Tsushima defeat: a battle with a predetermined outcome. Tsushima: analysis against myths Causes of defeat in the Tsushima battle

00:05 — REGNUM Already from the first days of the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese fleet, superior to the Russian squadron in the Far East, seized the strategic initiative. From February to May 1904, the Japanese made three attempts to block the entrance to the harbor of Port Arthur from the sea. They also attacked by land. The Japanese command did everything to capture Port Arthur as soon as possible and destroy the Russian squadron there. On June 10 (23) and July 28 (August 10), the Port Arthur squadron twice tried to break through to Vladivostok, but both attempts failed.

Ivan Shilov © IA REGNUM

The 1st Pacific squadron was too weak to hold back the onslaught of the Japanese, so in April 1904 it was decided to strengthen the fleet of the Far East by sending the 2nd Pacific squadron from the Baltic Sea. It was assumed that this action would help to seize the advantage at sea and unblock Port Arthur. The 2nd Pacific squadron was formed in Kronstadt and Reval, and vice admiral was appointed its commander Zinovy ​​Rozhdestvensky, who previously served as Chief of the Main Naval Staff. However, it was only possible to prepare the squadron by September.

Japanese attacks on Port Arthur intensified day by day. They made several assault attempts, but the Russian garrison heroically repulsed the enemy's advance. The 2nd Pacific squadron left Libau only on October 2 (15), 1904. She had to go 32.5 thousand km, and she did not have time to get to the theater of operations in time. On December 20, 1904 (January 2, 1905), 329 days after the start of the war, the Port Arthur fortress was surrendered to the Japanese. The ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron, which remained in service, were flooded, and the Japanese got time to prepare for a collision with the 2nd Pacific Squadron. They were engaged in re-equipment of ships, retraining according to a new method of firing.

Despite the fact that Port Arthur fell, the fleet was ordered to move on. Nicholas II set the task of taking possession of the Sea of ​​Japan, and Rozhdestvensky decided to break through to Vladivostok along a short path through the Tsushima Strait. In any case, the order to take possession of the sea looks almost impossible, because the squadron was not only significantly inferior to the Japanese fleet in terms of numbers, but also arrived at the battlefield after several months of a difficult campaign.

The 2nd Pacific Squadron included 8 squadron battleships, 3 coastal defense battleships, 1 armored cruiser, 8 cruisers, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 9 destroyers, 6 transports and 2 hospital ships. Japanese fleet under the command of an admiral Heihachiro Togo far outnumbered the squadron. 4 squadron battleships, 8 armored cruisers, 16 cruisers, 6 gunboats and coastal defense ships, 24 auxiliary cruisers, 21 destroyers and 42 destroyers were ready for the battle with the Russians.

The Japanese fleet surpassed ours not only in numbers: the Russian ships were in many ways inferior to the Japanese. Japanese artillery was faster-firing (360 rounds per minute versus 134), Japanese shells were 10-15 times more explosive than Russian shells, and Japanese ships were better armored.

“The fleet, like the army, was unprepared for the great test. It was terrible to find out later that most of the officers left Kronstadt with a firm consciousness of their doom. , - wrote a participant in the Russo-Japanese War, a future military agent of the Russian Empire in France Alexey Ignatiev in his book Fifty Years in the Line.

The Japanese were waiting for a meeting with the Russian fleet and placed patrol ships at all three straits (Laperouse, Sangarsky and Tsushima), through which you can go to Vladivostok in order to find out in time about the approach of Russian ships. And this strategy worked. On May 14 (27) at 02:45, on the approaches to the Tsushima Strait, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was discovered by one of the Japanese intelligence officers, the auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru. Convinced that the Russians were heading to the Tsushima Strait, the Japanese fleet began to deploy to destroy the arriving squadron.

Continuing the topic I started in my previous post. Russian - Japanese war of 1904 - 1905 and her final battle Tsushima naval battle May 14 - 15, 1905 . This time we will talk about the warships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which took part in the battle with the Japanese fleet, and about their fate. (The date in parentheses after the name of the ship means it was launched after construction)
In addition, I think it will be interesting for everyone who is interested in the history of the Fatherland to see what Russian warships looked like more than a hundred years ago.

1. Flagship - squadron battleship "PRINCE Suvorov" (1902)
Killed in battle

2. Armored cruiser "OSLYABIA" (1898)
Killed in battle

3. Armored cruiser "ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV" ( 1885)
Killed in battle

4. Cruiser 1st rank "DMITRY DONSKOY" (1883)
scuttled by the crew

5. Cruiser 1st rank "VLADIMIR MONOMAKH" (1882)
scuttled by the crew

6. Battleship "NAVARIN" (1891)
Killed in battle

7. Squadron battleship "EMPEROR NICHOLAS THE FIRST" (1889)
Surrendered to captivity. Later joined the Japanese Navy

8. Battleship of the coast guard "ADMIRAL USHAKOV" (1893)
scuttled by the crew

9. Battleship of the coast guard "ADMIRAL SENYAVIN" (1896)

10. Battleship of the coast guard "GENERAL-ADMIRAL APRAKSIN" (1896)
Surrendered to captivity. Joined the Japanese Navy

11. Squadron battleship "SISOI GREAT" (1894)
Killed in battle

12. Battleship "BORODINO" (1901)
Killed in battle

13. Cruiser 2nd rank "DIAMOND" (1903)
Was the only cruiser that broke through to Vladivostok

14. Armored cruiser of the 2nd rank "PEARLS" (1903)
He went to Manila, where he was interned, after the end of the war he returned to the Russian fleet.
(The same applies to all Russian ships that were able to break away from the pursuit of the Japanese
fleet and reached the ports of neutral states)

15. Armored cruiser of the 1st rank "AURORA" (1900)
Gone to Manila

16. Battleship "OREL" (1902)
Surrendered to captivity. Joined the Japanese Navy

17. Armored cruiser 1st rank "OLEG" (1903)
Gone to Manila

18. Battleship "EMPEROR ALEXANDER THE THIRD" (1901)
Killed in battle

19. Armored cruiser of the 1st rank "SVETLANA" (1896)
scuttled by the crew

20. Auxiliary cruiser "URAL" (1890)
scuttled by the crew

21. Destroyer "BEDOVY" (1902)
Surrendered to captivity. Joined the Japanese Navy

22. Destroyer "FAST" (1902)
Blown up by the crew

23. Destroyer "BUYNY" (1901)
Killed in battle

24. Destroyer "BRAVY" (1901)

25. Destroyer "BRILLIANT" (1901)
scuttled by the crew

26. Destroyer "LOUD" (1903)
scuttled by the crew

27. Destroyer "GROZNY" (1904)
Managed to break through to Vladivostok

28. Destroyer "Irreproachable" (1902)
Killed in battle

29. Destroyer "BODRY" (1902)
Gone to Shanghai

Thus, in the Battle of Tsushima, out of 29 warships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, 17 ships died in battle, fighting to the end (including those that, not wanting to surrender to the enemy and unable to continue the battle, were blown up by their own crew or flooded by the opening of kingstons, so as not to get to the enemy). 7 ships valiantly fighting the Japanese, after it was all over, managed to survive in different ways as combat units, leaving for neutral ports, or breaking through to their own in Vladivostok. And only 5 ships surrendered to the Japanese.
This time there will be no output. Do it yourself if you are interested in the history of our country, which consists not only of victories, but also of defeats.

Sergei Vorobyov.

Tsushima battle

TVD	Pacific Ocean
A place	Tsushima Island, East China Sea
Period	Russo-Japanese War
The nature of the battle	pitched battle

Opponents

Side force commanders

Side forces

Tsushima battle(Japanese 対馬海戦) - the largest battle in the era of the pre-dreadnought armored fleet, which took place on May 27-28, 1905. The battle ended with the complete defeat of the 2nd squadron of the Pacific Fleet under the command of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky by the forces of the United Japanese Fleet under the command of Admiral H. Togo . The results of the battle finally predetermined Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War, and also significantly influenced the development of world military shipbuilding.

common data

The sudden start of the Russo-Japanese War with a night attack by the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron gave the Japanese the opportunity to gain strategic initiative and superiority over Russian naval and land forces. In order to strengthen the Russian fleet and then gain dominance at sea, the command decided to form the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons.

The preparation of the 2nd TOE was delayed from April to September 1904 due to various difficulties associated with the supply, repair, completion and commissioning of new ships of the 1898 program. By the end of September, the completed squadron nevertheless concentrated in the Libava region, having refueled with coal and water and provisions, after which on October 2 she began to move to Vladivostok. Having made an unprecedented transition of 18 thousand miles, which required many efforts, Rozhdestvensky's squadron entered the Korea Strait on the night of May 14.

Characteristics of the parties involved

Russian side

Composition

Naval Action Plan

Z. P. Rozhdestvensky set the squadron the task of reaching Vladivostok by breaking through at least part of the squadron (this was contrary to the directive of Nicholas II, which demanded to “take possession of the Sea of ​​Japan”), which is why he chose the shortest route that ran through the Korea Strait. The Vice Admiral could not count on any significant assistance from the Vladivostok squadron, and also refused to conduct reconnaissance. At the same time, the Russian commander did not develop a detailed battle plan, giving only a few general instructions to individual ships. That is, the squadron was supposed to bypass Japan and not engage in battle until it arrived in Vladivostok. did not comply and doomed the squadron to death. You can say he sabotaged the transition and simply presented the squadron to the enemy.

