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Fight on the square minute December 31, 1994. Dead city. Battle for Grozny. Blocking of Russian troops in the center of Grozny

20 years ago, on December 31, 1994... Terrible, you held the ENEMY.

Grozny, you held the enemy.

20 years ago, on December 31, 1994, the assault on Grozny by Russian federal forces began. The siege of the capital of separatist Ichkeria continued for three months. As a result, after long fierce battles, the city was taken by Russian troops. The losses of the parties during the assault amounted to more than 8 thousand people, according to various estimates, the number of civilians killed in Grozny ranged from 5 to 25 thousand people.

On December 18, 1994, the bombing of Grozny began. Bombs and rockets fell mainly on the quarters where residential buildings were located and, obviously, there were no military facilities. Despite the statement of the President of Russia on December 27, 1994 on the cessation of the bombing of the city, aviation continued to strike at Grozny.

December 19, 1994 units of the Pskov airborne division under the command of Major General I. Babichev, they bypassed Samashki from the north and, together with other parts of the federal forces, reached the western outskirts of Grozny, where they entered into battles with Chechen armed formations.

The decision to send troops to Grozny was made on December 26, 1994, at a meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, where Pavel Grachev and Sergei Stepashin reported on the situation in the republic. Prior to this, no concrete plans were developed to take the capital of Chechnya.

On December 31, 1994, the assault on Grozny began by parts of the Russian army. It was planned to deliver "powerful concentric strikes" by four groups and link up in the city center.

The plan provided for the actions of military groupings under the cover of front-line and army aviation to advance in three directions to Grozny and block it. The total number of troops involved was 15 thousand 300 people, 195 tanks, over 500 infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles and BIR, 200 guns and mortars. Of these, more than 500 personnel, 50 tanks and 48 guns and mortars of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 503rd Motorized Rifle Brigade were allocated to the reserve.

The troops, in cooperation with the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSK, attacking from the northern, western and eastern directions, were supposed to capture the presidential palace, government buildings, and the railway station.

The troops that entered the city immediately suffered heavy losses. The 131st (Maikop) separate motorized rifle brigade and the 81st (Samara) motorized rifle regiment advancing from the north-west under the command of General K.B. Pulikovsky were almost completely destroyed. More than a hundred soldiers were taken prisoner.

January 2, 1995 press service Russian government reported that the center of the Chechen capital "is completely blocked by federal troops", the "presidential palace" is blocked. "The head of the press service of the Russian government admitted that the Russian army suffered losses in manpower and equipment during the New Year's offensive on Grozny.

After the New Year offensive on Grozny, Russian troops changed tactics - instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they began to use air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.

By the beginning of February 1995, the strength of the Joint Group of Forces was increased to 70 thousand people. Colonel-General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.

Losses during the "Grozny operation"
According to the General Staff, from December 31, 1994 to January 1, 1995, 1,426 people were killed in the United Forces, 4,630 military personnel were injured, 96 soldiers and officers were captured by illegal armed groups, more than 500 went missing.

Preparing for the assault

On December 12, 1994, the holiday of the Constitution of the Russian Federation was celebrated, and on this day it was announced that the war had begun. A hasty transfer of troops to Mozdok, a town in North Ossetia-Alania, began. Confusion, carelessness and fuss - that's how one could characterize the regrouping of troops. Every half an hour, one plane after another landed, and right on the runway there was a re-formation. Regiments are divided into marching battalions and companies. The hastily assembled parts had one question - what to do next? The task at hand was unclear. With whom and how to fight?

Defense Minister Pavel Grachev promised that the assault on Grozny would take no more than two hours. But only two weeks later, with fighting and losses, Russian troops reached the borders of Grozny. Intelligence showed that the road to Grozny would be the road to hell. Two people, one of whom was a journalist, filmed the entire route to Grozny, which showed the location of Dudayev's checkpoints and the approximate number of weapons. Intelligence showed that the militants were waiting for Russian troops and preparing for battle. But subsequent orders and actions of the command showed that the information “did not reach them”.

A few days before the assault, the Minister of Defense negotiated with General Dudayev, which did not lead to anything. But Pavel Grachev naively believed that Dudayev would throw a white flag. The Dudaevites did not even think of giving up, they were well prepared. In Grozny, they prepared for defense, organized three lines of defense. The first one is around the Presidential Palace, the second one with a radius of one kilometer around the first line, and the third one with a radius of 5 kilometers. The outer boundary was built on the outskirts. According to intelligence, there were up to 10 thousand Dudayevites. From weapons - heavy armored vehicles, artillery and mortars, kindly left when the Russian army left earlier.

What forced Pavel Grachev to conduct an unprepared assault? First, he gave the order to postpone the date of the assault on the Chechen capital. I got on a plane and almost flew to Moscow. "Almost" - because he left the cabin before takeoff and stayed in Mozdok. Gathered all the commanders of the groups. Lieutenant Colonel Valery Brightly recalls: “The task was set - by the holiday, by the New Year, to seize and solve the problem with the Chechen Republic. That is to capture the Presidential Palace. Flags were issued and on December 31 the commanders were taken to their combat positions. Grachev promised - which of the generals will be the first to hoist the flag over Presidential Palace, will receive the title of "Hero of Russia". This cheered up the commanders, but divided the team spirit - everyone dreamed of a title. Now Grachev had no doubts about the success of the operation.

Four offensive groups were identified: "North" under the command of K. Pulikovsky, "North-East" under the command of L. Rokhlin, "West" under the command of V. Petruk and east under the command of N. Staskov. The number of advancing - a little more than 15 thousand people. Equipment: 200 tanks, 500 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 200 guns and mortars. The operation was scheduled to be completed within a few days.

But according to estimates, in order to successfully storm Grozny, the military should have had at least 60 thousand people. Some commanders understood this and tried to prevent the assault. Aleksey Kirilin, platoon commander of the communications battalion of the 131st brigade, recalls: “Kulikovsky lined up our platoon and said that he would ask the Minister of Defense for at least a month to prepare an assault.” What Grachev said is unknown. But the very next morning, Kulikovsky gave the order to move towards the city.

On the morning of December 11, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Russian troops crossed the official border of Chechnya and moved towards Grozny in three directions. Thus began the operation to restore constitutional order in Chechnya.

Preparing for the assault

Oleg Dyachenko, commander of the 1st parachute company, recalls that due to uncertainty there was no unity in his unit. Some of the soldiers refused to storm Grozny, others agreed. But in the end, those who resisted also flew. Everyone secretly hoped that everything would work out, and this was just an "action of intimidation." Gathered as on the next maneuvers. There was another problem, a psychological one. Russian troops were greeted with posters "hands off Chechnya!" Petr Ivanov, a senior officer of the Airborne Forces, notes that for a Russian soldier the enemy was always abroad, in the case of the Chechen operation, his own sharply became strangers. Therefore, it was difficult to make a decision to open fire on the settlement, knowing that there were civilians there. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev promised that the assault on Grozny would take no more than two hours. But only two weeks later, with fighting and losses, Russian troops reached the borders of Grozny. Intelligence showed that the road to Grozny would be the road to hell. Two people, one of whom was a journalist, filmed the entire route to Grozny, which showed the location of Dudayev's checkpoints and the approximate number of weapons. Intelligence showed that the militants were waiting for Russian troops and preparing for battle. But subsequent orders and actions of the command showed that the information “did not reach them”. A few days before the assault, the Minister of Defense negotiated with General Dudayev, which did not lead to anything. But Pavel Grachev naively believed that Dudayev would throw a white flag. The Dudaevites did not even think of giving up, they were well prepared. In Grozny, they prepared for defense, organized three lines of defense. [С-BLOCK] The first one is around the Presidential Palace, the second one with a radius of one kilometer around the first line, and the third one with a radius of 5 kilometers. The outer boundary was built on the outskirts. According to intelligence, there were up to 10 thousand Dudayevites. From weapons - heavy armored vehicles, artillery and mortars. What forced Pavel Grachev to conduct an unprepared assault? First, he gave the order to postpone the date of the assault on the Chechen capital. I got on a plane and almost flew to Moscow. "Almost" - because he left the cabin before takeoff and stayed in Mozdok. Gathered all the commanders of the groups. Lieutenant Colonel Valery Yarko recalls: “The task was set - by the holiday, by the New Year, to seize and solve the problem with the Chechen Republic. That is to capture the Presidential Palace. Flags were issued and on December 31 the commanders were taken to their combat positions. Grachev promised that which of the generals would be the first to hoist the flag over the Presidential Palace would receive the title of "Hero of Russia". This cheered up the commanders, but divided the team spirit - everyone dreamed of a title. Now Grachev had no doubts about the success of the operation. Four offensive groups were identified: "North" under the command of K. Pulikovsky, "North-East" under the command of L. Rokhlin, "West" under the command of V. Petruk and east under the command of N. Staskov. The number of advancing - a little more than 15 thousand people. Equipment: 200 tanks, 500 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 200 guns and mortars. The operation was scheduled to be completed within a few days. But according to estimates, in order to successfully storm Grozny, the military should have had at least 60 thousand people. Some commanders understood this and tried to prevent the assault. Aleksey Kirilin, platoon commander of the communications battalion of the 131st brigade, recalls: "Kulikovsky lined up our platoon and said that he would ask the Minister of Defense for at least a month to prepare an assault." What Grachev said is unknown. But the very next morning, Kulikovsky gave the order to move towards the city.

How did the operation start?

Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles of the Sever group entered Grozny. 2 battalions of the 131st Maikop brigade moved along the Staropromyslovsky highway. In parallel, the 81st motorized rifle regiment of Samara was moving. The commander of the 131st brigade, Savin, was instructed to gain a foothold at the intersection of st. Mayakovsky and Staropromyslovsky highways and ensure the approach of the remaining parts of the group. Ignorance of the city, lack of modern detailed maps played a fatal role. Encountering no resistance, the Maykop brigade slipped through the required turn. Brigade commander Savin realized his mistake when the presidential palace appeared, and the headquarters rejoiced at the quick capture of the city. The brigade received a new order - to occupy the railway station in the city center. There was a battalion of the 81st Samara regiment. Without shots, the Maykop brigade reached the station and stopped.

Railway station in Grozny. The tragedy of the Maykop brigade

Maikop brigade turned out to be surrounded by 2 militant defense rings. The brigade commander Savin realized late that the brigade was not protected from the flanks, and the Chechen mousetrap could slam shut at any moment. Other parts of the troops got stuck in battles on the outskirts of Grozny. The battle of the 131st Maikop brigade continued all night, and all this time brigade commander Savin asked for help in order to break out of the ring of militants. By morning, he realized that help would not come, loaded the wounded and killed on 2 infantry fighting vehicles and went on a breakthrough. Savin commanded the brigade until he was shot dead. The rest of the 131st brigade continued to wait for help and fired back from the militants. At night, a convoy was formed from the reserve of the 131st brigade, but it could not break through to its own - the militants met them with a flurry of fire. The 131st Brigade and the 81st Regiment will fight in encirclement for another week. Of the 26 tanks that entered Grozny, 20 were burned. Of the 120 BMP vehicles, 18 left the city. In the first minutes of the battle, 6 anti-aircraft systems were destroyed - everything that was prepared. The bodies of the dead 131st brigade were collected for more than a month. The body of brigade commander Savin was found only in March 1995.

Secrets of the tragic assault of 95

According to Vasily Krisanov, head of the RAV of the 131st brigade, for a long time they determined who went to storm Grozny according to the lists of the brigade. This means that individual commanders of companies and batteries did not have time to count the people, to draw up lists of those who were in which car by name. Who will be responsible for the death of the Maikop brigade? They decided to lay the blame on the deceased brigade commander Savin, and this information was picked up by the Russian media. General Rokhlin says: “The rout was complete. The command was in shock." The main concern of the command was the search for those responsible for the tragedy. Rokhlin has not received a single order since that moment. The main reasons for the failure of the New Year's assault were the lack of a clear plan and task. The lack of coordination of hostilities due to the competition for the title of "Hero of Russia" among the commanders. In addition, they did not take into account the poor material security and poor training of personnel. General Gennady Torshev gave his assessment of the operation: “According to some generals, the “festive” assault was organized for Grachev’s birthday. This information is unconfirmed, but the fact that the assault was prepared in a hurry, without really assessing the situation, is a fact. We didn’t even have time to come up with a name for the operation.” The technical equipment was unreliable. Of the five hundred infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 36 were out of order. Of the 18 howitzers, 12 were out of order; of the 18 self-propelled guns, only 4 were fit for combat. On the morning of January 1, an attempt was made to break through to the aid of the Maykopians from the 693rd Motorized Rifle Regiment from the West group. But the paratroopers were met with hurricane fire in the Andreevskaya Valley area. Not having gone even five hundred meters, they retreated and entrenched themselves on the southern outskirts of the city. Although they broke through to the Central Market, they were stopped by militants. Under the onslaught, the regiment began to retreat and by 18 o'clock it was surrounded near the park named after Lenin. Communication with the regiment was lost. Like the Maikopians, they had to break out of the encirclement, they suffered heavy losses. They learned about the tragedy the next day, and this time Major General Petruk was guilty. He was accused of the death of parts, and removed from command. Major General Ivan Babichev took his place.

For one New Year's Eve, more than 70 soldiers and officers were captured by the Dudaevites. Valery Mychko, captain of the 81st Samara regiment, recalls: “The Chechens pulled me out of a burning car. Then, half-consciously, I answered their questions, later I lost consciousness. I woke up from a blow to the chest - it turns out that the Chechens provided first aid. The Chechen lying next to me was already raising a knife over me.” The prisoners were mocked, their eyes were gouged out, their ears were cut off. For intimidation, the militants handed over such prisoners to the Russian side.

Capture of the Presidential Palace, Operation Retaliation

In the footsteps of the 131st brigade, the 276th Ural motorized rifle regiment from the Northeast group was sent to Grozny. The regiment entered along the parallel streets of Lermontov and Pervomaiskaya street. The Urals left checkpoints at every crossroads, cleared streets and houses. As a result, the Ural regiment settled there. The losses of personnel were great, but the Urals did not leave the conquered territory. Fighters from the West group broke through to them, and with heavy losses they took the railway station. Consolidating success, they abandoned parts of the 8th Army Corps from the North group under the command of Lev Rokhlin. They took over the hospital and the cannery. Rokhlin's headquarters was organized at the cannery, and this was the first success. From this bridgehead, further advancement of the units became possible. There was little left before Dudayev's headquarters, groups of troops North, West and East were moving towards the presidential palace. The fighting was fierce, fought for every street. The militants did not give up, and the paratroopers requested the help of artillery. Dozens of meters remained before the target, so sometimes they hit their own. Aviation was also powerless, because the troops that entered were standing in a zigzag manner, and it was difficult to figure out where they were and where they were. The command reported to Moscow that the center of Grozny was blocked. In fact, the militants were preparing for the second wave of the assault, looking forward to the defeat of troops like the Maikop brigade. The trench generals rebuilt the battle tactics on the go. Now the new units reflected the structure of the militants. On January 5, the group of troops Vostok crossed the Sunzha, which divided Grozny into two parts. The troops captured strategic points and three bridges. Groups of troops West and North came closer to the Presidential Palace. At this time, the Russian military agreed with the militants on a ceasefire for 48 hours. Russian soldiers, militants, civilians were removed from the streets. In a week and a half of fighting, both sides lost more than a thousand people, excluding the wounded and civilians. During these 48 hours, the militants were able to regroup their forces, bring up reinforcements, and replenish ammunition. The commanders and soldiers were perplexed: they almost occupied the presidential palace, and they received orders to cease fire. After the end of the moratorium, the fighting intensified. On January 13, the marines of the Northern Fleet were thrown to the aid of the thinned troops. January 14 entrenched in the building of the Council of Ministers groupings of troops West. The Rokhlins joined them, they squeezed out the militants and surrounded the Presidential Palace. On January 19, the Presidential Palace was captured. Dudayev left the building the night before so as not to be taken prisoner. On this day, the commander of the joint grouping, Anatoly Kvashnin from Mozdok, reported to Pavel Grachev that the task had been completed. But the fighting for Grozny continued until 26 February. It seemed that the Chechen conflict was over. But the first Chechen war ended only two years later, in 1999 the Second Chechen war began.

