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Stalingrad battle uranium briefly. Counteroffensive near Stalingrad, operation "Uranus": course, dates, participants. Under reconnaissance aircraft

Operation Uranus- the code name of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation of the Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943). The counteroffensive of the troops of three fronts: the South-Western (gen. N. F. Vatutin), Stalingrad (gen. A. I. Eremenko) and Don (gen. K. K. Rokossovsky), with the aim of encircling and destroying the enemy group of troops in the area city of Stalingrad.

Military situation before the operation

By the end of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 62nd Army held the area north of the Tractor Plant, the Barrikady plant and the northeastern quarters of the city center, the 64th Army defended the approaches to its southern part. The general offensive of the German troops was stopped. On November 10, they went over to the defensive on the entire southern wing of the Soviet-German front, with the exception of sectors in the areas of Stalingrad, Nalchik and Tuapse. The position of the German troops became more difficult. The front of Army Groups A and B was stretched for 2300 km, the flanks of the shock groups were not properly covered. The German command believed that after many months of heavy fighting, the Red Army was not in a position to carry out a major offensive. For the winter of 1942/43, the German command planned to hold on to the occupied lines until the spring of 1943, and then go on the offensive again.

The balance of forces on the fronts

Before the start of the operation (November 19, 1942), the ratio of manpower, tanks, aviation and auxiliary forces in this section of the theater of operations according to the "History of the Second World War, 1939-1945" was as follows:

Operation plan

Since September, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff began to develop a counteroffensive plan. On November 13, the strategic counteroffensive plan, codenamed "Uranus", was approved by the Headquarters under the chairmanship of I.V. Stalin. The plan was as follows: the Southwestern Front (commander N.F. Vatutin; 1st Guards A, 5th TA, 21st A, 2nd Air and 17th Air Armies) had the task of inflicting deep strikes from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don from the areas of Serafimovich and Kletskaya (advance depth approx. 120 km.); The strike force of the Stalingrad Front (64th A, 57th A, 51st A, 8th Air Army) advanced from the Sarpinsky Lakes region to a depth of 100 km. The shock groupings of both fronts were to meet in the Kalach-Sovetsky area and encircle the main enemy forces near Stalingrad. At the same time, part of the forces of these same fronts ensured the creation of an external encirclement front. The Don Front, consisting of the 65th, 24th, 66th, 16th air armies, delivered two auxiliary strikes - one from the Kletskaya region to the southeast, and the other from the Kachalinsky region along the left bank of the Don to the south. The plan provided for: to direct the main blows against the most vulnerable sectors of the enemy's defense, to the flank and rear of his most combat-ready formations; strike groups to use terrain advantageous for the attackers; with a generally equal balance of forces in the breakthrough areas, by weakening the secondary areas, create a 2.8-3.2-fold superiority in forces. Due to the deepest secrecy of the development of the plan and the enormous secrecy of the concentration of forces achieved, the strategic surprise of the offensive was ensured.

Operation progress

Start of the offensive

The offensive of the troops of the South-Western and right wing of the Don Fronts began on the morning of November 19 after a powerful artillery preparation. Troops of the 5th tank armies broke through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian army. The German troops tried to stop the Soviet troops with a strong counterattack, but were defeated by the 1st and 26th tank corps introduced into the battle, the advanced units of which went into the operational depth, advancing to the Kalach area. On November 20, the strike force of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. On the morning of November 23, the advanced units of the 26th Panzer Corps captured Kalach. On November 23, the troops of the 4th Panzer Corps of the Southwestern Front and the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Stalingrad Front met in the area of the Sovetsky farm, closing the encirclement ring of the Stalingrad enemy grouping in the interfluve of the Volga and Don. The 6th and main forces of the 4th tank armies were surrounded - 22 divisions and 160 separate units with a total strength of 330 thousand people. By the same time, a large part of the outer front of the encirclement was created, the distance of which from the inner one was 40-100 km.

On November 24, the troops of the Southwestern Front, having defeated the Romanian troops surrounded in the Raspopinskaya area, took 30 thousand prisoners and a lot of equipment. On November 24 - 30, the troops of the Stalingrad and Don fronts, fighting fierce battles with the encircled enemy troops, halved the area occupied by them, squeezing it in the territory of 70-80 km from west to east and 30-40 km from north to south.

In the first half of December, the actions of these fronts to eliminate the encircled enemy developed slowly, since, due to the reduction of the front in the pocket, he condensed his battle formations and organized defenses in equipped positions occupied by the Red Army in the summer of 1942. A significant (more than 3-fold) underestimation of the number of encircled German troops played a significant role in slowing down the offensive.

On November 24, Hitler, having rejected the proposal of the commander of the 6th Army, F. Paulus, to break through in a southeast direction, ordered to hold Stalingrad in anticipation of outside help. At the end of November, the German troops operating against the outer front of the encirclement were united into the Don Army Group (commanded by General Field Marshal E. Manstein), which also included the encircled group.

Development of events

In the areas of Kotelnikovsky and Tormosin, the Wehrmacht created two strike groups. On December 12, the Goth strike force, which, according to Soviet data, had 9 infantry and 4 tank divisions, 125 thousand people, 650 tanks, which, however, is not confirmed by German sources, went on the offensive from Kotelnikovsky along the railway to Stalingrad, not waiting for the concentration of the Tormosinsky group in order to release the encircled troops. Using, according to the Soviet version, not confirmed by German sources, a significant superiority in forces over the 51st Army, the enemy pushed it back across the river. Aksai, where on December 15 his offensive was stopped. On December 19, the enemy resumed the offensive, but was stopped by the troops of the 2nd Guards and 51st armies on the river. Myshkov, 40 km from the encircled troops. On December 16, the offensive of the troops of the South-Western Front began on Morozovsk and Kantemirovka in order to defeat the enemy in the Middle Don region and reach the rear of the Tormosinsky group. During three days of fierce fighting, the enemy's defenses were broken through in five directions. By December 31, the Italian 8th Army and the German task force Hollidt were completely defeated. The 2nd Guards Army, during the counteroffensive on December 24-31, inflicted a complete defeat on the Goth group, which suffered heavy losses, including 5200 prisoners and threw it back to Zimovniki, pushing the outer front of the encirclement 200-250 km 57th, 64th I and the 62nd Army of the Stalingrad Front were transferred to the Don Front to eliminate the encircled troops. On January 1, 1943, the Stalingrad Front was renamed the Southern Front and received the task of advancing in the Rostov direction. By the beginning of January, the position of the encircled troops had worsened. The space occupied by them was shot through by artillery, material reserves were depleted.

Elimination of German resistance

On January 8, 1943, the Soviet command presented an ultimatum to surrender to the command of the encircled troops, but on Hitler's orders, it rejected it. On January 10, the liquidation of the Stalingrad cauldron began by the forces of the Don Front (Operation "Ring"). At this time, the number of encircled troops was still approx. 250 thousand, the number of troops of the Don Front was 212 thousand. The enemy stubbornly resisted, but the Soviet troops moved forward and on January 26 cut the group into two parts - the southern one in the city center and the northern one in the area of the tractor plant and the Barrikady plant. On January 31, the southern group was liquidated, its remnants, led by Paulus, surrendered. On February 2, the northern group was finished. This ended the Battle of Stalingrad.

