Russian battleships against British fishermen, the Aurora cruiser and invisible destroyers. Russo-Japanese War. Alternative battleships of the Russian Imperial Navy
April 10 E.I. Vikorst reported that the rafts could be ready in 40 days, but the chief commander demanded that the time be reduced in every possible way. The only foundry in Kerch of the French company Meneton stopped working by the beginning of 1878, and the hawse for batteries, and then the details of the installation of guns (shoulder straps, pins with cups and machine tools) had to be made in Nikolaev. The advantages of the sectional-modular assembly method helped to significantly reduce the construction time and overcome the many difficulties that arose during the work of backward equipment and technology.
By February 1, 1878, decks of 102 mm thick boards were laid on the platforms of both batteries. From the same boards, the pontoon sheathing was also recruited. By March 1, three pontoons of the first Kerch battery were caulked and launched. Their internal saturation, cabin finishing and installation of equipment on the platform deck continued.
By March 15, 5 more pontoons were caulked, barrels were put into them and launched into the water. Then they began to cover the bomb cellars and the hook chambers. By May 15, battery No. 6 (No. 5 received, as one might assume, the same battery under construction in Nikolaev) both layers of armor plates were installed, the turntables of the guns and their machines were loaded, the equipment of the hook chambers and bomb cellars in the pontoon compartments were completed.
They installed "corner barbets" (elevated platforms) at the corners of the parapet and traverses. They were supposed to protect the batteries from attacks by steam boats with mines and rowboats with boarding parties. The war gave examples of such hand-to-hand skirmishes between the crews of Russian boats and the Turks on the Danube and during the attacks of boats from the steamer "Grand Duke Konstantin" under the command of S.O. Makarov off the coast of the Caucasus. The same work was consistently launched on battery No. 7. It was launched on May 24th. The trigger recess was 0.66 m bow, 0.64 m stern. On June 1, the installation and bolting of armor plates was completed on Battery No. 6.
Lockers were installed in the cabins, butts were attached for attaching guns. On both rafts, the decks were caulked and the grooves were filled with pitch. All this testified that the batteries were built in compliance with all the requirements for warships, and they were counted on for a fairly long autonomous navigation in the area of \u200b\u200bthe combat position. Apparently, crossings by sea were not excluded. All this energetic, albeit protracted, shipbuilding activity was crowned with complete success. As evidenced by the act admission committee dated September 13, 1878, both Kerch batteries (Nos. 6 and 7) were built in accordance with the approved drawings with due care and durability of the finish.
But, as often happens, the formidable combat vehicles built with great effort did not have time to take part in the war. Soon after the conclusion of peace, the inexorable economy that came into force made it necessary to pull the batteries ashore "for an indefinite time." They, as one has to assume, did not have time to assign crews. There were simply not enough people in the fleet, which was largely replenished at the expense of the Baltic, and the batteries were saved as a last resort. The same fate befell, obviously, the Nikolaev battery No. 5. But even without entering service, they played a role in creating a balance in the naval forces of the opponents. Turkish armadillos did not dare to approach the Kerch coast. The experience of their creation confirmed the role of well-thought-out engineering improvisation, which made it possible to sharply strengthen the defense of the coasts with the help of even a poorly equipped military port. The experience of truly free creativity, not bound by dogmas, was also extremely important.
But the era of "glaciation" that was advancing in Russia (Emperor Alexander III abruptly turned the country in the direction of outright reaction) did not contribute to the development of original and original solutions in shipbuilding technology. The experience of the ill-fated priests, who discredited the true freedom of creativity, contributed to the loss of interest in battery rafts. They turned out to be outside the interests of the naval ministry, in which armored and destroyer euphoria began to reign supreme. And as a reaction to the wasteful and reckless construction of popovkas, which could have been replaced by rafts at incomparably lower costs, one long-term trend began to take hold - unconditional, as in the case of Emperor Nicholas I, borrowing foreign models. And although rafts, as a means of limited use in their specific conditions of coastal defense, have far from exhausted themselves, they did not find a place in the new shipbuilding.
Sources of the RGA of the Navy
Fund 417. Naval Headquarters.
Fund 421. Marine Technical Committee.
Fund 427. Main Department of Shipbuilding and Supply.
Fund 609. Headquarters of the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet.
Fund 920. Sevastopol port.
Reports on the Maritime Department for 1855–1860.
Russian armored ships of the transition period
V.Yu. Gribovsky
The decisions taken in 1845 in England, France and Russia to install steam engines with propellers on battleships and frigates soon began to be put into practice. So, two years later, the English propeller-driven battleship Blenheim was tested with a steam engine with a nominal power of 450 hp. and a speed of about 6 knots. The first Russian propeller-driven frigate "Archimedes" was launched in 1848, and seven years later the first propeller-driven 76-gun ship "Vyborg" (displacement 3505 tons, nominal power 450 hp. speed 7, 5 knots).