The commander of the Russian fleet, Vice-Admiral Zinoviy Rozhestvensky, is criticized by historians for the fact that he adhered to defensive tactics in the battle against the Japanese. Since leaving the Baltic, he spent very little time preparing the crew, in particular the gunners, and the only serious maneuver was made only on the eve of the battle. A strong impression is created that he did not trust his subordinates and did not inform them of his battle plans, and during the battle he himself was going to lead the ships from his flagship Suvorov.

Japanese side

Composition

Naval Action Plan

The main goal of Admiral H. Togo is to destroy the Russian squadron. He, knowing about the passive tactics of the Russians following in the wake columns, decided to act in small maneuverable formations (4-6 ships), which, using their speed, would attack the Russian wake column from favorable heading angles. The primary goals of these formations are the head and end ships of the column. Intelligence data added confidence to the Japanese admiral, thanks to which he knew where, in what composition and how the Russian squadron was moving.

The course of the battle

Time	Event
On the night of May 14 (27), 1905, the Russian squadron approached the Tsushima Strait. She moved at a 5-knot speed in three columns, observing blackout. A reconnaissance detachment marched ahead in the formation of a wedge. The main forces marched in two wake columns: on the left the 3rd armored detachment and in its wake a detachment of cruisers, on the right - the 1st and 2nd armored detachments.
04 h 45 min.	Admiral Togo on board IJN Mikasa, receives a radiogram from the scout of the auxiliary cruiser IJN Shinano Maru, containing information about the location and approximate course of the Russian squadron.
06 h 15 min.	Admiral Togo, at the head of the United Fleet, leaves Mozampo to meet the squadron of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky, which entered the eastern part of the Tsushima Strait
07:14	The Russian squadron notices the Japanese class 3 cruiser IJN Izumi. It becomes clear that the Russian connection has been detected, but Rozhdestvensky does not cancel his order and maintains radio silence.
OK. 11 o'clock	A detachment of Japanese cruisers ( IJN Kasagi, IJN Chitose, IJN Otowa, IJN Niitaka), were fired upon by "Oslyabey", "Prince Suvorov" and battleships of the III detachment and hastily retreated. By order of Rozhdestvensky "do not throw shells", the inconclusive firing was stopped.
12:00 pm - 12 hours 20 minutes	The 2nd TOE changes its course to Vladivostok and maintains a 9-knot speed. Japanese reconnaissance cruisers are again discovered, which forces Rozhdestvensky to cancel the maneuver he had begun to build a front of 12 battleships.
13 hours 15 minutes	"Sisoi the Great" by signal reports the discovery of the main forces of the Japanese fleet, crossing the course of the squadron from right to left.
13h 40 min.	The Japanese ships crossed the course of the Russian squadron and began to turn to a course parallel to it, so as not to diverge on counter courses (and to avoid a short-term battle).
Daytime battle May 14
13 h 49 min.	"Prince Suvorov" fired the first shots at IJN Mikasa from a distance of 32 kb. Behind him, Alexander III, Borodino, Oryol, Oslyabya, and possibly Navarin opened fire on the Japanese flagship. Shisoy the Great and all three coastal defense battleships are firing at Nissin and Kasuga, after 5-10 minutes. opened fire and "Nicholas I" and "Admiral Nakhimov".
13 hours 51 minutes	First shot from IJN Mikasa, after which the rest of the Japanese ships begin firing: IJN Mikasa, IJN Asahi, IJN Azuma- according to "Suvorov"; IJN Fuji, IJN Shikishima and most armored cruisers - according to "Oslyaba"; IJN Iwate And IJN Asama- according to "Nicholas I".
OK. 14 o'clock	Flagship Togo IJN Mikasa comes out from under the fire of "Borodino", "Eagle" and "Oslyabya", having received in the first 17 minutes. battle 19 hits (five of them - 12-inch shells). From 2 p.m. no more than twelve large-caliber guns fired at it. Despite the flooding of the coal pit as a result of breaking through casemate No. 1, it was not possible to disable the ship.
14h09 min.	As a result of Russian artillery fire, only IJN Asama, which is 40 min. got out of the fight.
OK. 14h 25 min.	"Oslyabya", which received serious damage from the first minutes of the battle (the bow turret was destroyed, the 178-mm armor plate of the main belt came off, a hole formed in the bow of the left side along the waterline, which caused flooding), and the Prince Suvorov, enveloped in fires, went out of order. This led to the loss of combat control of the main forces of the squadron.
14 hours 48 minutes	The Japanese ships, turning "all of a sudden," rebuilt and began to fire on the Borodino.
OK. 14 h 50 min.	"Oslyabya" rolled over and began to go under water.
15:00 min.	Sisoi the Great and Navarin received holes near the waterline, the commander was mortally wounded on the last ship.
15h 40min	The beginning of the battle between Russian forces led by "Borodino" and the Japanese at distances of 30-35 kb, which lasted about 35 minutes. As a result, all the towers of the "Prince Suvorov" were put out of action, the commander of the "Borodino" was seriously injured, a fire started on the "Sisoy the Great", due to which the ship was temporarily out of order. "Alexander III" was heavily damaged. From the firing of Russian ships, heavy damage was received IJN Mikasa And IJN Nisshin.
5:30 p.m.	The destroyer "Buyny" removed from the completely out of action "Suvorov" the surviving officers of the headquarters and the wounded in the head Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky.
5:40 p.m.	The Russian squadron led by the Borodino was fired upon by a detachment of Admiral Togo that had overtaken it, which led to the stretching of the Russian system and lagging behind the Alexander III column.
18 h 50 min.	"Alexander III", being fired upon by H. Kamimura's cruisers from a distance of about 45 kb, lost stability, rolled over to starboard and soon sank.
19h00 min.	The wounded Rozhdestvensky formally handed over the command of the squadron to N.I. Nebogatov with the order to go to Vladivostok.
19 hours 10 minutes	"Borodino", possibly as a result of hits by 12-inch shells from IJN Fuji, which led to the explosion of ammunition, rolled over to starboard and sank.
19 hours 29 minutes	"Prince Suvorov" was finally sunk as a result of four torpedo hits fired point-blank by Japanese destroyers.
OK. 20 o'clock	N. I. Nebogatov, following the last order of the commander, headed for Vladivostok, increasing the speed to 12 knots.
As a result of the daytime battle, four of the five best Russian battleships were sunk; "Eagle", "Sisoy the Great", "Admiral Ushakov" received serious damage, which affected their combat capability. The Japanese won this battle largely due to their tactics: general and use of artillery (concentration of fire on the lead ships of the Russian squadron, high firing accuracy).
Fight on the night of May 14-15
At night, Nebogatov's squadron was attacked by Japanese destroyers, from which the already damaged ships mostly suffered. In general, Russian ships successfully repelled mine attacks (perhaps due to the lack of searchlights and distinctive lights). From the fire of Russian ships, two Japanese destroyers (Nos. 34, 35) were killed, and 4 more ships were seriously damaged.
OK. 21 o'clock	The cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov", having found itself after turning on the combat lighting, received a mine hole in the bow coal pit.
OK. 22 o'clock	Whitehead's mine, fired from a Japanese destroyer, hit the Navarin's stern, causing it to sink to the stern turret. The "Vladimir Monomakh" also received a mine hit in the bow.
23h 15 min.	As a result of the mine explosion, the Sisoy Veliky lost steering control.
OK. 02 o'clock	The damaged Navarin was discovered by Japanese destroyers, who fired 24 Whitehead mines at it. The battleship, which received hits, soon sank.
Separate fights on May 15
On the afternoon of May 15, almost all Russian ships trying to reach Vladivostok on their own south of Evenlet Island were attacked by the superior forces of the Japanese fleet.
OK. 05 o'clock	The destroyer "Brilliant" was flooded by her crew south of about. Tsushima.
05 h 23 min.	As a result of an unequal battle with a cruiser IJN Chitose and fighter IJN Ariake, which lasted more than an hour, the destroyer "Imperfect" was sunk.
08 h 00 min.	The battleship "Admiral Nakhimov" was flooded north of about. Tsushima.
10 h 05 min.	"Sisoi the Great" sank as a result of being hit by a Japanese mine.
10 hours 15 minutes	A detachment of Admiral Nebogatov's ships (battleships "Emperor Nicholas I" (flagship), "Eagle", "General-Admiral Apraksin", "Admiral Senyavin") ended up in a half-ring of five Japanese combat detachments and surrendered. Only the rank II cruiser Izumrud managed to break out of the Japanese encirclement.
OK. 11 o'clock	After an unequal battle with 2 Japanese cruisers and 1 destroyer, the crew of the cruiser Svetlana was sunk.
14h00 min.	The crew scuttled "Vladimir Monomakh".
5:05 p.m.	The commander of the 2nd TOE, Vice-Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky, who was on the destroyer Bedovy, surrendered.
18 hours 10 minutes	The Russian battleship Admiral Ushakov was sunk by the Japanese cruisers Yakumo and Iwate.

Chronology on maps
red - Russians
white - Japanese

Losses and results

Russian side

The Russian squadron lost 209 officers, 75 conductors, 4761 lower ranks, killed and drowned, a total of 5045 people. 172 officers, 13 conductors and 178 lower ranks were wounded. 7282 people were taken prisoner, including two admirals. 2110 people remained on the captured ships. The total personnel of the squadron before the battle was 16,170 people, of which 870 broke through to Vladivostok. Of the 38 ships and vessels participating from the Russian side, they sank as a result of the enemy’s combat action, flooded or blown up by their crews - 21 (including 7 battleships, 3 armored cruisers, 2 armored cruisers, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 5 destroyers, 3 transport) , surrendered or were captured 7 (4 battleships, 1 destroyer, 2 hospital ships). Thus, the Almaz cruiser, the Bravy and Grozny destroyers, and the Anadyr transport could be used to continue hostilities.