Operation results

During the Stalingrad offensive operation, two German armies were destroyed, two Romanian and one Italian armies were defeated. 32 divisions and 3 brigades were destroyed, 16 divisions were destroyed. The enemy lost more than 800 thousand people, the losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 485 thousand people, including irretrievable - 155. The conditions for conducting an outstanding operation were created by the Soviet troops during the Stalingrad defensive operation starting from September 1942. “Before the Battle of Stalingrad, history did not know the battle when such a large grouping of troops was surrounded and would have been completely defeated. The defeat of the enemy on the Volga marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War as a whole, the expulsion of enemy troops from Soviet territory began. ”- G.K. Zhukov. It should be noted that, of course, it is difficult to talk about the complete defeat of the encircled grouping - after all, a significant part of it was evacuated by air. The encircled grouping, which did not attempt to break through the internal front of the encirclement, was completely destroyed, down to the last unit. A significant number of the wounded (from the diary of F. Paulus - 42 thousand) were evacuated from the boiler by air, but Paulus does not say how many of the wounded managed to reach the "mainland". It should, however, be noted that the very word "evacuation" implies export to the rear, that is, if Paulus correctly used this word, then he meant that all 42 thousand people reached the "mainland".

additional information

Only during the operation "Ring" according to Soviet data 10.01. - 02.02. In 1943, 91,545 were taken prisoner and more than 140,000 (up to 147,200) enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed. According to various sources, from 30 to 42 thousand wounded were taken out of the boiler by air. Only as prisoners before the start of Operation Ring, he lost 16,800 people.

The Soviet command estimated the size of the grouping that was to be surrounded in the final version of Operation Uranus in the range of 80-90 thousand. The initial version had a more modest scale. The underestimation did not have a significant impact on the rapid encirclement, which occurred within 4-5 days (instead of the estimated 3 days), but greatly slowed down the liquidation of the encircled troops. Such a large underestimation with a final brilliant result is not the only example in military history. A similar example is the Battle of Novi. The prolonged presence of a huge pocket, which riveted all the forces and attention of the enemy to itself and sharply limited the possible options for its actions on the entire southern wing, allowed the Soviet command to brilliantly build on the success of the encirclement and inflict new huge losses on the enemy.

Memory

At the junction of the troops of the South-Western and Stalingrad fronts (modern village of Pyatimorsk) in 1955, the monument "Connection of Fronts" was erected. Author E. V. Vuchetich, architects L. Polyakov and L. Dyatlov.

Great Patriotic and World War II. And it began with a successful Red Army offensive, code-named "Uranus".

Prerequisites

The Soviet counter-offensive near Stalingrad began in November 1942, but the preparation of the plan for this operation at the Headquarters of the High Command began in September. In autumn, the German march to the Volga bogged down. For both sides, Stalingrad was important both in a strategic and propaganda sense. This city was named after the head of the Soviet state. Once Stalin led the defense of Tsaritsyn from the Whites during the Civil War. Losing this city, from the point of view of Soviet ideology, was unthinkable. In addition, if the Germans had established control over the lower reaches of the Volga, they would have been able to stop the supply of food, fuel and other important resources.

For all the above reasons, the counteroffensive near Stalingrad was planned with particular care. The process was favored by the situation at the front. The parties for some time switched to positional warfare. Finally, on November 13, 1942, the counter-offensive plan, code-named "Uranus", was signed by Stalin and approved at Headquarters.

original plan

How did the Soviet leaders want to see the counteroffensive near Stalingrad? According to the plan, the Southwestern Front, under the leadership of Nikolai Vatutin, was to strike in the area of \u200b\u200bthe small town of Serafimovich, occupied by the Germans in the summer. This grouping was ordered to break through at least 120 kilometers. Another shock formation was the Stalingrad Front. Sarpinsky lakes were chosen as the place of his offensive. After passing 100 kilometers, the armies of the front were to meet with the Southwestern Front near Kalach-Soviet. Thus, the German divisions that were in Stalingrad would be surrounded.

It was planned that the counteroffensive near Stalingrad would be supported by auxiliary strikes of the Don Front in the area of Kachalinskaya and Kletskaya. At Headquarters, they tried to determine the most vulnerable parts of the enemy formations. In the end, the strategy of the operation began to consist in the fact that the blows of the Red Army were delivered to the rear and flank of the most combat-ready and dangerous formations. It was there that they were least protected. Thanks to good organization, Operation Uranus remained a secret for the Germans until the day it was launched. The unexpectedness and coordination of the actions of the Soviet units played into their hands.

Encirclement of the enemy

As planned, the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad began on November 19. It was preceded by a powerful artillery preparation. Before dawn, the weather changed dramatically, which made adjustments to the plans of the command. Thick fog did not allow aircraft to take off, as visibility was extremely low. Therefore, the main emphasis was on artillery preparation.

The first under attack was the 3rd Romanian army, whose defenses were broken through by Soviet troops. In the rear of this formation were the Germans. They tried to stop the Red Army, but failed. The defeat of the enemy was completed by the 1st Tank Corps under the leadership of Vasily Butkov and the 26th Tank Corps of Alexei Rodin. These parts, having completed the task, began to move towards Kalach.

The next day, the offensive of the divisions of the Stalingrad Front began. During the first day, these units advanced 9 kilometers, breaking through the enemy defenses on the southern approaches to the city. After two days of fighting, three German infantry divisions were defeated. The success of the Red Army shocked and disconcerted Hitler. The Wehrmacht decided that the blow could be smoothed out by a regrouping of forces. In the end, after considering several options for action, the Germans transferred two more tank divisions to Stalingrad, which had previously operated in the North Caucasus. Paulus, until the very day when the final encirclement took place, continued to send victorious reports to his homeland. He stubbornly repeated that he would not leave the Volga and would not allow the blockade of his 6th Army.

On November 21, the 4th and 26th Southwestern Fronts reached the Manoilin farm. Here they made an unexpected maneuver, turning sharply to the east. Now these parts were moving straight to the Don and Kalach. The 24th Wehrmacht tried to stop the advance of the Red Army, but all its attempts came to nothing. At this time, the command post of the 6th Army of Paulus urgently relocated to the village of Nizhnechirskaya, fearing to be caught by the attack of Soviet soldiers.

Operation "Uranus" once again demonstrated the heroism of the Red Army. For example, the advance detachment of the 26th Panzer Corps crossed the bridge over the Don near Kalach in tanks and vehicles. The Germans turned out to be too careless - they decided that a friendly unit equipped with captured Soviet equipment was moving towards them. Taking advantage of this connivance, the Red Army destroyed the relaxed guards and took up a circular defense, waiting for the arrival of the main forces. The detachment held its positions, despite numerous enemy counterattacks. Finally, the 19th tank brigade broke through to him. These two formations jointly ensured the crossing of the main Soviet forces, which were in a hurry to cross the Don in the Kalach region. For this feat, commanders Georgy Filippov and Nikolai Filippenko were deservedly awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On November 23, the Soviet units took control of Kalach, where 1,500 soldiers of the enemy army were captured. This meant the actual encirclement of the Germans and their allies who remained in Stalingrad and the interfluve of the Volga and Don. Operation "Uranus" at its first stage was successful. Now 330 thousand people who served in the Wehrmacht had to break through the Soviet ring. Under the circumstances, the commander of the 6th Panzer Army, Paulus, asked Hitler for permission to break through to the southeast. The Fuhrer refused. Instead, the Wehrmacht forces, located near Stalingrad, but not surrounded, were united in a new army group "Don". This formation was supposed to help Paulus break through the encirclement and hold the city. The trapped Germans had no choice but to wait for the help of their compatriots from outside.