The growth in the number and caliber of bombing guns, the power of machines, the increase in their total mass, along with the limited structural capabilities of wood, led to a reassessment of the role of screw battleships. In 1857–1858 The Naval Ministry set a course for the construction of large frigates armed with artillery of the largest caliber. Their displacement reached 4500-5700 tons, the cost of hulls and machines was 880,000-1,000,000 rubles. silver.
Positive experience of the combat use of bomb artillery and the first battleships during the Crimean War of 1853–1856. accelerated the transition to iron armored shipbuilding in England and France. The fact that Russia lagged far behind is evidenced by at least this fact: in the year of the launch of the first French seaworthy battleship "Gluar" (1859), four next wooden screw frigates were approved for construction ("Navarin", "Chesma", " Sevastopol" and "Petropavlovsk"), obsolete even before the start of construction. Therefore, on April 4, 1860, the Naval Ministry decided to build nine small clipper cruisers instead of the first two of them. The contract for the construction of the 59-gun frigate "Sevastopol" in the Northern Dock of Kronstadt was concluded with the merchant S.G. Kudryavtsev on June 3, and the contractor undertook to use best materials(oak, teak, partly pine) and take the ship out of the dock on October 15, 1862.
The construction of the frigate "Petropavlovsk" by state funds in the New Admiralty was approved on September 19, 1860. The prototype for it was the "Sevastopol", the project of which was drawn up "in accordance with the drawings" of the latest foreign and Russian frigates. The construction of the frigates, laid down on March 16 and September 9, 1861, respectively, was headed by ship engineers Colonel A. Kh. Shaunburg and Captain A. A. Ivashchenko. This happened at the very time when the construction of battleships with both iron and wooden hulls was widely developed in England and France.
The efforts of the Russian Naval Ministry focused on armored shipbuilding only in 1862. It was decided to build a second ship in St. Petersburg according to the type of the Pervenets armored battery ordered in England in 1861 and to sheathe the Sevastopol and Petropavlovsk under construction with armor, which later became the only in the Russian fleet armored wooden ships.
So it's 1895 again. This time we are building a new Russian Imperial Fleet (hereinafter - RIF) within the limits of Russia's economic and technical capabilities.
Flowers blossomed, grass rose, and it seemed that not only nature, but the whole Russian land, from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean, rejoiced at the ascension to the throne of the new Tsar, Nicholas II. The tsar's train pacified the sound of its wheel sets at the junctions of the rails, approaching Sevastopol. There is nothing surprising that in the spring of 1895 the young Sovereign decided to hold a review, talk with the sailors, and inspect the southern maritime borders of his State.
However, having enjoyed the bright flags, polished coppers and the brave bearing of the sailors, the All-Russian Emperor was not satisfied with this, but expressed a desire to look at the ships in action. Such a desire caused considerable amazement of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Nikolai Vasilyevich Kopytov.
- How is it? In what case?
- Yes. I want to see combat training. Order, Vice-Admiral, several battleships, well, four, for example, to go to the exercise area at once and open fire.
- Impossible! Unthinkable, Your Imperial Majesty, the embarrassed commander murmured. - There are no practical shells on the ships, there is a shortage of coal, no steam is divorced.
- It is impossible, Nikolai Vasilyevich, for a Russian nobleman not to fulfill the order of the Sovereign Emperor, and it is unthinkable, Mr. Vice Admiral, for a Russian officer not to fulfill the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. If you please, - answered the Sovereign
Unfortunately, the course of events confirmed the commander's assumption - at the exit from the harbor, two battleships - "Chesma" and "Catherine II" collided, and were forced to immediately go to ship repair. Thank God, there were no casualties. “Sinop” and “Twelve Apostles”, which came out after 14 hours with grief in half, could not hit the shield. But the sovereign was truly shocked when the commander of the Twelve Apostles refused to demonstrate the firing of casemate 47mm guns: “It’s fresh at sea, Your Imperial Majesty: I don’t think of putting your sacred person in danger, and when the gun ports are opened, the ship may take water and lose stability” .
Nicholas II was returning in the most disgusting mood, and upon arrival in St. Petersburg, he immediately summoned the Minister of the Sea, Nikolai Matveyevich Chikhachev. Nikolai Matveyevich believed that he was ready for anything - from a mild reprimand to a shameful resignation, but, as it turned out, he was not ready for this. Nicholas II, not listening to objections, ordered a sudden check of the combat readiness of the Baltic Fleet "right now" in order to conduct artillery fire on the shields in 2 hours. Needless to say, not after 2, not after 22 hours, no shell hit any shield, about which the sovereign was informed by a messenger appointed by him from the retinue. There were also incidents, now even more significant - the squadron battleship "Gangut" sat on the stones, so much so that it was not possible to save the ship.