In the early morning of December 31, as part of the planned operation to send troops to Grozny, the reconnaissance group of the 690th OOSpN under the command of Captain Igor Lelyukh, consisting of eight people, departed to carry out a combat mission. The purpose of the special forces was reconnaissance of the route of the forthcoming advance of the brigade to the suburbs of Grozny. It was necessary to "punch" the road from the Tersky Range to the airport "Grozny-Severny". Captain Lelyukh's group successfully completed the task, returning to the location of the brigade even before sunrise. The commandos reported that "the road to the airport is free, two tanks buried in the ground were found at the airport."

Assault squad advances

By 5 o'clock in the morning, the 276th motorized rifle regiment arrived in the area of the Kolodezny pass in order to change the units of the 131st brigade at the occupied lines. Personnel brigade was put on alert. It took about two hours to refuel, load ammunition, prepare for the march and build columns.

07.07 - the movement of battalions started.

- Assault detachments advanced to the strongholds indicated by them the day before at about 7 o'clock in the morning.

Sergei Zelensky, Deputy Chief of Staff of the 131st Brigade (acting Chief of Staff), Lieutenant Colonel:

“Two motorized rifle battalions, a tank battalion and an anti-aircraft division went to the city, a total of 446 people.”

The nearest operational-tactical task of the 131st motorized rifle brigade December 31 was the capture of lines on the northern bank of the Neftyanka River. According to the plan, the 1st assault detachment, having passed the village of Sadovoe, went to positions west of the Rodina state farm, and the 2nd assault detachment, advancing through the Grozny-Severny airport, blocked the southern outskirts of the Rodina state farm. At these lines, the 131st brigade should have gone on the defensive and, as many of the brigade’s soldiers believed, would meet New Year.

The 1st assault detachment (the 1st battalion of the brigade with the attached 3rd tank company) advanced from the Kolodezny Pass area in the direction of the Rodina state farm. Moving ahead was the T-72A tank No. 537 of senior lieutenant Yuri Morozov (call sign "Bronya-37", later "Bronya-39") (acting tank gunner-operator - senior lieutenant Yuri Morozov; in place of the commander - private Alexander Alekseev, driver - private Sergey Netrebko). The column passed the village of Sadovoe.

- We there and along the streets in some places drove, in some places along the outskirts. In general, where they could, they slipped through.

During the advance, overcoming the track bridge over the dam, the head tank T-72A No. 537 of senior lieutenant Yuri Morozov fell into the canal. Tank driver Private Sergei Netrebko lost control. A heavy vehicle slid off the bridge with one track and slid into a canal. Following her, a BMP-2 from the 1st motorized rifle company landed in the canal. Neither the tank crew nor the BMP crew managed to pull the vehicles out on their own. The platoon commander of the 3rd tank company, senior lieutenant Yuri Morozov, decided to transfer to the T-72A tank No. 539. The technical closing group of the column was engaged in the T-72A tank No. 537, this vehicle was not included in the city.

The 2nd assault detachment, which was based on the 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the brigade and the 1st tank company attached to it, was located on the southern slopes of the Tersky Range at the foot of Mount Yastrebina.

“At 6.00 on December 31, 1994, the personnel of the brigade were assigned a combat mission - to advance and gain a foothold in the area of the Rodina state farm north of Grozny.”

“On December 31, 1994, at 6 o’clock in the morning, a command was heard over the radio: “Everyone line up in a battle column!” Our crew hesitated because we overslept. I remember how the officers shouted to us on the radio: “Enough sleep! We are waiting for you! Gathering vigorously, we pulled ourselves up to the column and advanced further in its composition.

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

7.39 - Alkhanchursky Canal (Alkhanchurtovsky. - Approx. Aut.) Passed by everyone, with the exception of the 4th motorized rifle company.

The 2nd Assault Detachment of the 131st Brigade was to build up the efforts of the 81st Regiment and follow it, providing it with a reliable rear. However, in the absence of stable contact, it was not possible to organize interaction between the two units.

Oleg Vorobyov, tank commander (acting gunner-operator) T-72A No. 559, captain:

“They went to the city in two columns, the hatches of combat vehicles were tied to harnesses in order to at least slightly soften the impact of the cumulative jet. In parallel with us, the equipment of the Samara regiment was moving. There is no connection from the bottom, although I tried to make contact ... "

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

7.52 - "Caliber-10" (brigade commander) calls the combat control group ... (combat control aviation group with the call sign "Shark-1". - Approx. Aut.).

7:57 - "Shark-1" follow the commander!

7.57–2nd battalion passes the airfield, brigade commander with the first motorized rifle battalion ...

The 2nd assault detachment went around the Rodina state farm along the eastern outskirts, following the columns of the 81st motorized rifle regiment and headed down the road from the airport to Grozny.

During the movement, the T-72A No. 510 tank of the commander of the 1st tank company, Captain Yuri Shchepin, lagged behind the column. The car got stuck in one of the many canals. I couldn't get out on my own - I had to wait for help.

- Serega Deev arrived in a BTS (a tractor based on the T-44M or T-54 tank. - Author's note), hooked us with a winch and pulled us out. And together with him we went to catch up with ours. Wedged into some column and, in the end, caught up with their own.

Denis Shachnev, gunner-operator of the T-72 A tank No. 517, private:

“At times the road was broken - ditches, ravines came across, but the column walked without meeting resistance. I remember how an infantry fighting vehicle got stuck in one of the ditches, and they couldn't get it out for a long time. We ourselves had a tank stuck, but we somehow got out, and that BMP was pulled out with a cable.

Tank T-72 A No. 519 (crew: tank commander junior sergeant E. Yu. Balet, gunner-operator private P. B. Dudarev, driver private A. A. Mashakov) from the 2nd assault detachment also lost its place in line. The commander of a tank platoon, Senior Lieutenant Alexander Sufradze, in an explanatory note, described this moment as follows: “According to ml. s-ta Ballet E.Yu., with whom I spoke in the OVG (district military hospital. - Approx. Aut.) Rostov-on-Don on the fact of the disappearance of privates Mashakov A.A. and Dudarev P.B. , I realized that: on December 31, 1994, the crew of tank No. 519 received an order to advance in a convoy to Grozny. When moving forward, one of the 2 infantry infantry fighting vehicles coming from behind rolled over on the bridge and the column stood up. For some reason, the crew of the 519th tank of the “Stop” command did not hear, and they drove on on their own. They were killed in the city. In what part of the city they were, he does not know. When it hit the left side, junior sergeant Ballet saw a flame from the side where the gunner was sitting - Private Dudarev P.Yo. With a blast wave, junior sergeant Ballet E.Yu. was thrown out of the hatch. He does not know how long he lay on the transmission, the tank was already on fire. Then junior sergeant Ballet E.Yu. crawled away from the tank, the tank started up and drove back. I did not see him further. What happened to MB (driver. - Approx. Aut.) Private Mashakov A. A. and BUT (gunner. - Approx. Aut.) Dudarev P. B. in the future, does not know.

Tank T-72A No. 519, having joined the column of the 81st motorized rifle regiment, entered Grozny with the regiment’s reconnaissance company and was hit near the intersection of Pervomaiskaya and Mayakovsky streets, opposite school No. 7. In the crew of the tank, only the driver, Private Alimkhan, had an automatic Mashakov.

As a result of the battle, the gunner-operator and driver-mechanic burned down in the tank, only junior sergeant Eduard Balet, who was burned and shell-shocked, survived. These were the first losses in the 131st brigade on December 31, and, as subsequent events showed, not the last.

Occupation of the borders on the Neftyanka River

By 8 o'clock in the morning, the 1st assault detachment of the brigade completed the immediate task - captured the bridge over the Neftyanka and reached the lines west of the Rodina state farm.

- We reached the bridge at about 8 o'clock in the morning and captured it with the forces of Dmitry Adenin's 3rd motorized rifle platoon. The bridge was mined, but the enemy did not have time to blow it up.

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

08.02 - "Phrase-22" (1st Motorized Regiment) is called by the commander - a report on the completion of the task (capturing the line along the Neftyanka River).

June 8 - the brigade commander is at the mark 142.7 (in the field, west of the Rodina state farm. - Approx. Aut.).

To assess the situation and reconnaissance, the brigade commander sends a reconnaissance company of captain Oleg Tyrtyshny behind Neftyanka: all three BMP-2s: No. 012 (call sign "Olimp-12"), No. 015 (call sign "Highlander-32") and No. 018 (call sign "Havana") .

Valery Danilov, reconnaissance platoon commander, senior lieutenant:

“It wasn’t even a river, but some, sorry for being rude, a smelly river. Three meters wide. But it gave me a lot of trouble."

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

8.15 - Phrase passes Neftyanka.

8.30 - the brigade commander called a com. 2nd MSB personally (Major A. Chernutsky - Approx. Aut. ".

By 9 o'clock the state farm was blocked by the forces of the units of the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment. In the "Workbook" of the 8th Guards Army Corps, this is reflected as follows: "9.01 131 omsbr ...: agricultural "Motherland" is covered from the northern, western and southern sides ..."

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

9.05 - the brigade commander ordered to send 5 infantry fighting vehicles to him - done.

Meanwhile, the scouts crossed the field on the southern bank of the Neftyanka River.

At 9:17 a.m., in the square "Jackal 4 (9)" ("Jackal" is the coordinate grid of the city of Grozny on military maps. - Author's note), a platoon of senior lieutenant Valery Danilov discovered a Dudaev tank, and subsequently two "Ural" and VTR.

At 09:24, the scouts reported via communications about the maneuvers of the enemy tank.

What happened, Olympus? Why did you stop? - the company commander asked him.

A tank is starting to move in our direction, - Valery answered Tyrtyshny.

Colonel Ivan Savin, according to the recollections of the head of intelligence of the 131st brigade, Major Roman Kuznetsov, sets the task for Captain Oleg Tyrtyshny to suppress the firing points of the Dudaevites.

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

9.47 - enter the frequency of missile troops and artillery ... and adjust the fire.

At 9:48 a.m., the scouts managed to hit a “truck” (presumably a Ural or a ZIL with a kung) with BMP-2 fire. Then, a kilometer from the vehicles of the reconnaissance platoon, Dudayev's tank appeared. The subordinates of Captain Tyrtyshny hid the vehicles in a hollow near the nearest grove and prepared to fire from ATGMs, none of the scouts had combat experience of firing from them until that moment. Therefore, there was a delay: “From the radio exchange, [Danilov] realized that Havana (commander of BMP-2 No. didn't get off. By intercom Valery ordered the gunner-operator to point and pressed the button. "What the hell is this! - flashed through his head. - Is the contact really broken? .. ”In a fraction of a second, I remembered what was taught in my native VOKU. Turned around. Removed the fuse of the remote ATGM. Again, a four-handed game with a gunner. Start!".

At 10 o'clock the rocket hit the tank and broke its caterpillar. Having put a new ammunition, at 10 hours 8 minutes, Senior Lieutenant Danilov fired a second shot, this time more successful. "Smoke, bitch!" - he did not stay on the air. Nobody jumped out of the tank.

The scouts decided to make sure that the tank was destroyed and no longer poses a threat, and also to seize the documents from the deceased crew.

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

10:15 - a reconnaissance company during the withdrawal of the village one car in a ditch.

We are talking about the car of the commander of the reconnaissance company of the 131st brigade, Captain Tyrtyshny - BMP-2 No. 015. It fell into the slush right up to the loopholes. In addition, her fuel line broke. There was no fire. The crew, all in diesel fuel, quickly got out of the BMP and started repairing the damage.

A platoon of senior lieutenant Valery Danilov, while trying to get close to a wrecked tank, discovered an enemy machine-gun point in the area of the DOSAAF school, which was one of the defense centers of the Dudaevites.

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

10.18 - a mortar fires from behind the school.

10.21 - reconnaissance hit an armored personnel carrier.

10.27 - 2 mines exploded near the brigade commander (Savina. - Approx. Aut.).

10.51 - scouts hit a car with a tank.

The machine-gun point was also silenced. “They didn’t destroy it, but the machine gun was suppressed, it didn’t fire anymore,” recalled Senior Lieutenant Valery Danilov.

Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Klaptsov noted that one or two people in the brigade were slightly injured from mortar fire. Following this, according to the memoirs of senior warrant officer Vadim Shibkov, Dudayev's snipers began to "work". However, they fired from a fairly long distance, and the snipers did not cause harm to the personnel of the brigade.

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

9.53–1st SSB started engineering equipment district.

According to lieutenant colonel Vladimir Zryadny, the commander of the 1st motorized rifle battalion, Major Sergei Khmelevsky, competently organized the defense of the occupied area.

“The battalion commander (Sergey Khmelevsky. - Approx. Aut.) successfully coped with this task himself. And, in principle, I looked - in general, he competently began to arrange equipment there, that is, there was no special need for me, as such!

The 1st battalion is located on the northern bank of the Neftyanka River in the area of a dairy farm (MTF). The officers of the battalion determined where the trenches and caponiers for equipment would be located, and set the appropriate tasks for the personnel. Everyone was sure that they would have to stay at the occupied defense lines until at least January 7th. There was no talk of any further action that day.

Valery Nikolaev, commander of the 2nd motorized rifle company, captain:

- Then the brigade commander drove up on his "Seagull" (BTR-60PU No. 003. - Approx. Aut.) - Colonel Savin. He asked me how it was. We talked with him for just two minutes, and he left. I got out of my car and went along the front line of defense to see what the platoon commanders, sergeants, soldiers are underestimating, how the strong point is being equipped. The state farm "Rodina" was on my left side, and directly opposite me was the pre-Saafovsky airfield. That is, I directly observed the old airfield from my car. There, in my opinion, there were even several "corn" planes?! I saw this myself...

Yuri Morozov, commander of a tank platoon, senior lieutenant:

- When we went to the indicated area, we stood on the firing lines, and there the targets appeared! We reported on them, we were given the task: "Fire on identified targets!" I then destroyed two helicopters at this airfield, a tanker with fuel - it burned badly afterwards. Even at the airfield, "corn" stood. I destroyed one anti-tank gun when the infantry gave me target designation for it. Then they found an enemy tank. He seemed to be without a crew, but I still shot him with a sub-caliber projectile ...

The events that followed came as a complete surprise to all of their participants. At about 11 o'clock from Major General Konstantin Pulikovsky to the commander of the brigade, Colonel Ivan Savin, an order was received by radio to seize the indicated objects in the city of Grozny. According to Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Klaptsov, the brigade should have entered the city with two assault detachments - the 1st detachment was supposed to occupy the railway station, and the 2nd - the central market (to close the environment of the presidential palace from Rosa Luxembourg Street).

Vladimir Zryadniy, head of the planning group of the combat training department of the 67th Army Corps, lieutenant colonel:

“Somewhere, approximately, at 11 o'clock ... Khmelevsky says: “Comrade Lieutenant Colonel! I received radio instructions from the brigade commander to enter the city!"<…>And soon, literally, maybe in 3-5 minutes, the armored personnel carrier "Seagull" approached, on which the brigade commander was ...<…>He says: “You’re lowering, Vladimir, you received an order on the radio to enter the city!” I say: “Ivan, how do you imagine doing this? Do you have a plan… cities?” He says no. I say: "How are you going to come in?" [Savin]: - "Well, they pointed out the street along which we should go with the 1st battalion ... to the station ... railway station."

Assault detachments of the 131st brigade began to organize combat columns for advancing to the city, and captain Tyrtyshny's scouts remained to carry out their combat mission.

- The decision was made in a hurry, so I still can’t understand why, heading to the city, Colonel Savin did not order the withdrawal of the scouts, who continued to carry out their task in the suburbs of Grozny on their own, left without the support of the main forces.

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

13.40 - reconnaissance destroyed the gun.

It was dangerous for the scouts to remain in the suburbs, separated from the main forces. They completed their task in full. According to the intelligence chief of the 131st brigade, Major Roman Kuznetsov, it was possible to recall the scouts only with the assistance of the intelligence chief of the 67th corps, who was at the command post of the brigade. As a result of reconnaissance on December 31, two reconnaissance vehicles had technical malfunctions that were not directly related to the daytime battle. Moreover, BMP-2 No. 015 had to be towed. During the night, all three vehicles were repaired by reconnaissance forces and were again ready for battle.

Actions of the 1st assault detachment in the city

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

11.00 - the command "forward" was given ... The 1st MSB resumed movement into the city.

