Battle of the Khalkhin Gol River 1939. Fighting on Khalkhin Gol. Historical reference. Quantitative factor in the battles at Khalkhin Gol

Bayin-Tsagan

Perhaps none of the events at Khalkhin Gol in May-September 1939 causes as much controversy as the battle for Mount Bayin-Tsagan on July 3-5. Then the 10,000-strong Japanese group managed to secretly cross Khalkhin Gol and begin moving towards the Soviet crossing, threatening to cut off Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the river from the main forces.

The enemy was accidentally discovered and, before reaching the Soviet crossing, was forced to take a defensive position on Mount Bayin-Tsagan. Having learned about what had happened, the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov ordered the 11th brigade of brigade commander Yakovlev and a number of other armored units immediately and without infantry support (Fedyuninsky’s motorized rifles got lost in the steppe and reached the battlefield later) to attack the Japanese positions.

Soviet tanks and armored vehicles launched several attacks, but, having suffered significant losses, were forced to retreat. The second day of the battle came down to constant shelling of Japanese positions by Soviet armored vehicles, and the failure of the Japanese offensive on the east bank forced the Japanese command to begin a retreat.

Historians still argue how justified the introduction of Yakovlev’s brigade into battle from the march was. Zhukov himself wrote that he deliberately went for it... on the other hand, did the Soviet military leader have a different path? Then the Japanese could have continued moving towards the crossing and a disaster would have occurred.

The Japanese retreat is still a controversial point for Bain-Tsagan - whether it was a general flight or a systematic, organized retreat. The Soviet version depicted the defeat and death of Japanese troops who did not have time to complete the crossing. The Japanese side creates a picture of an organized retreat, pointing out that the bridge was blown up even when Soviet tanks burst onto it. By some miracle, under artillery fire and air strikes, the Japanese managed to cross to the opposite bank. But the regiment that remained in cover was almost completely destroyed.

Bayin-Tsagan can hardly be called a decisive tactical victory for one of the sides. But in strategic terms, this is, of course, a victory for the Soviet-Mongolian troops.

Firstly, the Japanese were forced to begin a retreat, suffering losses and failing to complete their main task - the destruction of the Soviet crossing. Moreover, not once during the conflict did the enemy again try to force Khalkhin Gol, and this was no longer physically possible. The only set of bridge equipment in the entire Kwantung Army was destroyed by the Japanese themselves during the withdrawal of troops from Bain Tsagan.

Next, Japanese troops could only conduct operations against Soviet troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, or wait for a political solution to the conflict. True, as you know, the enemy expected something completely different...

Mongolia Mongolia 2,260 people (2 cavalry divisions)

In Japanese historiography the term " Khalkhin Gol" is used only to name the river, and the military conflict itself is called " incident at Nomon Khan", after the name of a small village in this area of ​​​​the Manchu-Mongolian border.

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✪ Battles at Khalkhin Gol

✪ Battle of Khalkhin Gol in 1939.

✪ Military conflict “The enemy found a grave on the Khalkin Gol River” 1939, USSR, Mongolia, Japan

✪ War in the days of lotus blossom. Battles at Lake Khasan with the Japanese 1938

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Background to the conflict

According to the Soviet side, the conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia, although the border ran 20-25 km to the east. The main reason for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the railway being built by the Japanese in this area, bypassing the Greater Khingan Khalun-Arshan - Ganchzhur to the USSR border in the area of ​​Irkutsk and Lake Baikal, since in some places the distance from the road to the border was only two or three kilometers. According to the Soviet historian M.V. Novikov, to substantiate their claims, Japanese cartographers fabricated forged maps with the border along Khalkhin Gol and “ a special order was issued to destroy a number of authoritative Japanese reference publications, the maps of which showed the correct border in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River", but the Russian historian K. E. Cherevko points out that the administrative border along the Khalkhin Gol channel was marked on a map published on the basis of Russian topographic surveys of 1906 and on the physical map of Outer Mongolia of the General Staff of the Republic of China in 1918.

May

The Soviet command took radical measures. On May 29, a group of ace pilots headed by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Ya. V. Smushkevich flew from Moscow to the combat area. 17 of them were heroes of the Soviet Union, many had combat experience of the war in Spain and China. They began training pilots and reorganized and strengthened the air surveillance, warning and communications system.

To strengthen air defense, two divisions of the 191st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment were sent to the Trans-Baikal Military District.

At the beginning of June, Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and G. K. Zhukov was appointed in his place, at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, M. V. Zakharov. Brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Soon after arriving in the military conflict area in June, the chief of staff of the Soviet command proposed a new combat plan: conducting an active defense on the bridgehead beyond Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack against the opposing group of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with Bogdanov's proposals. The necessary forces began to gather in the area of ​​​​combat operations: the troops were transported along the Trans-Siberian railway to Ulan-Ude, and then through the territory of Mongolia they followed a marching order for 1300-1400 km. Corps Commissar Zhamyangiin Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov’s assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry.

To coordinate the actions of Soviet troops in the Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, the commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army, commander of the 2nd rank G. M. Stern, arrived from Chita to the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River.

Air battles resumed with renewed vigor on June 20. In the battles of June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.

July

Fierce fighting broke out around Mount Bayan-Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired direct fire at the enemy, and at some points there were up to 300 aircraft on both sides in the sky above the mountain. The 149th Rifle Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles.

On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, retreated to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike force under the command of Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoki did not complete its task.

A group of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan found themselves semi-surrounded. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, by order of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge across Khalkhin Gol at their disposal was blown up. In the end, Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a wholesale retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. According to some Russian historians, more than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan, although according to the Japanese themselves, their total losses for the entire period of hostilities amounted to 8,632 people. killed. The Japanese side lost almost all their tanks and most of their artillery. These events became known as the “Bayan-Tsagan Massacre.”

The result of these battles was that in the future, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, Japanese troops “no longer dared to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.” All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.

However, Japanese troops continued to remain on Mongolia, and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the source of conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the goal of completely defeating the entire Japanese group located on the territory of Mongolia.

July August

The 57th Special Corps was deployed to the 1st Army (Front) Group under the command of Army Commander G. M. Stern. In accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, for the leadership of the troops, the Military Council of the Army Group was established, consisting of: commander of the 2nd rank army commander G. M. Stern, chief of staff brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov, aviation commander corps commander Ya. V. Smushkevich, corps commander G.K. Zhukov, divisional commissar M.S. Nikishev.

New troops, including the 82nd Infantry Division, urgently began to be transferred to the site of the conflict. The 37th Tank Brigade, armed with BT-7 and BT-5 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow Military District; partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the 114th and 93rd Rifle Divisions were formed.

General Ogisu and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. Moreover, taking into account the sad experience of the battles on Mount Bayan-Tsagan for the Japanese, this time the enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Crossing the river was not planned.

