the net away.

At that time in the USSR I received 107 rubles a month. In Cuba, we were given a salary of 195 percent of our home wage. That is actually twice as much. In addition, the Cuban authorities paid us three hundred pesos a month extra as military advisers. But they gave this money for only two months. Who wanted to, and received - in rubles or pesos, to choose from. Pesos in hand, and rubles went to the passbook. You could also take checks from Vneshtorgbank. Many, including me, gave part of their allowance to their families even before they were sent according to the report. In Cuba, I received sixty percent of the salary, the rest went to my wife and daughter. And I, like others, made money transfers to the family.

Soldiers and sergeants lived worse. They received ten rubles. Although they also doubled the payments. But the soldiers found a way out. Our regiment brought ten tons of caustic soda with them. For what - is unknown. And in Cuba at that time there was a terrible shortage of soap and detergents. And our soldiers began to trade this caustic soda. The case took on such a scale that from the early morning at our checkpoint there were already queues of cubans. They exchanged soda for money and food.

CONTACTS. From love to hate

When we arrived in Cuba, the Cubans were ready to carry us in their arms. In places where an entrance fee was required, we were let through without payment. In bars, the first drink for Russians was free. The Cubans did not hesitate to say that now "they will show" the Americans. And when it became clear that we would not fight, their mood changed dramatically. At our Granma base, leaflets appeared in Russian calling not to obey the orders of the commanders, but to declare war on the United States and land on the American mainland. In Havana, women threw rotten tomatoes at Anatoly Repin and me. Tolya wanted to "figure it out", I kept him. We then cleaned ourselves up, but still the clothes had to be thrown away.

DEPARTURE. A Farewell to Arms

When Khrushchev and Kennedy nevertheless agreed and the removal of ballistic missiles from Cuba began, transport was allocated from our regiment. For several days I was the head of the KrAZ, which carried cargo from former combat positions to the port. After I visited these positions, I had a difficult impression. I was struck by the scope and quality of the work performed: these were halls of not very deep (almost on the surface) occurrence with powerful arched vaults and gates with a meter thickness. But all this was so barbarously destroyed, plundered, smashed, that all that remained was to lament.

Mikhail Valeryevich Gavrilov, co-author of the recently published book "White Spots of the Caribbean Crisis" (together with V.A. Bubnov), told Motherland little-known details of the key episode of the Caribbean crisis. The American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down in the sky over the Cuban city of Banes on October 27, 1962 by the crew of the Soviet S-75 anti-aircraft missile system. The guidance officer was Lieutenant Alexei Artemovich Ryapenko. Here is how he describes it in the book:

"...Major Gerchenov ordered me: "Destroy the target in three bursts!" I switched all three firing channels to the BR mode and pressed the "Start" button of the first channel. The missile left the launcher. After that, I reported: "There is a capture!" The first rocket had already been flying for 9-10 seconds when the commander ordered: “Second, launch!” I pressed the “Start” button of the second channel. When the first rocket exploded, a cloud appeared on the screens. I reported: “First, detonation. Goal meeting. The target has been hit!" After the second missile was detonated, the target began to lose altitude sharply, and I reported: "Second, detonation. Target destroyed!"

Major I.M. Gerchenov reported to the regimental command post that target N33 had been destroyed. He told me that I worked calmly and confidently. Then we got out of the cabin. All the officers and operators gathered on the site. They picked me up and started throwing me up - it was easy, since I weighed only 56 kilograms. Looking back, I can say: we fulfilled our duty, unconditionally and to the end. Then I could not know that the American plane we shot down would be the only one, that this event would be a turning point in resolving the Caribbean crisis. It’s just that in those years, our entire generation was brought up in such a way that we were ready to die for our Motherland.”

The U-2 aircraft was designed and manufactured with the latest technology. In particular, it was equipped with a device for detecting Soviet radars. Mikhail Gavrilov asks the question: why did the experienced pilot Rudolf Anderson, knowing that he was "under the gun", not begin to maneuver, but continued to move on the intended course? The authors of the book "White Spots of the Caribbean Crisis" believe that the American command deliberately sent Anderson to certain death by disabling the security system of his aircraft in advance. The attack on U-2 was supposed to be the signal for the start of a massive air strike on Cuba:

President John F. Kennedy only after the latest American plane was destroyed did he realize that the United States in Cuba was opposed not by scattered groups of Soviet soldiers and officers, but by a combat-ready group of troops. And if the United States strikes at Cuba, there will be an irreversible reaction around the world.

The authors of the book are convinced that Georgy Voronkov, commander of the 27th Air Defense Division, Ivan Gerchenov, commander of the division, and Alexei Ryapenko, guidance officer, played one of the key roles in resolving the Caribbean crisis. Rodina correspondents turned to Alexei Artemovich Ryapenko, who lives in Sochi, for additional details:

- The book says that you worked on the goal "calmly and confidently." Can you decipher?

Confidence comes when you know your business perfectly. But I graduated from the Tambov Aviation School in 1960. But after graduation, I was sent to the anti-aircraft missile forces, so I had to learn a new specialty. On shooting, everything worked out in the best way, the calmness that you ask about came. Although I was the youngest officer in the division. On October 27, everything was even simpler than at the exercises.

- What did you think about when you clicked on the "Start" button?

There is nothing to think about, all actions are scheduled in seconds. The detection and shooting process is quite simple. We immediately grabbed the plane on the radar screen, the reconnaissance station led it. And as soon as he approached the detection zone, she handed it over to us. At the command of the commander, I pressed "Start". Regular situation even despite the fact that it was raining. The plane was moving at a low speed - somewhere around 800 kilometers per hour. So there were no problems.

- Was there a gala dinner for a successful shooting?

What are you speaking about! We didn't feel like it would end there. On the contrary, we feared retribution. So there was no time for treats.

No. Yes, I would refuse. Or he simply told them: "Guys, what you did was your initiative. And we did our job, our duty - we helped the Cubans defend their revolutionary gains. There's someone who wins ...".