Needless to say, a series of resignations from their positions swept through the Navy. Many powerful people of this world have lost their posts, starting from Chikhachev and ending with many admirals. Admiral General Alekseev was appointed Minister of the Sea.
combat training
Combat training was radically reorganized. It was decided to pay special attention to squadron maneuvering - both when controlled from navigation bridges, and when controlled from conning towers. Maneuvering on warships was temporarily suspended, having found a cheaper alternative.
For training in squadron maneuvering, 20 steam boats of the same type were urgently delivered to each fleet, and they, under the control of admirals and captains of the first rank, in designated areas, under the supervision of instructors from training centers, depicted squadron evolutions, various formations of bearing, front, rebuilding from one column to two, and other tactical sea wisdom. Warships, during the training period of 1895 and 1896, went to sea no more often than before, but since 1897 the number of trips to the sea has been tripled.
In order to accustom ship commanders to control from the conning tower (which required a habit and a fair amount of imagination, because the view from there is almost non-existent), amusing villages were set up on the coasts of the Black and Baltic Seas, consisting of 40 ordinary village huts each, located in two lines at a distance of 100 steps from each other, and a mile from the line. The interior of the hut was very reminiscent of a conning tower, dummies of various ship devices were immediately installed, up to a machine telegraph. In each hut for the duration of the exercises were the commander of the ship, the navigator and the instructor of the training center. For communication, at each hut there was a tower with a signal searchlight, where the signalman climbed during the exercise, and his understudy with signal flags. The squadron commander, receiving water from the instructor, passed commands to the orderly, the orderly ran to the signalman, and he transmitted commands to all the ship-huts of his squadron. In the passage, the second instructor from time to time transmitted by sound pipe or telephone introductory (in the form of a report to the commander of the ship on command) about damage to the vehicle or hull, and other troubles.
To discuss the issues of shipbuilding, a Special Meeting was convened from the ministers of military, foreign affairs and the manager of the naval ministry to clarify the issues of the future development of the fleet, in connection with the political and military requirements of the moment (hereinafter referred to as the Meeting), which always met under the chairmanship of Nicholas II. In June, the issue of building squadron battleships was chosen on the agenda, the main task of which was to gain dominance at sea through a linear battle with the enemy.
armadillos
Discussion of armadillos
The features of the development of scientific and technological progress of those years was that the ships became obsolete even in the slipway period, so it was categorically impossible to use the designs of ships of the previous series for the construction of new ships. But a ship built according to a new project almost inevitably brought technical problems associated with insufficient development design solutions and the novelty of the tasks set for shipbuilders and their suppliers.
Nevertheless, it was necessary to find a way out, and it was found - for the construction of a new series of Russian ships, it was decided to use the projects of the "newest" squadron battleships. Under the “newest” (taking into account the previously unprecedented rapidity of scientific and technological progress), it was decided to understand not those that have already been put into operation by any fleet, but only those under construction at the moment (already laid down, but not yet put into operation) squadron battleships of the world.
It was decided to use the project "as is", or with the most minimal changes.
A meeting in June 1895, chaired by His Imperial Majesty Nicholas II, considered the main characteristics of such battleships, summarized in a table for the sake of simplicity:
For Austria-Hungary; Argentina; Norway; China; Spain; the Netherlands; Finland; Chile; Sweden in 1895, squadron battleships were not built
As it turned out, the Russian, German and British battleships of the Majestic type were characterized by insufficient speed, which put their opponents in a more advantageous position, allowing them to form a convenient tactical formation. The Italian type "Ammiraglio di San Bon", as well as the British "Rinaun", surpassing competitors in speed, gave insufficient firepower and protection.
Those under construction in England looked like a completely harmonious project. Japanese armadillos Fuji type: 18-knot move, 12-inch caliber and powerful armor in the center of the ship (which, however, left the extremities with almost no protection, if not considered as such a carapace armored deck 63mm thick). However, their 305/40 caliber guns gave a rate of fire of 0.25 rounds per minute, which is completely insufficient for today, and besides, they were placed in barbets, not towers.