During the preparation by the Soviet command of the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly followed. All troop movements in the front-line zone were carried out only in the dark, it was strictly forbidden to send troops into the initial areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground by command personnel was carried out only in trucks and in the uniform of ordinary Red Army soldiers. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, throughout the preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side carried out active electronic warfare against the enemy. Knowing that the Japanese were conducting active radio reconnaissance and listening to telephone conversations, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed in order to misinform the enemy. Negotiations were conducted only on the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. Radio traffic in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code.

Despite the overall superiority in the forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive Stern managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. To carry out the offensive operation, two-week reserves of ammunition, food and fuel and lubricants were created. More than 4 thousand trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1300-1400 kilometers. It should be noted that one road trip with cargo and back lasted five days.

During the offensive operation, the Soviet command, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, planned to encircle and destroy the enemy in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River with unexpected strong flank attacks. At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in world military practice, tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational problems as the main striking force of flank groups performing an encirclement maneuver.

The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, an auxiliary blow by the Northern group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was supposed to pin down enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. The reserve, concentrated in the center, included the 212th Airborne, 9th Motorized Armored Brigades and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also took part in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions, as well as a motor transport division under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.

The balance of forces of the parties before the start of the offensive

August

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command.

At 6:15 a.m., powerful artillery preparation and air raids on enemy positions began. 153 bombers and about 100 fighters were launched into the air. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with the plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred when crossing the tanks of the 6th Tank Brigade, since when crossing Khalkhin Gol, the pontoon bridge built by the sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks.

The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance on the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications. Here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day.

Already on August 21 and 22, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so the Soviet command had to bring the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade into the battle.

Soviet aviation also performed well at this time. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers carried out 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese planes in air battles.

In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to provide support to its troops defending on the flanks. By the end of August 26, the armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian forces united and completed the complete encirclement of the Japanese 6th Army. After this, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed in parts.

In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese on August 23 on the Central sector of the front, the Soviet command even had to bring into battle its last reserve: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards. At the same time, it took a considerable risk, since the commander’s closest reserve - the Mongolian armored brigade - was located in Tamtsak-Bulak, 120 kilometers from the front.

Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to carry out counterattacks and release the group encircled in the Khalkhin Gol area ended in failure. On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, entered into battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment covering the border, but could not break through either that day or the next and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo . After the battles of August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, no longer attempted to release its encircled troops, having accepted the inevitability of their death.

The Red Army captured as trophies 100 vehicles, 30 heavy and 145 field guns, 42 thousand shells, 115 heavy and 225 light machine guns, 12 thousand rifles and about 2 million rounds of ammunition, and much other military equipment.

The last battles continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khaylastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of hostilities.

In total, during the conflict, the USSR lost 207 aircraft, Japan - 162.

During the fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River, Soviet troops actively used artillery: according to incomplete data (the results of the shelling of a number of objects in the adjacent territory were not established), 133 artillery pieces were destroyed by artillery fire (six 105-mm guns, 55 pieces of 75- mm guns, 69 small-caliber and three anti-aircraft guns), 49 mortars, 117 machine guns, 47 artillery, 21 mortar and 30 machine gun batteries were suppressed, 40 tanks and 29 armored vehicles were destroyed, 21 observation posts, 55 dugouts, 2 fuel warehouses and 2 warehouses with ammunition

Through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government appealed to the USSR government with a request to cease hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River, which came into force the next day.

But “de jure” the conflict ended only in May 1942 with the signing of the final settlement agreement. Moreover, it was a compromise settlement, largely in favor of the Japanese, based on the old map. For the Red Army, which was suffering defeats on the Soviet-German front, a rather difficult situation arose at that time. Therefore, the settlement was pro-Japanese. But it only lasted until 1945, before Japan's surrender in World War II.

Results

The victory of the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic at Khalkhin Gol was one of the reasons for the refusal of Japan to attack the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Immediately after the start of the war, the Japanese General Staff, taking into account, among other things, the experience of Khalkhin Gol, decided to enter the war against the USSR only if Moscow fell before the end of August. In response to Hitler's demand in a telegram dated June 30 to immediately fulfill his allied obligations and strike the USSR from the east, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on July 2, the final decision was made to wait until Germany was sure to win.

In Japan, the defeat and the simultaneous (August 23) signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact led to a government crisis and the resignation of the cabinet of Hiranuma Kiichiro. The new Japanese government announced on September 4 that it did not intend to interfere in any form in the conflict in Europe, and on September 15 it signed an armistice agreement, which led to the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on April 13, 1941. In the traditional confrontation between the Japanese army and navy, the “maritime party” won, defending the idea of ​​cautious expansion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. The German military leadership, having studied the experience of the Japanese wars in China and Khalkhin Gol, rated Japan’s military capabilities very low and did not recommend that Hitler commit himself to an alliance with it.

The fighting on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic coincided with negotiations between Japanese Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita and the British Ambassador in Tokyo Robert Craigie. In July 1939, an agreement was concluded between England and Japan, according to which Great Britain recognized the Japanese seizures in China (thus providing diplomatic support for aggression against the Mongolian People's Republic and its ally, the USSR). At the same time, the US government extended the trade agreement with Japan, denounced on January 26, for six months, and then fully restored it. As part of the agreement, Japan purchased trucks for the Kwantung Army, machine tools for aircraft factories for $3 million, strategic materials (until 10/16/1940 - steel and iron scrap, until 07/26/1941 - gasoline and petroleum products), etc. A new embargo was imposed only on July 26 1941. However, the official position of the US government did not mean a complete cessation of trade. Goods and even strategic raw materials continued to flow into Japan until the outbreak of war with the United States.

The events at Khalkhin Gol also became an important element of propaganda in the USSR. Its essence boiled down to the idea of ​​​​the invincibility of the Red Army in a future war. Participants in the tragic events of the summer of 1941 many times noted the harm of excessive optimism on the eve of the great war.

The impact of the Khalkhin-Gol campaign on the Sino-Japanese War is poorly understood.

"Golden Star"

The government of the Mongolian People's Republic established the badge “Participant in the battles of Khalkhin Gol,” which was awarded to distinguished Soviet and Mongolian military personnel.

Khalkhin Gol became the beginning of the military career of G.K. Zhukov. The previously unknown division commander (deputy commander of the ZapOVO), after the victory over the Japanese, headed (June 7, 1940) the largest Kiev military district in the country, and then became the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

The commander of the 1st Army Group, Commander G. M. Stern and the aviation commander, Ya. V. Smushkevich, were awarded Gold Star medals for the battles at Khalkhin Gol. After the end of the conflict, Smushkevich was appointed head of the Red Army Air Force, Stern commanded the 8th Army during the Soviet-Finnish War.