Unclear prospects

Although the beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive near Stalingrad led to the encirclement of a significant part of the German forces, this undoubted success did not mean at all that the operation was over. The Red Army continued to attack enemy positions. The Wehrmacht grouping was extremely large, so the Headquarters hoped to break through the defense and divide it into at least two parts. However, due to the fact that the front narrowed noticeably, the concentration of enemy forces became much higher. The counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad slowed down.

Meanwhile, the Wehrmacht prepared a plan for Operation Wintergewitter (which translates as "Winter Thunderstorm"). Its goal was to ensure the elimination of the encirclement of the 6th Army under the leadership of the Blockade, the Don Army Group was supposed to break through. The planning and conduct of Operation Wintergewitter was entrusted to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. The main striking force of the Germans this time was the 4th Panzer Army under the command of Hermann Goth.

"Wintergewitter"

At the turning points of the war, the scales tilt to one side or the other, and until the last moment it is not at all clear who will be the winner. So it was on the banks of the Volga at the end of 1942. The beginning of the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad remained with the Red Army. However, on December 12, the Germans tried to take the initiative into their own hands. On this day, Manstein and Goth began to implement the Wintergewitter plan.

Due to the fact that the Germans delivered their main blow from the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Kotelnikovo, this operation was also called Kotelnikovskaya. The blow was unexpected. The Red Army understood that the Wehrmacht would try to break the blockade from the outside, but the attack from Kotelnikovo was one of the least considered options for the development of the situation. On the way of the Germans, seeking to come to the rescue of their comrades, the 302nd Rifle Division was the first. She was completely scattered and disorganized. So Gotu managed to create a gap in the positions occupied by the 51st Army.

On December 13, the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht attacked the positions occupied by the 234th Tank Regiment, which was supported by the 235th Separate Tank Brigade and the 20th Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade. These formations were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Diasamidze. Also nearby was the 4th mechanized corps of Vasily Volsky. Soviet groups were located near the village of Verkhne-Kumsky. The fighting of the Soviet troops and units of the Wehrmacht for control over it lasted six days.

The confrontation, which went on with varying success on both sides, almost ended on December 19. The German grouping was reinforced by fresh units that came from the rear. This event forced the Soviet commanders to retreat to the Myshkovo River. However, this five-day delay in the operation played into the hands of the Red Army. During the time that the soldiers fought for every street of Verkhne-Kumsky, the 2nd Guards Army was brought up to this area nearby.

critical moment

On December 20, the army of Goth and Paulus was separated by only 40 kilometers. However, the Germans, who were trying to break through the blockade, had already lost half of their personnel. The advance slowed down and eventually stopped. Goth's powers are over. Now, to break through the Soviet ring, the help of the encircled Germans was needed. The plan for Operation Wintergewitter, in theory, included the additional plan Donnerschlag. It consisted in the fact that the blocked 6th Army of Paulus had to go towards the comrades who were trying to break the blockade.

However, this idea was never implemented. It was all about Hitler's order "not to leave the fortress of Stalingrad for anything." If Paulus broke through the ring and connected with Goth, then he would, of course, leave the city behind. The Fuhrer considered this turn of events a complete defeat and disgrace. His ban was an ultimatum. Surely, if Paulus had fought his way through the Soviet ranks, he would have been tried in his homeland as a traitor. He understood this well and did not take the initiative at the most crucial moment.

Manstein's retreat

Meanwhile, on the left flank of the attack of the Germans and their allies, the Soviet troops were able to give a powerful rebuff. The Italian and Romanian divisions that fought on this sector of the front retreated without permission. The flight took on an avalanche-like character. People left their positions without looking back. Now the road to Kamensk-Shakhtinsky on the banks of the Severny Donets River was open for the Red Army. However, the main task of the Soviet units was the occupied Rostov. In addition, the strategically important airfields in Tatsinskaya and Morozovsk, which were necessary for the Wehrmacht for the rapid transfer of food and other resources, became naked.

In this regard, on December 23, the commander of the operation, Manstein, gave the order to retreat in order to protect the communications infrastructure located in the rear. The maneuver of the enemy was used by the 2nd Guards Army of Rodion Malinovsky. The German flanks were stretched and vulnerable. On December 24, Soviet troops again entered Verkhne-Kumsky. On the same day, the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive towards Kotelnikovo. Goth and Paulus were never able to connect and provide a corridor for the retreat of the encircled Germans. Operation Wintergewitter was suspended.

End of Operation Uranus

On January 8, 1943, when the position of the encircled Germans finally became hopeless, the command of the Red Army issued an ultimatum to the enemy. Paulus had to capitulate. However, he refused to do so, following the order of Hitler, for whom a failure at Stalingrad would have been a terrible blow. When the Headquarters learned that Paulus was insisting on his own, the offensive of the Red Army resumed with even greater force.

On January 10, the Don Front proceeded to the final liquidation of the enemy. According to various estimates, at that time about 250 thousand Germans were trapped. The Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad had already been going on for two months, and now a final push was needed to complete it. On January 26, the encircled Wehrmacht grouping was divided into two parts. The southern half turned out to be in the center of Stalingrad, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Barricades plant and the tractor plant - the northern half. On January 31, Paulus and his subordinates surrendered. On February 2, the resistance of the last German detachment was broken. On this day, the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad ended. The date, moreover, became the final one for the entire battle on the banks of the Volga.

Results

What were the reasons for the success of the Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad? By the end of 1942, the Wehrmacht had run out of fresh manpower. There was simply no one to throw into battles in the east. The rest of the energy was exhausted. Stalingrad became the extreme point of the German offensive. In the former Tsaritsyn it choked.

The key to the whole battle was precisely the beginning of the counter-offensive near Stalingrad. The Red Army, through several fronts, was able to first encircle and then eliminate the enemy. 32 enemy divisions and 3 brigades were destroyed. In total, the Germans and their Axis allies lost about 800 thousand people. The Soviet figures were also colossal. The Red Army lost 485 thousand people, of which 155 thousand were killed.

For two and a half months of encirclement, the Germans did not make a single attempt to break out of the encirclement from the inside. They expected help from the "mainland", but the removal of the blockade by Army Group "Don" from the outside failed. Nevertheless, in the given time, the Nazis set up an air evacuation system, with the help of which about 50 thousand soldiers got out of the encirclement (mostly they were wounded). Those who remained inside the ring either died or were captured.

The plan for the counteroffensive near Stalingrad was successfully carried out. The Red Army turned the tide of the war. After this success, a gradual process of liberation of the territory of the Soviet Union from Nazi occupation began. In general, the Battle of Stalingrad, for which the counteroffensive of the Soviet armed forces was the final chord, turned out to be one of the largest and bloodiest battles in the history of mankind. The battles on the burnt, bombed and devastated ruins were further complicated by the winter weather. Many defenders of the motherland died from the cold climate and the diseases caused by it. Nevertheless, the city (and behind it the entire Soviet Union) was saved. The name of the counter-offensive at Stalingrad - "Uranus" - is forever inscribed in military history.