Rustem Klupov, commander of the 3rd motorized rifle company, captain:

- ... The acting commander of the 1st motorized rifle battalion, Major Khmelevsky, drove up to me and verbally ordered me to go to Grozny. I ask him about the tasks and the route of movement. In response: “In the course of promotion you will receive!” I began to be indignant: “It’s not supposed to be like this! ..”, to which the answer was given to me: “The 81st regiment is already fighting in the city. If you do not lead the column, then the 1st company will go ahead! I say: "The commander of the 1st company of the city does not know, I'd better lead." I send Adenin's platoon forward, and the entire battalion "at first speed" trudged behind, at the same time reorganizing itself into the battle formation of an assault detachment.

Valery Nikolaev, commander of the 2nd motorized rifle company, captain:

-.. Literally half an hour has passed - the soldier called me and said that the battalion commander wanted me on the radio station. The battalion commander set the task of advancing along the specified road. I gathered the cars into a company column and moved out. While on the route, I saw the closing of the third motorized rifle company ...

The 1st assault detachment, lining up in a column, headed for the bridge over the Neftyanka. The 3rd motorized rifle company of Captain Rustem Klupov served as the head marching outpost (GPZ). Two tanks moved ahead of her - No. 536 (crew: gunner-operator, acting tank commander, sergeant I. V. Isaev, tank commander, acting gunner-operator, senior lieutenant S. A. Grinchenko, private driver I. M. Ebzeev) and No. 539 (crew: gunner-operator, acting tank commander junior sergeant X. M. Dzhamalutdinov, tank commander, acting gunner-operator senior lieutenant Yu. G. Morozov, mechanic- private driver R. A. Mereshkin). Behind the 3rd company, two others stretched out in reverse order: the 2nd, followed by the 1st.

All the servicemen of the brigade, with whom we managed to talk, assure that they did not assume until the very last moment that the convoy was going to Grozny. The realization of what was happening came when city buildings appeared ahead.

Yuri Morozov, commander of a tank platoon, senior lieutenant:

- When they began to roll up, I understood that we were returning back. And it seems that I’m already going back on a course, and they say to me: “No, brother, to the left and forward slowly, slowly we go ...” The most unpleasant thing was that by that time I had less than half of the ammunition left in the tank, and most of the remaining shells were in hanging stacking on the tower. I expected that, having “worked out” on the targets, the column would return and I would be able to reload. But it turned out differently. If I had known in advance that we were really going to the city, I would not have shot so much, of course!

“Something happened - I didn’t understand ... There were scouts ... driving ... We got into the car and drove off. The guy [who] was sitting in the commander's seat (senior lieutenant A. Savchenko. - Approx. Aut.), leaned over to us, who was in the landing party ... and said that we were going to the city. Well, somehow, one might say, [I] was even delighted…

- [Reporter] Why?

Well, I don’t know - it’s a young thing?! .. Maybe you wanted thrills ?! ”

Valery Nikolaev commander of the 2nd motorized rifle company, captain:

- Went through some dachas. They made an almost circular motion. We passed through the dachas and came out on a straight road. I saw that there was a bridge in front of us. Ahead of me were the battalion commander and the third company. I noticed that they take to the right and cross the bridge...

The commander of the 3rd tank company, Captain Andrei Cherny, describes an episode when, at the entrance to Grozny, one tank from his company (presumably T-72A No. 534) lagged behind the column. It turned out that the tank "hung" fuel - an air lock formed in the fuel system. It was necessary just to open the tank lid and pump this "cork". While the crew was doing this, the column moved forward. They had to enter the city on their own. Entering Grozny, the tank came under enemy fire. As a result, the turret of the car jammed, and a machine gun on the tank was smashed from a direct hit from an RPG. Having fought off grenade launchers, the crew managed to withdraw the damaged vehicle from the city.

The 1st assault detachment of the 131st brigade entered Grozny. In its composition, 8 out of 10 tanks of the 3rd tank company, 17 infantry fighting vehicles of the 1st motorized rifle battalion, two BTR-60s, 4 assigned to the Tunguska assault detachment and several technical locking vehicles advanced to the station.

Rustem Klupov, commander of the 3rd motorized rifle company, captain:

- Having crossed the bridge, we turned left and through the field went to Altaiskaya Street.

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

11.40–131st Motorized Rifle Brigade attacks in the direction of el. 123.5 (in the direction of the DOSAAF airfield. - Author's note).

Encountering no resistance from the enemy, the head marching outpost of the brigade in the battle formations of the assault detachment goes along Altaiskaya Street to the intersection with Staropromyslovsky Highway. Here the head patrol should have turned left and walked along the Staropromyslovsky highway to the Press House, but the column slipped through the turn.

Rustem Klupov, commander of the 3rd motorized rifle company, captain:

- We walked along Altaiskaya Street through the Staropromyslovsky district and went to the outskirts of the city. I did not know the end point of the route, but I suspected an error and reported to Savin. He ordered to turn around and go to the Staropromyslovskoye Highway. At the end of Altaiskaya Street, when they had already gone beyond the boundaries of the residential sector, they found a Chechen armored personnel carrier with two white stripes crosswise on the hull and turret. We immediately burned it from the ATGM. Then the column turned around and lay down on the opposite course. While we were going to the crossroads, the landing party fired at us from the Sunzhensky ridge. They fought with the "spirits", and their shells flew over us.

- I remember well how Klupov reported on radio communication: “The paratroopers are hitting me! Let's turn around!"

At that time, organized and combat-experienced units Chechen fighters, in particular, the battalions of Shamil Basaev and Ruslan Gelaev, occupied key positions in the Staropromyslovsky district near the Elektropribor plant, where competent defense was built, as evidenced by the memoirs of Colonel Hussein Iskhanov: “We built some specific obstacles on Staropromyslovskoye Highway, near the Elektropribor factory ". They were primitive, but we hoped that they would delay the tanks - we knew that it was not enough to stop them. We expected the Russians to advance along the Staropromyslovsky Highway. We waited for them, wishing they would come along this path (and it was a narrow corridor surrounded by hills and five-story buildings). It would be easy to destroy them there. But obviously they were afraid of such a situation and waited before moving the tanks into the city.”

The 1st and, subsequently, the 2nd assault detachments of the brigade bypassed the prepared enemy fortified area, located on Zaveta Ilyich Street in the area of the Elektropribor plant. However, it is possible that the column of the 2nd assault detachment was fired upon precisely by the subdivisions of Basaev and Gelaev, who approached the area of the intersection of Staropromyslovsky highway and Altaiskaya street.

Nikolai Ryabtsev, flamethrower of the 3rd motorized rifle company, private:

“They walked in the city, either dismounting behind their infantry fighting vehicles, or riding directly inside them.”

"The infantry got off the armor and walked along the edges of the street: those on the right inspect the windows on the left side, and vice versa."

Mikhail Ibragimov, commander of the grenade launcher section of the 2nd motorized rifle company, junior sergeant:

- Either we were moving on foot behind the BMP, then the order “By cars!” sounded. and we went in combat, batten down the hatches. After a while, we dismount again and slowly move forward. This was repeated several times.

Yevgeny Pashchenko, commander of the 1st motorized rifle company, captain:

- When we were walking, I gave the command to my company: “Shoot!” The soldiers just walked and fired along the walls. They beat on stalls, lanterns, window openings, bushes in anticipation.

The infantry fired in all directions, but sometimes the execution of an essentially correct order turned into childishness.

Mikhail Ibragimov, commander of the grenade launcher section of the 2nd motorized rifle company, junior sergeant:

- We walked and fired on the sides: “Ay! Who can break the wire?! Let's shoot?" - "Let's!" And it began - bang, bang, bang! Shooting there, shooting there, shooting there...

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

12.28 - passed the intersection: Pobeda and Mayakovsky Avenue, brigade commander from the 1st SSB.

Mikhail Ibragimov, commander of the grenade launcher section of the 2nd motorized rifle company, junior sergeant:

- When we were walking along Mayakovsky Street, there was such an episode. The machine gunner Aganes Khachatryan from the crew of our BMP-2 No. 124 had grease frozen in his machine gun from frost, and the machine gun stopped firing bursts. Khachatryan reloads it - "bang" - makes one shot! Reloads - "bang" - makes one shot. And while they were walking down the street behind the BMP, Khachatryan was trying to restore the machine gun's performance. At that moment, a spontaneous shot occurred - the bullet went into the asphalt. One of the soldiers walking nearby - Vadim Sakhanko - grabbed his side. He screamed that he was wounded. The BMP just rolled over the tram tracks. Sakhanko is thrown into the landing of the BMP and they find out that the wound is not serious, caused by a stone that bounced off in the leg, but I, as a castle platoon, caused a lot of unrest. While moving along Mayakovsky, in one of the lanes I noticed a group of civilians watching the column. They stood in the arch and looked at us. And we are all dirty, like bastards, this uniform is all torn off on us ... A German near Stalingrad! One hundred percent, one to one!

On Friendship Square, near the monument to Pikalo, Akhriev and Sheripov (Grozny people called this sculptural group “a monument to three men” or, more strictly, “a monument to three fools.” - Author's note), according to the head of the operational department of the brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Klaptsov, the column was fired from small arms and grenade launchers. Apparently, it was one of the "wild" detachments of the Dudaevites, acting independently. 2 or 3 enemy vehicles were destroyed by return fire, the column of the 1st assault detachment had no losses.

To get to the railway station, from Mayakovsky Street, it was necessary to turn left onto Rabochaya Street. At the head of the column, to the right and left, covering each other, were T-72A tanks No. 536 and No. 539, followed by the 3rd motorized rifle company and the rest of the equipment of the 1st assault detachment. If you look at the map of Grozny, you can see that Mayakovsky Street forms quite a few intersections. On which of them to turn to the station, man, do not who knows the city, is difficult to determine. Senior Lieutenant Yuri Morozov, commander of the T-72A tank No. 539, asks the commander of the 1st battalion, Major Sergei Khmelevsky, where to move, at which intersection to turn. The battalion commander's answer struck him with its simplicity and spontaneity: “Are you literate? Look at the signs!

Yuri Morozov, commander of a tank platoon, senior lieutenant:

- The street signs were so capital, as if they had already been hanging for a hundred years!

The designations on military maps did not always match the names of streets in Grozny, as the new Chechen authorities renamed some of them. For example, 1st Sovetskaya Street became Idrisov Street, Mayakovsky Street - Sheikh Mansur Street, etc. The lead tanks, and then the entire column, slipped through the desired intersection.

Yuri Morozov, commander of a tank platoon, senior lieutenant:

- ... I'm following the signs! That's why we skipped one block then?! I'm telling. I see the sign "Station"! To the left - I remember exactly! I come closer, I see: one intersection to the left, another intersection to the left! I request over the link: “Two intersections to the left! Which one should you turn on? And I myself look - some small intersections! I think: “Well, can’t such a road lead to the station ?!” They tell me: “Look for the railroad tracks there!” I see a thread is coming! I turned to her! And this, it turns out, is a dead end! I reached a dead end, turned around! It’s good, the “spirits” didn’t realize then, otherwise they would have burned us all there!

Valery Nikolaev, commander of the 2nd motorized rifle company, captain:

- We walked, walked, walked along Mayakovsky Street, and I see that we are going to the other outskirts of the city. That is, the buildings are already running out, there is a white sky ahead, there are no more houses! We've almost made it to the edge...

Having turned 180 degrees, the column returns to Mayakovsky Street, finds the right intersection and starts moving along Rabochaya Street to the railway station. Having reached Ordzhonikidze Avenue, the advanced armored vehicles of the 1st Assault Detachment of the 131st Brigade found here the equipment of the 1st and 2nd companies of the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment, stretching along the avenue towards the station square. Several Samarans' cars were already on fire. Tanks T-72A No. 539 and T-72A No. 536 crossed their line and moved to the neighboring intersection with Komsomolskaya Street. Turning to the right, the tankers of the 131st brigade went to the station square.

Yuri Morozov, commander of a tank platoon, senior lieutenant:

- I passed through the battle formations of the 81st regiment twice. When I got to the station, I reported on the completion of the assigned task to the commander of the 1st motorized rifle battalion, Major Sergei Khmelevsky.

Wasting no time, Senior Lieutenant Morozov and his crew reloaded the shells from the hinged stowage inside the tank. Gradually, the rest of the equipment of the 1st assault detachment of the brigade pulled up to the station square.

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

13.00 - the brigade commander and the 1st motorized brigade went to the station.

Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Klaptsov noted that when approaching the square near a group of two-story Stalin-built houses, an infantry fighting vehicle was hit. The car was blown to pieces, there were dead and wounded, he himself received a bullet in his finger. Apparently, it was one of the infantry fighting vehicles of the 81st regiment.

On the way to the station square, two cumulative grenades hit the BTR-60PB R-975 No. 105, attached to a brigade from the 2150th communications and radio-technical support battalion of the aviation combat control group. Throughout the entire route, the armored personnel carrier of the air controllers kept in line behind the car of Colonel Ivan Savin. At the intersection of Rabochaya and Komsomolskaya streets, BTR-60PB R-975 No. 105 stopped for a moment. At that moment, a grenade launcher hit the APC from above. The car was saved by chance. At the pass, officers from the repair battalion replaced the worn-out right front wheel of the armored personnel carrier, and also, by order of the brigade commander, Colonel Savin, left the air controllers with a spare wheel, which had to be fixed on the armored personnel carrier turret. The grenade, hitting the "reserve" from above, ricocheted and did no harm to the car.

- If it were not for the wheel, we would not have reached the station!

However, a minute later, turning onto Komsomolskaya Street, the car took a grenade to the starboard side. Both engines stalled from the explosion, the crew escaped with light contusions. The radio equipment absorbed the cumulative jet, several radio stations went out of order (only the 123rd station and communications with aviation remained, the 134th station, according to Vadim Shibkov, "carried away as if it had never been there"). In the aft part of the armored personnel carrier, rubber mats flared up. Captain Evgeny Pokusaev, who was at the fifth workplace in an armored personnel carrier (at the stern), quickly extinguished them with a fire extinguisher.

The tasks of the air controllers included correcting the work of aviation and, in the event of better weather conditions, to ensure the reception of "boards", the guidance of front-line and army aviation on targets. To do this, given the nature of the terrain and weather conditions on December 31, 1994, was almost impossible.

If the vanguard of the 1st assault detachment of the 131st brigade reached the station square without encountering enemy resistance, then the vehicles closing the column had to make fire contact on Rabochaya and Komsomolskaya streets.

- I walked in the closure of the column. That is, my tank was almost the last - there was only an infantry fighting vehicle behind, and there was no one else. The militants fired at me from the trenches. Due to the fact that the tank is not suitable for fighting in the city, I had to demolish the third floor in order to demolish the grenade launcher, who sat down on the top floor of the five-story building.

“... When we were moving along the route, since I stood at the end of the column for a long time, they were looking for a route ...<…>.. I saw that behind my car, since it was the last one, ... detachments of militants were closing in. I had to - well, this has already been discussed - turn the tower back and ... shoot back a little.

The 1st assault detachment reached the station without loss: “The column of the 1st motorized rifle battalion, led by Major Sergei Vladimirov (deputy commander of the 1st motorized rifle battalion. - Approx. Aut.), attached to the ZSU, the headquarters of the brigade, which tankers joined with some delay , practically without a fight occupied the forecourt.

Tanks of the 8th company of the 6th Guards Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division) and equipment of the 1st and 2nd companies of the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment were already in this area. This detachment was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Semyon Burlakov.

- Brigade commander Ivan Savin told me something like this: “The order of the commander is that I occupy the station. This hotel under construction is our dividing line!”

The "hotel under construction" (construction) was separated by a concrete fence from the forecourt and the old building of the railway station. Thus, units of the 81st motorized rifle regiment occupied the Vulcanization building (car service) on the territory of the “construction site”, as well as technical buildings on the territory of the freight station - the building of a polyclinic, technical offices (railway administration), etc. Motorized riflemen of brigade commander Savin took control only the old railway station building.

The officers began to place armored vehicles on the forecourt. During these actions, an unusual episode occurred, which was remembered by some participants in the hostilities. The commander of the 1st motorized rifle company, Captain Evgeny Pashchenko, recalled how one crazy Chechen with scissors in his hands tried to open the hatch of the BMP-2 No. 120 of the commander of the 2nd company, Captain Valery Nikolaev.