The chief of staff of the 1st Army Group, brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on November 17, 1939. At the end of hostilities in September 1939, by order of the USSR NKO, he was appointed deputy commander of the 1st Army Group (Ulaanbaatar). In the same month, by Decree of the Government of the USSR, he was appointed chairman of the Soviet-Mongolian delegation to the Mixed Commission to resolve controversial issues regarding the state border between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchuria in the conflict area. At the end of the negotiations, as a result of provocation on the Japanese side, Bogdanov made a “gross mistake that damaged the prestige of the USSR,” for which he was put on trial. On March 1, 1940, he was convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR under Art. 193-17 paragraph “a” for 4 years ITL. By a resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 23, 1941, he was amnestied with his criminal record expunged and placed at the disposal of NGOs of the USSR. He ended the Great Patriotic War with the position of division commander and the rank of major general.

Losses of the parties

According to official Soviet data, the losses of the Japanese-Manchurian troops during the battles from May to September 1939 amounted to more than 61 thousand people. killed, wounded and captured, including about 25,000 killed (of which about 20 thousand were Japanese losses). Officially announced losses of the Kwantung Army: 18 thousand people [ ] . Independent Japanese researchers give figures of up to 45 thousand people. [ ] . In the research of A. Nakanishi, the Japanese alone lost 17,405 - 20,801 people killed and wounded, the losses of the Manchus are not taken into account.

According to Soviet data, 227 Japanese and Manchu soldiers were captured during the battles. Of these, 6 died in captivity from wounds, 3 refused to return to Japan, the rest were transferred to the Japanese side). Also, three Barguts refused to return to Inner Mongolia.

The irretrievable losses of Soviet troops amounted to 9,703 people (including 6,472 dead, 1,152 who died from wounds in hospitals, 8 who died from disease, 2,028 missing, 43 who died from accidents). Sanitary losses amounted to 15,952 people (including 15,251 wounded, shell-shocked and burned, 701 sick). According to official data, the losses of the Mongolian troops amounted to 165 killed and 401 wounded (sometimes with reference to a certain Mongolian historian T. Ganbold, data are given about 234 killed and 661 wounded, and a total of 895 people for the total losses of the Mongolian troops). In the research of A. Nakanishi, the losses of the Soviet-Mongolian side amounted to 23,000 - 24,889.

During the battles, 97 Soviet soldiers were captured. Of these, 82 were returned in a prisoner exchange in September, 11 people were killed by the Japanese in captivity, 4 refused to return from captivity. Of the prisoners of war returned to the Soviet Union, 38 were tried by a military tribunal on charges of voluntary surrender or collaboration with the Japanese while in captivity.

Reflection in literature and art

The events at Khalkhin Gol were reflected in Soviet and world literature and art. Novels, poems and songs were written about them, and articles were published in newspapers.

• K. M. Simonov - novel “Comrades in Arms”, poem “Far in the East”, poem “Tank”, poem “Doll”.
• F. Bokarev - poem “Memory of Khalkhin Gol”
• H. Murakami - novel “Chronicles of the Wind-Up Bird” (long story by Lieutenant Mamiya).
• Gelasimov A. V. - novel “Steppe Gods”, 2008.

In cinema

• "Khalkin Gol" () - documentary film, TsSDF.
• “Listen, on the other side” () is a Soviet-Mongolian feature film dedicated to the battles at Khalkhin Gol.
• “I, Shapovalov T. P.” (, dir. Karelov E. E.) - the first part of the “High rank” dilogy, an episode in the film.
• “On the Roads of the Fathers” () - a television film by Irkutsk television journalist Natalya Volina, dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the end of the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River and the Soviet-Mongolian expedition to places of military glory.
• "Khalkin-Gol. 
• The Unknown War" () - a documentary film dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the victory on the Khalkhin Gol River. The film uses a large amount of chronicles, as well as comments from veteran participants in those events and historians.
• Volunteers

On May 11, 1939, an armed conflict (war) began on the Khalkhin Gol River between the USSR and the Empire of Japan; it is called the “Nomonhan Incident” in Japanese historiography. The clash between the two great powers took place on the territory of a third country - Mongolia.

On May 11, 1939, the Japanese attacked Mongolian border outposts near the Khalkhin Gol River. The formal reason for the attack was a border dispute. The Japanese side believed that the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo, a puppet state created by the Japanese military administration in 1932 on the territory of Manchuria occupied by the Japanese Empire, should pass along the Khalkhin Gol River. The Mongolian side believed that the border should pass 20-25 km east of the river. By May 14, the Japanese army occupied the entire “disputed” territory and declared it to belong to Manchukuo, i.e. de facto Japan. Mongolia could not support its right to these lands by armed means - its armed forces were very small and poorly armed.

Soldiers plant a victory banner on the Zaozernaya hill. 1938 Lake Khasan region Author of the survey: Temin Viktor Antonovich

Moscow, in accordance with the Mutual Assistance Agreement of March 12, 1936 between the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), transferred units of the 57th Special Corps to the Khalkhin Gol area. Soviet-Mongolian units, after battles with varying degrees of success, managed to oust Japanese units from the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic by the end of May. Almost simultaneously with the fighting on land - from May 22, fierce air battles began. June became a month of struggle for air supremacy. Until the end of May, the Japanese Air Force had air superiority - Soviet pilots had little experience, the aircraft were old models. The Soviet command took decisive measures to eliminate the Japanese advantage in the air: on May 29, a group of experienced pilots was sent to the front line from Moscow, led by the Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force, Yakov Smushkevich. 17 of them were heroes of the Soviet Union, many had experience of the war in China and Spain. New fighters were also deployed - modernized I-16 and I-153 Chaika fighters. After this, the Japanese Air Force lost its advantage and began to suffer significant losses. By the end of June, the Soviet Air Force, after fierce fighting, gained superiority in the sky.

In June, both sides did not take active actions on land, preparing for a decisive battle. Within a month, both the Japanese and Soviet commands brought new troops into the conflict area. At the headquarters of G.K. Zhukov, and brigade commander Mikhail Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps, a combat plan was prepared. They were going to conduct an active defense against it on the bridgehead across the Khalkhin Gol River and prepare a strong counterattack against the Japanese army group opposing the Soviet-Mongolian forces. The General Staff of the Red Army and the People's Commissariat of Defense approved this plan.

Soviet officers during the battle for Khalkhin Gol. 1939

On July 2, the Japanese group went on the offensive: they struck Soviet-Mongolian units on the eastern bank of the river, while Japanese troops crossed the river and captured Mount Bayan-Tsagan on its western bank. The Japanese command was going to create a powerful defense in the hill area and strike from this position at the allied forces on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River in order to cut them off from the main forces and eliminate them. Zhukov threw the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev and the Mongolian armored division, which was in reserve, against the enemy who had broken through. Then the approaching rifle units also joined the battle. During the fierce battle, the Japanese forces that broke through were completely defeated and fled by the morning of the 5th, having lost all armored vehicles and artillery. It should be noted that at the same time there was a battle in the sky with the participation of up to 300 aircraft on both sides.