Reasons for the defeat of the Wehrmacht

Much later, after the end of World War II, Manstein published his memoirs, in which, among other things, he described in detail his attitude to the Battle of Stalingrad and the Soviet counter-offensive under it. He blamed Hitler for the death of the encircled 6th Army. The Fuhrer did not want to surrender Stalingrad and thus cast a shadow on his reputation. Because of this, the Germans were first in the boiler, and then completely surrounded.

The armed forces of the Third Reich had other complications. Transport aviation was clearly not enough to provide the encircled divisions with the necessary ammunition, fuel and food. The air corridor was never used to the end. In addition, Manstein mentioned that Paulus refused to break through the Soviet ring towards Goth precisely because of the lack of fuel and the fear of suffering a final defeat, while also disobeying the order of the Fuhrer.

Zhukov. Ups, downs and unknown pages of the life of the great Marshal Gromov Alex

Operation Uranus

The operation conceived by Zhukov was codenamed "Uranus". During the preparations, a new Southwestern Front was created under the command of General N.F. Vatutin. The Stalingrad Front became the Don Front under the command of K. K. Rokossovsky, and the former South-Eastern Front became the Stalingrad Front under the command of General A. I. Eremenko.

"Uranus" was prepared in deep secrecy. Even the commanders of the fronts almost until the last moment did not know the details. In most reports, the offensive was called "resettlement", and the commanders were listed under pseudonyms - Vasiliev (Stalin), Konstantinov (Zhukov), Mikhailov (Vasilevsky) ...

And the Soviet troops continued to fight for every piece of Volga land, exhausting and exterminating the enemy.

Zhukov recalled this time in this way: “September 13, 14, 15 were difficult, too difficult days for the Stalingraders. The enemy, regardless of anything, step by step broke through the ruins of the city closer and closer to the Volga. It seemed that people could not stand it. But as soon as the enemy rushed forward, our glorious fighters of the 62nd and 64th armies shot him point-blank. The ruins of the city became a fortress. However, with each passing hour, there was less and less strength left.

The turning point in these difficult and, as it seemed at times, last hours was created by the 13th Guards Division of A. I. Rodimtsev. After crossing to Stalingrad, she immediately counterattacked the enemy. Her blow was completely unexpected for the enemy. On September 16, the division of A. I. Rodimtsev recaptured Mamaev Kurgan. The Stalingraders were helped by air strikes under the command of A. E. Golovanov and S. I. Rudenko, as well as attacks and artillery shelling from the north of the troops of the Stalingrad Front against units of the 8th German army corps.

It is necessary to pay tribute to the soldiers of the 24th, 12th Guards and 66th Armies of the Stalingrad Front, the pilots of the 16th Air Army and long-range aviation, who, regardless of any victims, provided invaluable assistance to the 62nd and 64th armies of the South-Eastern front in holding Stalingrad.

Many Soviet soldiers distinguished themselves in the battles for Stalingrad. One can recall Sergeant Yakov Pavlov, who became a living legend, who defended the same house, the commander of a machine gun company, Captain Ruben Ruiz Ibarruri (son of the leader of the Communist Party of Spain, Dolores Ibarruri), Vasily Zaitsev, a sniper of the 62nd Army, Alexander Kuznetsov, commander of a rifle battalion, pilot Gavriil Ignashkin, Captain Sergei Pavlov, commander of a tank company, senior sergeant Georgy Khachin, gunner of a separate artillery brigade, Lieutenant Eduard Utukin, commander of a rifle platoon ...

Zhukov reproached Marshal Chuikov for the fact that in his memoirs he "did not consider it necessary to pay tribute to his comrades-in-arms - the soldiers of the 1st, 24th and 66th armies of the Stalingrad Front, the 16th air army and long-range aviation, those who, apart from with no sacrifice, provided invaluable assistance to Stalingrad in this difficult time.

And here is what a German officer from the Paulus army wrote about the Battle of Stalingrad: “At the same time, parts of our corps suffered huge losses, reflecting the fierce attacks of the enemy in September, who tried to break through our cut-off positions from the north. The divisions that were in this sector were bled dry, as a rule, 30-40 soldiers remained in the companies.

In a moment of calm, Zhukov, Eremenko, Khrushchev, Golovanov, Gordov and Moskalenko gathered at the command post of the 1st Guards Army to discuss the situation around Stalingrad and further actions.

Zhukov didn’t even say too much there: “Since the Supreme Commander warned me about keeping the projected plan for a large counteroffensive in the strictest confidence, the conversation was mainly about strengthening the troops of the South-Eastern and Stalingrad fronts. When A. I. Eremenko asked A. I. Eremenko about the plan for a more powerful counterattack, I did not shy away from answering that the Stavka would conduct counterattacks of much greater force in the future, but so far there is neither the strength nor the means for such a plan.

In preparing Operation Uranus, Zhukov tried to take into account the shortcomings of the recent counter-offensive near Moscow. Where it was planned to deliver the main blows, artillery was concentrated, capable of suppressing the enemy's defenses and coping with his tanks. Huge masses of troops and equipment were regrouping in an atmosphere of deep secrecy. Thirty thousand cars and almost one and a half thousand railway cars were involved. German intelligence did not detect what was happening, and by mid-November the regrouping was completed. And the enemy consoled himself with the certainty that “the Russians were seriously weakened during the last battles and would not be able to have the same forces in the winter of 1942/43 as they had last winter.”

For two days he worked for Eremenko. I personally examined the enemy positions in front of the 51st and 57th armies. Worked in detail with the commanders of divisions, corps and commanders of the upcoming tasks on "Uranus". The check showed that Tolbukhin is preparing better for Uranus ... I was ordered to conduct combat reconnaissance and, on the basis of the information obtained, clarify the battle plan and the decision of the commander ...

The two rifle divisions given by the Stavka (87th and 315th) to Eremenko have not yet been loaded, since they still have not received transport and horse trains.

So far, only one of the mechanized brigades has arrived.

Things are going badly with supplies and with the supply of ammunition. There are very few shells for "Uranus" in the troops.

The operation will not be prepared by the due date. Ordered to prepare for 11/15/1942.

It is necessary to immediately throw Eremenko 100 tons of antifreeze, without which it will be impossible to throw the mechanical parts forward; send the 87th and 315th rifle divisions faster; urgently deliver warm uniforms and ammunition to the 51st and 57th armies with the arrival of the troops no later than 11/14/1942.

If Eremenko and Vatutin's air preparation for the operation is unsatisfactory, then the operation will end in failure. The experience of the war with the Germans shows that an operation against the Germans can be won only if we have air superiority. In this case, our aviation must perform three tasks:

The first is to concentrate the actions of our aviation in the area of the offensive of our strike units, to suppress the German aircraft and to firmly cover our troops.

The second is to break the way for our advancing units by systematically bombing the German troops standing against them.

The third is to pursue the retreating enemy troops through systematic bombing and assault operations in order to completely upset them and prevent them from gaining a foothold on the nearest defense lines.

If Novikov thinks that our aviation is not in a position to carry out these tasks now, then it is better to postpone the operation for a while and accumulate more aircraft.