Yevgeny Pashchenko, commander of the 1st motorized rifle company, captain:

-.. I tell him on the radio: “Valera, don’t stick your head out - it will pierce!”

Similar memories remained with Lieutenant Colonel Semyon Burlakov.

Semyon Burlakov, chief of staff of the 81st motorized rifle regiment, lieutenant colonel:

- When I stopped my convoy and drove up to the station in an armored personnel carrier, I saw how one Chechen was dancing lezginka. Right on the square. All tattered, covered in blood, barefoot. It's cold outside, and he is dancing a lezginka. I think: “Well, it’s kind of a sin to shoot an unarmed person!” And he greets us like this. And as soon as the cars dispersed, it seems that he disappeared. It's like he's gone underground. Once - and all!

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

13.17 - the brigade commander reports that a battle is going on on the left.

Actions of the 2nd assault detachment in the city

Anatoly Zhornik, commander of a repair platoon, senior warrant officer:

“At 12.42 on December 31, the deputy commander of the 42nd Army Corps (an error in the source - Lieutenant Colonel Durnev was the deputy commander of the 67th Army Corps. - Approx. Aut.) Colonel Durnev set the task of the command of the motorized rifle battalion (deputy for weapons (ZK) of which, for the period operation, the ZKV of the tank battalion, Major Gogolev V.N. was appointed) to march to the area of the railway station and arrive at the disposal of the commander of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, Colonel Savin I.A. ".

However, the head of the operations department of the 131st brigade, lieutenant colonel Yuri Klaptsov, claims that the 2nd motorized rifle battalion was given the task of moving to the central market area.

“Finally, we entered the city. Ahead lay a wide street (Bogdan Khmelnitsky. - Approx. Aut.). On it the column lined up two cars in a row.

Senior Lieutenant Valery Eliseev recalled something similar.

Valery Eliseev, and. about. T-72A tank driver No. 510, senior lieutenant:

- Entered Grozny. On the first wide street, they lined up in a column of two cars, as it should be. combat charter. Infantry jumped onto the transmission of our tank as cover - three or four people ...

The 2nd assault detachment, having reached the intersection of Chukotskaya and Bogdan Khmelnitsky streets, turned right, went to the DOSAAF airfield, and then to Altaiskaya street.

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

14.00 - "Kamin-23" (2nd motorized brigade) reported that in the battalion 1 person was killed during the shelling.

When turning at the intersection of Staropromyslovsky highway and Altaiskaya street, a caterpillar jumped off BMP-2 No. 214. The column passed by, and technical locking vehicles approached the BMP, which had lost its maneuverability. Senior warrant officers S. Deev and V. Zalin repaired the damage. At that moment, enemy fire fell on the column of the technical locking vehicle and BMP-2 No. 214. According to the commander of the repair platoon, senior warrant officer Anatoly Zhornik, this happened at 14.15. Vladimir Vorozhtsov, head of the public relations center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, who visited Grozny, described the place of the battle as follows: “The picture of what happened became more and more clear as we moved along the street. Its end was blocked by a barricade of five to seven dented and shot through fire engines (the depot of local firemen was located nearby, apparently, the equipment was quickly moved out of there). It was obvious that the column was trapped.”

Apparently, one of the first was hit by the BMP-2 No. 214 of the deputy commander of the 2nd motorized rifle battalion for educational work, Major Klimenty Mankirov, who was seriously wounded. In the Book of Memory of the 131st brigade, the following is written about the death of the crew of BMP-2 No. crossroads Staropromyslovskoe highway - st. Altai. This captain told them that BMP No. 214 was hit by 2 shells from a grenade launcher, the shell hit the upper armor, closer to the driver's hatch. According to him, the soldiers from this crew died, the officer who was with them was seriously wounded and is still alive. Then the militants approached them and, making sure that all the soldiers were killed, heard the groan of the officer, asked him who he was. In response, they heard that he was from Adygea (meaning the location of the brigade: the city of Maikop, Adygea. - Approx. Aut.), After which they fired a shot at him. Whether specifically about this crew in question I still don't know."

What happened to the crew of the car, it was not possible to establish exactly. It is only known that the crew was eventually completely destroyed by the militants. Private Alexander Dokaev was the first to die. He had a penetrating shrapnel wound to the head - he died instantly. It was established that the driver-mechanic Private Yuri Frolov was wounded in the hand: "According to local residents, he was shot in the building of the fire department not far from the wrecked BMP."

According to the commander of the 6th motorized rifle company, Captain Sergei Malikov, the crew and troops of the wrecked BMP-2 No. 214 (in addition to those already listed, there were privates Alexei Afanasiev, Konstantin Zatsarny, Vladimir Korotkiy, Yuri Soldatov, Alexei Khomenko and BMP commander Sergeant Alexander Polyakov in the car - a total of 9 people) jumped out of the car and hid in nearby buildings, from where shooting was heard for some time. The wife of the deceased Major Mankirov, looking for her missing husband, established the following: “The last time my husband (Major K. N. Mankirov. - Approx. Aut.) was seen by Captain Malikov, who currently continues to serve in the 131st Maikop brigade. Upon his release from captivity, he said that he saw Major Mankirov climb out of the hatch of the BMP and he was bleeding from under the headset, it was clear that he was wounded in the head.

From the explanatory note of Captain Nikolai Podkatilov, deputy commander of the 4th motorized rifle company; regarding the death of Private A. B. Afanasyev:

“... According to Captain Malikov, who was released from captivity, BMP No. 214 was hit in Grozny, the entire crew jumped out of the car, including Private Afanasiev. Everyone ran to the nearby buildings, where they later heard gunfire. No one else saw any of the members of this crew. There is information from the Federal Grid Company and parents that Polyakov, Dokaev, Korotkiy, Khomenko (members of this crew) are in captivity.”

Trying to provide assistance, BREM-1 No. 504 (acting driver, senior warrant officer Anatoly Zhornik and vehicle commander, deputy commander of a tank battalion for weapons, Major Vladimir Gogolev) covered the motionless BMP-2 No. 214 with the body of his vehicle.

Anatoly Zhornik, commander of a repair platoon, senior warrant officer:

“Major Gogolev conducted aimed fire from a machine gun at the Dudayevites who had settled in nearby houses. A shot from a grenade launcher in the stern of the BREM was damaged and caught fire. Vladimir, to change the store, sank into the hatch of the car, said: “Tolya, we are on fire,” and at that moment he was seriously wounded in the abdominal cavity with a second shot from a grenade launcher through the armor of the car. At that moment, tank number 514 came to the rescue of the ambushed convoy (crew: tank commander Lieutenant E. V. Lobov, gunner-operator Private A. V. Gorbunov, driver Private S. G. Zaprudin. - Approx. Aut.), and the burning BREM began to exit the battle, along with it began to leave the BREM-Ch st. Warrant Officer Zalina V. A. At the intersection of Staropromyslovsky Highway and Mayakovsky Avenue (an error in the source, it should be read “Mayakovsky Streets.” - Approx. Aut.) A burning armored vehicle met the tank of the commander of battalion No. 500 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Garkovenko E. A. (crew: tank commander Major E. A. Garkovenko, sergeant gunner-operator A. 3. Nabiulin, driver sergeant M. F. Kalmykov. - Approx. Aut.), who shot down the flames from the burning car with a shot along the BREM.

With a broken radiator, dragging a plume of black smoke behind the stern, BREM-1 No. 504 began to retreat to the state farm "Rodina" along the streets of Mayakovsky and Bohdan Khmelnitsky under the cover of the T-72A tank No. 500. BREM-1 No. 504 entered the checkpoint of the 81st motorized regiment in the area of bridges across the Neftyanka River. Here, the seriously wounded major Gogolev was handed over to the doctors of the 81st motorized rifle regiment, and then urgently delivered “to the field hospital of the LenVO in the village. Tolstoy-Yurt. Doctors fought for Vladimir's life for more than four hours, but the wound was very severe, and at 20:00 on December 31, 1994, Major V. N. Gogolev died.

It is worth noting that now BREM-1 No. 504 is installed in the memorial complex of the 131st brigade in Maykop as a monument to all the servicemen of the 131st motorized rifle brigade who died in Grozny.

BMP-2 No. 232, in which the commander of the 6th motorized rifle company, Captain Sergey Malikov, was located, burned down on Altaiskaya Street at 14:15. Of the entire crew of the BMP, only the company commander survived, who was captured and subsequently released.

From a letter from the mother of Alexander Korovin, the deceased driver of BMP-2 No. 232, corporal:

“... Then they told me to go to Mozdok, that the lieutenant who was with Sasha in the BMP-232 car was released there, that he could say that with Sasha. I met with lieutenant (captain. - Approx. Aut.) Malikov Sergey, he told me that Sasha died, he saw how he remained lying near the fence of the plant.

The crew of BMP-2 No. 230 shared the bitter fate of the two previous vehicles. According to some reports, the combat vehicle was hit on Zavety Ilyich Street near the Neftyanka stop opposite the two-story building of the Tax Police. As Sergeant Alekseev pointed out in the explanatory note, “the car took off its shoes (that is, the caterpillar flew off. - Approx. Aut.) on Staropromyslovsky Highway (Zavety Ilyich Street is a direct continuation of Staropromyslovsky Highway. - Note Aut.) ".

In this regard, we will cite the story of an 80-year-old Russian resident of Grozny about that tragic episode: “In the Neftyanka area (the name of the stop. - Approx. Author), two of our infantry fighting vehicles with seven fighters fell into the hands of Dudayev's militants. First of all, the Dudayevites placed three wounded soldiers next to each other, doused them with gasoline and burned them. When the flames went out, the charred bodies of the dead became small, like those of babies. Eyewitnesses of the tragedy, living in neighboring houses, went to the fire to bury the remains of the soldiers, but the militants did not allow this to be done. “The dogs came running and started chasing the skulls of our sons,” the woman sobbed ... In front of the people, dumbfounded by inhuman cruelty, the militants stripped the remaining four captives naked, hung them by their legs and began to cut off their ears, gouge out their eyes, rip open their stomachs ... So they hung three days. Several local residents came to the Dudaevites with a request to bury the soldiers. In response, a shot followed, which ended the life of one of them (one of those who asked. - Approx. Aut.).

The crew of the BMP-2 No. 230 in the amount of six people died completely (senior lieutenant S. E. Guzhbin, senior sergeant Z. G. Atabiev, corporal S. A. Kochetkov, privates A. A. Popov, S. V. Agarkov and A V. Chindrov).

On one of the streets of Grozny, she received a hit from a BMP-2 cumulative grenade No. 223. The crew left the car and took up defense. However, noticing that the car did not catch fire, the fighters rushed back to it.

From the explanatory letter of private Streltsov, regarding the death of the commander of the 1st platoon of the 5th motorized rifle company, Lieutenant Vitaly Shchukin:

“I, Private Streltsov, was in the emergency zone as part of 2 SSB.<…>... We were among multi-storey buildings, there was a stop nearby (stop "Neftyanka" or "GRMZ". - Approx. Aut.).<…>When they started firing at us, the tank turned its turret sharply, swept a few people off their armor, and only one person was killed in the car. In my opinion, Lieutenant Shchukin was wounded in the shoulder, a doctor ran up to him, our column went forward. With Lieutenant Shchukin was Private Kononov Grigory (actually his last name is Konkov, an error in the text. - Approx. Aut.) from 2 MSB, 5 measures. According to Captain Basalko, Konkov was taken prisoner and was returned from captivity.

BMP-2 No. 220 of the commander of the 5th motorized rifle company, Captain Konstantin Basalko, in his words, fought back until the ammunition was completely used up. In the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, this episode is described as follows: “Captain Basalko and several other soldiers jumped into the BMP when the tank ahead went up in smoke. They covered the retreat of the tankers from the onboard weapons, but they themselves did not save themselves. A caterpillar was killed at the Bempeshki, and it froze, becoming an ideal target. In addition, after a few minutes, the cannon and the coaxial machine gun fell silent - the ammunition ran out. For four, there was one grenade and less than half of the magazine of cartridges. That's when the firing stopped. The silent BMP was surrounded by militants. A voice was heard amplified by the loudspeaker. Motorized riflemen were promised life if they surrendered without a fight.

The crew of the vehicle, consisting of Captain Konstantin Basalko, Sergeant Grigory Konkov, presumably the captain of the medical service, Sergei Kotenko, and other servicemen who were not identified by us, surrendered. Basalko spent 19 days in captivity and was returned alive to the Russian side. Konkov was also released from captivity and returned home. But the captain-medic died, it was not possible to find out the circumstances of his death.

The advanced part of the column of the 2nd battalion, which escaped destruction in the Staropromyslovsky district, went to the Central Market of Grozny.

Denis Shachnev, gunner-operator of the T-72A tank No. 517, private:

“In front and to the left of our tank, infantry fighting vehicles were moving, on the armor of which infantry was located. I turned the turret of the tank left and right, inspecting the area, and almost knocked out the infantry from one of the BMPs with the barrel of the gun. The streets were deserted, but in the windows of the houses and on the balconies, as before in the village, I sometimes noticed women who greeted us. Valera Lykov advised to load the gun, but I refused, because I did not see the need for it. Then nothing foreshadowed trouble, and I thought that no one would dare to mess with us - after all, such power was going through the city!

The street along which the column was moving began to narrow, private sector houses appeared on the left, and residential multi-storey buildings appeared on the right. I was looking at the triplex ahead of the infantry fighting vehicle, when suddenly at that moment it was hit from the right by a grenade launcher. The car immediately stood up and began to smoke. The infantry, which was sitting on top, fell from the armor, the landing doors opened, and white-gray smoke and the crew poured out of its belly. The living began to crawl along the asphalt from the car in different directions, the dead remained lying next to the BMP. Our driver, Private Pozdnyakov, hesitated, and for some time we stood motionless right behind the wrecked BMP. I drove a high-explosive projectile into the breech and began to look for targets. The enemy is not visible, in the walkie-talkie - confusion, mat. From the verbal stream on the air, we could hardly make out the coordinates of the shooting. I set the range and reported to the commander about the readiness, but the electric trigger of the gun turned out to be inoperative. I had to repeat pressing several times, but it was all in vain. The tank also had a backup button for firing, but it did not help either. Then, in desperation, I kicked the mechanical descent pedal, and this had its effect - the gun fired! I was incredibly delighted and, encouraging myself, dragged on “Don’t cry and don’t grieve, my dear…”

After the shot, I, as expected, pressed the A3 button (automatic loading). At this moment, the pallet left from the previous shot flew into the hatch for ejection of cartridges (according to the given program, it automatically flies into the hatch located between the commander's hatch and the gunner's hatch). But as soon as the hatch cover began to close, the felt boots lying on the tower fell and fell into this hatch! The lid closed the felt boot, and the tank's electronic system failed again. The commander and I rushed to fix the problem - we pulled the felt boots, cut them with a bayonet-knife, tried to open the hatch, but it was all to no avail. Only one question throbbed in my head: why haven't we been hit yet? I can say that I expected that there would be a blow to the tank, because we were standing in one place! Perhaps we were saved by the fact that the tank did not show signs of life outwardly - we did not fire, did not move, and the enemy ignored us. While we were retrieving the stuck boots, I managed to look around through the triplexes: an intense firefight ensued outside. It was necessary to urgently support the column with main battery fire. By pressing all the buttons and toggle switches at hand, Valera and I were finally able to open the hatch cover and remove the felt boot. It seemed to me that this disgrace lasted for an eternity, but, probably, everything happened much faster. Having made a couple of shots from the spot in the direction of the targets, the coordinates of which I heard over the connection (the first shell blew the roof of a private house to our left into chips), the car rolled forward along the street. The electronic system of the tank now worked properly. I fired from a PKT machine gun and from a tank gun, clearly seeing armed militants through the sights. He hit them, sparing no shells! I can’t say for sure whether it hit or not, but the machine gun and the cannon worked without ceasing. Several times I shot, as it seems to me, at the presidential palace - fire was also fired at us from there. They fired at the flashes - where the fire came from, they beat them there. ”

The column of the 2nd assault detachment included two 1V15 artillery fire control vehicles (based on MT-LB) with tail numbers 100 and 115, attached from the 429th motorized rifle regiment. During the march through the streets of Grozny, 1V15 No. 100, the commander of the artillery battalion, Major Yuri Mozgovoy, was hit by a cumulative grenade, as a result of which junior sergeant Vitaly Yatsenko was wounded. Near the buildings of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Chechnya on Ordzhonikidze Avenue, both cars were fatally damaged. The 1V15 car No. 115 of the commander of the 3rd battery, Captain Dmitry Bondarev, received two hits: “... The first grenade hit the engine compartment without harming the crew. The second is right on target. One of my five soldiers immediately burned to death. The rest, it seems, escaped ... "

Radiotelephone operator Sergeant Yevgeny Shabanov was killed, Captain Dmitry Bondarev was wounded. The crew of the car took refuge in the nearest private house.