Already on July 8, the Japanese attacked Soviet positions on the eastern bank of the river. Fierce fighting raged for several days. On July 23, Japanese troops, after shelling, began an attack on the bridgehead of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. But after a two-day battle, having suffered heavy losses, the Japanese troops retreated to their original positions. At the same time, there were intense air battles, so from July 21 to 26, the Japanese Air Force lost 67 aircraft, and the Soviets 20. At the same time, the Japanese command was preparing a new major offensive - it was planned for August 24.

Captured soldiers of the 6th (Kwantung) Army. 1939

Anticipating the enemy's offensive, the Soviet command struck on August 20. The offensive of the Soviet troops came as a complete surprise to the Japanese command. After fierce fighting, the Kwantung Army was defeated by August 31, and the territory of the MPR was cleared of enemy troops. At the beginning of September, Soviet troops repulsed several attempts to cross the state border line, and this ended the war on land. Air combat continued until September 15: on this day another major air battle took place - 120 Japanese Air Force aircraft against 207 Soviet aircraft. On the same day, an armistice agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan, and on September 16, hostilities on the border ceased.

US game in the Far East

Many people know this or that information about the role of the great Western powers (France, Great Britain and the USA) in organizing the “crusade” of European countries led by the German Empire against the Soviet Union. In fact, Adolf Hitler, National Socialism (Nazism) and the Third Reich were projects of the “world behind the scenes”. Germany was the tip of the weapon directed against the Red (Stalinist) project of human development.

At the same time, the United States tried to push the Japanese Empire against the USSR. Japan was supposed to divert Moscow's forces and attention to the Far East. Initially, the Americans tried to use China as a means of external pressure on the USSR. The Americans sharply strengthened their position in China after right-wing nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek came to power. By 1930, compared to 1914, US investment in China increased 3.7 times, government loans and financial assistance increased 6 times. But by 1930, Americans were seriously disillusioned with the Kuomintang leader. Chiang Kai-shek was unable to restore the unity of the state by eliminating the communists and semi-feudal general clans, or create a united, strong China that could threaten the USSR from the East. In 1929, Chinese troops suffered a crushing defeat from Soviet troops. In addition, a significant part of China came under the control and influence of the Chinese communists, which was unacceptable for the West and the United States.

Therefore, the United States began to urgently look in the Far East for a force that could make China under the control of American capital (driving out European competitors - the British and French), and turn Chinese territory into a springboard for military influence on the Union. As a result, they followed the path of the British Empire, which used Japan to undermine the position of the Russian Empire in the Far East (the Americans also took part in this matter). The choice fell on the Japanese Empire, which, after the Europeans, together with the United States, ousted it from China in 1920-1922. needed raw materials, markets for its goods and capital investments for its developing industry. China was to become the source of raw materials and sales market for the Japanese, and the States had the finances.

Mongolian soldiers on the front line

In addition, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria was beneficial to the United States in the sense that it was supposed to force Chiang Kai-shek to focus even more on the United States. The creation of a “hotbed of war” in the Far East had a lot of advantages for the United States. In June 1930, the United States pushed Japan to war: the Americans raised customs duties on goods from the Japanese Empire by 23% and thereby virtually completely closed their domestic market to the Japanese. In addition, Japan was financially dependent on the West and the United States. The Americans also took into account the expansionist plans of the Japanese; at this stage, the interests of Japan and the United States coincided. On September 18, 1931, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria began. Under political and diplomatic pressure from the Americans, Chiang Kai-shek gave the order to the Chinese troops to retreat without offering resistance to the aggressor. During the year and a half during which Japanese troops captured Manchuria, the United States provided financial assistance to Japan in the amount of $182 million.

It is believed that until mid-1939, Tokyo pursued a foreign policy that was fully coordinated with Washington. In 1937, the Empire of Japan, with the permission of the United States, began a new war with China in order to undermine the positions of British and French capital there and expand the sphere of American influence in China at the expense of these powers. In the summer of 1938, the United States pushed Japan to aggression against the Soviet Union in order to distract Moscow from events in Europe (the conflict between Czechoslovakia and Germany over the Sudetenland) and to test the strength of the Red Army. There is a conflict at Lake Khasan.

Army commander 2nd rank G.M. Stern, Marshal of the MPR Kh. Choibalsan and corps commander G.K. Zhukov at the Hamar-Daba command post

In May-September 1939, Japan, with the consent of the United States, delivered a new blow to the USSR. The operation in the area of ​​the Khalkin-Gol River was supposed to divert Soviet forces and attention to the East, in anticipation of the Wehrmacht's invasion of Poland (and the possible movement of German troops further to the USSR). Washington planned to organize a full-scale war in the Far East so that the USSR would face the threat of war on two fronts. Only the decisive actions of the Red Army and the firmness of Moscow preserved the shaky peace on the eastern borders of the USSR. But the West partially solved the problem of diverting the forces and resources of the USSR to the Far East. The USSR was forced to seriously increase its forces in the Far East in order to fend off a potential blow from the Japanese Empire.

The United States generously financed the Empire of Japan to pin down Soviet forces in the Far East. In 1938 alone, the Morgan Financial Group provided Japan with loans worth $125 million, and the total US assistance to the Japanese in 1937-1939. amounted to 511 million dollars. In fact, the Americans financed the war against the Chinese people and the occupation of China by equipping the Japanese army. The United States supported Japan in its aggressive plans against the USSR and Mongolia.

In addition, the British also supported their old ally. In July 1939, an agreement was concluded between Tokyo and London, according to which the British side recognized the Japanese conquests in China (thus, Great Britain provided diplomatic support for the aggression of the Japanese Empire against the Mongolian People's Republic and its ally, the USSR). The American government extended the previously canceled trade agreement with the Empire of Japan for six months, and then completely restored it. As part of this agreement, the Japanese side purchased trucks for the Kwantung Army (which fought against Soviet troops), machine tools for aircraft factories, and various strategic materials (steel and iron scrap, gasoline and petroleum products, etc.). A new embargo on trade with Japan was only imposed on July 26, 1941.

Michitaro Komatsubara
Ryuhei Ogisu
Kenkichi Ueda Strengths of the parties by the beginning of August:
57,000 people
542 guns and mortars
2255 machine guns
498 tanks
385 armored vehicles
515 aircraft by the beginning of August:
75,000 people
500 guns
182 tanks
700 aircraft Military losses 9284 - 9,703 killed, dead and missing, 15,952 wounded and sick
45,000 people killed and wounded,
162 aircraft (according to Soviet sources - 660 aircraft and 2 balloons)

Japanese infantry crossing the river. Khalkhin Gol

In foreign historiography, in particular in American and Japanese, the term “Khalkin Gol” is used only to name the river, and the military conflict itself is called the “Nomon Khan incident.” "Nomon Khan" is the name of one of the mountains in this area of ​​the Manchu-Mongol border.

Background to the conflict

The conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia, although the border ran 20-25 km to the east. The main reason for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the railway being built by the Japanese in this area, bypassing the Greater Khingan Khalun-Arshan - Ganchzhur to the USSR border in the area of ​​Irkutsk and Lake Baikal, since in some places the distance from the road to the border was only two or three kilometers. To substantiate their claims, Japanese cartographers fabricated false maps with the border along Khalkhin Gol and “ a special order was issued to destroy a number of authoritative Japanese reference publications, the maps of which showed the correct border in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River» .