Talk to Novikov and Vorozheykin, explain the matter to them and let me know your general opinion.

1. In recent days, in the areas of Ivanov (Eremenko - A.G.) and Fedorov (Vatutin), no new enemy reserves have been established, only internal regroupings and pulling closer to the front line of army reserves, in particular the Romanian tank division in the Romanenko area. Small groups of tanks were set up 5-6 kilometers from the front line of defense, apparently, with these groups of tanks the enemy strengthens the defense of his front line. The enemy sets up a wire at the forefront, creates minefields.

Until now, antifreeze has not been delivered, all cars are filled with vodka. There are also no winter oils and lubricants. Many units, especially reinforcement artillery, did not receive warm uniforms.

2. To date, all parts of Fedorov have reached their original areas and are working on their tasks. Now everyone is working on organizing the rear, speeding up the delivery of ammunition, fuel and food.

In the period from 9 to 12.11, enemy aircraft systematically attacked the areas where Fedorov's units were concentrated. Since 12.11 aviation activity has sharply weakened. From a survey of prisoners captured in various sectors of the Fedorov front, it was established that there was no talk in the enemy troops about our impending resettlement, apparently, the enemy did not disclose our grouping and our intentions.

3. According to the condition of the units and the course of preparations for Ivanov and Fedorov, the resettlement period can be set for November 18 or 19. I don't think it's worth postponing any further. Please let me know about your decision and the date of relocation.

4. On 14 and 15.11 I will check the progress of preparations with Chistyakov and Batov. On the evening of 16 I suppose to be in Moscow. Mikhailov from Ivanov will arrive at Fedorov on November 16 at 12 o'clock.

You can set the date for the resettlement of Fedorov and Ivanov at your discretion, and then report it to me upon arrival in Moscow. If you have an idea that one of them will start resettlement one or two days earlier or later, then I authorize you to decide this issue at your discretion ...

Zhukov proposed that the forces of the South-Western Front and the 65th Army of the Don Front go on the offensive on November 19, and the Stalingrad Front on November 20. Firstly, this made it possible to smooth out the difference in distance that had to be overcome by troops advancing from different points, and secondly, this was supposed to mislead the enemy. Stalin agreed.

And on November 17, the Supreme Commander summoned Zhukov to Headquarters and ordered the organization of a distraction operation in the Moscow direction by the forces of the Kalinin and Western fronts.

During the preparation of Operation Uranus, Zhukov was twice on the verge of death. Both times - during flights.

“Before reaching Moscow, I felt that the plane was suddenly making a U-turn and descending. I figured we must have veered off course. However, a few minutes later, A.E. Golovanov drove the car to land on an unfamiliar area. Landed safely.

Why did they park the car here? I asked Golovanov.

- Say thank you for being near the airfield, otherwise we could have fallen.

- What's the matter?

- Icing.

And once, during an urgent flight to Moscow, on the orders of Stalin, the plane with Zhukov miraculously did not crash into a brick pipe. “The flight to Moscow was not bad, but on the approach to Moscow, visibility did not exceed one hundred meters. On the radio, the pilot was given a command from the Air Force flight department to go to the alternate airfield. In this case, we must have been late for the Kremlin, where the Supreme Commander was waiting for us.

Having assumed full responsibility, I ordered the pilot E. Smirnov to land on the Central Airfield and remained in his cockpit. Flying over Moscow, we suddenly saw the mouth of a factory chimney 10–15 meters from the left wing. I looked at Smirnov, he, as they say, without batting an eyelid lifted the plane a little higher and after 23 minutes led him to land.

- It seems that we have successfully got out of the situation about which they say "trumpet case"! I said as we landed.

“Everything happens in the air if the flight crew ignores the weather conditions,” he replied smiling.

- My fault! - I said to the pilot, while shaking his hand firmly.

This text is an introductory piece. From the author's book

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"PARADE OF THE PLANETS": "URANUS", "MARS" AND "LITTLE SATURN" None of the strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War can be considered in isolation from those that took place earlier, simultaneously with it or immediately after it. So the Moscow battle not only affected

10 seven-year cycles have passed since the operation "Uranus", and at this time you can objectively look at the events. Of course, Stalingrad fought heroically. If it were not for this operation, sooner or later they would have surrendered to the Germans, as other cities surrendered. After Operation Uranus, the Germans never recovered, like an attacking boxer who suddenly fell into a deep knockdown, they could not regain the initiative.
The defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad was not only a landmark event in the war, but also in the entire strategic approach of the Red Army. In his memoirs “The March on Stalingrad”, General Doerr, that for Germany the battle of Stalingrad was the gravest defeat in its history, and for Russia its greatest victory.
Until now, the origins of this event are surrounded by mystery. Let's try to solve this mystery with the help of astrology. Stalin did not trust his generals at the beginning of the war, especially since the summer of 1942 after the tragic defeats on the Kerch Peninsula and near Kharkov.

Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko

July 23, 1942 Timoshenko was removed from his post as commander of the newly renamed Stalingrad Front. The reasons are more than compelling: for the failure in the offensive near Kharkov in May 42, subsequent retreats, and finally, the encirclement near Millerovo. This event is significant. Timoshenko was People's Commissar of Defense before the war. It was he who corrected the situation in the Finnish War, and it ended relatively well for us, but this is where his merits end. Tymoshenko bears all responsibility for the defeats at the beginning of the war.
And here is 1942. Stalin did not touch him for a very long time, because there was no one to replace him. In the army it is impossible to put an ordinary general in command of the front, only in exceptional cases they take the commander of the army if he distinguished himself in previous battles. At the beginning of the war, few were different, so there was little choice. But, despite everything said, July 23 was a milestone date. Since that time, there were no more large boilers in the Red Army.

Stalin's search for new commanders was reflected even in Koreychuk's play "Front" , which Stalin edited in the summer of 42 on the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad. The plot of the play was that the commander of the front, Lieutenant General Gorlov, a brave participant in the Civil War, and today an ignorant military leader who is behind the times, faces a young, well-educated Major General Ognev. Ognev started the war as a colonel, commanded a division, then an army. At Gorlov's headquarters there are flatterers, sycophants, self-satisfied boors, drunkenness. Ognev openly opposes not only Gorlov, but the whole trend. According to the first version of the play, he independently develops his plan of operation, and without informing anyone, he carries out it with success.
Stalin edited this version: Ognev conveys his plan to a member of the military council of the front, and he to Moscow. The plan is brilliantly implemented. Gorlov was removed from his post, and Ognev was appointed in his place. Stalin wrote the following monologue into the lips of a member of the military council: Stalin says that it is necessary to nominate young, talented generals to leading positions more boldly. We must beat these narcissistic ignoramuses, replace them with others: new, young, talented, otherwise you can ruin the whole great cause».