Following this, the artillery fire control vehicle 1V15 No. 100 was burned. Inside, in addition to the regular crew, according to Major Yuri Mozgovoy, there were senior lieutenant of the medical service Alexander Gursky, as well as a soldier wounded in the head of the 4th motorized rifle company 131- brigade and the body of an unidentified deceased officer. When hit by a cumulative grenade in the car, the commander of the control platoon, Senior Lieutenant Alan Elkanov and Private Alexei Morozov, were killed. During the evacuation from the damaged car, Senior Lieutenant Gursky was killed by a sniper, the driver-mechanic, Private Oleg Kovalev, and again Sergeant Vitaly Yatsenko were wounded, this time in the chest.

The column of the 2nd assault detachment of the 131st brigade continued to suffer losses. At the intersection of Ordzhonikidze Avenue and Rabochaya Street, BMP-2 No. 210 of the commander of the 4th motorized rifle company, Captain Vitaly Apasov, was hit. According to senior warrant officer Barybin, who acted as a gunner in the crew of the BMP-2 No. 210, the car stopped at the intersection of Ordzhonikidze Avenue and Rabochaya Street. Noticing the enemy on the right approaching the combat vehicle along Rabochaya Street in the direction of Ordzhonikidze Avenue, BMP-2 “No. 210 left the intersection to turn around and take an advantageous position to repel the enemy’s fire attack. After turning at the next intersection, the car approaching the street. The worker was hit by a grenade launcher and caught fire. As a result of hitting a cumulative grenade, a machine gunner Private Konstantin Sayustov, who was in the troop compartment of the BMP, was killed. Senior Warrant Officer Barybin was wounded and shell-shocked. Private driver Igor Nagibin pulled out Sayustov's body from the BMP and left him near the car on the sidewalk, and also helped the wounded senior warrant officer Barybin to overcome the open space of the street. All this time, Captain Vitaly Apasov covered them with automatic fire. The three of them safely hid behind two piles of bricks on Rabochaya Street. According to the memoirs of senior warrant officer Barybin, there was already a medical captain (probably senior lieutenant A. Gursky) and a wounded officer, whose name we have not established. The shelling from the enemy intensified, so Captain Apasov decided to retreat, hiding behind houses and burning cars. For this purpose, they decided to use the BMP-2 No. 216, the driver of which was Private Alexei Elfimov. A wounded officer was loaded into the BMP, as well as senior warrant officer V. Barybin. Captain Apasov again covered the loading of the wounded. During the retreat, BMP-2 No. 216 was also burned from grenade launchers.

It is reliably established that Elfimov and Apasov died (for a long time they were considered missing), but the details of their deaths have not been established. Senior warrant officer Barybin received a concussion again and lost consciousness. Having come to his senses on the street 50 meters from the burning BMP-2 No. 216, he noticed the 1V15 No. 100 vehicle engulfed in flames and successfully reached it.

“There were three seriously wounded (driver Private Kovalev, junior sergeant Yatsenko and a soldier of the 4th motorized rifle company wounded in the head. - Approx. Aut.), Major (Yuri Mozgovoy. - Approx. Aut.), Lieutenant and two soldiers ( Sergeant Khapaev and Private Subbotin. - Approx. Aut.)".

The defense was taken up in a nearby private house, where the crew of the previously knocked-out 1B15 No. 115 and, as Major Yuri Mozgovoy notes, “an unknown civilian” were already located. The identity of the "civilian" was established from the words of senior warrant officer Barybin - A. A. Sukhomlinov, apparently, the owner of the house.

Major Yuri Mozgovoy tells about attempts to get out of the encirclement of the fighters cut off from the main forces: “At dusk, a civilian (A. A. Sukhomlinov. - Approx. Aut.) One by one brought all the walking wounded to the market area on Nikitin Street. Twice - at 11 p.m. and in the morning - we tried to carry out the wounded, but ran into Dudayev's men. In the evening, Yatsenko died in front of my eyes.

On the morning of January 1, they tried, under the guise of civilians, to take out the wounded in a wheelbarrow, but ended up with the Dudaevites - Captain Bondarev, Private Kovalev and an infantry fighting vehicle gunner from the 131st brigade were captured. The rest left in two groups. With me were the battery commander, Captain Gaitov, Sergeant Khapaev, Private Subbotin, and a company commander from the 131st brigade.

We safely reached the area of the village of Dolinsky. The second group was ambushed. Lieutenant Bitiev and junior sergeant Derkachev were seriously wounded, they were saved by a Russian woman, Maria Dmitrievna Kuzmina. The wounded private Volskov was taken prisoner. Private Stolmatsky was killed."

From the explanatory note of V. Barybin, senior warrant officer:

“The locals took us out of the house. The first time I tried to get out of Grozny on January 5, with the help of A. A. Sukhomlinov, a resident. We walked about 6–7 blocks and ended up on the street. Working. I recognized the place of the battle, saw my burned-out car. The dead lay there. Captain Apasov was not among those killed. On this day, we could not go out, because [as] we ran into a large group of militants and were forced to hide.

The second attempt was made on January 8 along the same route. At the battle site on St. Only burnt-out cars remained working. There were no dead bodies. Sukhomlinov A.A. brought me to the heating main, and then I walked myself to the park (Park named after Lenin. - Approx. Aut.). There was a group of paratroopers there. They took me to the location of our troops.

During the battle on the street. Working fire from the BMP-2 No. 210 destroyed two vehicles with militants, a blockage was made of poles and trees to block the street. Working to promote the militants."

In the BMP-2 No. 213, an ordinary Anatoly Ignatov died in the first minutes of the battle. According to the chief of staff of the 1st battalion, Captain Yuri Chmyrev, Ignatov's head was blown off by the explosion. The car with the crew went to the railway station, where the units of the 1st assault detachment of the brigade had already taken up the defense. The fate of the servicemen from the crew of the BMP-2 No. 213 developed in different ways. Privates Sisel and Zarinsky survived. The driver-mechanic, Private Sobolevsky, the BMP commander, Junior Sergeant Efremov, and Private Bezusko died while retreating to the BMP with the wounded from the railway station.

The fate of the officer of the 213th vehicle, Senior Lieutenant Nikolai Kalambet, deserves a separate story. He was assigned for reinforcement to the 2nd battalion from the 8th motorized rifle company. When trying to get out of Grozny, he was taken prisoner. Then, together with the rest of the prisoners, he sat in the cellars of Grozny, and when the militants began to leave the city, he was transferred to Shali. With Nikolai Kalambet until his death was the commander of the 3rd self-propelled artillery battery of the 429th motorized rifle regiment, Captain Dmitry Bondarev. It was he who told in a letter to Svetlana Grigorievna Kalambet how her son died.

From a letter from Captain Bondarev to the mother of the deceased senior lieutenant Nikolai Kalambet dated August 4, 1996:

“I was taken prisoner on the 1st, militants took me to their detachment, back in Grozny, to the detachment where Shamsudin was. On the 3rd, we went to the house of the government of Chechnya and the militants brought Kolya from there from the basement. I was with them in the car. There we first met and never parted until that very day. They slept together under the same blanket, ate together from the same plate, and also smoked a cigarette for two. We knew everything about each other. They became friends, in general they were like a right and left hand. On [th] 1st, Art. Lt. Galkin Yura (from the 81st SME. - Approx. Aut.). We stayed in this detachment until January 21-24. In general, it was good. We were well fed, not beaten, not humiliated, everything was fine. Many thanks and gratitude to Shamsudin. He is very good man . Then they sent us to the basement, where there were about 50 captured soldiers and officers. From that day on, it all started. And malnutrition, and bullying, etc. But Nikolai and I held on to each other and it was easier, especially since the officers always got more. The situation was such, not in favor of the Chechens, we were dragged from the basement to the basement until February 6th. The Chechens decided to withdraw the prisoners from the city. At that time, my mother found me, and she was with us (with prisoners). And at night they began to take us all out of Grozny. Again, we were with Kolya together and another 10 privates. Galkin and Zryadny (Zryadny - author's note) were taken from the basement in Grozny by prosecutor Imaev to build fortifications in the mountains. They were not in Shali. We walked all night, half-starved, wounded, beaten, also my mother and 3 women. I kept smearing on one side, Kolya on the other. In general, everyone got to Shaley by all sorts of different ways. There, 3 [three] mothers from us were taken away and placed in the Children's State Security building. They searched, took everything away and placed it in cells. Kolya and I and several other officers (together 6 people) ended up in the officer's cell, where more officers were held captive. It was, in my opinion, on the 7th [February] in the morning, while we were getting used to, getting acquainted with the inhabitants of the cell. Kolya and I thought that it would be better here than in Grozny. Mothers nearby, Cossacks, allowed the exchange, there were no hostilities. At night, when we lay down to sleep on the bunks, cars drove into the fence (2 KamAZ trucks with dead Chechens - as we found out later). There was a noise in the yard, shouts were heard. In general, it was terrible. The door to our cell opened. Chechens were standing in the corridor: commanders and chiefs. Everyone's faces are twisted with anger. They yelled for all the officers who arrived today to go outside. We got up, began to put on shoes and dress and go out into the corridor. Kolya was 4th and I was 5th. He was released, and I and another officer were thrown back into the cell with blows. I cannot say how much time has passed since Kolya was taken out; Beloshitsky (Vladimir Valentinovich, 76th Airborne Division - ed.) and two more majors - 30 sec., 1 min. or 2, but no more than in the yard there was shooting, random, bursts, after [some time] single ones, and then “Allah Akbar” - so the Chechens yelled. Everyone who remained in the cell looked at each other and said: "Let's hope for the best." After there was a night of nightmares, me and the remaining art. l-she was beaten all night, how many times they took me out, I don’t remember. And so it was until Shamsudin found me, he said that he would give me to my mother, which he did on February 13th. I immediately told him about Kolya, he promised to find out. Well, that's all, you can't write much in a letter.

Kolya was taken prisoner unconscious, shell-shocked, somewhere in the vicinity of the railway station, there were no injuries. You can talk and talk, but not in writing, you just can't write everything. If I can help you in any way, that's great. I don’t know what to write next, but I will always remember Kolya, sorry if something is wrong.

It can be assumed for what reason Nikolai Kalambet and other officers were shot on the night of February 7-8. The book by A. V. Antipov “Lev Rokhlin: the life and death of a general” describes an episode of how Russian troops took Minutka Square, and also talks about the death of Shamil Basayev’s Abkhaz battalion under fire from Russian Shilok. It is possible that the bodies of militants who died in the events described in the book were brought to Shali on the KAMAZ vehicles mentioned by Bondarev. It was for Basayev's failures that Kalambet, Beloshitsky and other prisoners of war, who were shot on the night of February 8, 1995, lost their lives.

The crew of the BMP-2 No. 211, commander of the 1st motorized rifle platoon of the 4th company, Lieutenant Vladimir Adodin, was also captured. It was established that at least two servicemen, Andrey Neshin and BMP driver Private Andrey Gogol, were subsequently released. Lieutenant Vladimir Adodin was less fortunate. On January 1, 1995, the militants sent him as a truce to the units besieged at the railway station. It was assumed that Adodin would pass on the proposals of the militants to the Russian units surrounded at the station to leave their positions and return back. In case of refusal to return, the militants promised to shoot his subordinates.

From a letter from Captain Nikolai Podkatilov, deputy commander of the 4th motorized rifle company of the 131st brigade:

“... Many servicemen of the company and many officers saw Volodya, saw him talking with the brigade commander Colonel Savin. There was a fight and no one followed the actions of the other. Where Volodya then disappeared, no one can say, but many assume that he returned back to the militants, to his captured soldiers ...<…>Or rather, he returned, and what happened next: whether he reached his guys or not and what happened to him - no one knows. And the fact that his body was brought in the same car along with the brigade commander does not mean anything. Volodya died in another place, where, unfortunately, we do not know.”

The 2nd assault detachment of the 131st motorized rifle brigade suffered serious losses in Grozny and actually ceased to exist as an independent combat unit. Only a few armored vehicles of the 2nd detachment were able to reach the station square and join the 1st assault detachment. Among them was the T-72 A No. 517 tank.

Denis Shachnev, gunner-operator of the T-72A tank No. 517, private:

“We rushed through the streets of the city in search of our own, but saw only burning, smoking infantry fighting vehicles and soldiers lying nearby. Some fighter tried to stop us. Waving his arms, he ran out into the street, but we did not stop, realizing that they could immediately shoot us from grenade launchers. Knowing what is most weakness in the tank it is the transmission, I recommended to the mechanic that he drive the tank backwards into some house in the private sector, and we were able to orient ourselves a little in the situation. Hiding in this way in some kind of shack, I contacted the platoon commander of Art. Lieutenant A. Sufradze. He answered the call. I explained the situation, said that we were lost in the city, and asked what we should do next. Sufradze tried to clarify where we are. I replied that we could not understand. Then he ordered to act according to the situation. We went outside again. According to TPU (tank intercom. - Approx. Aut.), I shouted to the mechanic, private D. Pozdnyakov: “If you see any military vehicle, stand behind it! She must lead us either to our own, or out of the city!” Before I had time to finish, I saw in the triplex KShM (command and staff vehicle. - Approx. Aut.), rushing down the street. We rushed after her, caught up with her and drove out onto a wide and long avenue. Dima Pozdnyakov settled down behind the "kasheemka", as I advised. Following the avenue, I noticed how an unknown car was moving towards us, and its headlights were burning in broad daylight! I couldn’t make out what kind of car it was, so I started measuring the distance to the probable target with a rangefinder. Distance - 800 meters, the target is approaching! For some reason, it seemed to me that the car with the headlights on was like an SPG (self-propelled artillery mount. Presumably, Private Denis Shachnev saw one of the 1V15 No. 100 or No. 115 artillery fire control vehicles. - Approx. Aut.). Both cars were in my field of vision. Suddenly, the situation escalated: a white cloud of smoke shot up from the bow of the Kasheemka - it immediately went into the ditch, and the stern remained on the road, since the roadbed was slightly higher than the sidewalk. I can’t say who knocked out the Kasheemka and where they fired from - we immediately turned around and walked away from this avenue into the first alley that came across. Where to go is unknown, but it was also impossible to stand!

Departure of BTS-4 to the city

We propose to make a short digression and turn to the story of the head of the armored service of the 131st brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Dmitriev, about the entrance to Grozny of the BTS-4 tractor with a crew of three. Between 13:00 and 14:00, Colonel Nikolai Pikha, who was in touch with the deputy brigade commander for armaments, and Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Dmitriev, head of the armored service, decided to enter Grozny on their own in order to clarify the situation on the spot.

- Piha says: “Let's go to the city, see the situation: what and how ?!” We took the tractor BTS-4. Let's go Piha, Sasha Petrenko. We did not take a soldier-mechanic. Piha said: "Let him stay here!" I went for the levers.

In the area of the state farm "Rodina", near the dam, the crew of the BTS noticed a car that had fallen into a ditch. Apparently, it was a "Ural" of the 81st motorized rifle regiment. Colonel Piha offered to help and hook the car with a cable to pull it out of the ditch. During these actions, the following episode occurred.

Sergey Dmitriev, head of the armored service of the 131st brigade, lieutenant colonel:

- I'm moving by a tractor, I feel that the BTS's feed is starting to hang. I stopped, got out, looked, and under the caterpillars the soldiers were sitting, under the mound, and sleeping! We drove them away, pulled the fallen car out, put it on wheels - it went on by itself.

According to Sergei Dmitriev, the picture after the entry of Russian troops into Grozny remained unattractive: the soldiers sat on the roadsides with a detached look, boxes of ammunition were lying along the road, etc. It was as if there was not an offensive, but, on the contrary, a retreat.