May 1939. First battles

The Soviet command took radical measures. On May 29, a group of ace pilots led by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Yakov Smushkevich flew from Moscow to the combat area. 17 of them were heroes of the Soviet Union, many had combat experience in the skies of Spain and China. They began training pilots and reorganized and strengthened the air surveillance, warning and communications system. After this, the forces of the parties in the air became approximately equal.

Downed Soviet fighter

At the beginning of June, Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and G. K. Zhukov was appointed in his place, at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, M. V. Zakharov. Brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Soon after arriving in the area of ​​military conflict in June, the chief of staff of the Soviet command proposed a new combat plan: conducting an active defense on the bridgehead beyond Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack against the opposing group of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with Bogdanov's proposals. The necessary forces began to gather in the area of ​​​​combat operations: the troops were transported along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan-Ude, and then through the territory of Mongolia they followed in marching order for 1300-1400 km. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov’s assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry.

To coordinate the actions of Soviet troops in the Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, the commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army, commander of the 2nd rank G. M. Stern, arrived from Chita to the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River.

Downed Japanese plane

Air battles resumed with renewed vigor on June 20. In the battles of June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.

Throughout June, the Soviet side was busy organizing defenses on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol and planning a decisive counteroffensive. To ensure air supremacy, new Soviet modernized I-16 and Chaika fighters were deployed here, which for the first time in the world used combat unguided air-to-air missiles, later used to create multiple launch rocket systems. Thus, as a result of the battle on June 22, which became widely known in Japan (in this battle, the famous Japanese ace pilot Takeo Fukuda, who became famous during the war in China, was shot down and captured), the superiority of Soviet aviation over Japanese aviation was ensured and it was possible to seize dominance in the air . In total, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft in air battles from June 22 to 28. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 aircraft.

July. The advance of the Japanese group

Komkor G.K. Zhukov and Marshal Choibalsan

Fierce fighting broke out around Mount Bayan-Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired direct fire at the enemy, and at some points there were up to 300 aircraft on both sides in the sky above the mountain. The 149th Rifle Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles.

On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, retreated to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike force under the command of Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoki did not complete its task.

The group of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan found themselves semi-surrounded. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, by order of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge across Khalkhin Gol at their disposal was blown up. In the end, Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a wholesale retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. According to some Russian historians, more than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan, although according to the Japanese themselves, their total losses for the entire period of hostilities amounted to 8,632 people. killed. However, it should be noted that some sources indicate total losses on both sides at 120 thousand people, which significantly contradicts official, both Soviet (7632 people killed) and Japanese data (8632 people killed). The Japanese side lost almost all their tanks and most of their artillery. These events became known as the “Bayan-Tsagan Massacre.”

The result of these battles was that in the future, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, Japanese troops “no longer dared to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.” All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.

However, Japanese troops continued to remain on Mongolia, and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the source of conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the goal of completely defeating the entire Japanese group located on the territory of Mongolia.

The 57th Special Corps was deployed to the 1st Army (Front) Group under the command of Army Commander Grigory Mikhailovich Stern. In accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, for the leadership of the troops, the Military Council of the Army Group was established, consisting of: commander commander of the 2nd rank Stern G. M., chief of staff corps commander Bogdanov M. A., aviation commander corps commander Ya. V. Smushkevich, corps commander Zhukov G.K., divisional commissar Nikishev M.S.

New troops, including the 82nd Infantry Division, urgently began to be transferred to the site of the conflict. The 37th tank brigade, armed with BT-7 and BT-5 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow Military District; partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the 114th and 93rd rifle divisions were formed.

General Ogisu and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. Moreover, taking into account the sad experience of the battles on Mount Bayan-Tsagan for the Japanese, this time the enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Crossing the river was not planned.

During Zhukov’s preparation for the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly followed. All troop movements in the front-line zone were carried out only in the dark, it was strictly forbidden to send troops into the initial areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground by command personnel was carried out only in trucks and in the uniform of ordinary Red Army soldiers. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, throughout the preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side carried out active electronic warfare with the enemy. Knowing that the Japanese were conducting active radio reconnaissance and listening to telephone conversations, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed in order to misinform the enemy. Negotiations were conducted only on the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. Radio traffic in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code.

Despite the overall superiority in forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive Stern managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. To carry out the offensive operation, two-week reserves of ammunition, food and fuel and lubricants were created. More than 4 thousand trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1300-1400 kilometers. It should be noted that one road trip with cargo and back lasted five days.

During the offensive operation, Zhukov, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, planned to encircle and destroy the enemy in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River with unexpected strong flank attacks. At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in world military practice, tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational problems as the main striking force of flank groups performing an encirclement maneuver.

The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, an auxiliary blow by the Northern group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was supposed to pin down enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. The reserve, concentrated in the center, included the 212th airborne, 9th motorized armored brigades and a tank battalion. Also participating in the operation were Mongolian troops - the 6th and 8th Cavalry Divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.

Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army at Khalkhin Gol, 1939.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command.

At 6:15 a.m., powerful artillery preparation and air raids on enemy positions began. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred when crossing tanks of the 6th Tank Brigade, since when crossing Khalkhin Gol, the pontoon bridge built by sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks.

The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance on the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications. Here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day.

Already on August 21 and 22, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so Zhukov had to bring the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade into the battle.

Soviet tanks crossing the river. Khalkhin Gol

Soviet aviation also performed well at this time. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese planes in air battles.

In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to provide support to its troops defending on the flanks. By the end of August 26, the armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian forces had united and completed the complete encirclement of the Japanese 6th Army. After this, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed in parts.

Captured Japanese soldiers

In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese, on August 23 on the Central sector of the front, Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards. At the same time, he took a considerable risk, since the commander’s closest reserve - the Mongolian armored brigade - was located in Tamtsak-Bulak, 120 kilometers from the front.

Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to carry out counterattacks and release the group encircled in the Khalkhin Gol area ended in failure. On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, entered into battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment covering the border, but neither that day nor the next were able to break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo . After the battles of August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, no longer attempted to release its encircled troops, having accepted the inevitability of their death.

The Red Army captured as trophies 100 vehicles, 30 heavy and 145 field guns, 42 thousand shells, 115 heavy and 225 light machine guns, 12 thousand rifles and about 2 million rounds of ammunition, and much other military equipment.

The last battles continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khaylastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of hostilities.

Through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government appealed to the USSR government with a request to cease hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River, which came into force the next day.

Results

The victory of the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic at Khalkhin Gol became one of the reasons for Japan's non-aggression against the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Immediately after the start of the war, the Japanese General Staff, taking into account, among other things, the experience of Khalkhin Gol, decided to enter the war against the USSR only if Moscow fell before the end of August. In response to Hitler's demand in a telegram dated June 30 to immediately fulfill his allied obligations and strike the USSR from the east, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on July 2, the final decision was made to wait until Germany was sure to win.