Japanese side

According to the report of Admiral Togo, a total of 116 people died on the Japanese squadron, 538 were wounded. According to other sources, 88 people were killed on the spot, 22 died on ships, 7 in hospitals. 50 invalids turned out to be unfit for further service and were fired. 396 of the wounded recovered on their ships and 136 in hospitals. The Japanese fleet, as a result of the fire impact, lost only two small destroyers - No. 34, 35 and the third No. 69 - as a result of a collision with another Japanese destroyer. Of the ships that participated in the battle, shells and fragments did not hit the cruisers Itsukushima, Suma, Tatsuta and Yaema. Of the 21 destroyers and 24 destroyers hit by fire, 13 destroyers and 10 destroyers were hit by shells or shrapnel, and several were damaged due to collisions.

Main Consequences

The tragedy that occurred in the waters of the Korea Strait had a serious impact on Russia's internal political situation. The defeat led to the rise of the socio-political movement in the country, including the revolutionary-separatist nature. One of the most severe consequences for the Russian Empire was the fall of its prestige, as well as its transformation into a minor maritime power.

The Battle of Tsushima finally tipped the scales in favor of Japan's victory, and soon Russia was forced to conclude the Portsmouth Peace Treaty. The final dominance of the sea also remained with Japan.

From the point of view of military-technical influence on the development of shipbuilding, the experience of the Tsushima battle once again confirmed that the main means of striking in battle was large-caliber artillery, which decided the outcome of the battle. Medium-caliber artillery, due to the increase in combat distance, did not justify itself. This led to the development of the so-called "big guns only" concept. An increase in the penetration ability of armor-piercing and destructive high-explosive shells required an increase in the armor area of ​​the ship's side and reinforcement of horizontal armor.

With donations from caring residents of St. Petersburg, in Moscow, 4 original magazines "Sea Collection" of 1905 were purchased. These issues contain the names of Russian sailors who died in the Battle of Tsushima. In the journal "Sea Collection" No. 10, October 1905, the first detailed description of the Tsushima battle in Russian was published.

Tsushima battle according to Japanese sources

The Times newspaper, dated August 22, 1905, contains a very lengthy and detailed account of the Tsushima battle. The article was brought to the paper by its correspondent in Tokyo, so that all the information given by him was in all likelihood carefully checked beforehand on the spot; in view of this, one can be sure that an excerpt from the said report will be of great interest. The description of the battle is preceded by a statement of the circumstances that took place in the battle, and in addition, some considerations are placed regarding the plans of the commanders of the fleets of both opponents.

The approach of the Baltic squadron.
It must be said that from the Japanese point of view, the Baltic squadron was not considered a serious factor until it entered the waters of the French possessions of Indo-China. Until that time, it seemed that many almost insurmountable circumstances barred her free path to the theater of war. The whole undertaking of Admiral Rozhdestvensky might have failed and turned out to be almost madness if, after passing through the Strait of Malacca, he had not been able to find a friendly refuge for his ships, where they could take coal and provisions from their transports and recover after a long passage from Madagascar, and if if he were not in a position to choose any particular place for meeting with the third detachment of his squadron. France was still trying to adhere strictly to the rules of neutrality, and in view of this, public opinion was at a loss as to whether the Russian admiral would be finally defeated by all physical difficulties before he met the Japanese, or would solve his problem by capturing some Chinese or Dutch port for turning it into a base, paying no attention to either Beijing or The Hague. In a word, this expedition, so long delayed in its movement, showed too little ability to overcome all the initial difficulties and seemed so incompetent to reach the final goal without some desperate step to violate neutrality, that to the Japanese it positively seemed more like some kind of adventure. than a serious threat.

Causes of Japanese gullibility.
A complete and unexpected change of view occurred, however, when it became clear that the ports of Indo-China were at the service of Admiral Rozhdestvensky. From that moment on, the semi-mythical force suddenly became a real force, and the Japanese saw that the Russian admiral was being led to their very doors by the same power, which they so blindly trusted in terms of the severity of neutrality. Japan began to protest loudly against the behavior of the French - so loudly that many mistook her indignation for a threat. Japanese values ​​on the stock exchange, however, did not sway, because the people were still confident that their sailors would certainly defeat the enemy, regardless of any violations of neutrality. The Japanese were obliged to count on success, because otherwise their entire campaign would have been in vain. If Admiral Rozhdestvensky not only defeated their fleet, but only inflicted such harm on them that he would have mastered the sea at least for a while, then the entire half-million Japanese army in Manchuria would immediately be cut off from its mother country and the whole situation would have to change completely. Japan would then have had no other way out than to leave the theater of war and accept any conditions that would be dictated to her by the enemy.

In view of this, the question arises before us, why did the Russians not try to inflict such a blow on Japan before? However, the time was right for this in 1904, when the Port Arthur squadron consisted of 6 strong first-class battleships, one armored cruiser, 4 armored cruisers and several small ships. On July 28, these ships made a fruitless attempt to break through to Vladivostok, and this, as you know, ended somewhat unsuccessfully, that some of the ships returning to Port Arthur were badly damaged, that the entire squadron almost ceased to be considered existing for a new battle. History will probably someday call this exit the biggest mistake of this campaign. There was no need to leave, since the ships could then remain in the port for at least another three months, and during this time the squadron of Admiral Togo had to vigilantly guard the Russians and overwork in the end. During those three months, the entire Baltic squadron, or at least most of it, could have reached the China Sea.

In such a case, the Japanese fleet would be in a desperate situation. Admiral Rozhdestvensky with at least six ironclads and five armored cruisers could emerge from the west and attack Admiral Togo from the flank, while Admiral Witgeft with his six ironclads and one armored cruiser would come out of Port Arthur to attack the Japanese from the other flank, and then, against all 12 ironclads and 6 armored cruisers, Togo would certainly not have been able to field more than 4 ironclads and 8 armored cruisers. Yes, and that's not all: the sinking of the "Rurik" in the Sea of ​​Japan must also be considered a consequence of the fatal exit of the Port Arthur squadron on July 28, and if this latter remained calm in the port, waiting for the appearance of the Baltic squadron, then the Vladivostok ships could have served the same general attack. If Admiral Togo were simultaneously threatened with an attack from the north, east and west, then he would have to move at least three cruisers from his fleet to meet the Vladivostok cruisers in order to detain them at sea, and then he himself would remain in place with only 4 battleships and 5 armored cruisers, finding himself among 12 battleships and 6 armored cruisers of the Baltic and Port Arthur squadrons. The Japanese commanders would have been confused, not knowing which way to shoot, and, moreover, the expenditure of shells would have been enormous. Russia, however, missed this one advantageous moment. No maritime power has ever made such a large waste of its forces on unimportant single efforts. Even Vladivostok and Port Arthur could not really come to an agreement in order to successfully act together. The Port Arthur squadron went to sea for its misfortune on July 28, and the Vladivostok cruisers approached the Tsushima Strait on August 1. If the breakthrough of the first had been successful, then the exit of the second would no longer be needed, but since the Arthur squadron returned back to the port, the northern cruisers should no longer go to useless self-sacrifice. Vladivostok, it is true, diverted part of Togo's forces from the main theater of the war, but nevertheless, in this case, the latter was able to drive the Arthurian ships back into the trap and at the same time beat the Vladivostok detachment to such an extent that it surrendered with an absolutely insignificant force. These examples of Russian naval strategy gave the Japanese Navy a great deal of self-confidence. Now the Russians still had to rely on their Baltic squadron, while if the Russians had thought a little more carefully, they could, with the combined forces of their three squadrons, as already mentioned above, completely destroy the Japanese fleet. In Tokyo, all this was foreseen last year, when they took up military weapons for the first time. Then began a desperate and bloody effort to capture Port Arthur as soon as possible, because no one could have foreseen that a reasonable power would so neglect its favorable circumstances and no prudent strategist could allow the existence of such an inability in his opponent.

When in this way a serious danger had already passed for Japan, then she at first completely indifferently, like an outside observer, followed the difficult preparations of the squadron of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, and then her slow movement to the East, but then she suddenly started when she saw that France was helping the Russian to the admiral, who has been staying in the waters of Kokhinikhina for five weeks, loading with coal and provisions, refreshing his teams after a tiring long transition and waiting for the arrival of Admiral Nebogatov's detachment.

The enemy lay in wait for Admiral Rozhdestvensky's entire movement, but the French local authorities forbade foreigners to use the Saigon telegraph cable, which was temporarily provided only at the full disposal of Admiral Rozhdestvensky. The Japanese agents were in great difficulty on this occasion. Only on May 3 did it become positively known that Admiral Rozhdestvensky left Hongkohe Bay, the last stop of your stay in French waters, and took with him all the ships that had been under his flag from the very beginning. His ships had a completely combat appearance. This circumstance alone seemed no small feat: to bring from the Baltic to the China Sea, without any misfortunes and adventures, such a diverse collection of ships; only a very great organizer and excellent sailor could do it.