After the publication of the play in Pravda on August 24 and 27, 1942, an unexpected reaction appeared. On August 28, Timoshenko sent a telegram: “ To Comrade Stalin, the play by Comrade Korneichuk Front, published in the press, deserves special attention. This play has been harming us for centuries, it must be withdrawn, the author brought to justice, those responsible for this should be sorted out. Tymoshenko»
As you can see, this play touched the nerve not only of Timoshenko, who was expelled from Stalingrad with shame. The commanders were given a signal: since it was impossible to fight before. Interestingly, Timoshenko was replaced by Lieutenant General Gordov as commander of the Stalingrad Front. Almost the namesake of the hero of the play. A month later, it was also taken down with a bang. The final version of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation was approved July 30, 1942 . It is this date that is on the maps of this plan, along with the signatures of the then Chief of the General Staff Vasilevsky and the true author of the idea of the operation plan, Colonel Potapov, i.e. Chief Operations Directorate of the General Staff.
Apparently, the idea was born during one of Potapov's reports to Stalin. Iosif Vissarionovich had a habit of working directly with the officers of the General Staff, who personally oversaw this or that direction.

Zhukov, who in his memoirs attributed the development of the plan to himself, in fact, with the permission of the Headquarters, was initiated into the plan of the Stalingrad operation only on September 27, 1942. He writes that on September 12 a meeting was held in the Kremlin, at which Vasilevsky was present. However, Stalin's visit log entry for 12 and 13 September does not record any visit involving Zhukov and Vasilevsky. The first such record for September is dated only September 27th.

Potapov

It is clear that an operation of this magnitude could not be prepared in a month and a half, as Zhukov writes about it. It follows from this that the Stalingrad operation or the counteroffensive plan "Uranus" was being prepared for 3.5 months in the strictest confidence. Only 3 people were devoted to all the details - Stalin, Vasilevsky and Colonel Potapov. Part of the operation was revealed to Zhukov at a meeting at the end of September. And even then only a part, because Zhukov was sure to the last that the main offensive of the Soviet army would take place near Rzhev (Operation Mars), and near Stalingrad there would only be a distracting blow.
The fact that Zhukov did not know the scale of the offensive near Stalingrad is evidenced by this fact. At that meeting on September 27, Zhukov and Konev refused to transfer the reserves of the Western and Kalinin fronts to the Volga. Meanwhile, Operation Mars is a deliberate misinformation of the Germans in order to convince them that the main blow will be against the German Army Group Center. At the end of July, Stalin appointed Zhukov to command the summer Rzhev-Sychevsk operation and hid that it was a distraction from the southern direction. Even more carefully, Stalin concealed the diversionary nature of this operation in November-December 1942.

On Stalin's instructions, the NKVD intelligence "helped" the Germans two weeks before Zhukov arrived here, i.e. told them that from November 15, it was near Rzhev that the main blow would take place. This is described in the memoirs of the Germans. Stalin played out the decisive significance of Operation Mars so stubbornly to the end that for decades to come he led everyone into a sincere delusion. This operation, as a distraction, played one of the decisive roles in the battle of Stalingrad. But Zhukov had no idea about this.
Operation Mars, with modest results, was marked by huge losses. After that, Stalin promoted Zhukov to the field marshals of the Soviet Union. Everyone, including Zhukov himself, was perplexed - for what? The Germans, based on these data in October-November 1942, transferred an additional 11th field army, led by Field Marshal Manstein, to the West Moscow direction, which was intended to storm Leningrad. Also transferred here another 5 divisions and 2 brigades from Western Europe with the beginning of the offensive of the Western and Kalinin fronts. Then another 10 divisions. In this direction, until November 24, 1942, in the Vitebsk region, Hitler held Manstein and only finally understood where the main events were taking place, sent him to Stalingrad.

As noted in his memoirs, the former head of the Vostok department, Reichand Gelem, on November 4, 1942, an important report was received along the Amber line. It said: “According to information received from a trusted person, a meeting of the military council was held under the chairmanship of Stalin, which was attended by 12 marshals and generals. It was decided to bring all offensive operations back on November 15, as far as weather conditions permit. The main blows were from Grozny (direction of Mazdok), in the area of Upper and Lower Mamon in the Don region, near Voronezh, Rzhev, near Lake Ilmen and near Stalingrad. It was reported to Hitler on 7 November.
In fact, the southwestern front delivered the main blow not on its right wing near the Upper and Lower Mamon farms against the Italians, but on its left wing against the Romanians. Apparently, this is also part of the misinformation - until the very beginning, only 3 people were privy to all its details. So even Amber's high-ranking informant (most likely one of the 12 listed generals) did not give convincing information about the Stalingrad counterattack. Hitler aimed the company of 1942 at the conquest of the oil-bearing regions of the USSR. In his choice, he was not free, his decision was influenced by the Rockefellers, who sponsored him, and Hitler was forced to obey them.
By the end of 1942, a positive picture was emerging for the German troops. The creation of a powerful grouping in the center and the presence of superior forces in the south gave Hitler no reason to worry about the eastern front. The Fuhrer even decided to use it for personal purposes. On November 7, together with the top generals, he went on vacation to the Alps. The day of November 19 passed quietly for him. Goebels' speech, delivered the day before, was printed: "The goal in the east is clear and unshakable, Soviet military power must be completely destroyed." Only short reports reported weak Soviet counterattacks near Stalingrad.

Operation Uranus began on November 19 for the troops of the Southwestern and Don Fronts, and for the Stalingrad Front on November 21. Operation "Mars" began on November 25, the day after the encirclement of Paul's army near Stalingrad. What was the success of the Stalingrad operation? The fact that for the planned encirclement, reserves were created in the form of another front and several armies. All this colossus of tanks, guns, ammunition (there were about 8 million of them on three fronts!), food and fuel had to be prepared and transferred by train to the Stalingrad region in absolute secrecy.
For this, the Volzhskaya rakada (rakada in French - front-line road) was built from Vilovlya station (84 km from Stalingrad) to Sviyazhsk station (on the right bank of the Volga opposite Kazan). The entire line was taken over on 1 November 1942. This meant that the railway line of about 1000 km was built in a fantastic time of 6 months! No one has ever assembled such railway tracks in such a time frame. The result was a turn in the war. Operation "Uranus" was prepared in an atmosphere of absolute secrecy - correspondence and telephone conversations were prohibited, all orders are transmitted orally only to direct executors. All movements of regiments, exit to positions only at night.
Military history has always considered the classic defeat by the Carthaginian Hannibal in 216 BC. Roman legionnaires near the town of Cannes in southeastern Italy. 2158 years after Cannes, Stalingrad will become synonymous with the classic operation to encircle and destroy the enemy. But if such a grandiose operation as the Stalingrad one ended successfully, then planetary constellations should indicate this.

Rice. 2 eclipses

And 2 solar eclipses could become such constellations. August 12, 1942 in the "anti-Russian field" and February 4, 1943 in the "Russian field". These eclipses mark the Battle of Stalingrad. The encirclement itself began and ended at the midpoint between these eclipses - November 15 and 23. This ensured the unexpectedness and surprise of this operation. “We had absolutely no idea about the strength of the Russian troops in the area. Previously, there was nothing here, and suddenly a blow of great force was suddenly dealt, which is of decisive importance.", - wrote one of the German generals.
The eclipse on August 12 is extremely interesting. Firstly, it happened on the star Merak, one of the stars of Ursa Major associated with our territory. Secondly, the eclipse was on Chiron, which indirectly indicates the anti-hero of the Battle of Stalingrad - Paulus (Libra by the Sun). Another rare constellation was at this time - Priapus and Razi connected in one degree with the White Moon - a new light cycle for 4 years turned on, which indicates a bright past program that, after the conjunction of these planets, can be reborn. The Sun was in this degree of the Zodiac on the day of the battle on the Kulikovo field and Borodino, which symbolizes the protection of the Russian egregore.
When superimposed on the map of the III Reich, this connection falls on Jupiter and Mars of the Reich, which means that from that moment on, the military authority of Nazi Germany will steadily decline until the victory of the Soviet army.