In Japan, the defeat and the simultaneous signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact led to a government crisis and the resignation of the cabinet of Hiranuma Kiichiro. The new Japanese government announced on September 4 that it did not intend to intervene in any form in the conflict in Europe, and on September 15 signed an armistice agreement, which led to the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on April 13, 1941. In the traditional confrontation between the Japanese army and navy, the “maritime party” won, defending the idea of ​​cautious expansion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. The German military leadership, having studied the experience of the Japanese wars in China and Khalkhin Gol, rated Japan’s military capabilities very low and did not recommend that Hitler commit himself to an alliance with it.

The fighting on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic coincided with negotiations between Japanese Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita (English) Russian

The impact of the Khalkhin-Gol campaign on the Sino-Japanese War is poorly understood.

"Golden Star"

with the British ambassador in Tokyo, Robert Craigie. In July 1939, an agreement was concluded between England and Japan, according to which Great Britain recognized the Japanese seizures in China (thus providing diplomatic support for aggression against the Mongolian People's Republic and its ally, the USSR). At the same time, the US government extended the trade agreement with Japan, denounced on January 26, for six months, and then fully restored it. As part of the agreement, Japan purchased trucks for the Kwantung Army, machine tools for aircraft factories for $3 million, strategic materials (until 10/16/1940 - steel and iron scrap, until 07/26/1941 - gasoline and petroleum products), etc. A new embargo was imposed only on July 26 1941. However, the official position of the US government did not mean a complete cessation of trade. Goods and even strategic raw materials continued to flow into Japan until the outbreak of war with the United States.

The chief of staff of the 1st Army Group, brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on November 17, 1939. At the end of hostilities in September 1939, by order of the USSR NKO, he was appointed deputy commander of the 1st Army Group (Ulaanbaatar). In the same month, by Decree of the Government of the USSR, he was appointed chairman of the Soviet-Mongolian delegation to the Mixed Commission to resolve controversial issues regarding the state border between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchuria in the conflict area. At the end of the negotiations, as a result of provocation on the Japanese side, Bogdanov made “a grave mistake that damaged the prestige of the USSR,” for which he was put on trial. On March 1, 1940, he was convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR under Art. 193-17 paragraph “a” for 4 years ITL. By a resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 23, 1941, he was amnestied with his criminal record expunged and placed at the disposal of NGOs of the USSR. He ended the Great Patriotic War with the position of division commander and the rank of major general.

Propaganda in the USSR

The events at Khalkhin Gol became an important element of propaganda in the USSR. Novels, poems and songs were written, articles were published in newspapers. The essence of the propaganda boiled down to the idea of ​​the invincibility of the Red Army in a future war. Participants in the tragic events of the summer of 1941 many times noted the harm of excessive optimism on the eve of the great war.

In literature

• Simonov K. M. - novel “Comrades in Arms.”
• Simonov K.M. - poem “Far in the East”.
• Simonov K.M. - poem “Tank”.

In cinema

• « Khalkhin Gol"() - documentary film, TsSDF.
• “Listen, on the other side” () - Soviet-Mongolian feature film dedicated to the battles at Khalkhin Gol.
• “Officers” (, dir. V. Rogovoy) - in one of the episodes of the film, the heroes of G. Yumatov and V. Lanovoy meet in the context of a military conflict on Khalkhin Gol.
• “I, Shapovalov T. P.” (, dir. Karelov E. E.) - the first part of the “High Rank” dilogy, an episode in the film.
• “On the Roads of the Fathers” () - a television film by Irkutsk television journalist Natalya Volina, dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the end of the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River and the Soviet-Mongolian expedition to places of military glory.
• "Khalkin-Gol. Unknown War"() - a documentary film dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the victory on the Khalkhin Gol River. The film uses a large amount of chronicles, as well as comments from veteran participants in those events and historians.

Literature

• Bakaev D. A. Khasan and Khalkhin Gol are on fire. Saratov, Volga region publishing house, 1984. - 151 pages.
• Vorozheikin A.V. Stronger than death. - M.: Children's literature, 1978.
• Vorotnikov M. F. G.K. Zhukov on Khalkhin Gol. Omsk: book publishing house, 1989-224 pp. (circulation 10,000 copies)
• Gorbunov E. A. August 20, 1939. M., “Young Guard”, 1986.
• Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. (Chapter 7. The undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol). - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2002.
• Kondratyev V. Khalkhin Gol: War in the Air. - M.: Techniki - Youth, 2002.
• Kondratyev V. Battle over the steppe. Aviation in the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River. - M.: Aviation Promotion Foundation “Russian Knights”, 2008. - 144 p. - (Series: Air Wars of the 20th Century). - 2000 copies.
• - ISBN 978-5-903389-11-7 Koshkin A. A.
• - ISBN 978-5-903389-11-7"Kantokuen" - "Barbarossa" in Japanese. Why Japan didn't attack the USSR.
• The collapse of the “Ripe Persimmon” strategy: Japanese military policy towards the USSR 1931-1945. - M.: Mysl, 1989. - 272 p. Kuznetsov I. I.
• Heroes of Khalkhin Gol. 3rd ed., add. Ulaanbaatar, Gosizdat, 1984-144 pp. Simonov K. M.
• Far to the east. Khalkhin-Gol notes. - M.: Fiction, 1985.
• At Khalkhin Gol. Memoirs of Leningraders who took part in battles with Japanese militarists in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River in 1939. Comp. N. M. Rumyantsev. - L.: Lenizdat, 1989. Novikov M.V.
• Victory at Khalkhin Gol. - M.: Politizdat, 1971. - 110 p. - 150,000 copies. Panasovsky V. E.
• Lessons from Hassan and Khalkhin Gol. M., “Knowledge”, 1989. Fedyuninsky I.I.
• In the East. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1985. Shishov A.V.

Russia and Japan. History of military conflicts. - M.: Veche, 2001.

• see also

List of associations, formations, units and subunits that were part of the Active Army in the area of ​​the river. Khalkhin Gol in 1939

1. Notes. Team of authors
2. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: Losses of the Armed Forces / G. F. Krivosheev. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2001. - P. 177. - 608 p. - (Archive). - 5,000 copies.
3. - ISBN 5-224-01515-4
4. History of the Second World War. 1939-1945 (in 12 volumes). volume 2, M., Voenizdat, 1974. p.217
5. (English) . Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1981. Retrieved June 20, 2010.