Considerations of Admiral Togo.
Is it worth mentioning that in all sectors of society for several months there was only talk about the path that the Russian admiral would choose for his squadron. In any case, there is no doubt that the goal of his entire voyage was Vladivostok, which was the only Russian base in the Far East. To get there, there are three roads: the La Perouse (Soya) Strait between Sakhalin and Iezo, the Sangar Strait (Tsugaru) between Iezo and Nipon, and the Tsushima Strait between Korea and Japan. Togo himself had to guess which path the Russians would choose, since he could not guard all three passages at the same time; they were too far apart. It was even impossible for him to organize such a system of communications that could indicate to him a place where to keep his forces gathered in a central and waiting position. He had to seriously think and think, and then submit to how the circumstances would turn out. He stopped at the Tsushima Strait, arguing as follows: the La Perouse Strait requires too long a voyage, and therefore would complicate Admiral Rozhdestvensky in the coal issue, and besides, various obstacles or ambushes could easily be found there. The Sangar Strait is a long and difficult way, especially during the period of fogs, and its narrowness, perhaps, is littered with mines; in view of this, the Tsushima Strait still turns out to be the best of the three inevitability.
It is worth paying special attention to this discussion, because some critics attribute all the misfortunes with Admiral Rozhdestvensky to his supposedly unsuccessful choice of path. But now it turns out that Admiral Togo himself would have chosen the same path. So solid arguments spoke for this choice that Togo himself with full confidence expected the Russians in the Tsushima Strait. If he could still have any doubt, then this would already mean waiting for his opponent to do something that common sense would not advise him at all.
In addition to all these considerations, the Japanese admiral had only one doubt: if the Russians found out that they were expected in the Tsushima Strait, then they would probably choose a different path. Of course, they would not do this out of a desire to avoid a fight, for they have never given anyone the right to doubt their courage; but they would like to reach Vladivostok without the least impediment or damage, in order to have immediate access to the docks, renew their coal supplies, and generally prepare for battle according to their own timing. At first glance, it seems impossible that a huge squadron of warships could hide their location for several months, nevertheless, Togo succeeded: from March to May, he arranged for himself a main base in Chintai Bay, in a port on the southern coast of Korea, and although thousands of his compatriots knew that he was there, yet they all, from the first to the last, kept it a great secret. To tell the truth, the Russians were in such a position that they could not use scouts and do reconnaissance. They could only count on random spies. Still, if we recall what a huge price is sometimes paid for a well-known message, how many different agents Russia had in Chinese ports, how many different adventurers are ready for any business for money, and finally, how many friends and adherents Russia has in Japan in general and even in foreign embassies in Tokyo, one simply wonders how the ships of Togo could keep the secret of their stay for so long.

The last voyage of the Baltic squadron.
As already mentioned above, the squadron of Admiral Rozhdestvensky on May 3 left Khonkohe Bay, where they had previously done everything necessary to meet the enemy. It was decided to go through the Tsushima Strait. Actually, Admiral Rozhdestvensky had to choose one of two maneuvers. One was to first pass the China Sea through the Strait of Formosa and only then head to Tsushima, and the other to leave the China Sea, enter the Pacific Ocean and then head for Tsushima on the east side of Formosa. With regard to the range of distance, neither one nor the other path has an advantage, but they differ significantly from each other in that, going through the Formosa Canal, Admiral Rozhdestvensky would not only clearly see that Tsushima would be death for him, but would also be subjected to mine attacks from the destroyers in the ports of Formosa. Meanwhile, if he went out into the Pacific Ocean, he could rule on Tsushima or go through the Sangar Strait, and at the same time, he would avoid the danger from mine attacks. On May 6, the squadron passed between Formosa and the Philippines and, after a short stop due to coal, headed for the Pacific Ocean.
In Russia and in Europe in general, during the voyage of the squadron, various rumors constantly circulated about Admiral Togo: either he was waiting for his enemy in the Sunda Strait, or he was hiding in the passages to the Pacific Ocean between Luzon and Formosa, where he had a mine trap. Later it was said of him that he had set up his base at Kelung, on the northern tip of Formosa, with the intention of attacking the Russians, whether they came from the Pacific Ocean or the China Sea. But Togo, analyzing the views of knowledgeable people on the state of affairs, correctly guessed the intentions of the Russian admiral, and Rozhdestvensky, in turn, understood the wise decision of his opponent - not to give up the benefits of fighting in his own waters. This circumstance is proved by the fact that the Russian admiral did not break his troops until he approached the shores of Japan. They continued to keep with them all the heterogeneous groups of ships - coal miners, provisional transports, auxiliary cruisers and special service steamers, with which he certainly would not burden himself if he had to expect every minute to meet with the enemy. Only when he entered the China Sea from the Pacific Ocean, that is, when he began to make his very last crossing, did he let go of his transports. All of them, with a few exceptions, were ordered to enter Yantse-Kiang and await the results of the inevitable battle. Their appearance at Wusung on May 12 created a great sensation among foreigners and gave rise to a lot of absurd rumors. The Japanese naval officers, however, were not at all embarrassed; they realized that Admiral Rozhdestvensky had decided to cast his lot at Tsushima, because if he wanted to pass through the Sangar or La Perouse Straits, it would be inevitable to keep transports and coal miners with him for some longer time. From this it is clear that the Russian admiral in this case made his first major mistake: he had to hide his non-combat ships from prying eyes for a more or less long period in order not to betray his intentions to the enemy. One Norwegian steamer, chartered to a Japanese company in Japan, was stopped for inspection by a Russian cruiser in the Bashi Canal and then was soon released again with confirmation that the Baltic squadron would appear at Tsushima in a few days. Admiral Rozhdestvensky knew that this message would arrive in Japan before him, and he was sure that the Japanese would not give any faith to such information and would understand it in the opposite sense. In order to further disguise their movement towards Tsushima, they reduced their speed so that the Japanese, who knew the exact distance to Tsushima from the place where the Norwegian steamer was detained and knew what course the squadron was moving, could assume that she had left on some in another direction, to another place. This fact did cause some confusion among the Japanese.

In view of the Baltic squadron
When the 12th of May came and passed, and then the 13th came and the day passed without the appearance of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's warships, the Japanese, who were waiting for them at Tsushima, began to really worry, believing that the Russian squadron had gone somewhere else a place. But then, at 5 o'clock in the morning on May 14, one of the large number of patrol ships stationed in different places south of Tsushima made it known by wireless telegraph that "The enemy squadron appeared in square 203 and, apparently, was heading for the Eastern Passage." To understand the meaning of this notice, it must be noted that the sea between Quelpart Island and Vladivostok was divided by the Japanese into squares like the divisions of a chessboard, and each square on the map had a number assigned to it, so that when the number "203" reached the headquarters of Admiral Togo at dawn On May 14th, the maps on his tables accurately indicated to him the place where the Russian squadron appeared.

Here, by the way, to point out an accidental coincidence of circumstances that had a symbolic omen for the Japanese in the meaning of the number "203" for them. A high mountain of 203 meters played a big role in the fate of Port Arthur, since with the capture of it from the Russians, their entire impregnable stronghold fell; in the present case, square number 203 predicted success for the Japanese in the naval battle of Tsushima. The words of the telegram "Eastern Passage" meant that the Russian squadron was leaving Tsushima on the left side; the entire water area between Korea and the western coast of Japan is divided by Tsushima in half, through which two passages or straits are formed - East and West.
What kind of ships appeared in the square number 203? The morning was cloudy and it was difficult to determine their true character; were these the main forces of Admiral Rozhdestvensky or his secondary ships sent by this passage to divert the attention of the Japanese from other straits, where might the battleships and armored cruisers go? This question was finalized only around noon, when Admiral Togo became aware that both Baltic squadrons in their full combat strength were already entering the Eastern Passage of the Tsushima Strait and that any doubt about any sabotage on their part could already be considered disappeared.
We know the very composition of the Russian squadron: it consisted of 14 armored ships, while the Japanese had 12 such ships; in addition, the Russians had 6 more armored cruisers, against 16 Japanese ones. These cruisers, of course, could not be considered essential for the success of the battle, where only armored ships are mainly competing among themselves.

The artillery of both opponents consisted of the following number of guns:

	12-d.	10 days	9-d.	8-d.	6-d.	Total
the Japanese	16	1		90	160	207
Russians	26	7	12	13	121	179

The numerical superiority in armament was thus on the side of the Japanese, although in terms of the number of heavy guns the Russian squadron was much stronger than the Japanese fleet, because it had 45 guns of 9, 10 and 12 inch caliber against the same 17 Japanese guns. If Admiral Rozhdestvensky had been able to determine for himself the distance from which it was necessary to conduct a battle, then he would certainly have chosen a more distant one in order to be able to successfully use the power of his heavy artillery; such, at least, was the program of the compatriots of the Russian admiral in Russia itself, but in order to have the right to choose the battle distance, it was necessary that the ships could maneuver at a much higher speed than the enemy ships, but Admiral Rozhdestvensky was not for this right to count. With regard to speed, the ships of his squadron could be divided into the following three categories:
1) five new and strong battleships capable of speeds from 16 to 17 knots
2) a group of six armored cruisers (Aurora, Oleg, Emerald, Zhemchug, Svetlana and Almaz) at a speed of 17.5 to 18 knots
3) a detachment consisting of three battleships of the old type, three coastal defense battleships and three armored cruisers, whose speed was generally equal to the course of the battleship "Emperor", that is, 13 knots.

Having such a diverse squadron, the Russian admiral would have had to send his best five battleships to the Tsushima Strait to successfully reach Vladivostok, and a squadron of slow-moving ships from old battleships, coastal defense battleships and armored cruisers to the Sangar Strait, and finally send six fast cruisers to the La Perouse Strait. In this way, the admiral would have been able, perhaps, to bring most of his squadron to Vladivostok. To connect the two goals together, that is, to beat the Japanese and then get to their base, was completely unthinkable. He kept the whole bunch of his heterogeneous ships grouped together and adjusted to the speed of the most extreme slug, so that all the movements of the squadron during the battle were made no faster than at 12 knots.