Rice tauksquare to Uranus

And finally, in July, a tauksquare was formed in the sky from the Lunar Nodes to Uranus. All the time of the Battle of Stalingrad, he will hold on and at key moments be completed to the cross. It will disintegrate only in January 1943. In what follows, we will follow these constellations.
Uranus is the ruler of the territory of Aquarius and at the same time this was the name of this operation, which led to a turn in the war. Interestingly, Uranus midway from the Moon's Nodes indicates freedom. Despite the incredible contraction from eclipses in its territory, Uranus gets freedom.
In the horoscope of the USSR, the eclipse on August 12 fell on Neptune, which indicates the secrecy and secrecy of the upcoming operation. It was after this eclipse that Operation Uranus was classified. And in Stalin's horoscope, this eclipse fell in the 5th house of the horoscope on the White Moon, which indicates a fatal period, at best bright and creative.

Finally, about Paulus, commander of the 6th German Army. If we compare him with Vasilevsky, then we will find they have a lot in common. Both were born under the sign of Libra, both staff officers. Paulus was appointed commander of the 6th Army in early January 1942. Prior to that, he had not commanded a corps, or a division, or even a regiment. He held his last combat position in 1934, commanding a separate tank battalion. Vasilevsky also commanded a regiment in 1930 and was on staff work until 1942. But despite all this, one becomes the chief of the army, and the second chief of the general staff and coordinated the 3 front lines.

Rice Paulus Horoscope

Friedrich Paulus was born on September 23, 1890 at 20:07 near the midpoint. Tall, trim, neat, Paulus invariably wore gloves, because he hated dirt. He took a bath and changed clothes twice a day, for which he was caustically called "noble lord". Maybe this is how the influence of the Sun in the degree of the “black vulture” affected, but also this degree gives a catastrophe after elevation. In his horoscope, we see several alarming circumstances.

First. The exact opposition between the White Moon and Vakshya with Uranus on the cusps of 6-12 houses causes concern. Also here is a tauksquare to the Moon in the 9th house. Undoubtedly, this is one of the main changes in his horoscope, which affected his fate. Uranus, lord of the 10th house in the 6th, shows a staff worker who may be noticed and his finest hour will come. But Vakshya here shows that everything will end in absurdity, even imprisonment, prison (White Moon in the 12th house) abroad (Moon in the 9th house).
Second. White Moon in the 23rd destructive degree of Aries in the "Germanic field". On the one hand, he marked the beginning of the destruction of the German state. But on the other hand, this is the destruction of a villainous country built on satanic ideology.
Third. Another fatal configuration, located at the former opposition, is a stretcher (with the opposition of Chiron - the Moon with Jupiter). The karmic aspects between them give stiffness and oppression, a conclusion, and Giedi's star on his Jupiter says that hundreds of thousands of people will freeze and die under his leadership.
Fourth. The Sun is in the destructive 1 degree of Libra. This is a collective degree of humanity, associated with judgment and condemnation. Indeed, Paulus was imprisoned as a prisoner for 10 years until 1953.
And finally fourth. The Black Moon is in the 4th house of the horoscope, which indicates the negative karma of the family or that it will be betrayed at home. Indeed, Hitler forbade him to surrender, and awarded him the rank of field marshal in the hope that Tom would commit suicide. In addition, given that he was born at the middle point and the Lunar Nodes are on the horizontal axis of the horoscope, then the eclipse will become for him a developer and retribution for past sins.

Now let's turn to eclipses. The solar eclipse on August 12 occurred on the Black Moon of Paulus in the 4th house at 19 gr. Leo, and the following happened in opposition at 16 gr of Aquarius in the 10th house, thereby marking the encirclement and liquidation of the German group. An eclipse on the Black Moon is considered very difficult - a betrayal at home. Hitler - Taurus, is in turn the 8th sign, the destroyer for Libra.

And now Vasilevsky. Stalin sent him to coordinate 3 fronts near Stalingrad. Only he, one of all, knew about the true goals of the operation. With this mission, as a representative of the Headquarters, he will stay there until the final encirclement. Unfortunately, we only know Vasilevsky's cosmogram - September 30, 1895. It can be assumed that his Moon is in the Russian field. Then the Ascendant falls into the sign of Virgo. At the same time, the Sun is in exact conjunction with Vakshya. Such a person should occupy the golden mean. If he rushes up to the pinnacle of power, then he will face a fiasco. He can get high positions if he doesn't want them. On June 26, 1942, he was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Before that, Stalin showed him a compromising letter, which listed his shortcomings, saying that he could not be in such a position. When Stalin asked what he thought about this, Vasilevsky replied that it was true. He strongly opposed this appointment. However, he was appointed to this position and in a year went from lieutenant general to marshal.
Vasilevsky, by nature, not a combatant general, was the only one who was fully dedicated to this operation. Rokosovsky, when he arrived at the command post of the southwestern front to coordinate the actions of the fronts, was outraged that the chief of the general staff was actually in command of the front. But he had no idea of the scale of the operation. Front commander Latutin himself did not know this.
It is interesting to look at the transit situation at the beginning of the counterattack on November 19-21 for Vasilevsky's horoscope. These days the Black Moon is in exact opposition to the White Moon. And the transiting White Moon passes along the Sun with Vakshya, closing the tauksquare. All this is preserved for a month, when Paulus's army was surrounded.
The name of the fronts also contains an element of secrecy. Stalin so confused everyone with names that even now it is not easy to figure it out. In July 1942, a huge area from the bend of the Don to Tsimlyansk was entrusted to one front. In August the front was divided in two, although the two fronts were led by the same man, Eremenko. Only in September, with the advent of Rokossovsky, did the division of fronts become a reality. But from October 31, a third front appears, which indicates the formation of Operation Uranus.
Vasilevsky writes that in order to preserve secrecy, the creation of the third front was postponed to the end of October. So the whole front was formalized 2 weeks before the offensive. This indicates a gradual, covert build-up of strength. And so, on November 19-21, a terrible force was struck from three sides. The main role in this operation was played by the southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, which took up positions against the flanks of the German grouping.
In general, the plan for Operation Uranus was simple. From the breakthrough sites on the Don River north of Stalingrad and from the chain of lakes south of the city, the armies fanned out, forming the outer and inner fronts of the encirclement. The middle of the fan was formed by tank and mechanized corps, which had the most penetrating power. They should have been the first to break through towards each other. Hope for a quick completion of the operation was given by the fact that on the flanks of the army of Paulus were Romanian troops, who were not distinguished by their stamina. The Don Front carried out the task of pinning down the encircled enemy and advancing with its right wing with limited targets.
“Send the receiver to get fur gloves” - such a telephone message was sent to the 5th Panzer Army. This meant an infantry attack on November 19 at 8.50. It was at this time that the fronts went on the offensive. This day became the day of the artillery holiday.