The French type "Charlemagne" showed a different approach. The speed and weapons of the main caliber (305-mm guns with a rate of fire of 1 shot per minute in armored turrets) met all possible requirements. In total, the battleship carried 820 tons of Harvey's armor (The slightly thinner armor belt was compensated by the fact that it protected the entire ship, and not just its middle part, as was customary in English school shipbuilding. Two armored decks in combination with coffee darts provided excellent protection against enemy shells at long ranges:
By and large, two serious claims could be made to the project of the French battleship:
- Firstly, the medium caliber was frankly unsuccessful 138-mm / 45 Mle.1893 (armor-piercing, semi-armor-piercing and high-explosive shells of which weighing 35-30 kilograms were carried away to an impressive range of 15,000 meters, but the gun showed a completely unsatisfactory rate of fire of 4 rounds per minute).
- Secondly, the unreasonable armament of powerful combat mars, on which 4 units of 47-mm Hotchkiss guns stuck out in different directions, was puzzling
And, nevertheless, of all the battleships under construction, the French type "Charlemagne" was, according to the Special Meeting, the most harmonious, balanced squadron battleship, moreover, having a slightly lower displacement, and, consequently, cost than the English models:
armadillo armament
Main caliber
As for the 305-mm ship's gun, in Russia its design began in 1891, and just in March 1895, successful firing tests of the first sample were carried out. 305/40 tower installations for the Sisoy Veliky, Poltava, Petropavlovsk and Sevastopol BRs were planned for delivery from May to September 1895. The weight of the projectile was determined to be 331.7 kg. The actual time of loading the gun on the “Sisoy the Great” was 2 min 22 s.
Now the drawings of the French guns of the main caliber - 305-mm / 40 Mle.1893 with a rate of fire of one shot per minute, were also acquired. The question of full or partial copying of the French gun was left by the Special Meeting on the conscience of the OSZ, but the rate of fire of the twelve-inch guns had to be increased to 1 round per minute.
The nomenclature of 305-mm shells was also expanded, the weight of which was now 349 kilograms. In addition to armor-piercing, the RIF received semi-armor-piercing and high-explosive shells.
medium caliber
As you know, at the beginning of 1891 in France, the Russian delegation was shown firing from 120/45-mm and 152/45-mm cannons of the Canet system. They were fired with unitary cartridges, and the French managed to get a huge rate of fire - 12 rds / min - from 120-mm guns and 10 rds / min from 152-mm.
Since 1892, the OSZ, and somewhat later the Perm plant, began mass production of Kane guns, and the Russian fleet was completely satisfied with these guns.
Armadillo design
For the Russian Imperial Fleet (hereinafter referred to as the RIF), it was decided to buy the working drawings of a squadron battleship of the Charlemagne type. The first ship of the series was named "Apostol Andrew"
It was decided to make minor changes to the design of a squadron battleship for the Russian fleet compared to the French prototype: it was decided to replace the Harvey armor with a more advanced Krupp one of the same thickness, and also change the medium-caliber artillery to the recently adopted Canet guns. Instead of 10x1 138/45 and 8x1 100/45 for the RIF, 8x1 152/45 (just according to the number of casemates) and 10x1 120/45 (8 with shields on the superstructure decks and 2 in the superstructure casemates) were provided. On combat mars, instead of 20 units of 47-mm Hotchkiss guns, it was decided to put the previously rejected GAU 75/70 Kane guns in half the number. Small-caliber artillery was reduced to 10 units, but, in the opinion of the Special Meeting, it increased in quality. It is characteristic that both 47mm and 75mm guns were serviced by gun servants of 4 people each, so that the staff of small-caliber artillery gun servants was somewhat reduced.
The meeting, on reflection, abandoned torpedo tubes and minefields on the battleship, which, coupled with the replacement of 24 small-caliber guns with 10 auxiliary caliber 75mm, which made it possible to reduce the crew from 694 to 650 people.
Construction of battleships
At the time the project was approved in Russia, 8 battleships were in service, and 6 more were under construction:
An innovative solution was used for the construction - at the same time 2 ships were laid down in the USA, France and Germany and Russia, so that the builder who was most distinguished in terms of quality and timing ordered 4 more battleships.
8 units of squadron battleships of the Apostol Andrei type were laid down in November 1895, launched in different countries in the period 1896-1897, and entered service in the period 1898-1901, and one even in 1902.
The first, to everyone's surprise, was the American breeder Kramp, who, after handing over his pair of battleships to the Russian fleet, laid down (in accordance with the contract) four battleships in 1898, which he launched in 1899 and handed over to the fleet in 1901-1902, thus overtaking , the slowest builder of battleships (Nikolaev Admiralty) twice.