On the other hand, the warships of Admiral Togo - 4 battleships and 8 armored cruisers, could easily move at a speed of 16 to 17 knots, and in fact maneuvered at 14 and 17 knots during the entire battle. The difference in course between the 12th and 14th or 15th knots does not seem very significant at first glance, but the practical significance of this difference becomes obvious if we assume that one squadron is standing still, but moving around it at a speed of 2 or 3 nodes. The second squadron can then choose its position and distance in relation to the first for its own, greater benefit.

Action Plan of Admiral Togo.
The original action plan of Admiral Togo extended to the entire water area between Quelpart and Vladivostok and required a 4-day operation. He divided the upcoming battle into seven parts, and no information was later made public about the first two parts, but it was only reported that they could not be carried out due to fresh weather. The third part consisted of a direct battle between both squadrons in the southern part of the Sea of ​​Japan; the fourth phase contained a night mini-attack after a daytime battle; then, the fifth part of the plan meant to collect after a night attack all their surviving ships and place them in a line between the Matsushima islands and the Liancourt rocks, and from there further east up to the Japanese coast, in order to block the Russian squadron from the way to the north. As for the sixth and seventh phases of the general plan of action, they were not described and were not carried out, since the course of events made their implementation useless.

The base of the Japanese fleet was Chintai Bay, on the Korean coast, and this bay was covered from the eyes of passing ships by Kargodo Island. Admiral Togo had the intention on the eve of the battle to collect all the ships of his fleet near the island of Oki, at a distance of about 150 miles from Chintai. It was necessary that he should receive all information about the enemy's movements in a timely manner, and for this purpose he deployed a whole flotilla of reconnaissance ships at known intervals along the Russian route to the island of Tsushima; the scouts were ordered, immediately upon the discovery of the enemy, to approach him and continuously telegraph to their admiral about all the movements of the Russians. This prescription was so carefully carried out that Togo, despite the severe cloudiness that was at sea, every minute between 10 and 11 o'clock in the morning on May 14th knew where and at what speed the Russian squadron was moving and in what formation it was. As for Admiral Rozhdestvensky himself, as he moved forward along the Eastern Passage of the Tsushima Strait, he only saw the appearance of the ghosts of Japanese ships on the bow to the right, and why exactly they flashed before his eyes - they did not give themselves any account. His fleet did not have any forzeils or scouts, and therefore he could judge the location of the Japanese fleet only by the topic by the occasional appearance of Japanese scouts, who showed up in glimpses of the fog clearing from time to time; in view of this, it was natural that they could expect the enemy from the northeast. He always felt that he was under the supervision of enemy intelligence officers, because already from 5 o'clock in the morning the breakdown of his telegraphic inductors told him that the Japanese were talking about him. Nevertheless, the scouts did not betray the proximity of the main forces of Admiral Togo: on the contrary, everything was striving to confirm the rumor received by Admiral Rozhdestvensky during his stay in Indo-Chinese waters, namely, that the Japanese allegedly divided their forces into parts, with than the main part of them occupied the Sangar and La Perouse straits and a very small detachment remained to guard the Tsushima passage. All those ships that he saw on the horizon in the fog were a secondary force. Among these ships was, among other things, the outdated battleship Chin-Yen, which has been in existence for 21 years and was taken from the Chinese in 1895; its course did not exceed 12.5 knots. This Chin-Yen had once given the Japanese great embarrassment when there was only one armored cruiser in that fleet, but now it could no longer fight alongside the latest warships; Togo made a big mistake if he put Chin-Yen in line with modern courts; it was like what Admiral Rozhdestvensky did when he went into battle with modern battleships, in the genus Borodino, having at his side such ships as Emperor Nicholas I, Dmitry Donskoy and Vladimir Monomakh. One useful service could still be performed by the old Chin-Yen - to stay at sea on the beam of armored cruisers and fire at the enemy squadron with their 12-inch Krupp guns, thus confirming the opinion of Admiral Rozhdestvensky that he was dealing only with secondary cruisers. Consistent with this view, Admiral Rozhdestvensky built his squadron in the same erroneous order as he went to meet the enemy that suddenly appeared on the left side. The squadron, as already known, was built in two parallel wake columns, with the right or eastern one containing the four most powerful battleships: "Prince Suvorov", "Emperor", "Eagle" and "Borodino", while the left or western column consisted of four cohesive detachments. "Oslyabya" was ahead, followed by "Sisoy the Great", then "Navarin" and "Admiral Nakhimov", that is, one first-class battleship, two class II battleships and one armored cruiser; the second detachment consisted of the battleship "Emperor Nicholas I" and three coastal defense battleships; the third detachment was already far behind; it was made up of the cruisers Oleg, Aurora, Svetlana and Almaz, and finally the fourth detachment, which had the armored cruiser Dmitry Donskoy in front, followed by the Vladimir Monomakh and six special service steamers with one auxiliary cruiser . Admiral Rozhdestvensky thus partly observed the principle of strengthening the extremities of the formation of wake columns. The fast cruisers Izumrud and Zhemchug kept between both columns as scouts.
At the same time, the fleet of Admiral Togo, with the exception of a few reconnaissance ships, was all grouped at the northern tip of Oki Island. The Japanese admiral was now well aware of the location of the enemy ships and saw that the Russians were expecting an attack from the east; in view of this, he decided to attack them from the west. His main fighting force was split up to attack them from the west. His main fighting force was divided into two squadrons, of which the first included four ironclads with the armored cruisers Nisshin and Kasuga, and the second, six armored cruisers. The armor protection of the Nisshin and Kasuga is so strong that these cruisers could well fight alongside battleships. Both squadron names here were to operate against the head units of enemy columns, while all armored cruisers were intended to attack weaker ships from the south, so that the battle consisted of two completely different actions in the northern and southern parts of the battle area.

Main fight.
Before dividing his fleet into parts for a double action against the enemy, Admiral Togo raised a signal to remind the participants that “the fate of the empire depends on the outcome of the coming battle. Let everyone apply their greatest zeal to achieve success. Then she led her main fighting force in a southwestern direction, continuing to go in this way until she found herself on the left ahead of the enemy and even then, at a convenient moment for herself, she suddenly turned to NO, rebuilding both squadrons in one wake column and went to the intersection course of the Russian squadron at an angle of 45 °, in order to shower its lead ships with strong concentrated fire. First, he fired on the forward detachment led by the battleship Oslyabya, and then the detachment of Admiral Rozhdestvensky himself, the Prince Suvorov, and the battleships following him.

Scheme I

Admiral Togo was moving at 15 knots and the Russians at 12 knots. There was a fairly strong wind from the SW and the sea was very high, so that the artillery fire met with great difficulty. The Russians, suddenly seeing Togo heading towards them with W, somewhat diverted their course to the right, as if in order to go parallel to his ships and prevent the Japanese from crossing their course, but this maneuver could not be successfully carried out without a significant increase in speed, because if the battleship "Suvorov" and its rear matelots would add speed, they would immediately move away from the "Oslyabi" and its followers, who, in essence, could not give more progress. The Russians opened fire at 2:80 pm from a range of 9,000 to 10,000 meters (50 cables); they wanted to make full use of the fire of their large guns, but the Japanese did not answer them until the distance separating them decreased to 6,000 meters (30 cables). This tactic was a novelty with Togo, for he had never fired before except from a long distance, for he had always been strictly instructed to take care of his ships and not expose them to great risk, so as not to reduce the already weak fleet unnecessarily. Now, when this fleet was in contact with the last forces of Russia, gathered in the waters of the Far East, the moment came when it was possible to spare nothing more, if only to deliver the most destructive blow to the enemy.
At the very beginning of the battle, it turned out that the Russian gunners were very poorly trained. Upon careful observation, it turned out that at first for every Russian well-aimed shot there were already three Japanese hits, and later this ratio became even more striking when it corresponded to 1 to 4. The Japanese sailors, according to the testimony of an English correspondent, acted all the time with great composure and did not at all hot from work, so that almost no one approached the pails of drinking water placed near them in various places on the deck.
All the officers of the Japanese fleet were quite convinced that they could defeat the enemy, and their enthusiasm, according to the same English correspondent, was most excited by the skill of their admiral, who so skillfully led his squadron over an invisible target right at the right moment to the meeting point with the enemy. . The Japanese sailors especially admired this.

Scheme II

As the fleet of Admiral Togo approached the Russian squadron and cut a course in front of her nose, his tactics became as brilliant as his artillery turned out to be valid. While the Japanese were concentrating their fire on the Oslyab and Knyaz Suvorov, which were the heads of both columns, the ships following them were unable to aim their guns at the Japanese. Under these circumstances, "Oslyabya" and "Prince Suvorov" came under such fierce fire that both were soon enveloped in flames and were forced to leave their places in the battle line, and as a result, all other ships of the squadron were obliged to change their formation.

Scheme III

The left wake column, led by "Oslyabey", now had the lead battleship "Sisoy Veliky" and turned somewhat to the left in order to enable the "Emperor Nicholas I" detachment to fire at enemy ships with their guns, and all other detachments went a little east to be in a parallel line Japanese courts. This maneuver, however, turned out to be disastrous for the Russians, since the battleships of Togo had a significant advantage in speed, and the Russians, suffering more and more from fire, not only changed their course from east to west, but also completely changed their formation, destroying two columns in the formation of one wake column, with the right column at the head of the left and in front of the "Sisoya the Great", taking a course completely opposite to the course of the battleships of Togo. During this rebuilding, the battleship "Emperor Alexander III" received severe damage and caught fire; this circumstance forced him to leave his place, so that the Russian squadron was thus deprived of three of its strongest ships. Here Togo made a turn to the opposite course, adding speed and went to repeat in the west the same tactics that he was guided by in the eastern region of the theater of operations, that is, he went to the intersection of the course of Russian ships obliquely on their right cheekbones. This maneuver temporarily put his squadron of armored cruisers in a line perpendicular to their own battleships, so that a kind of formation of the Latin letter L was formed, with the battleships hitting the Russians from the north, and the armored cruisers from the east side.