Sergey Dmitriev, head of the armored service of the 131st brigade, lieutenant colonel:

- We went to the airfield "Severny", rounded it and headed to the state farm "Rodina". Then we got to the crossing with two bridges. One bridge was destroyed. There was a tank in front of him. A soldier was sitting next to the tank, holding his head ... And one car was on fire - the artillery control point ...

Senior warrant officer Anatoly Zhornik, who had just left Grozny BREM-1 No. 504, was also here. Thick black smoke billowed from the wrecked car. Zhornik said that Major Gogolev was wounded, and it was not worth going into the city without support. Nevertheless, at about 3 pm, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Pikha led the BTS to Grozny.

Sergey Dmitriev, head of the armored service of the 131st brigade, lieutenant colonel:

- We went out to Bohdan Khmelnitsky Street, and here I noticed how a Mercedes stopped at one intersection, a Chechen came out of it and looked at us. We passed by. High-rise buildings appeared ahead. At the crossroads of Chukotskaya and Bohdan Khmelnitsky streets, I turned left, towards the 15th school - to the cannery. And in the area of the 15th school, we were already being shelled. Then Piha decided to return ...

Between 18:00 and 19:00, the BTS safely returned to the area of the Grozny-Severny airport, without any loss in the crew.

Attempt to capture the Belikovsky bridge

When the entire 1st assault detachment (with the exception of the 1st motorized rifle company) with the attached 3rd tank company and vehicles of the anti-aircraft division concentrated on the forecourt, the brigade commander gathered officers and set the task for the commanders of the 1st and 2nd companies to go to the area bridge on Subbotnikov street. To organize the defense of the station, Colonel Savin left the 3rd motorized rifle company, the brigade headquarters, tanks and Tunguskas of the detachment.

Two motorized rifle companies departed to complete the task. Ahead was the T-72A tank No. 539, followed by all five infantry fighting vehicles of the 1st company of Captain Pashchenko: No. 110, 112,113,114 and 311 (attached from the 3rd battalion) from the tail of the battalion column to Komsomolskaya Street. In the closure were 6 cars of the 2nd company of Captain Nikolaev: No. 120,121,123, 124, 125, 126. The column moved along Tabachny Street, along the private sector, past the post office building. Thus, brigade commander Savin carried out the tasks assigned by the command within the framework of the general strategic plan of Colonel-General Anatoly Kvashnin - to reach the bridge over the Sunzha and connect with the forces of the 129th SME, which, in turn, had the task of reaching the indicated bridge from the opposite side.

Valery Nikolaev, commander of the 2nd motorized rifle company, captain:

- For each company of the battalion, Colonel Ivan Savin determined a part of the street where, according to the “herringbone” principle, motorized rifle squads were to gain a foothold. To the right and left of the vehicles, the infantry was to occupy buildings and organize defenses.

Colonel Savin did not plan to concentrate the equipment of the 1st assault detachment on the forecourt. The task he received from his superiors was as follows: "... advance to Grozny on Mayakovsky Street, occupy the railway station, organize defenses from Subbotnikov Street to Popovich and wait for the approach of other troops."

The companies advanced to the Belikovsky bridge, observing precautionary measures. The infantry dismounted and walked alongside the armored vehicles.

Yevgeny Pashchenko, commander of the 1st motorized rifle company, captain:

- Let's go, let's go ... I stop the company, I ask Nikolaev via communication: "Valera, do you fit on the street?" He replies, "No!" Let's go further! I arrange the equipment: a car here, a car there ... We are moving forward. Ahead of me is Morozov on a tank, the company is trailing behind him! Again I ask Valera: “Do we fit?” He: "No!" Everything repeats again...

Valery Nikolaev, commander of the 2nd motorized rifle company, captain:

- When the first company practically disappeared behind the intersection, I moved forward along the same street.

Unexpectedly, intense radio communication between the unit commanders was interrupted - noise and crackling were heard in the headphones. The enemy used means of electronic frequency suppression. Switching to a spare frequency saved the situation only for a few minutes - Dudayev's team found it on the air and jammed it again. On December 31, there was no stable connection between the companies of the brigade, according to Captain Nikolaev.

The enemy broke communications in two ways: firstly, by acting directly through electronic warfare (EW) means and, secondly, by wedging into the negotiations of the assault squads. In Reskom, for this purpose, a special room was equipped for radio operators and electronic warfare. It should be noted that the electronic warfare service of the militants was headed by Colonel Taymaskhanov, who at one time served in Soviet army and with considerable experience.

Andrey Cherny, commander of the 3rd tank company, captain:

- At first I thought that the problem was with the headset. I started to bypass my tanks - they have the same thing: noise, and that's it ...

Roman Kuznetsov, head of intelligence of the 131st brigade, major:

We were all on the same radio network! There was a powerful electronic warfare! They weren't allowed to talk at all! At the very beginning, let’s say, it didn’t manifest itself that way, and then it was simply impossible to talk!

While the 1st motorized rifle company turned onto Subbotnikov Street, the trailing vehicles of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Company were still on Tabachny Street. The lead tank T-72A No. 539 approached the intersection of Krasnaya and Subbotnikov streets, behind which one could see the bridge over the Sunzha, and stopped. The tank commander, senior lieutenant Yuri Morozov, not knowing the carrying capacity of the bridge, did not dare to go to it.

Yuri Morozov, commander of a tank platoon, senior lieutenant:

- I understood from the tops of the trees, which seemed to stick out from under the bridge, that there was a high cliff, and if the bridge could not withstand the weight of the tank, then I would have to fly down for a long time!

The embankment of the river was reinforced with a concrete parapet. Senior Lieutenant Morozov asked for help from the infantry, trying to convince the motorized riflemen to take the crossroads and the bridge under the cover of his tank. While the column stood motionless on Subbotnikov Street, the Dudayevites pulled several of their combat detachments into the area of the upcoming battle. One of these detachments, led by Musost Khutiev, included 16 people and was located on the eastern bank of the Sunzha River, on Subbotnikov Street. When the group commander learned about the approach of Russian armored vehicles, his detachment, armed with 11 machine guns and 1 grenade launcher, took up observation positions in one of the Grozny basements. As soon as the equipment of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade was in the area of the bridge and observers noticed it, the militants left the shelter and entered the battle.

Galina Tretyakova, who worked in the building of the Grozny branch of the railway, was an involuntary witness to this battle: “After an hour or two, screams and noise were heard from the street. I saw people running under the windows in civilian clothes. Bending down, they moved, firing their machine guns as they went, out of breath and looking back. I remember their completely unshaven faces and hoarse, broken voices, shouting "Allah Akbar!" The news quickly spread: tanks appeared in the direction of the bridge across the river. Sunzha, that is, 20 steps from the railway department. The seriousness of the situation was already evident. Through a short time all of us, employees, received the first "baptism" with a powerful explosion that sounded somewhere far away from us. It was so strong that the building shook. Some got sick. Before they had time to come to their senses, the shell hit a pole with wires on the street, just three meters from the building. In the blink of an eye, the windows were freed from glass, and instead of the usual table - a stub.

Yevgeny Pashchenko, commander of the 1st motorized rifle company, captain:

“Someone said to me: “I think they started shooting at us?!” I turn my head: in front of my eyes a soldier - once, and fell! Aminov ... He was good ... A bullet hit him right in the chin! I turn my head in the other direction: my BMP 112 is on fire!

About the death of the driver of the BMP-2 No. 113, private Magomed Aminov, his friend, the driver of the BMP-2 No. 311, Private Ramazan Islimkhanov, told.

From a letter from Private Islimkhanov to the father of the deceased Private Magomed Aminov:

“... His car was not far from mine, about 25–20 meters away ... in another alley. Suddenly, a grenade launcher was fired at his car [at] the tower. He walked to the car, because he was standing at the fence, behind the machine gun. At the time when I got out of the tower from my car, I saw that someone 3–4 meters had fallen near the car, I ran up at full speed. It turned out to be Maga. A 7.62 bullet hit him in the chin.<…>... At the time when I ran up, he had convulsions. I quickly felt for a pulse, took out an anesthetic tube [promedol] and injected it into his leg, [and] into his shoulder blade, but it didn’t help. There was no time to cry, he could not say anything, and the pulse disappeared. A heavy shelling began from the side of the militants. Me and the Armenian Ara from my car (this was Private Zaven Oganesyan, who, according to Private Nikolai Ryabtsev, had his leg blown off at the station square. - Note by the author), they quickly took him and carried him to car No. station, on the move, put [-or] him into the landing ... ".

The soldiers, who, according to Captain Yuri Chmyrev, perceived everything as a kind of game, only now came to their senses and realized the full horror of what was happening.

Yuri Chmyryov, deputy commander of the 1st motorized rifle battalion for educational work, captain:

“We were lost - officers, professionals, served for how long, after all, time! And for the fighters it was very difficult. Here, the first minutes of the battle, when Ignatov's head was torn off, they all sat down in general - no one could even move. From the horror of blood, from everything. We are also the same: even many of the guys with whom I talked: “For us,” they say, “comrade captain ... it was like in a movie!” That is, they did not perceive that this was a reality ... Even when people fell, soldiers, when they killed someone - for them it was really like computer game! Then the horror came - the horror and the heaviness of it all. And he pressed his head. Immediately some kind of ... I remember myself - well, as if it were not me!<…>As if, like, I - like, and not me?!”.

Mikhail Ibragimov, commander of the grenade launcher section of the 2nd motorized rifle company, junior sergeant:

- When they carried the first dead, that's when everyone realized that in fact it was a war ...

Captain Evgeny Pashchenko recalls how the commander of the 2nd platoon, Vadim Bykov, sitting on the march on the BMP-2 No. 114, only by a lucky chance did not become a victim of a sniper. The bullet cut off the antenna, which fell on Bykov's headset.

As soon as the first losses appeared, the infantry, according to senior lieutenant Morozov, fell into a stupor.

Yuri Morozov, commander of a tank platoon, senior lieutenant:

- ... And this infantry from the BMP dismounted and sits along the street! I climb out of the hatch, shouting: “Take the crossroads for me! I’ll go out to him now and kill all the militants there!” And they sit, shaking their heads: “Hey! Will not go!" I had to maneuver to avoid hits from RPGs - grenade launchers hit almost point-blank! I drive back and forth - I see the militants behind the houses of the private sector are accumulating. I'm giving back. They jump out to shoot - I'm no longer in the old place. I’m on my tank left and right, spinning back and forth - there was nowhere to maneuver ...

One grenade intended for the tank hit BMP-2 No. 112 and the vehicle burst into flames. The driver Deryatko jumped out of the BMP, but immediately tried to climb back into the car.

Yevgeny Pashchenko, commander of the 1st motorized rifle company, captain:

- I shout to him: “What are you rushing about for?” He says: “I have a machine gun there!” Me: “What, nah ... machine gun ?! Now the car will explode - run away!

Due to the fact that the motorized riflemen did not occupy the houses of the private sector on Subbotnikov Street, but only settled along it, the enemy had the opportunity to covertly maneuver and approach through the yards almost close to the armored vehicles. Hiding behind the buildings, the grenade launchers chose the moment, ran out from around the corner, fired a shot and again disappeared around the corner of the house. Senior Lieutenant Morozov did not dare to take the tank to the crossroads without the support of the infantry and risk the vehicle and crew - the motorized riflemen only held their previously occupied positions and covered their infantry fighting vehicles. The tank was running out of ammunition. There was nothing left but to hit the corner of the house without going to the crossroads. A tank projectile is cocked after flying approximately 25–30 meters. Houses of the private sector were located only 10–15 meters away!

Yuri Morozov, commander of a tank platoon, senior lieutenant:

- I can’t deploy the tower - on the one hand, the lamppost interferes, on the other - the tree is standing! The tank will twitch forward a little, I will deploy the tower - the buildings are closing the firing sector! I had to hit the corner of the house - I beat off half a corner along with those who were sitting there! Only the legs flew ...

The Dudaevites could not get the tank out of the grenade launchers, despite the fact that they hit from 20-30 meters. Only the 7th RPG shot hit the car. The grenade launcher came in from the flank through the courtyard of the house opposite which the tank was standing, and fired a shot from the second floor of the building over a brick fence.

Yuri Morozov, commander of a tank platoon, senior lieutenant:

- I was hit on the left side, just down under the "gunner", where I was sitting. It’s good that I didn’t have anything in my ammo rack! I mean, the ammunition rack remained - three high-explosive fragmentation shells - they stood on the supply line. Where the grenade hit, there were no more shells. Well, of course, all the power cables were interrupted, the tank stalled and began to burn! I received a concussion.

The cumulative jet, breaking through the left side, passed next to the workplace of the gunner-operator. The hatches in the turret were not battened down with the expectation that excess pressure, in the event of its occurrence, knocked them out and went outside, and did not smear the crew on the walls (in fact, there is no excess pressure inside the armored vehicles when hit by a cumulative ammunition - the crew gets injured as a result of this the so-called "leakage" of the blast wave from the explosion of ammunition into the hull through open hatches, or during the explosion of fuel and ammunition inside the vehicle, caused by a direct hit by a cumulative jet For more information, see: Robert Lynn Asprin. "Another great MYTH" http://otvaga2004.narod.ru/publ_w5/012_myth.htm.
- Approx. auth.). The hatch covers, in themselves quite heavy, simply rested on torsion bars, protecting the crew from bullets and shrapnel. Thanks to this, the rest of the crew did not even get shell shock! Coming to his senses, senior lieutenant Morozov gave the order to leave the car. His subordinates already knew what to do and how to act.

Yuri Morozov, commander of a tank platoon, senior lieutenant:

- It was scary, because I assumed that a normal militant, when knocking out a tank, was watching the crew! The crew climbed - you can immediately put it all on the tower!

The T-72A tanks have a hatch in the bottom of the hull for the safe escape of a damaged vehicle. However, in order to open it, you need to turn the tower to a certain position. In this case, it was difficult to do this, because after the shaped charge hit in the tank, all the electrical equipment failed. Another design flaw with the T-72 is the lowering of the gun barrel when the gun's stabilizer stops working. If the barrel falls on the driver's hatch, he will no longer be able to get out on his own. The mechanic of the 539th tank, Private Roman Mereshkin, was lucky - the turret was turned away from the course of the tank.

Of all the crew members, only Senior Lieutenant Yuri Morozov had a machine gun. He covered the departure of the crew. Dudaevites began to pursue the retreating. Covering the retreat of his comrades, Yuri Morozov was wounded in his right hand.

Yuri Morozov, commander of a tank platoon, senior lieutenant:

- When I fired back, I took cover behind a concrete base. I got up and fired at the enemy. And behind me is a brick steppe: either a house, or a fence ?! When the militants started shooting back, they didn’t hit me, but they “loaded” into this wall! And from the wall, a bullet ricocheted into my arm. It's like she's been drained! I can't shoot. The fighters removed the machine gun from me - let's shoot back instead of me ...

Captain Pashchenko also ordered his subordinates to withdraw. The remaining four infantry fighting vehicles of the 1st company - No. 110, 114, 311 and the damaged No. 113 - turned around and began to withdraw from the battle.

Valery Nikolaev, commander of the 2nd motorized rifle company, captain:

- I see: several infantry fighting vehicles of the first company slipped past me in the opposite direction, to the railway station. In the end, my car (BMP-2 No. 120. - Author's note) in the general column turned out to be the closest to the enemy. That is, there was no one left in front of me - all the “armor” went to the square.

The 2nd motorized rifle company, located on Tabachny Street, hesitated to withdraw, without having an order to do so. Some time later, the order was received.

Valery Nikolaev, commander of the 2nd motorized rifle company, captain:

- A messenger from the battalion commander came running, gave me an order to concentrate the cars of the 2nd company on the square in front of the station, leaving two infantry fighting vehicles to cover Tabachny Street ...

The task of covering Tabachny Street was assigned to the crews of BMP-2 No. 120 and 121. The vehicles completely occupied the width of the road and could shoot through the entire street with longitudinal fire. Two platoons of the 2nd company entrenched themselves in the building of the railway post office. Until January 1, 1995, the right flank of the brigade was covered.