Thus, instead of 11 RI battleships, this AI built 12 battleships of a slightly lower total displacement, and, moreover, earlier:
The ships of the series (later called the Apostolic) had the same name:
1. Apostle Andrew
2. Apostle Peter
3. Apostle John
4. Apostle James Zebedee
5. Apostle Philip
6. Apostle Bartholomew
7. Apostle Matthew,
8. Apostle Thomas,
9. Apostle Jacob Alfeev
10. Apostle Thaddeus
11. Apostle Simon the Zealot,
12. Apostle Paul
Project evaluation
Russian battleships of the First Apostolic series were the most massive project of a ship with a displacement of more than 10,000 tons until 1917.
The armament and speed of the battleships of the "Apostol Andrei" type fully met the requirements of their time. Their armor as a whole was weaker than most battleships at the turn of the XIX and XX, and could justify itself only in one case - in a collision with the Japanese fleet, which mainly fired high-explosive shells from a long distance. Under these conditions, a double armored deck and multi-tiered ship superstructures prompted enemy shells stuffed with shimosa to prematurely detonate, which could not bring significant harm to the combat stability of Russian battleships.
A significant role in the successful use of this rather controversial type of ships during the subsequent Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was played by the fact that officers and sailors in the training periods of 1900, 1901 and 1902 thoroughly studied their advantages and disadvantages, and in the course of numerous maneuvers learned use the former and, if possible, consider the latter. So, for example, the type "Apostol Andrew" was mortally afraid of overloading, and before the battle, in 1902, it was decided to carry out emergency unloading of coal into the sea.
Russian battleships
In 1864, the first Russian armored floating batteries "Pervenets" and "Don't Touch Me" foamed the waters of the Gulf of Finland with their stems. And thirteen years later, in 1877, the Russian battleship Peter the Great, one of the strongest ships of its time, entered service. This ship had only 4 guns with a caliber of 306 millimeters. Each shell weighed about 300 kilograms. On the same Russian wooden battleship of the old time "Prokhor" (built only 30 years earlier and also one of the strongest battleships of its time) had 84 guns. All together they threw out a little more metal than Peter the Great. But the force of impact of all these 84 guns was three times weaker than the force of impact of the four guns of the battleship. To service the 84 guns of the Prokhor, 572 gun servants were needed, and only 64 people were needed to service the two towers with 4 guns on the Peter the Great.
All 84 guns of the Prokhor, even if it were possible to fire from them at the same time and hit the shells at one point even on the weak armor of the enemy ship, would not cause him any harm. And the shell of "Peter the Great" at a distance of 2 thousand meters could pierce the side, covered with armor 330 millimeters thick. The displacement of "Peter the Great" was already almost 10 thousand tons. This ship was built in a Russian shipyard by Russian engineers. But only on the Baltic Sea could we build powerful ships for linear combat.
On the Black Sea after the Crimean War, under the terms of the peace treaty imposed on us, for a long time we did not have the right to build large warships. Even during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, Russian sailors fearlessly acted against the Turkish fleet not with ships of the line, but with small mine ships.
From this situation it was necessary to find some way out. At the suggestion of Vice-Admiral Popov, they decided to build unusual-looking ships on the Black Sea, completely round. They were a kind of floating coastal forts. They were intended to protect the coast. On round ships with a displacement of only 2500 tons, it was possible to place both thick armor and powerful guns, the same as on foreign battleships. So in 1876 two round armadillos appeared - "priests", as they were called. One of them bore the name "Novgorod", and the other - "Vice Admiral Popov". These ships were supposed to stay at their sea posts off the coast and help coastal artillery repel the attacks of a strong enemy. They could not participate in naval operations: they were difficult to control, they were unstable on the course and after the shot they rotated around their axis.
Russian battleship Peter the Great. Round gun turrets are visible forward to aft. At that time, it was one of the strongest ships in the world.
It was only in 1886 that the first three battleships of 10,000 tons displacement each, each armed with 6 305-millimeter caliber guns placed in turrets, entered service with the Black Sea Fleet.
Russian engineers - the creators of battleships - as in the days of the sailing fleet, highly raised the art of domestic military shipbuilding. They introduced a lot of new things into the design and armament of ships, they knew how to speed up, reduce the cost and improve the very construction of battleships. One of the best Russian shipbuilders of the late 19th century was Pyotr Akindinovich Titov, the son of a peasant who came to the plant from the countryside. Self-taught, he learned the highest theory and practice of his favorite business. Alexei Nikolaevich Krylov studied practical shipbuilding with Titov, later the world's largest scientist, full member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
In 1891, the French-Russian shipbuilding plant in St. Petersburg, where P. A. Titov worked, was visited by the famous French shipbuilding engineer de Bussy, a member of the Paris Academy of Sciences, who for many years headed the shipbuilding of the French fleet. The battleship Navarin was being built at the plant at that time, and P. A. Titov was the ship engineer leading the construction. De Bussy toured the plant. Here is what A.N. Krylov wrote about this inspection in his memoirs about Titov:
"P. K. Dubuy (director of the plant. - 3. P.) wanted to quickly guide him through the construction and take him to some kind of breakfast party. But it was not there. The old man (de Bussy. - 3. P.) immediately noticed that the construction was being carried out not in routine, but in original ways, quickly reduced Dubuis to the role of a simple translator and began to delve into all the details, asking Titov. He forgot about - breakfast, climbed the whole ship, spending four hours on the building. Parting, he took Titov by the hand and, without releasing her, said in front of Dubuis: “Translate my words to your engineer: I have been building ships of the French fleet for forty-eight years, I have been to the shipyards of the whole world, but nowhere have I learned so much as on this building ”(A.N. Krylov, My memories, 1945, pp. 84-85).