Scheme IV

The Japanese also had some damage on their ships: the armored cruiser Adzuma lost its steering apparatus and dripped heavily, so it had to leave its place in the ranks soon to repair its damage aside, and on the armored cruiser Kasuga three 8-inch guns were withdrawn from action. Despite this, the battle was essentially already won. 40 minutes were enough to destroy three Russian battleships and thoroughly damage several other ships, so that the main concern of the Russians was to leave the battlefield as soon as possible, since they could no longer think of winning any kind of victory.
Admiral Rozhdestvensky, seriously wounded, was transferred to one of the fighters, and command of the squadron passed to Rear Admiral Nebogatov, holding his flag on the battleship Emperor Nicholas I.
The Russians were now moving to W in the order of one wake column and, looking for an opportunity to leave, were again met by the Japanese from the bow and pushed to the south, just as they had previously been pushed to the east, and almost an hour later (at 3 o'clock in the afternoon), having the advantage in the course, both squadrons of Togo again paraded in front of the nose of the enemy. This time the Russians again took a course to the north and the armored squadron of Togo again changed its direction in order to put Nisshin across the course of the Russians and thus still repeat their old maneuver; this was the main character of his tactics. The Japanese constantly cut through the course of the enemy from the bow, and each time he turned to the side to avoid the full force of the blow, and this was repeated with inevitable persistence. The main factors for the success of the Japanese were superiority in the course and more accurate shooting from guns. A few minutes after 3 p.m., the Oslyabya sank; it was the first ship to be sunk by a single artillery fire. Half an hour later, the "Prince Suvorov" was a pitiful sight; one mast and two chimneys were shot down, and his body was enveloped in flame and smoke; at that time, Japanese fighters approached him to finish him off, and despite the fierce defensive artillery fire from neighboring Russian ships, the Japanese managed to successfully launch a mine at 4 hours and 45 minutes. Although he did not immediately sink to the bottom, nevertheless, he remained already in a completely hopeless state.

Shortly before 5 o'clock, the Russians, after being under murderous fire for almost three hours, which turned out to be especially cruel in the end, left their main combat units, which were already in a terrible situation and made a desperate attempt to escape, and at first they took heading for S, as if wanting to go back to the China Sea, and then suddenly turned back to the old NO course. Smoke and fog hid them at a critical moment from the eyes of Admiral Togo, as a result of which the latter passed in vain for half an hour to the south, considering them still ahead of him, until finally the truth was revealed. Guessing what was the matter and not seeing more resistance from the Russians, Togo himself headed north in pursuit of the main forces of his enemy and sent his squadron of armored cruisers to the south to join other ships there and prevent the enemy from retreating. After a short voyage at full speed, Togo overtook the main forces of the remaining Russian squadron, which fled in a crowded form to NO; there were 6 ships in total - "Eagle", "Emperor Alexander III", "Borodino", "Sisoy the Great", "Navarin" and "Admiral Nakhimov". It turned out that "Emperor Nicholas I" and with it three other ships (battleships of coastal defense) went south to protect their auxiliary and armored cruisers. Once again, Togo tried his tactics of crossing the enemy’s course, and this time he did it with only four battleships and two armored cruisers, and successfully knocked the Russians off their course to W, and then to NW. This phase of the battle lasted from 6 pm until dusk, that is, until 7:28 pm. Five minutes before that, the battleship Borodino, leading the convoy, caught fire and sank. It had been burning for 43 minutes before, and apparently the fire from the fire had reached its cruise chamber. Mines did not participate at all in its destruction, but nevertheless it cannot be said with certainty that it fell victim to artillery fire alone. Another battleship of the 1st class - "Emperor Alexander III" was no doubt killed by guns: he suddenly left the line and struggled for some time with various hardships near the cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov", turned to the top with a keel and went to the bottom at 7 hours 7 minutes evenings.

Battle of armored cruisers.
In the south, at the same time, fighting between minor ships raged. It was evident that at the time when Togo was crossing the course of the main Russian squadron on the left side, his secondary cruisers were ordered to head south and attack the weaker ships that were at the tail of the Russian columns. Unfortunately, it is impossible to analyze in detail the organization of the attack by armored cruisers in this battle; it is only known that 4 squadrons were made up of these ships. From the very beginning of the battle, only two of them immediately took part in the battle and these were the first squadron of Rear Admiral Deva ("Kasagi", "Chitose", "Yakumo" and "Tokiwa", with a speed of 21 knots or more and with artillery of 8 and 6 inch guns), and then the squadron of Rear Admiral Uriu ("Naniwa", "Niitaka", and "Otawa", somewhat smaller than the previous one, at a lower speed and with 6 inch artillery ). Along with these ships, on the enemy side were the armored cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Vladimir Monomakh and six armored cruisers: Aurora, Oleg, Emerald, Zhemchug, Svetlana and Almaz. Admirals Deva and Uriu followed the same tactics as Togo, but in reverse order, that is, instead of passing at the enemy in front of the bow, they went astern, then skirting it on the right side; this action they repeated several times; taking advantage of the course and depending on the circumstances, they appeared at the enemy either on the right or on the left. In essence, the Russian squadron included three cruisers with a speed exceeding the speed of all Japanese ships, but their speed was useless along with such slow-moving vehicles as Dmitry Donskoy and Vladimir Monomakh, who could not do more than 14 knots. There were no visible results of this attack, although the enemy's formation was broken and two of his auxiliary steamers were sunk; in general, all Russian cruisers were more or less damaged.

After a two-hour battle, the remaining two Japanese cruiser squadrons also joined the Deva and Uriu squadrons, but this reinforcement was more than balanced by the approach of the battleship Imperator Nikolay I and its three coastal defense satellites. Then a heated battle ensued, and at its most serious moment, both Japanese flagships had to temporarily go out of order to repair their damage. An hour later, however, a squadron of Japanese armored cruisers descending from the north quickly reversed the situation and the Russians headed north in frustration, persistently pursued by three squadrons of armored cruisers, together with a mine squadron. The result of this pursuit was the sinking of another auxiliary steamer and the sinking of mines on the battleship Knyaz Suvorov, which until then was still in a helpless state. This battleship resisted desperately until the very last minute, only one gun in the stern remained still fit for action and the servants did not stop firing from it until the ship went under water.

At nightfall, all Japanese warships, on a signal from Admiral Togo, headed north to the rendezvous of the Matsushima Islands, where a line of Japanese ships had been placed to the east since dawn to prevent Russian penetration to Vladivostok.

Mine attack.
Now came the second stage of the battle, which consisted of a predetermined mine attack. This attack has never had anything similar in theme to the wide scale in which it was undertaken. Six detachments of fighters and six detachments of destroyers took part in it. Admiral Togo's plan was to hold his enemy's ships in the southern Sea of ​​Japan, destroy his secondary artillery and then launch a whole cloud of destroyers against which he would be powerless to fight. During the whole day the prospects for success in this part of the battle were very weak due to strong winds and high seas, which could prevent these small fragile vessels from maneuvering on the high seas, but by evening the wind had died down and despite the remaining waves it was already clear that the issue of the program seemed to be solved. The officers themselves and the sailors repaired by him felt that the matter could not be done without their help and that the decisive moment had come for testing the destroyers in a difficult and final struggle. After the first, rather trivial attack by destroyers on the Russian squadron in Port Arthur, at the beginning of the present war, ships of this kind did nothing particularly significant for the entire company. The climatic conditions were, in truth, now very unfavorable for the impending event, but the Japanese decided that if destroyers were only suitable for attacking on a smooth lake, then it was better not to have them at all and not count them along with other combat weapons. Five detachments of fighters were assigned to attack the main enemy forces: one came from the north, two from NO, one from O and one SO. To attack ships separated from the squadron and individual cruisers, four detachments of destroyers were sent from the south, and finally, one detachment of fighters and two destroyers were sent to attack ships that had their own independent direction. This terrible raid from all sides began at 8:15 pm and continued until 1 am. In some cases, the destroyers kept so close to the enemy ships that these latter could not even lower their guns so much to repel their attacks, and it all ended with the Russian ships, in order to avoid danger, scattered in all directions, while the Sisoy battleships Veliky and Navarin and the armored cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Vladimir Monomakh received mortal blows, after which they sank; on the part of the Japanese, the losses ended in the death of three drowned destroyers, 22 people were killed and 65 people were wounded.
This report speaks very much in favor of the reputation of the destroyers, although, bearing in mind the significant number of them in this battle and some of the demoralizing conditions of the Russians, one would expect much more success from these ships. In any case, Japanese naval officers say that if the sea were calm, then in all likelihood not a single Russian ship would have escaped their hands and that the destroyers, by their mere presence in these waters, had an effect on scattering the enemy during the second day of the battle.
Mine attacks were especially pronounced on May 15th; the Russian fleet, or that part of it that ceased to exist as an organizational unit, was finally broken up into 11 independent separate parts. Three armored cruisers - Oleg, Aurora and Zhemchug - not only left the theater of operations untimely, but even took their direction to the south, instead of going east; they thus again passed the Tsushima Strait and headed for Manila. One of the same cruisers - Almaz - successfully broke through to Vladivostok, and besides it, one of Admiral Rozhestvensky's fighters also successfully got there. Two fighters fled towards Shanghai, and one died on the way, and finally the only group that still more or less retained the semblance of a joint voyage consisted of the battleships Eagle and Emperor Nicholas I, coastal defense battleships General Admiral Apraksin and "Admiral Senyavin" and one armored cruiser "Izumrud". Due to the countless turns on May 14 and the fear caused by the mine attack during the following night, these ships lost their place on the map, so Rear Admiral Nebogatov, who commanded them, decided to take a course to the west and followed it until approached the Korean coast and was not determined by noticeable points on it. At dawn, he saw the Ulneung Islands and from them he already laid a course for Vladivostok, but again in this area, almost 200 miles from the place where the battle began, the drama of the previous day was repeated. While Togo and Nebogatov were still at a distance of 60 miles from each other, a wireless telegraph informed the first of them of the Russian movement to the north and at 10:30 in the morning Nebogatov, his officers and teams, who were probably already rejoicing at their successful breakthrough, suddenly saw themselves surrounded on all sides by 27 Japanese military ships, not counting the mass of destroyers. The high-speed cruiser "Izumrud" took advantage of the first minute of confusion and fled, so that when she came to the bay of St. Vladimir, she would throw herself on the stones. The other four ships surrendered to the enemy.