Team of authors. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: A statistical study. M., 2001. P. 179

In May 1939, Japanese troops invaded the territory of the USSR-allied Mongolian People's Republic in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River. This invasion was an integral part of Japanese plans to seize the Soviet Far East and Siberia, China and the possessions of Western countries in the Pacific Ocean. The imperial headquarters prepared two options for waging war: the northern one - against the USSR and the southern one - against the USA, Great Britain and their allies.
Despite the warning from the Soviet government that the USSR would defend the Mongolian People's Republic as its own territory, Japanese troops, having a threefold superiority in forces (about 40 thousand people, 130 tanks, more than 200 aircraft), crossed the river on July 2. Khalkhin Gol and invaded the territory of the MPR, but after bloody battles they were forced to temporarily retreat. The Japanese were preparing to resume the offensive with the forces of an entire army on August 24, but the Soviet troops forestalled the enemy and on August 20 themselves went on the offensive with the forces of the 1st Army Group created by that time under the command of Corps Corps G. Zhukov.

While inferior in number of troops, the 1st Army Group outnumbered the enemy by approximately twice the number of tanks and aircraft. The Mongolian troops were led by Marshal of the Mongolian People's Republic Kh. Choibalsan. Coordination of the actions of the Soviet and Mongolian troops was entrusted to the front group led by Army Commander 2nd Rank G. Stern.

The offensive was well prepared and came as a surprise to the enemy. As a result of six days of fighting, the Japanese 6th Army was surrounded and virtually destroyed. Its losses amounted to more than 60 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, Soviet troops - 18 thousand killed and wounded. The air battles were especially intense, the largest at that time, in which up to 800 aircraft took part on both sides. As a result, the Japanese command asked for a cessation of hostilities, and on September 16, 1939 they were suspended.

The events at Khalkhin Gol have important international consequences. Priority in Japanese plans was given to the southern version of the war - against Great Britain and the United States. Soviet diplomacy, skillfully acting in the current situation, achieved the conclusion of a neutrality pact with Japan on mutually beneficial terms. The pact was signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941, which allowed our country to avoid a war on two fronts.

PU AND ABOUT EVENTS IN CHINA AT THE LATE 1930S

The commander of the Kwantung Army praised to me the power of the Japanese army and its amazing military successes... On July 7, 1937, the war between Japan and China began and the Japanese army captured Beijing.

The Kwantung Army was like a strong source of high voltage current. I was a precise and obedient electric motor, and Yoshioka Yasunori was an electric wire with excellent conductivity.

He was a small Japanese man from Kagoshima, with prominent cheekbones and a mustache. From 1935 until the surrender of Japan in 1945, he was next to me and, together with me, was captured by the Red Army. Over the past ten years, he has gradually risen from lieutenant colonel of the ground forces to lieutenant general. Yoshioka held two positions: he was a senior adviser to the Kwantung Army and an attaché to the Imperial House of Manchukuo. The latter was the Japanese name. Strictly speaking, how this name is translated is not so important, since it still did not reflect Yoshioka’s activity itself. In fact, he was like an animated electrical wire. Every thought of the Kwantung Army was transmitted to me through him. Where to go for a reception, whom to salute, which guests to receive, how to instruct officials and people, when to raise a glass and propose a toast, even how to smile and nod - I did all this on Yoshioka’s instructions. Which people I could meet and which I could not, which meetings I could attend and what I could say—I obeyed him in everything. He wrote the text of my speech to me in advance on paper in his Japaneseized Chinese. When Japan began a war of aggression in China and demanded food, labor and material resources from the puppet government, I ordered Prime Minister Zhang Jinghui to read a call to the governors written by Yoshioka at a meeting of provincial governors. In it he called on the governors to exert all their efforts to maintain the holy war...

Whenever the Japanese army occupied a relatively large city in Central China, Yoshioka spoke about the results of the battles, and then ordered them to stand with him and bow towards the front, thereby expressing condolences to the dead. After several such “lessons,” when the city of Wuhan fell, I myself, without anyone’s reminder, having listened to the end of the message, stood up, bowed and honored the dead Japanese with a minute of silence.

Pu Yi. The first half of my life: Memoirs of Pu Yi, the last emperor of China. M., 1968.

FROM ZHUKOV'S MEMOIRS

On August 20, 1939, Soviet-Mongolian troops began a general offensive operation to encircle and destroy Japanese troops.
It was Sunday. The weather was warm and calm. The Japanese command, confident that the Soviet-Mongolian troops were not thinking about an attack and were not preparing for it, allowed generals and senior officers Sunday holidays. Many of them were far from their troops that day: some in Hailar, some in Khanchzhur, some in Dzhanjin-Sume. We took this important circumstance into account when deciding to begin the operation on Sunday.
At 6:15 a.m. our artillery opened sudden and powerful fire on enemy anti-aircraft artillery and anti-aircraft machine guns. Individual guns fired smoke shells at targets that our bomber aircraft were supposed to bomb.

In the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River, the roar of the engines of approaching aircraft grew more and more. 153 bombers and about 100 fighters took to the air. Their blows were very powerful and caused a rise in the fighters and commanders.

At 0845 hours, artillery and mortars of all calibers began a fire attack on enemy targets, pushing them to the limits of their technical capabilities. At the same time, our aircraft attacked the enemy’s rear. A command was transmitted through all telephone wires and radio stations using the established code - to begin a general attack in 15 minutes.

At 9:00 am, when our aircraft stormed the enemy and bombed his artillery, red rockets soared into the air, indicating the beginning of the troops' movement to attack. The attacking units, covered by artillery fire, quickly rushed forward.

The strike of our aviation and artillery was so powerful and successful that the enemy was morally and physically suppressed and could not return artillery fire for the first hour and a half. Observation posts, communications and Japanese artillery firing positions were destroyed.
The attack took place in strict accordance with the operation plan and battle plans, and only the 6th Tank Brigade, unable to completely cross the Khalkhin Gol River, took part in the battles on August 20 with only part of its forces. The crossing and concentration of the brigade were completely completed by the end of the day.
On the 21st and 22nd there were stubborn battles, especially in the Big Sands area, where the enemy put up more serious resistance than we expected. To correct the mistake, it was necessary to additionally bring in the 9th Motorized Armored Brigade from the reserve and strengthen the artillery.

Having defeated the enemy's flank groups, our armored and mechanized units completed the encirclement of the entire 6th Japanese Army by the end of August 26, and from that day the fragmentation into parts and destruction of the encircled enemy group began.

The fight was complicated by shifting sands, deep pits and dunes.
The Japanese units fought to the last man. However, gradually the inconsistency of the official propaganda about the invincibility of the imperial army became clear to the soldiers, since it suffered extremely heavy losses and did not win a single battle during the 4 months of the war.”