"Navarin" served as a model for the construction of battleships in subsequent years.
A year or two later, when the ministry organized a competition for drafting an armadillo according to given conditions, P. A. Titov’s projects received the second prize.
One of the round battleships designed by Vice Admiral Popov
Years passed. The competition between armor and cannon continued. The thickness of the armor increased to 55 centimeters, and yet the giant cannons pierced it. Then metallurgists began to invent even more durable armor. The thickness of the armor belt has decreased, while at the same time it has become better able to resist projectile impacts. But the gunners did not lag behind: they increased the caliber, improved the metal and shape of the shells; even stronger blows fell on the armor.
At the very end of the last century, a new gunpowder was invented - smokeless. This gunpowder proved to be more powerful than the old "black". The gas pressure in the bore of the artillery gun has tripled. The speed of the projectiles increased: not 500, but 600, 700 and more meters the projectile flew per second.
So that the huge pressure of the gases would not tear the gun apart, and the recoil force would not destroy it, it was necessary not only to improve the metal, but also to increase the weight of the gun.
Giant guns appeared on the armadillos. Their weight has grown to 100 tons or more.
And yet it was not easy to destroy the enemy ship with artillery fire. After all, the armor made its way only at close range. In addition, it was necessary to achieve many hits in the vital parts of the enemy ship in order to disable it or completely destroy it.
Here is what Friedrich Engels once wrote about the development of warships as a result of the struggle between armor and cannon:
“And the rivalry between armored weapons and the power of guns is still so far from its end that at present the ship turns out to be unsatisfactory, that is, obsolete, before it is released from the shipyard ...” (Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1930, p. 123).
For large ships, protected by thick armor, armed with giant cannons, a machine of enormous power was needed - tens of thousands of horsepower. Steam engines on large ships took up more and more space, their weight increased. Finally, they reached the limit, and it was no longer possible to get more power and sufficient speed from the steam engine.
A new engine was needed that would take up less space, have less weight, and at the same time be stronger and move the ship faster.
The steam turbine, which replaced the steam engine around 1890, turned out to be such an engine.
By this time, machine-building plants had mastered the complex technique of manufacturing steam turbines, and very soon the turbines migrated to warships - first to destroyers, then to cruisers. And in the first decade of the 20th century, powerful turbines easily and with unprecedented speed moved the huge ships of the line across the sea - the first "floating fortresses" of our century.
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From the author's bookAfter a crushing defeat in the Crimean War of 1853-56, and also taking into account the experience of the Civil War in the USA of 1861-65, the military-political leadership of Russia came to the idea of the need to create a modern steam and armored fleet.
Armored shipbuilding enthusiast Rear Admiral G.I. Butakov, analyzing the results of the Hampton battle, wrote in his order for a practical squadron dated May 30, 1862: “Now the question of wooden ships has been finally resolved in the most stupid and improvident minds ... So - armor, towers and rams!”
On November 16, 1861, the Russian Naval Ministry signed a contract with the English company "Temzen Iron and Shipbuilding Plant" for the construction of the Pervenets armored battery. The project task was compiled by the MTK.
In the next three years, very important events for the development of domestic shipbuilding took place in Russia. Firstly, armored batteries “Don’t Touch Me” and “Kremlin” of the same type as the “Firstborn” were laid down in St. Petersburg. Secondly, the construction of ten tower monitors of the "Hurricane" type was started. Thirdly, the command of the fleet decided to rebuild the wooden sail-screw frigates "Sevastopol" and "Petropavlovsk" that were under construction into battery battleships.
In August 1881, by decree of Emperor Alexander III, a Special Conference was convened to determine the naval policy of Russia, arising from the international situation, financial and production capabilities. Its chairman was the new Admiral General of the Russian Navy, Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich.