Surrender of Admiral Nebogatov.
This incident of the Tsushima battle very naturally aroused a lot of different rumors. Admiral Nebogatov himself explains this misfortune by the fact that, seeing resistance as useless, he considered himself obliged to save the officers and lower ranks who were under his command, and there were more than 2,000 of them in his detachment. All critics, however, argue that even if he opened the kingstones on his ships and let them sink, then only the smallest part of his people would die at sea. So the Sovereign Emperor also looked at this issue, refusing to authorize the release of Nebogatov and his officers from captivity for an even word, since the Japanese agreed to let them go. The correspondent of The Times says that nothing could have caused any Japanese admiral to surrender with his ships under such circumstances, but, nevertheless, it does not prevent us from quoting here an interesting excerpt from a letter of a high-ranking Japanese officer on a subject relating to this incident:
“Everyone who looks with ordinary eyes at this surrender of judgments, of course, condemns it and imposes treason and an illegal act, but what a warrior experiences under such circumstances is far from suitable for those feelings that take possession of a player who loses his game at a chessboard . Admiral Nebogatov was undoubtedly considered an officer of good reputation and common sense, and he certainly would have had the courage to decide to blow up his four ships and thereby prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy, but he was afraid to carry out this harsh decision. Condoling with what this admiral must have felt, I believe that everyone who condemns him for surrender greatly diminishes Togo's ability and the efforts that the people under his command showed in surrendering this surrender inevitable. Take into account the reasons that come to surrender. The Russian ships were not only stripped of most of their combat strength during the previous day's battle, but were also subjected to incessant attacks from minecraft during the night that followed. At such and such a moment, the flagship of Admiral Togo suddenly appeared in front of them at the head of 27 pennants. What was left to do in view of such conditions, how not to surrender? After all, Russian officers are as brave as ours. No one should fall into error and think that any special considerations could induce them to surrender.

Russian and Japanese losses.
Apart from this astonishing incident, the battle of May 15th was of little interest. The scattered units of the broken squadron were searched for and destroyed with mathematical prudence. Nothing illuminated the darkness of this terrible misfortune for Russia, except for the amazing courage of its officers and teams. In many cases, individual ships, meeting with vastly superior Japanese forces, fought until they sank. The commander and navigator on the Admiral Nakhimov did not even allow them to be rescued: they shared the fate of their ship and only later were pulled out of the water, hands clasped with each other. The Japanese, for their part, spared no effort to save the drowning, and generally treated their prisoners very generously.

To show the relationship between the surviving and the dead people, when the ship went to the bottom during the day from only one artillery fire, we can cite the case of the coastal defense battleship Admiral Ushakov. It sank at about 6 pm on May 15th, after half an hour of shelling from the armored cruisers Iwate and Idzumo from a long distance and out of its entire crew of 422 people, only 80 people died, and all the rest were picked up by Japanese boats. Another fact became clear at the same time - a huge depressing effect of horror: the rescued immediately changed into dry clothes and received a small amount of vodka, but many behaved like distraught, ran up and down the deck and rushed to the ladders to the top; some wrapped their arms around nearby objects and did not tear themselves away from them. People obviously mentally still experienced everything that they had just experienced. Something similar probably also happened on Nebogatov's squadron after the ray of hope to get to Vladivostok disappeared.

The Japanese lost in this battle only three destroyers and 116 people killed and 538 people wounded. The figures for the losses of the Russian squadron have already been published several times, and therefore we will not repeat them here; let's just say that the decline in personnel consisted of 4,000 killed and drowned and 7,282 prisoners.

Reasons for the Japanese victory.
What caused the Japanese victory? Many claim that the Japanese used submarine mine boats, but they positively did not have them. Others claim that they scattered floating mines all over the place, of the kind that caused so much trouble near Port Arthur last year. They also did not have these mines. Success must be attributed entirely to good shooting and sound tactics. The Japanese fired so well compared to the enemy that the strength of their artillery fire was three and even four times greater than the nominal. On paper, they had 16 12-inch guns against 26 Russians, and during the battle this ratio was already 48 or even 64 to 26. This superiority in artillery was further supported by skillful tactics. The Japanese ships were almost continuously in a position that gave them the opportunity to concentrate their fire on known combat units of the Russian squadron. This circumstance was again favored by their high speed. It is easy to see that much was won in the battle thanks to Togo's excellent tactics, but at the same time it is clear that if he had advantages in the course, he would not do anything with his wise tactics. The entire Russian squadron equated the speed of its movement with the speed of its extreme slug. There is nothing new in this, but nevertheless, long-known old truths are once again confirmed here.

Some lessons learned from combat.
Did this battle provide any new guidance for shipbuilders? The Japanese answer: "nothing significant." At first they said that the artillery unexpectedly won over the armor, but this conclusion does not stand up to criticism, since out of the six battleships launched to the bottom, only two died from artillery fire, and there is no reason to believe that their main side armor was pierced by shells . On the surrendered battleship Eagle, the thinner armor was rather loose in places, but the main side belt remained completely unharmed. The battleships "Oslyabya" and "Alexander III" were very overloaded with coal and provisions, so that all the main damage in the sides fell on them above the main armor belt, but the waves freely fell through holes above the armored deck and thus quickly reduced the degree of stability of the ships themselves. Thus, we see that the armor has not yet been defeated in any way, but still one might wish that its very distribution over the ship's hull was somewhat changed.

One very serious drawback noted in this battle is that the fire of the lighter guns was comparatively not very soft, especially on the unstable class II cruisers in times of high seas. It is remarkable that the battle of the armored cruisers had little success all day 14 th of May, although their tactics were the same as those of the armored ships and the gunners were equally capable people.

The battleship and the armored cruiser very clearly showed their enormous combat advantages compared to ships of lower ranks. The solution of this issue is of great importance in shipbuilding.

Since this article was compiled by an English correspondent from Japanese sources, we find it useful to place here the opinion of a high-ranking Japanese naval officer, whose letter was printed on the columns of the English newspaper Japan Mail.

“The lessons of the last great naval battle do not provide any new guidance. All the most important points of military art remained unchanged. The commandant remained as before the same significant person as he was considered before. The following remained just as important and unchanged: the uniformity of the composition of the squadron’s combat ships, high speed, the undesirability of having weak ships in the combat squadron, such as special-purpose steamers, the disadvantage of going into battle with overloaded ships and the lack of a suitable naval base near. All this must be considered as important now as ever. During the battle, nothing changed the old theory that the resistance of the armor is stronger than the guns, and in fact, on all Russian battleships, the armor turned out to be excellent in every respect. Further, it has been proved that the accuracy of shooting from large guns is incomparably higher than the accuracy of smaller artillery, and that armadillos are the most important and necessary figures in a naval battle. As for the assertion that destroyers are not capable of taking a prominent part in naval battles, it can be argued from experience that the usefulness of these ships depends entirely on the people who manage them. Competent naval officers all unanimously agree on these considerations and all assure that no serious change in their views has occurred. However, there are still some points that will have to be changed, namely: the armament of the battleship should consist not only of 12 inch guns, but also of 10 and 8 inch and several 6 inch guns . The speed must be at least 18 knots, and the capacity of the coal pits must meet the requirements of a fairly large radius of action. Every ironclad must be protected by armor capable of resisting such armament as she herself has, and this means that her displacement must exceed 16,000 tons. Further, if we take into account the likely future improvement in explosive compositions, then the armor that will have to resist their action will require the construction of ships with a displacement of about 20,000 tons. Many of these arguments apply to cruisers as well. If their special service is taken into account, as well as the possibility of their action in squadron combat together with ironclads, then they should be increased in size and in all likelihood will reach a displacement of 15,000 tons. As for the combat armament of such cruisers, in England it is already customary to put two 9-inch guns on them, but one can think that probably two 8-inch guns with thick shields will be quite enough. In the future, cruisers will probably carry four 10-inch guns mounted in the bow and stern turrets and several 8-inch secondary guns, or the entire armament will consist of one 8-inch guns. There is a suggestion to make further improvements in this direction, but in general all indications are in favor of a mixed armament of 10 and 8 inch guns. Then, beyond any doubt, there is a requirement that all cruisers develop a speed of at least 23 knots.
With regard to the question of armored cruisers, many lessons have already been passed on to us in this respect. With the development of wireless telegraphy, it was thought to do away with some of the functions of cruisers, but it turned out, however, that this method of telegraphy has its limits. Armored cruisers are still needed."