Occupation of the railway station

While the 1st and 2nd companies were fighting on Subbotnikov Street, the forces of the 1st assault detachment of the brigade that remained in the station area began to organize defense. The equipment was concentrated on the forecourt and along the perimeter of the building, the station: some of the vehicles were placed in one line, the other part covered the rear of the defenders. The Tunguskas were placed in such a way that they could cover the large windows and doors of the station. By evening, the entire space of the station square was filled with armored vehicles of the 1st assault detachment and the vehicles of the 2nd detachment that had joined.

Structurally, the defense of the station looked like this: the personnel of the 1st motorized rifle company and the brigade management occupied the ticket office in the center of the station, two platoons of the 2nd motorized rifle company were located in the building of the railway post office on the right flank (two BMPs were shooting through Tabachny Street, the rest retreated to the square ), the forces of the 3rd company were also located on the right flank between the station and the post office and covered the direction from the railway depot. A group of soldiers led by Captain Yuri Chmyrev occupied a house in the private sector at the very beginning of Komsomolskaya Street. Thus, all-round defense was provided!

The station was occupied, but it was tactically unprofitable to hold it - an old building, with large windows and doorways actually located in a semicircle of high-rise buildings. The enemy had the opportunity to fire at the defenders according to the principle "from the circle to the center." The situation was saved only by massive brick walls station, well protected from fragments and small arms. They even withstood a shot from an RPG with TNT bombs attached to it!

A room with no windows was chosen as a temporary medical station at the station. The 1st assault detachment included not only company medical instructors, but also doctors from a separate medical company of the 131st brigade. The senior physician in the detachment was the brigade doctor, Captain Nikolai Tupikov. The doctor of the tank battalion, Yuri Demin, helped him. The first wounded and killed were at first in the same room. However, then, in order not to psychologically injure the wounded, the dead began to be taken out into the street and piled along the wall of the station. Over time, the enemy's fire became very dense and it was not possible to take out the bodies without endangering the living.

Fighting in the area of the railway station began gradually.

Yuri Klaptsov, head of the operations department of the 131st brigade, lieutenant colonel:

- When we arrived at the station, I went to Captain Tupikov for dressing. He walked across the square without hiding. I go to the station, Tupikov says to me: “Yuri Vladimirovich, please wait, I have a boy here now who was wounded in the stomach, I will deal with him, and then I will bandage you!” When I returned back to our armored personnel carrier, on the left edge of the station, from that moment - at about 15 or 16 hours - the fighting. An active battle flared up with the onset of darkness, probably from 17, 18 hours ...

First of all, the Dudaevites tried to deprive the brigade of control, destroying the command of the brigade. One of these episodes was described by Lieutenant Colonel Klaptsov.

Yuri Klaptsov, head of the operations department of the 131st brigade, lieutenant colonel:

- ... Some man came up and really wanted to talk to the brigade commander. In fact, he approached our armored personnel carrier "03rd". The brigade commander asks me: “Yura, go and deal with him, what does he want ?!” At first, I did not understand his intention. Only then I guessed - and on time! The man says: "Let's go, let's go separately, I want to talk to you!" He tried to lure me in this way to a flat area. I succumbed to his persuasion, but then it flashed through my head that this could end badly. I stood up so that they [the man] could cover themselves from the side of the five-story building opposite the station. And when I understood his intentions, he jumped two or three jumps behind the armored personnel carrier, and at that time they began to shoot from the windows of the third or fourth floors at the armored personnel carrier, at us. I managed to hide. The Chechens did not know that this was the head of the operational department, and not the brigade commander, he left!

The second important task of the enemy was to disable communications machines. At about 2 pm, the command and staff BTR-60PU No. 003 received the first hit from a grenade launcher on the left engine, however, despite this, none of the eight crew members was injured.

Vadim Shibkov, head of the communications center of the radio engineering brigade, senior warrant officer:

- I say to the brigade commander over the link: “Burn!” They were still in the BTEer, inside. The boy jumped out, their mechanic (Private D.E. Petrichenko. - Approx. Aut.), in my opinion, with a fire extinguisher. Turned off the engine.

Yuri Klaptsov, head of the operations department of the 131st brigade, lieutenant colonel:

- The engine was extinguished, the means of communication were taken out and they worked on the means of communication near the BTEER.

The commander of the communications platoon, Senior Lieutenant Alexei Kirilin, who was a member of the crew of the BTR-60PU No. 003, in a letter to the mother of the deceased private Dmitry Petrichenko, noted: “We were fired from machine guns and machine guns, the brigade commander and one officer were wounded.”

This is not contradicted by the testimony of lieutenant colonel Klaptsov, who said that a Chechen submachine gunner fired from a 5-storey building opposite the station and shot the brigade commander in the foot. Savin was bandaged and put on a tourniquet. He could barely walk on his own. After that, mattresses and radio stations were taken out of the armored personnel carrier and carried out control, hiding behind the body of the vehicle. Suddenly, on the left, from the side of the unfinished hotel, a machine gunner opened fire on the armored personnel carrier of the brigade commander.

Vadim Shibkov, head of the communications center of the radio engineering brigade, senior warrant officer:

- ... And they began to “land” (shoot. - Approx. Aut.) on them from the construction site! Most likely, from a machine gun, because the queue was very long! And the ricochet went in all directions. I covered them with my armor...

The air controllers placed their armored personnel carrier perpendicular to the brigade commander's car in order to cover it with armor. The driver of the armored personnel carrier, junior sergeant Leonid Vorobyov, firing from a machine gun through the loopholes of the car, successfully destroyed the militant, who fell out of the window opening on the second floor of an unfinished building and fell down.

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

14.11 - the brigade commander reports that 1 more person was wounded.

By 3 p.m., the tanks of the 1st tank company, escorting the column of the 2nd assault detachment of the 131st brigade, entered the station square.

Valery Eliseev, and. about. T-72A tank driver No. 510, senior lieutenant:

- We arrived at the station, stood on the square ...

Denis Shachnev, gunner-operator of the T-72 A tank No. 517, private:

“I can’t say how, but we went to the station square. There was a large accumulation of military equipment here: the vehicles were close to each other! Our tank stopped at the very beginning of Komsomolskaya Street opposite the end of a five-story building (opposite the railway station building. - Approx. Aut.). After examining the station square, and realizing that ahead of my own, I turned the tower from the station in the opposite direction. And then I noticed a group of unknown armed people, not like soldiers, moving along the street in the opposite direction from us. Following them, I fired a shot from a tank gun.

Several combat vehicles of the 2nd assault detachment, which managed to avoid destruction on the streets of Grozny, went to the freight station, organizing defense there: “In the current situation, Major A. Chernutsky managed to bring a column of eight infantry fighting vehicles out of the ashes into a nearby lane. But there is also an ambush. As a result, only five combat vehicles managed to break into the goods yard. railway station…»

The brigade commander, Colonel Ivan Savin, tasked the acting commander of the 1st tank company, Captain Yuri Shchepin, with his tanks to fill up the concrete fence enclosing the construction site near the station so that the militants could not secretly concentrate on the left flank of the brigade. His T-72A No. 510 and Senior Lieutenant Alexander Sufradze's tank No. 512 were sent to carry out the order.

When the task was completed, T-72A No. 510 settled down right on the square, since there was no free space at the station. It was at this time that the enemy stepped up the fire. The gunner-operator of the T-72A No. 510, Private Vyacheslav Kuznetsov, had problems with the warhead - the tank's gun landed on the driver's hatch. Despite all efforts, Private Vyacheslav Kuznetsov could not correct the situation. Then captain Yuri Shchepin decided to change places with him. Reseeding in the place of the gunner, Shchepin did not close the hatch, leaving it in an upright position. He had already fixed the malfunction, but an RPG grenade hit the hatch cover. Shrapnel penetrated the tower, Captain Yuri Shchepin was fatally wounded in the head and chest.

- The headset is broken. Cotton wool, blood ... And the head is all broken ...

Senior Lieutenant Eliseev and Private Kuznetsov tried to pull Captain Shchepin, who was still alive, out of the tank. Lieutenant Sufradze, captains Vorobyov and Cherny arrived in time to help, covering the evacuation of a wounded comrade with fire.

Valery Eliseev, and. about. tank driver T-72 A No. 510, senior lieutenant:

- Sufradze and I pulled him out with belts. Shchepin was still breathing, but we decided that he had already died, and reported his death by radio ...

The wounded man was taken to the medical center at the railway station, where he died on the morning of January 1 without regaining consciousness.

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

15.20 - BMP-2 burned down from a hit from a grenade launcher, a reconnaissance company delivered the wounded to the medical unit.

15.22 - foreman Kudryavtsev was wounded in the leg and sent to the infirmary.

At about 4 p.m. BTR-60PU No. 003 was again hit by a grenade launcher, causing the car to catch fire, and Colonel Ivan Savin received a second wound in the leg.

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

15.56 - the brigade commander was wounded in both legs, the armored personnel carrier was on fire.

A witness to this, captain Yuri Chmyrev, described this episode as follows: “He (Savin. - Approx. Aut.) Was wounded almost from the very beginning of the battle. How did it happen? .. Our first losses began: one soldier [from] the second assault detachment died, who made their way ... [to us] on a tank, and wounded a soldier. I asked what names ... well, the dead and wounded, and ran to the brigade commander to report so that ... And, when I approached him, there was a mine explosion (cumulative grenade. - Approx. Aut.). Perhaps from a mortar. The brigade commander grabbed his leg: "Pull off my boots," he shouted. The political officer (lieutenant colonel V. I. Konopatsky. - Approx. Aut.) took off his boot ... And I saw, it means that a fragment was sticking out in his leg. Somewhere centimeters ... probably ... two or two and a half. He ordered me ... he says: “Come on, drag him, drag him!” “Drag,” he says, “bitch, drag quickly!” Well, I grabbed the fragment with my hands - it was still hot - I burned my hand. Then he picked up some nonsense, wrapped the fragment around and pulled it out. And how the blood gushed! ..».

Colonel Savin was evacuated to the station building, where staff officers made improvised crutches for him from curved chair legs and other scrap materials.

When hit in an armored personnel carrier, Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Klaptsov received a concussion. At that moment, he and the head of artillery of the 131st brigade, Colonel Yevgeny Sashchenko, were firing from an armored personnel carrier. The cumulative jet, breaking through the side of the car, hit the engine.

Yuri Klaptsov, head of the operations department of the 131st brigade, lieutenant colonel:

- I remember only a bright flash and that's it - I don't remember anything else! Lost consciousness. I woke up when they had already taken me out of the armored personnel carrier and dragged me to the station building.

Judging by the data of radio intercepts, the enemy intensified the fire impact on the subunits occupying the defense at the railway station, precisely after 16 hours.

From the journal of combat operations of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade:

16.13 - in the 3rd measure, 2 BMP-2 vehicles were hit.

16.20 - in the 1st measure, 1 tank and 1 BMP-2 vehicle were hit.

At five o'clock, the 1st company and the "horseless" crew of the T-72A tank No. 539 returned to the station. The wounded senior lieutenant Yuri Morozov went to the chief medical officer, captain Nikolai Tulikov, for dressing. By this time, many wounded had already accumulated at the station. They decided to take them out of the city before dark. However, as soon as the BMP, on which the wounded and the bodies of the dead were placed, passed the station square and left for Ordzhonikidze Avenue, when, according to the testimony of Senior Lieutenant Morozov, it was hit from a grenade launcher right there.

Yuri Morozov, commander of a tank platoon, senior lieutenant:

- They turned around and retreated, and the BMP was already on fire! We were unable to extinguish it. The soldiers just hid. And the car exploded already near the station! I remember that the tower flew higher than the building! I don’t know where the armor plate fell, and the ATGM launcher crashed next to the tank, behind which Kolya Tupikov was bandaging me at that moment.

As soon as the officers managed to take cover under the frontal sheet of the tank, a massive ATGM tube and other parts of the wrecked vehicle fell nearby. During the explosion of the BMP, the commander of the 1st battalion, Major Sergei Khmelevsky, was injured - his face was seriously cut and several teeth were knocked out.

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

15.30 (probably 16.30. - Approx. Aut.) - They took up defensive positions - the 1st Motorized Rifle Corps around the station, the 2nd Motorized Infantry Battalion in the goods yard under heavy enemy fire, it was impossible to raise your head, there was no connection with the rest.

Having shown ingenuity, the brigade servicemen used about 40 bags of flour from the railway station restaurant. They began to lay huge windows in order to somehow protect themselves from bullets and shrapnel flying into the building.

17.55 - "Sultan" [Burlakov] beginning. Headquarters of the SME - I am under fire near the station building (the building with the inscription "Vulcanization". - Approx. Aut.), 1 infantry fighting vehicle was hit, they hit from grenade launchers, small arms from all buildings adjacent to the station.

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

18.30 - the order came: do not open fire with artillery.

From the Journal of Combat Actions of the 81st Guards. SME:

18.40 - "Sultan" [NSh regiment] - three tanks were knocked out, the crew was evacuated.

At about 7 p.m., the commander of the 3rd motorized rifle company, Captain Rustem Klupov, was ordered to lead the 1st battalion.

From the award sheet of Rustem Maksovich Klupov, commander of the 3rd measures of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, major:

“Major (at that time - captain. - Approx. Aut.) KLUPOV R. M. was appointed by order of the brigade commander as commander of the 1st motorized rifle battalion instead of the commander of this battalion who was wounded (Major Sergey Khmelevsky. - Approx. Aut.)".

From the recordings of the radio communications of the assault squads:

18.40–24.00 - the enemy fires heavily from the building opposite the station, the equipment is shot from grenade launchers point-blank, l / s in the station building, holds the defense ...

From the Journal of Combat Actions of the 81st Guards. SME:

19.20 - “Sultan” [reports] - Lt. Ivanov was killed - 2 grv (2nd grenade launcher platoon. - Author's note), 1 [one] BMP was knocked out, "Katok" (8 TR) is fighting.

20.15 - "Sultan" - squeezed from two sides, from the front with grenade launchers, on the right more from small arms, there are those killed.

22.00 - artillery fires.

22.45–24.00 - the regimental frequency is clogged with the Grozny, Tigr, Free Wolf radio stations.

Despite all the measures taken by the motorized riflemen, the enemy's return fire increased. By midnight, all the platoons of the 2nd motorized rifle company of the 131st brigade were wounded.

Valery Nikolaev, commander of the 2nd motorized rifle company, captain:

“... The commander of platoon number two and the commander of platoon number three were wounded. In fact, I was left with one officer for 45 soldiers ... "

Captain Nikolaev personally had to bypass the defense area occupied by the company. Having given orders to the gunner-operator of the BMP-2 No. 120, at about 11 p.m. he went to the neighboring post office building. BMP-2 No. 120 and 121, which covered Tabachny Street, held back the enemy almost all night. The gunner-operator at intervals fired several machine gun bursts along the street to indicate that the street was under fire and the enemy should not approach the location of the company. However, this did not stop the militants. While in the post office building, Captain Nikolaev witnessed how one of the infantry fighting vehicles, which was standing on the station square, was knocked out.

Valery Nikolaev, commander of the 2nd motorized rifle company, captain:

- The grenade launcher came out from behind the corner of the private sector house and fired. He fired three grenades! Of these, one passed under the car, the second flew over the tower, and only the third hit the BMP, right on the lower inclined sheet.

As a result of the hit, the oil pipeline was damaged near the BMP, but the driver still managed to start the car and drive it closer to the station.

Lieutenant Colonel Zryadny received a serious concussion.

Vladimir Zryadniy, head of the planning group of the combat training department of the 67th Army Corps, lieutenant colonel:

“In the 23rd joint-stock company, somewhere at that time, we were sitting near his (brigade commander. - Approx. Aut.) command and staff vehicle - the Chaika armored personnel carrier - it means that he fell, he says:“ Well, the New Year is not yet I had to meet! “…On the other side of the armored personnel carrier, it means that it exploded… a grenade exploded, as a result of which I received a severe concussion. Completely deaf in the left ear.<…>Five minutes later, another shot was fired, as a result of which I received a concussion on the right side ... [I] began to see and hear worse on the right side. Already in this state, they took me to the station building, put me in a more ... safe place, where I sat until the morning.