Most of all, the participants in this meeting were worried about the rapid growth of the armored fleet of Great Britain, which, since the Crimean War and in connection with Russian expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia, has remained the main potential adversary of Russia in all options for future conflicts. And the development of the German fleet upset the balance of naval forces that had developed in the Baltic.
According to the 20-year shipbuilding program approved on May 20, 1882, it was planned to build 16 battleships, 13 cruisers, 11 gunboats, 100 destroyers and 3 transports for the Baltic Sea. The Black Sea Fleet was to receive 8 battleships, 2 cruisers and 19 destroyers, and for the Pacific Ocean it was planned to build 8 gunboats, 6 destroyers and 2 transports.
In May 1890, Admiral General Alexei Alexandrovich presented a report to Emperor Alexander III, where he stated that the measures taken did not lead to the achievement of the main goal indicated by the Special Meeting of 1881: to eliminate the backlog of the Russian fleet from the level of the leading European powers.
The growth of naval armaments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary was impressive. Of particular concern was the rapid development of the German fleet. Against 4 Russian battleships in the Baltic, the Germans in 1890 already had 12 and built 14 more new ones. As for the defense of the coast, all 20 Russian monitors and floating batteries were hopelessly outdated and were "barely suitable for defensive operations within the sphere of fire of coastal fortifications."
The Admiral General managed to achieve the "highest approval" of the construction plan in 1891-95. additional ships for the Baltic Fleet, including 10 battleships. However, due to insufficient funding, this plan was not fully implemented and with a significant delay.
The next correction of the program took place in connection with the aggravation of the situation in the Far East, caused by the Japanese successes dangerous for Russia in the war with China in 1895-96. By the decision of the Special Meeting of December 27, 1897, a special five-year (1898-1902) program "for the needs of the Far East" was outlined. According to this program, by the beginning of 1905, a fleet "somewhat stronger than the Japanese" was to be concentrated in the Pacific theater of operations, while maintaining sufficiently powerful forces in the Baltic and the Black Sea.
In 1895-1903. The Maritime Ministry was allocated 738 million rubles against 480.2 million rubles from Japan's maritime budget. Russia, thanks to the presence of ready-made battleships, retained the ability to concentrate superior forces on pacific ocean. It was planned to create a powerful grouping in the Far East consisting of 10 squadron battleships, 5 armored and 12 armored cruisers, capable of ensuring Russia's interests in this region.
Before the start of the Russo-Japanese War, according to the program of 1882, with its changes and additions, 26 battleships, 16 armored and armored cruisers, 7 cruisers of the second rank were built. These were the main forces of the Russian fleet.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the basis of any fleet was battleships - large ships with strong artillery and powerful armor protection. Let us recall three Russian ships of this class - participants in the Russo-Japanese and World War I.
Squadron battleship "Sevastopol"
The battleship Sevastopol was commissioned in 1900. The ship carried four 305 mm main battery guns. Eight 152 mm guns were located in pairs in four towers, and four more six-inch guns on the battery.
By the time the Russo-Japanese War began, Sevastopol, along with the Poltava and Petropavlovsk of the same type, was far from a new ship, but it was very problematic to destroy it in an artillery battle.
"Sevastopol" took part in the battle on January 27, 1904, supporting the actions of the ground forces at Port Arthur and the naval battle in the Yellow Sea. Several times the battleship was damaged by Japanese mines, but, unlike the Petropavlovsk, it happily escaped death. In October 1904, Japanese troops began a methodical shooting of the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron in the inner roadstead of Port Arthur. Only when most of the squadron died under fire from Japanese siege artillery, did the commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank Essen, on his own initiative, manage to obtain permission to bring the battleship to the outer raid of the fortress in White Wolf Bay, where the crew began preparing an independent breakthrough of the blockade.
However, the lack of people in the team, the lack of part of the artillery transferred to the shore forced the breakthrough to be postponed. Meanwhile, the Japanese command, having discovered the Sevastopol in the outer roadstead, decided to destroy the Russian battleship with destroyer attacks. For several nights, the Sevastopol, which was under the protection of coastal batteries, the gunboat Groshiy and several destroyers, was subjected to numerous mine attacks.
Having fired up to 80 torpedoes at the Russian ship, the Japanese achieved one hit and two close explosions of torpedoes. On the "Sevastopol" a number of compartments were flooded and the battleship received a significant roll. True, this success cost the Japanese dearly. Destroyer No. 53 died on a Russian mine barrier with the entire crew, and destroyer No. 42, damaged by the fire of Sevastopol, was finished off by a torpedo from the destroyer Angry.