This war is special, it should be considered as a battle between the light and the dark. Therefore, when considering an astrological chart, we first of all pay attention to the shown good and evil. 8.50 - it was the 3rd sunny day. It is a sunny day that is important for an elective horoscope. 3rd day - the day of Asha Vakhishta, the day of the element of Fire, which was created first and was not defiled by Angromania. Also, this sunny day is dedicated to Airemon, the leader of the Aryan peoples, i.e. directly connected with the Russian egregore.

At the time of the start of Operation Uranus, a fatal cross was formed in the sky with the participation of Uranus, the Lunar Nodes, Chiron, the Sun and Venus. In general, this cross was kept throughout the operation. At this time, Uranus was closest to the Sun and could be seen with binoculars. At 12 o'clock at night, Uranus, like an 8-magnitude star, hung over the heads of the warriors.
The Sun was at the end of Scorpio in the Burnt Path, and by the end of the operation moved to the beginning of Sagittarius - the Diamond Path or the Road of Life. This sign, at best, gives protection and support to a light egregore. This is indicated by the aspect of the septile from the White Moon to the Sun. Moreover, transiting Venus and the Sun were exactly on the descendant of the horoscope of the III Reich. This operation symbolized the activation of his enemies. In the horoscope of the USSR, the Sun with Venus affects the White Moon. The White Moon at that time had aspects to three distant planets - a conjunction with Neptune, a sextile with Pluto and a trine to Uranus, and also made a septile to the Sun and Venus. All this speaks of a rare successful constellation for the forces of light.
At the same time, the Black Moon was in yellow (undicile) aspects to Neptune, Chiron, Jupiter. She was also in opposition to Aza, which weakened both of them.
On the Ascending Node, the symbol of evolutionary tasks, was the star of Ursa Major (connection with the Aryan egregor) Fekda. And finally, Jupiter makes trigonal aspects to the Sun and Venus, which speaks of great honors and awards in the near future for those who have embarked on a bright path.

The operation was completed in 4 days. As a result, on November 23 at 16.00, the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts were firmly connected in the area of Kloch and Sovetsky, closing the encirclement. In the early days, Paulus persistently sought permission to break out of the ring and leave Stalingrad, but Hitler ordered to hold out to the end, hoping to unblock the encircled group. It turned out that the Soviet army surrounded 330,000 people. This is much more than our military leaders expected. It was supposed to surround 90-120 thousand Germans. Therefore, the liquidation of the group was so delayed. In itself, the encirclement of such a large group did not mean their instant destruction. Moreover, by the autumn of 1942, the precedents of the encirclement of the Nazis by units of the Red Army demonstrated the high resistance of the enemy to getting into the boiler.
But this time it wasn't like that. The Germans could not transfer tanks from the central front, because they were involved in Operation Mars. The deblockade operation was called "Winter Thunderstorm" and Field Marshal Manstein was already preparing it. But a grouping of German troops went to the deblockade. But this happened only on December 12th. On December 14, there was no one on her way, except for scattered units and the 4th mechanized corps. It was one of those cases when, according to Churchill's catchphrase, " the fate of the many depended on the few».
The commander of the 4th Corps Zolsky had no room for error. He must fight, delaying the Germans as long as possible until the concentration of the main forces of the 2nd Guards Army. The battle lasted 5 days and time was won.

If you look at the elective horoscope of this battle on December 12, 1942, you can see that Mars from Ophiuchus closes the main cross of the planets in the period of December 12-18. For us, the greatest danger was on December 12-15, when Mars passed the Burnt Path.
Here, of course, people of the higher zodiac are fighting. If we superimpose the map of Major General Zolsky (March 22, 1897, 20.00 Moscow) on the map of the battle, then a strong Ophiuchus (Moon, Uranus, Saturn) is visible. The entire transit cross was included through this sign. General Ehard House was born on January 8, 1889 in Austria - the commander of the 6th German division. He fought with Zolski's army and had to release Paulus. He also had the highest zodiac in the cosmogram - Pegasus (Mars 30 gr Aquarius and Venus 2 gr Pisces). He also closed the entire cross on this connection. Ophiuchus defeated Pegasus and the deblockade failed. After that, the days of Paulus's army were numbered.

Content:

On November 19, 1942, Operation Uranus began - the offensive of the Red Army against Stalingrad, captured by the German troops. The headquarters set the fighters the task of encircling and destroying the enemy troops. In a few days, the army managed to close the ring around the 6th army of Friedrich von Paulus.

The defense of Stalingrad lasted 200 days. Fights were fought for every house, for every meter of land. German aviation made about two thousand sorties, literally wiping the city off the face of the earth, burned down the center with incendiary bombs along with the inhabitants.

July 17, 1942 is officially considered the start date of the Battle of Stalingrad. On this day, at the turn of the Chir and Tsimla rivers, the forward detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies met with the vanguards of the 6th German army. By the beginning of the battle, the German troops had superiority over the Soviet in tanks and artillery - 1.3 in aircraft - more than 2 times. In terms of numbers, the troops of the Stalingrad Front were twice inferior to the enemy.

By the end of July, the enemy pushed the Soviet troops back beyond the Don. The line of defense stretched for hundreds of kilometers along the river. By September 13, the Wehrmacht's shock groups pushed the Soviet troops in the direction of the main attacks and broke into the center of Stalingrad. Fierce battles went on for every house. Strategic positions, such as Mamaev Kurgan, the railway station, Pavlov's House and others, repeatedly changed hands. By November 11, after the most difficult and bloody battles, the Germans managed to break through to the Volga in a section 500 meters wide. The 62nd Soviet Army suffered huge losses, some divisions numbered only 300-500 fighters. By that time, the Headquarters already had a plan for a counteroffensive against Stalingrad. The operation was called "Uranus". The plan was to defeat the troops covering the flanks of the Stalingrad grouping of the enemy with strikes from the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, and, developing the offensive in converging directions, encircle and destroy the main enemy forces near Stalingrad.

The counteroffensive of the Red Army began on November 19, 1942. On the first day, the 1st and 26th Panzer Corps advanced 18 kilometers, and on the second day, 40 kilometers. On November 23, in the Kalach-on-Don area, the encirclement ring around the 6th Wehrmacht Army closed.

On January 10, 1943, the troops of the Don Front under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky began to carry out Operation Ring to defeat the group of Nazi troops surrounded near Stalingrad. The plan provided for the phased destruction of the enemy and the dismemberment of the 6th Army.

By the end of the day, Soviet troops, supported by artillery, managed to advance 6-8 km. The attack progressed rapidly. The enemy offered fierce resistance. The advance towards Stalingrad had to be temporarily halted on January 17 to regroup troops. The command of the 6th Army was again asked to capitulate, which was refused. On January 22, Soviet troops resumed their offensive along the entire encirclement front, and already on the evening of the 26th, a historic meeting of the 21st and 62nd armies took place near the village of Krasny Oktyabr and on Mamaev Kurgan.

On January 31, 1943, the southern group of troops of the Wehrmacht ceased resistance. The command headed by Colonel-General Friedrich von Paulus was captured. On the eve of his order, Hitler promoted him to field marshal. In a radiogram, he pointed out to the army commander that "not a single German field marshal has yet been captured." On February 2, the northern group of the 6th Army was liquidated. Thus, the battle for Stalingrad was over.