Behind the preoccupation and feigned efficiency they hid their own horror. They even tried to joke. After all, the New Year has arrived! After another hour or two, the second large wave of refugees reached the shelter. The second stream of people was already from Art. Khankala. They all ran along the railroad track under flares and continuous shelling. There were both with babies in their arms, and also half-dressed - in tanks and without. Sheltered them too. In the large rooms of the shelter, on shields, covered with old coats, bedspreads and everything that could fit for these purposes, they placed half to death frightened, shaking people. No one spoke of the feeling that one could finally look around oneself and take a breather. I was in the corridor with my employees when I saw a group of people in camouflage at the entrance to the basement. They came closer, looked closely: Chechens, hung with weapons, in their hands - shells for anti-tank grenade launchers. We died… They were militants. My mouth felt dry... The local women came to the rescue, asking to come to our shelter in the evening. They explained in Chechen that there were no men in the shelter at all, only women and children. “To dry off,” the head of the group, apparently, briefly expressed his wish. Their shoes and knee-length clothes were completely wet. They brought an electric stove, but from the generator it warmed weakly. We, as if rooted to the spot, continued to stand. The fighters took off their shoes. And then one of them looked at us. His blazing, angry look brought us to our senses. It got terrible. For the first time I saw so closely those who are fighting Russian soldiers, those who utter the word "federal" with hatred. Barely taking our feet off the floor, we turned and walked. It seemed like another moment and - no basement, no us ... Just one shell, and it will be over, because they have so many weapons!

"I would have solved everything there within two hours with one parachute regiment."
Former Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev on how Grozny should have been taken

The assault on Grozny is a painful scar on the history of Russia. An event that cannot be forgotten and that one does not want to talk about. This is a shame in front of those who died in hell, while the whole country was having fun, celebrating the New Year. The storming of Grozny is indignation towards politicians and military leaders who left unprepared young guys to their deaths. The storming of Grozny is the history of Russia, which should be remembered in order to never again make such monstrous and criminal mistakes.

Relations between Chechnya and the rest of Russia have historically been difficult. In the 20th century, fuel was added to the already flammable situation by Stalin, who deported the Chechen people to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Later, the Chechens were allowed to return to their homeland, but the sediment remained. When the USSR began to fall apart, Chechnya tried to secede, but Moscow did not give Chechnya such a right. No one in the world has recognized Chechnya as an independent state. However, in fact, since 1992, Chechnya has been dependent on Moscow only formally. Government in Chechnya it was also formal. The country was ruled by bandit clans that did business in hostage-taking, drug trafficking, slave trade, oil theft. Ethnic cleansing took place on the territory of Chechnya with the killing of non-Chechens. Back in 1991, all military units were looted, and the weapons were distributed among the bandits.

Photo: RIA Novosti

Relations between Chechnya and Moscow until 1994 were complex, but mutually beneficial. But by the end of the year, something went wrong, and on November 30, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "On measures to restore constitutionality and law and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic". In early December, Russian air strikes destroyed all aircraft at Chechen airfields. On December 11, 1994, the first ground groups entered the territory of Chechnya. The main goal was the capture of Grozny, where the main forces of the separatists were located.

“According to estimates, in order to successfully storm Grozny, there should have been at least 60,000 military men. Some commanders understood this and tried to prevent the assault. Alexei Kirilin, platoon commander of the communications battalion of the 131st brigade, recalls: “Kulikovskiy built our platoon and reported that will ask the Minister of Defense for at least a month to prepare an assault. "What Grachev said is unknown. But the very next morning Kulikovsky gave the order to move towards the city."
The decision to storm Grozny was made on December 26, 1994 at the Security Council of the Russian Federation. It was assumed that 4 groupings of federal troops would enter the city from four directions: "North" (under the command of Major General K. Pulikovsky), "North-East" (under the command of Lieutenant General L. Rokhlin), "West" (under the command of Major General V. Petruk), "Vostok" (under the command of Major General N. Staskov). It was planned to enter the city and capture the Presidential Palace, the railway station, government buildings and other important objects in the city center. It was assumed that due to the suddenness of the assault, Dudayev's group in the city center would be surrounded and neutralized. Minimal combat clashes and casualties were expected.
The grouping of federal troops included more than 15,000 soldiers, about 200 tanks, more than 500 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, about 200 guns and mortars. There were 3,500 soldiers and 50 tanks in reserve.
Up to 10,000 militants opposed the federal troops. The Chechens and mercenaries were armed with tanks, artillery, anti-tank systems, and anti-aircraft missiles. But, despite the presence of fairly serious weapons, the main advantage of the militants was their excellent knowledge of the city and high mobility. There were well-trained grenade launchers and snipers.
"My company was the first to leave the battalion. Four !!! reserved seats were assigned to the company, in the amount of 32 people. They loaded 20 PKT, NSVT machine guns, small arms, boxes of small arms ammunition (23,000 rounds of ammunition, 100 F-1 grenades, 10 AKSU-74, a box with pistols, flares, smoke). We were exhausted to the limit, so when a command was received from the commander of the 1st MSB (to whom we were attached), the Perepelkin p / p-ka to allocate personnel for loading shields from the tent of the command post 90 TD fighters did not wake up, the officers of my company, led by me, loaded them in. On the morning of December 15, the train set off to restore the constitutional order to Chechnya.
Most of all, I was depressed by the poor training of personnel, but in the infantry it was even worse, the infantry fighting vehicles were equipped only with crews, but how to fight in a city without infantry? There were many questions: including the absence of explosive plates in the KDZ boxes (dynamic protection boxes). There were also such bosses who answered me why you need plates in the KDZ, on a tank and so armor 45 tons (criminal negligence or Russian maybe). The explosive plates were brought in late at night, before the march on Grozny, but we never received them.
During refueling, a lieutenant colonel of the reserve approached us (he was leaving Grozny) and told us that a T-80 tank with ammunition had burned down 15 km from us. If I'm not mistaken tank "Leningradsky". The reason, according to him, is that the fire occurred due to the removed ceramic filter from the tank's heating system."
Memoirs of Igor Vechkanov "New Year's Carousel" (Storm of Grozny)

Why exactly the date of December 31 was chosen for the assault, there is no official explanation. Apparently, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev wanted to make, on the one hand, an unpleasant New Year's surprise for the Chechens, and on the other, a birthday present (January 1) to himself.
"The task was set - by the holiday, by the New Year, to capture and solve the problem with the Chechen Republic. That is, to capture the Presidential Palace. Flags were issued and on December 31 the commanders were taken to their combat positions. Grachev promised - which of the generals would be the first to hoist the flag over the Presidential Palace, will receive the title of "Hero of Russia". This encouraged the commanders, but divided the team spirit - everyone dreamed of the title. Now Grachev had no doubts about the success of the operation. "
“As we approached the bridge, they started shooting at us from heavy machine guns, sniper militants were clearly working. Our eyes appeared: the first tank was moving along the bridge, and it was being fired on from somewhere in seven, eight directions. The column went across the bridge, suffering losses. The column lost two armored personnel carriers, a tank and a kosheemka (command and staff vehicle) were blown up. There was a complete mess in communication. For the most part, no one could imagine: who was talking to whom. The landing company, closing the column, did not pass. It was cut off and shot - everyone. they said that Chechens and mercenaries finished off the wounded paratroopers with shots in the head, and our column did not even know about it. Only the ensign and the soldier survived ...
We entered Grozny and immediately came under heavy fire - from almost all places, from all high-rise buildings, from all fortifications. As soon as we entered the city, the column slowed down. During this hour, we knocked out five tanks, six armored personnel carriers. The Chechens had a dug-in one tower visible - a T-72 tank, which destroyed the entire avant-garde of the column. The column snaked through the city, leaving militants in its rear, destroying only what was being destroyed. It was here, having begun to suffer significant losses, that the Eastern Group rushed under heavy fire from the militants. Only one thing sounded on our air: "200th, 200th, 200th" ... You drive near the motorized rifle infantry, and there are only corpses on them and inside. All killed...
We again left Grozny in a column. Walked like a snake. I don't know where, what was the command. Nobody set tasks. We just circled around Grozny. We left on January 1st. There was a sort of chaotic gathering of desperate people."
From an essay by military reporter Vitaly Noskov

Photo: RIA Novosti
The station building was poorly adapted to defense. On the night of the 31st to the 1st, around midnight, it was decided to leave the station and leave Grozny. The wounded colonel Savin and 80 fighters of the Maykop brigade tried to break out of the encirclement on several infantry fighting vehicles. At one o'clock in the morning the connection with them was lost. Almost the entire personnel of this group was destroyed. While trying to unblock the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment, other units suffered heavy losses.
“There was still no information about the 81st regiment and the 131st brigade. And soon a company of the 81st regiment broke into the location of the 8th corps. ", depressed, having lost their commanders, the soldiers looked terrible. Only 200 paratroopers, who were transferred to the regiment at the last moment, escaped the sad fate. They simply did not have time to catch up with the regiment and join it. Reinforcement was supposed to be taken on the march ...
It was night, - says Rokhlin, - the situation remained unclear. A complete mess of management. When they learned about the position of the 131st brigade, my reconnaissance battalion tried to break through to it, but lost a lot of people. It was about two kilometers to the railway station, where the units of the brigade took up defense, stuffed with militants.
Antipov A. V. "Lev Rokhlin: The Life and Death of a General"

“There was a brigade commander on the first car, the wounded were in the landing, and all the infantry who could walk were all sitting on the armor. They knocked us out from an RPG, missed the first time, and hit the second on the right bulwark. We jumped, who remained alive, and to the ground. The Czechs took us with their bare hands, as they say. Of the entire BMP, only I and one lieutenant colonel from Krasnodar from the headquarters of the 58th Army (on May 27, 1995, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Ivanovich Zryadny was shot in the village of Kharsenoy on the orders of Ruslan Gelaev) survived. The rest got it."
Astashkin N. "Chechnya: the feat of a soldier"

During the New Year's assault, the Sever grouping alone lost about 50 tanks, 150 infantry fighting vehicles, 7 Tungusok. Of the 446 fighters of the 131st Maikop brigade who entered the city, more than 150 people died. Of the 426 soldiers of the 81st motorized rifle regiment, more than 130 were killed. The exact figures of human losses for New Year's Eve are unknown. Including because January 1st was followed by several more weeks of fighting for Grozny. The city was completely taken only in March 1995. The number of Russian servicemen who died only on New Year's Eve is estimated at a thousand people.
"The rout was complete. The command was in shock."
General Lev Rokhlin

Photo: Kommersant
"We are being beaten by our own for a long time. In general, in this war, shooting at our own due to confusion and inconsistency has become so commonplace that you are no longer surprised at this. Commanders say that every second person killed in this war is killed by his own ...
The battalion with which we are surviving the fire is going to reinforce the regiment, which is pouring fire on us now. While the battalion commander establishes "sound communication" with the regiment (that is, yells that we are our own). Finally, everything is cleared up and the battalion runs into the ruins occupied by the rifle regiment.
Battalion - loudly said. A little more than one and a half hundred people remained from him in two weeks of fighting. Only the killed battalion lost thirty people. But it still counts as "nothing". There are even fewer of those who were driven into Grozny on New Year's Eve.
From the motorized rifle regiment that arrived from Samara, only a few officers and a little more than a dozen soldiers remained. On the ninth day, Captain Evgeny Surnin and six soldiers with him went to the location of our troops - all that was left of the rifle battalion.
From the tank company on Ordzhonikidze Street, only two privates survived - Muscovite Andrey Vinogradov and Igor Kulikov from Lobnya.
It was a crime and madness to drive columns of troops into a city stuffed with militants and weapons.
For two days of New Year's battles, we suffered monstrous losses - more than a thousand killed and missing.
Even the airborne troops - the elite of the army - the only really combat-ready units in this war lost twenty-six people killed in the three weeks of fighting before the New Year, and more than eighty in two days on January 1-2.
One can talk endlessly about the tragedy of the infantry.
Parts of the Marine Corps were hastily understaffed before leaving the sailors from the ships. They were not even given a week to prepare. The battalions were thrown into battle despite the fact that almost every fourth sailor picked up a machine gun three days ago ...
A consolidated regiment of the Transcaucasian District arrived at the headquarters of the corps near the city hospital. The company commander of one of the battalions ingenuously asked: "Where can I shoot weapons here, everything is new from warehouses, not shot."
A few hours later, this battalion was already committed to battle ...
In general, the word "consolidated" is the most common in the grouping. They mask the degree of collapse to which the troops reached. Consolidated - this means recruited from the "pine forest". There are no full-blooded units and formations left in the Russian army, and therefore they hastily collect everything that can be collected for the war.
A combined regiment is assembled from the division. And even in summary form, this regiment is barely sixty percent complete ...
Almost two weeks after the first assault, the units corrected the mistakes and miscalculations of the generals. In these bloody battles, the losses of the Russian troops reached forty people killed per day ... "
There are many reasons for the defeat of the federal forces during the New Year's assault. As usual, there was no normal reconnaissance. The command had no idea what they would have to face in the city. There was no clear plan of action. Tasks were set in the course of promotion and constantly changed. The commanders who commanded the troops from Mozdok had little idea of the situation that was taking shape. The command constantly urged, demanding to go forward. Divisions acted inconsistently. The attacking groups had no idea where other units of the federal forces were located. Many episodes of friendly fire have been noted. There were cases of strikes against their own Russian aircraft. The state of technology was poor. The electronic systems of many machines did not work. The staff was very poorly trained. There were no normal maps of the city. The units were poorly oriented on the ground. With the start of the fighting, confusion began on the air. Due to the lack of secure communications, militants constantly wedged into the air and brought additional confusion. There were many commanders from among the graduates of civilian universities. More than half of the rank and file consisted of soldiers who had just come from training units.
“The Chechens opened fire on my tank with cannons. The stabilizer, MZ (loader) failed, the R-173P receiver flew off, damaging the pallet catcher. It was necessary to urgently change the firing position. But after another hit in the tank, it stalled.
Having launched the tank with the help of "snot" (external start wire), put the pillers in place, got out of the control compartment, explaining to the mechanic Sashka Averyanov how to control the tank in this malfunction. covered us in this moment the crew of the tank N189. Having taken the place of the commander, he got in touch with the mechanic, but did not have time to drive off. Another shot from the PTS hit the upper boxes of dynamic protection opposite the viewing devices of the mechanic's TNPO. The tank stalled, smoke began to rise in the fighting compartment, flames appeared. After waiting for the Chechen machine gunners to process open hatches, they left the fighting compartment.
Having opened the mechanic's hatch with the tank commander, we saw that we could not help Sasha Averyanov. The cumulative jet, turning the empty KDZs, passed through the TNPO mines, hitting the mechanic's head.
If there was a 4S20 product in the KDZ, everything would be different. Why did the tanks go into the city with empty KDZs? The answer is simple - Russian maybe and the fear of the command to object to the top leadership, as well as betrayal, which was all the time. The senior mechanic-driver of the company, Sergeant Alexander Averyanov, is a bright memory of him. A great specialist, a mechanic from God, who repeatedly saved the tank, the crew from the fire of the enemy's PTS."
Memoirs of Igor Vechkanov "New Year's Carousel" (Storm of Grozny)

Photo: RIA Novosti
In early January, the command of the Russian armed forces in Grozny, it passed to Lev Rokhlin, who from the very beginning did not enter the city in columns, as in a parade, but advanced, methodically destroying the enemy with the support of artillery and multiple rocket launchers. It was thanks to artillery and the transition to the classic street fighting schemes that the city was eventually taken. By the second half of January, the troops, at the cost of their own blood, had learned to fight in the conditions of the city. The Chechen war was just beginning...
The events of the New Year's assault on Grozny are impressively described in the films "60 Hours of the Maikop Brigade", "Cursed and Forgotten", "Undeclared War". The atmosphere of events is well shown in the film by Alexander Nevzorov "Purgatory".
A quarter of a century later, the events of New Year's hell begin to dissolve in the fog of memory. The 90s are over. People no longer understand why they spoil their mood by remembering the soldiers who died in battle while the rest of the country was eating salads and watching TV. But try for a few seconds to remember the young guys who disappeared into the heat of the night because of the stupidity of the country's leadership and army command. In Russia there is such a tradition - between wars to praise their feats of arms and military prowess. And when the next war comes, you will have to re-learn how to fight at the cost of your own blood. And only the memory of such events as the New Year's assault on Grozny will someday teach us not to get into such a massacre.
Happy New Year alive. The memory of the dead.
The post was prepared by Alex Kulmanov