Another two dozen Japanese fighters and destroyers were damaged, and some, apparently, were no longer commissioned until the end of the war. The damage received by the Russian ship already ruled out the possibility of a breakthrough, and the Sevastopol crew switched to fighting Japanese batteries, which continued until the very end. last day defense of Port Arthur. In connection with the surrender of the fortress, the battleship was towed from the shore and flooded at a depth of more than 100 meters. Thus, the Sevastopol became the only Russian battleship sunk in Port Arthur, which was not raised by the Japanese and did not fall into the hands of the enemy.
Squadron battleship "Evstafiy"
The squadron battleship "Evstafiy" was further development project of the battleship "Prince Potemkin Tauride". Unlike its prototype, the Evstafia has 152 mm. the guns at the extremities were replaced by 203 mm guns. However, the experience of the Russo-Japanese War made it necessary to reconsider the design of the ship. As a result, the already lengthy construction was delayed.
In 1907, all battleships of the Russian fleet were reclassified into battleships. With the advent of the Dreadnought battleship in England, all the battleships of the world of the “pre-dreadnought” type, including the Eustathius, instantly became obsolete. Despite this, both the "Eustace" and the "John Chrysostom" of the same type represented an impressive force on the Black Sea and Ottoman Empire, as the main potential adversary, in principle, could not oppose anything serious to Russian battleships.
To reinforce the Turkish fleet, the German command transferred the newest battlecruiser Goeben and the light Breislau, which Russia's allies in the Entente so obligingly let into the Black Sea.
The first collision with the "Goeben" occurred at Cape Sarych on November 5, 1914. The battle, in fact, came down to a duel between the flagship Eustathius and the German cruiser. The rest of the Russian ships, due to fog and errors in determining the distance, fired with large flights or did not open fire at all.
From the first volley, the commandors of "Evstafiya" managed to cover the "Goeben", which, according to various sources, received from three to fourteen direct hits in 14 minutes of the battle. As a result, the German cruiser withdrew from the battle and then underwent a two-week repair. The Eustathius was hit by five German shells that did not cause fatal damage.
The second clash between the Eustathius and the Goeben took place on April 27, 1915 near the Bosphorus, when a German raider attempted to destroy the core of the Black Sea Fleet in parts. However, faced with three dreadnought battleships, the Germans did not tempt fate and hurried out of the battle after a short skirmish. The fate of "Evstafiy", which successfully operated in the First World War, turned out to be sad. In 1918, he fell into the hands of the German command, and then - the former allies in the Entente. Leaving Sevastopol, they blew up the Eustathius cars. The successful restoration of the battleship, which required skilled workers and a powerful industrial base, immediately after completion civil war proved impossible, and in 1922 the ship was cut into metal.
Coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov"
Coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov type were built to protect the Baltic coast. Each of them carried four 254 mm guns (three Apraksin), four 120 mm guns and small-caliber artillery. Having a relatively small displacement (a little over 4,000 tons), the ships were distinguished by powerful weapons.
After the fall of Port Arthur, the formation of the 3rd Pacific squadron began, which, along with the Apraksin and Senyavin, included the Admiral Ushakov. The value of these ships consisted, first of all, in the well-trained crews, which, as part of the artillery training detachment, were engaged in the preparation of fleet commanders. However, before the ships were sent, the crews were replaced, and the battleships were sent to the Far East without replacing the main caliber guns, which subsequently played a fatal role in the fate of the Admiral Ushakov.
IN Tsushima battle“Admiral Ushakov was part of the 3rd combat detachment, closing the column of the main forces of the squadron. In a daytime battle on May 14, 1905, the ship, at about 15:00, during a firefight with Admiral Kamimura's armored cruisers, received two large holes in the bow and lagged behind the squadron. The speed of the battleship dropped to 10 knots.
At night, the Admiral Ushakov, walking without lighting, managed to avoid attacks by Japanese destroyers, but the next day was overtaken by the armored cruisers Yakumo and Iwate. At the offer of the Japanese to surrender, the Russian ship opened fire. Each of the Japanese cruisers carried four 203 mm and fourteen 152 mm guns, significantly outperforming the Russian battleship in speed. And if the first volleys of "Ushakov" covered the "Iwate", causing a fire on the Japanese cruiser, then in the future the Japanese ships kept out of reach of the armadillo's guns at a favorable battle distance for themselves. After a 40-minute battle, the Admiral Ushakov, when further resistance became pointless, was flooded by the crew. Among the 94 dead officers and sailors of the Ushakov was the commander of the battleship Vladimir Nikolaevich Miklukha (brother of the famous explorer of Oceania N. N. Miklukho-Maklay). According to one version, he was mortally wounded by a shrapnel, and according to another, he himself refused to be rescued, pointing out to the Japanese a sailor drowning nearby.