RESULTS OF THE BATTLES NEAR THE KHAKHIN-GOL RIVER

(From a report by V. Stavsky about negotiations held between Soviet and Japanese military representatives in September 1939 - after the end of the fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River)

VORONEZH. We report the next entry of comrade. V. Stavsky about the meeting of delegations on September 20. We have no special additions. We believe that the negotiations, in general, are going well.
Transferred to Chita for transfer to Moscow via the Bodo apparatus

OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE
18.09....A group of representatives of the Soviet-Mongolian troops climbs the hill. Japanese officers lined up outside the Japanese tent. Two steps ahead in front of the line is a short, round general. At a distance in the hollow there is a row of Japanese cars, two trucks, and more than fifty Japanese soldiers are gawking. At our tent there are cars, a shiny ZIS-101 and three telephone operators.
Japanese photo and film reporters are rushing about. Our comrades are also not wasting time. One of them noticed how, a little later, two trucks of armed guards and a machine gun standing on a tripod and pointed towards the Soviet-Mongolian group went deeper into the Japanese. Gentlemen, Japanese officers prudently go to negotiations...
From this hillock on the uneven wide valley, sandy mounds are clearly visible, like the banks of a grassy river. There, the forward positions of the sides pass along these hills. In front of our line there are still stinking Japanese corpses lying in the grass, broken wheels of Japanese anti-tank guns, and all sorts of Japanese military junk. The Soviet-Mongolian group was accompanied by cheerful glances from riflemen, tank crews, and artillerymen.
The chairman of the Soviet-Mongolian delegation, brigade commander Potapov, shakes hands with the general. They enter the tent. Everyone else follows behind them. And so, on both sides of the table, covered with green blankets, there were two worlds.
Japanese General Fujimoto leads the other side. A wide, well-fed, sleek face. Dull, black eyes, bags under them. Occasionally, the obligatory smile, as if someone were putting on a dead mask. The uniform has three rows of sewn order ribbons. At the table are Colonel Kusanaki and Hamada, Lieutenant Colonel Tanaka - yesterday, at the first preliminary meeting, he was senior. By the way, yesterday he asked to convey greetings to his friend from Khasan - Commander Stern.
Among the Japanese are also majors Nakamura, Shimamura, Oogoshi, Kaimoto and other officers.
On our side, brigade commander Potapov, a tall man, the Japanese are just runts against him; brigade commissar Gorokhov and division commander of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, the concentrated and silent Tseren.
The Japanese side begins negotiations.
GENERAL FUJIMOTO: - We are members of the Japanese army commission, appointed by the high command. We note that it will be very unpleasant for us if we do not agree.
POTAPOV: - We are members of the commission of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. We will give you our list. We want to achieve good results in the negotiations based on the agreement of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Molotov and Togo in Moscow.
FUJIMOTO: - We are far from the government, and we are very afraid of making mistakes. We want to act strictly according to the orders arising from the agreement...
Both the general and his officers have been expressing their wish for a long time that the results of the work turn out to be good, that the points of the agreement are fulfilled. In their hasty insistence, in the expression of their faces - gloomy and angry - I can clearly see dejection, inner emptiness, and even apprehension, simply fear.
From the central crossing over the Khalkhin Gol River, not far from the mouth of Khaylastin Gol, to the place of negotiations with the Japanese is about 15 kilometers.
There was a time - this was the beginning of July - when the Japanese hung a grim threat over this crossing. The range of their guns was more than enough here. How can we not miss it: that height dominating this entire area, two kilometers from the river, was in the hands of the Japanese. Here the entire earth is torn apart by shells and blown up by Japanese bombs. The car, swaying on potholes, goes from hillock to hillock. Stunted vegetation. Low growing bushes. Sandy cliffs, holes. These are the local Mongolian mankhans.
The cheerful valley of Khalkhin Gol is already behind us. In the banks bordered by bushes rushes a mighty stream, very reminiscent of the Kuban or Laba in the upper reaches. How many times did the Red Army soldiers tell me: “What gardens will grow here!”
The ridges are steeper and higher, the heights are wider. They all became family. At that height there was the headquarters of Remizov’s regiment, and the height now bears the name of the glorious Hero of the Soviet Union Remizov. And there are the heights “Boot”, “Egg”, “Two Eggs”, “Sandy”. All these names were given during the period of fighting. At these heights the Japanese created excellent fortified areas. These pits and manhanas turned out to be Japanese graves.
Here in this district eleven Japanese regiments were surrounded by the deadly ring of our troops. Captured and destroyed.
Here a bold and very subtle plan was carried out to defeat the Japanese.
When on the morning of July 20, one and a half hundred of our bomb carriers dropped their load on the Japanese heads, fantastic flowers of explosions grew above the manhans, covered with a veil of fog, the earth trembled, and the whole area gasped from the roar. And immediately the artillery began to work.
Ten days of our continuous offensive and extermination of the Japanese! The notorious Lieutenant General Kamatsubara did not even understand what was happening, where the main blow was being delivered, judging by his orders.
And here is the eloquent confession of the former commander of the Japanese 6th Army, Oogoshi Rippu. His address dated September 5 said:
“...Thanks to the bold and decisive actions of all units led by Lieutenant General Kamatsubara, the chaos during the battle became less widespread.” Just think about it. Feuilletonists have been hunting for such a line for years - “the chaos during the battle took on smaller dimensions.” Day by day it became smaller (Japanese chaos) until all of them, surrounded here, were destroyed...
And now, we are again in the Japanese tent, in the neutral zone. This is the fourth day of negotiations, September 20. The Japanese today are even more gloomy and dejected than yesterday. You can see it in their faces.
Major General Fujimoto sits gloomy, like a statue. But brigade commander Potapov is exquisitely kind.
During the days of the offensive, he commanded the southern group, which dealt the main blow to the Japanese. And he knows very well that there are not 5 thousand Japanese corpses here, as they said, but at least twice as many. And Potapov himself - a hot-tempered tanker - burst into the Japanese position in a thundering, deadly tank. But how could this person now have such a rounded gesture, smoothness and clarity of speech!
Brigade commander POTAPOV says: “Yesterday I once again reported to the main command about your desire to remove and remove the corpses yourself. The main command, wanting to meet you, not to hurt your religious feelings and not to violate your rituals, decided to satisfy your request - to allow Japanese soldiers to dig up and collect corpses, on the following conditions.
Potapov reads out a whole instruction according to which military teams of 20 soldiers, without weapons, will have to collect corpses. They will be accompanied by our commanders.
The general nervously writes in his book. The rest of the officers have completely stunned faces. Apparently, the Japanese did not expect this...
Finally the general comes to his senses. He says: “I sincerely thank you from the bottom of my heart.” I will report to my high command. Now we will consult each other...
The conversation then proceeds smoothly. The Japanese are asking for a diagram indicating the graves of Japanese soldiers - they will receive it tomorrow. They ask you to enter ten commands - okay, let them enter ten commands. They ask that ammunition, flasks, bayonets, binoculars, and officer revolvers be considered personal belongings. This was denied to them. They do not insist, but ask for permission: - not to remove bayonets or bags from corpses if they are directly on them, - so that the soldiers do not have a bad impression.

Brigade commander Potapov replies: “We will not remove these things from the dead (...)

Vl. Stavsky
RGVA. F.34725. Op.1. D.11. L.37-48 (Stavsky V.P. - author of military essays and stories. During the Great Patriotic War - military correspondent of Pravda. Killed in battles near Nevel).