“A destroyer destroyer with tremendous speed is an excellent scout, but its longitudinal attachment and general structural weakness, as well as the inability to stay at sea during fresh weather, make it less valuable for such a service. The cruiser should in most cases serve as the eyes and ears of a combat squadron, and also be used as trade fighters. Here one must take into account the tremendous speed which is now given to more or less every ocean-going commercial steamer. There have already been many cases when private steamships managed to safely escape from pursuit by their slow-moving military cruisers. Practice requires that in each squadron there should be several reconnaissance cruisers from 3,000 to 4,000 tons with a displacement and at a speed of at least 25 knots, and, to achieve the latter requirement, even some of the weapons could be sacrificed. The Russian cruisers "Zhemchug" and "Izumrud" are approximately suitable types for this; it is only necessary to improve their appearance a little more. These scouts must also be able to make huge crossings without renewing coal supplies.
With regard to destroyer fighters, one could say that the only improvement desired on them is their achievement of seaworthiness. Some internal reorganizations on them are also desirable, but the main thing that is required of them is still seaworthiness. As for the submarines, they are still in their probationary period."

There are defeats that turn out to be good for the country, when the sober authorities change the state policy, turning the country into a peaceful and prosperous power. Such a defeat, for example, was once suffered by Sweden near Poltava. And Japan, which lost the Second World War, does not look very shabby. However, there are also such defeats from which countries suffer for centuries. Tsushima became such a defeat - the last battle in Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905. The word "Tsushima" for the Russians became a household word - the same as the word "Stalingrad" later became for the Germans, for the Americans - "Pearl Harbor", for the Japanese themselves - "Hiroshima". The consequences of the Tsushima battle for Russia turned out to be truly catastrophic - in the end, they led to the death of the Russian Empire, the October Revolution and the 70-year rule of the communist regime. This battle took place exactly one hundred years ago, on May 14, 1905 (May 27, according to the new style).

The battle, in which Russia actually lost its fleet, was preceded by a year of incessant setbacks on the fronts of the Russo-Japanese War. Formally, this war was started by Japan, but its beginning was inevitable - the two countries divided the spheres of influence in Korea and Manchuria. After the victory over China in 1894-1895, Japan, under the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895, received the islands of Taiwan and Penghuledao, as well as the Liaodong Peninsula, which she had to give up under pressure from Russia and France. In 1896 Russia received from the Chinese government a concession to build a railroad across Manchuria, and in 1898 leased the Kwantung Peninsula with Port Arthur from China. At the same time, Russia received the right to create a naval base on it. In 1900 Russian troops entered Manchuria.

This war, which lasted more than a year, revealed serious shortcomings in the system of command of the Russian army and navy. Due to gross mistakes and miscalculations in preparation for war, in particular, underestimation of the enemy, Russia was losing battle after battle. In August 1904 - the defeat at Liaoyang, in September - on the Shahe River, in December 1904 the besieged Port Arthur fell. The head of the Kwantung Fortified Region, Lieutenant General Stessel, signed the surrender of the fortress despite the fact that the garrison and the squadron could and wanted to resist. In February 1905, Japanese troops inflicted a heavy defeat on the Russian army at Mukden.

All this long chain of failures heated up the situation in the country to the limit, and Russian government decided to send the 2nd Pacific Squadron, combined with the 3rd, to help the then still fighting in the encirclement of the garrison of Port Arthur. In addition to Port Artur, before the formation under the command of Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky, the task was to break through to the port of Vladivostok. This would lead to the strengthening of Russia's military presence in the Far East and would affect the entire course of the Russo-Japanese War. The combined squadron included eight squadron battleships, three coastal defense battleships, one armored cruiser, eight cruisers, one auxiliary cruiser, nine destroyers, six transports and two hospital ships.

BATTLE START. THE DEATH OF "OSLYABI". Illustration from pallada.narod.ru

Before reaching the Korea Strait (in which, near the island of Tsushima, there was a battle), the squadron made a 32.5-thousand-kilometer campaign from the Baltic Sea, past the coast of Europe, around Africa and further, lingering in Madagascar, across the Indian Ocean, past the coast of Indochina. .. Part of the squadron, which left a little later, took a shorter route through the Suez Canal. On the way, the ships actively replenished their coal reserves, which led to their overload and, as a result, to a loss of speed. In addition, the bottoms of the ships during the campaign were overgrown with algae, which also significantly reduced their speed. More or less modern ships in the squadron were only the battleships "Prince Suvorov", "Emperor Alexander III", "Borodino", "Eagle". However, the squadron, as you know, is equal to the slug ...

There were about three days left to Vladivostok when the squadron passed the section between Tsushima Island and the coast of Japan. It was there that the Japanese fleet of Admiral Togo was waiting for her - 10 battleships, 24 cruisers and 63 destroyers. By this time, three days before the battle, one of the Russian military leaders, Admiral Felkerzam, had died, whose pennant was raised on the battleship Oslyabya. Although Rozhdestvensky ordered not to lower the admiral's flag on the ship and the squadron was not notified of the incident, this death had a depressing effect on the crew of the battleship itself ...

Dozens of works in Russia (USSR) and other countries are devoted to the analysis of the Tsushima battle, which lasted almost a day. The Russian squadron suffered a defeat in it, or rather, a complete rout, since Admiral Rozhdestvensky paid for three destroyed Japanese destroyers with nine battleships, six cruisers, five destroyers and several transports, and four more battleships and one destroyer surrendered. The reasons for this were the shortcomings in the design of the ships, and their insufficient speed, and the imperfection of Russian artillery, and the fatigue of officers and sailors after a months-long campaign, and command errors ...

There were many reasons. Among them there was only a lack of courage, valor and bravery of Russian sailors, who continued to fulfill their duty to the last. During the battle, more than five thousand crew members of the Russian squadron were killed. Almost six thousand more were captured - the Russian ships, which received critical damage, shot ammunition, often simply had no other choice but to lower the flag ...

On May 14, at 7 o'clock in the morning, the first Japanese cruiser was seen, and a few hours later the main forces of Admiral Togo's squadron appeared. In the first phase of the Tsushima battle, the Japanese began to cover the head of the Russian squadron, rebuilt from two wake columns into one, and from a long distance opened fire on two flagship battleships - Suvorov under the flag of Rozhdestvensky and Oslyaba under the flag of Felkerzam. An hour later, the battleship Oslyabya capsized and sank, and the Suvorov, having received serious damage, left the battle. The flagship of the squadron was "Alexander III". Then the Japanese ships began to destroy it. A few hours later, "Alexander III" also sank along with a crew of 900 people. The battleship "Borodino", which took the place of "Alexander III", was also destroyed along with the crew.

Night fell and the damaged ships were attacked Japanese destroyers. They finished off the wounded Suvorov, and Rozhdestvensky switched to the destroyer Bedovy, which surrendered to the Japanese the next day. In the evening Admiral Nebogatov assumed command of the squadron. The next day, when the remnants of the squadron were again overtaken by Japanese ships, Nebogatov ordered the Andreevsky flags to be lowered. The battleships "Nikolai I", "Eagle", "Apraksin" and "Senyavin" were captured. Some ships, however, managed to escape capture. The high-speed cruiser "Izumrud" was able to evade pursuit, which the Japanese ships could not catch up with. He went to Vladivostok, where he was blown up by the team. The Almaz cruiser and two destroyers also broke into the Russian port. Three more cruisers (including the famous Aurora) managed to reach the Philippines, where they were interned.

The Tsushima battle remained a deep wound in the soul of Russian soldiers and sailors. Only later, after the country, humiliated by countless defeats, driven to rebellion, first overthrew the tsar, and then the provisional government, when the battles of the Civil War died down, revenge was taken. Japan made exactly the same mistake in 1939 as Russia made in 1904. The victory in the Russo-Japanese War inspired the Japanese command with confidence that the northern neighbor was not a formidable force. This confidence turned into a defeat for the Land of the Rising Sun in the conflict at Khalkhin Gol. It may not have been such a major disaster as Tsushima was for Russia, but it nevertheless forced Tokyo to abandon plans for an attack on the USSR for a long time. And in July-August 1945, when the USSR, having declared war on Japan, began to destroy the Kwantung grouping of the Japanese army, the Soviet troops, liberating Chinese cities, remembered not only Stalingrad and Brest, but also the Tsushima disaster ...

They remember her even now, 100 years later. On May 27, the day this battle took place, a group of diplomats from the Russian embassy in Tokyo, employees of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, representatives of the mayor's office of the city of Tsushima and Nagasaki Prefecture went out on the minesweeper of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces "Makishima" to the alleged battle site. At the site of the sinking of the Russian cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh", wreaths were laid on the water, artillery salute sounded. At the place where the cruiser's crew landed on the shore, a bas-relief was erected in memory of the dead sailors - Japanese and Russian. It was made in Japan. It depicts the well-known in Japan painting "Admiral Togo visits the commander of the Baltic squadron Rozhdestvensky in the naval hospital in the city of Sasebo". Next to the bas-relief there is a monument on which lists of dead Russian and Japanese sailors are engraved. Representatives of Russia and Japan said that their countries will never again fight against each other.

I would like to believe in it. Too many lives have been taken by all the Russo-Japanese military conflicts that have taken place in the last century.