Preface to the 1939 edition. The book is the first work in Russian naval literature devoted to a systematic review of the combat activities of four Russian cruisers based in Vladivostok during the period Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 Acquaintance with

Soviet-Finnish war November 30, 1939 - March 12, 1940. It is a prelude to immediate preparation for the expected Great Patriotic War. The Soviet-Finnish war reveals the weakest points of the Red Army. But, unfortunately, to solve these problems by

THE REGULATIONS OF 1874 AND ITS PRECURSORS In the last period of the existence of serfdom, all classes of society that rose in any way above the level of the masses of the people were exempted from compulsory military service. This exemption extended to nobles, merchants,

CHANGES INTO THE REGULATION OF 1874 The Charter of 1874, like the Recruitment Charter of 1831, saved the family of the father or, in his absence, the family of the grandfather, but not the family of the conscript himself. This is explained by the following motives. Immediately after the liberation of the peasants from serfdom

Any weapon gives an effect only when used appropriately. Naturally, the anti-tank defense system developed during the Second World War not only in technical, but also in “tactical” terms. The specialty of the tank destroyer was determined in the infantry. Tank destroyers were armed and organized accordingly. determined the order of their combat work within the unit and interaction with other units. Above, the details of the tactics of "tank destroyers" and armor-piercers have already been indicated. Now let's look at some points in the general organization of infantry anti-tank defense Since the tactics of tank destroyers were an integral part of the overall anti-tank system, closely linked to the state and the actions of its other elements, it will be necessary to touch upon both the evolution of the anti-tank defense system and its organization in various types of combat.

In the USSR, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the issues of PTO had not been sufficiently worked out. The provisional field charter of the Red Army of 1936 and the draft Field charter of 1940 rightly provided for artillery in combination with engineering obstacles as the basis of anti-tank defense. a platoon of anti-tank guns (45-mm guns) was introduced into the staff of rifle battalions. and in 19391 a battery of six 45-mm guns was introduced into the staff of a rifle regiment. In the presence of reinforcements, a mobile anti-tank artillery reserve was also assumed with the inclusion of sapper groups in its composition. The infantry was supposed to fire from rifles and machine guns at the viewing slots of the tanks with armor-piercing bullets. The combat charter of the infantry in 1938 and 1940 for the fight against tanks that had broken through suggested creating groups of tank destroyers with bundles of grenades and incendiary bottles. However, the importance of the infantry's PTS on the eve of the war was clearly underestimated. Anti-tank fire was organized using 45-mm cannons (we already mentioned that just before the war their production was stopped), combined with anti-tank obstacles, fire from divisional and partly regimental artillery. However, neither regimental nor divisional guns had special anti-tank shells. the average density of anti-aircraft artillery would be 4 guns per 1 km of front - not enough to repel a massive tank attack. Artillery was asked to take up positions behind natural anti-tank obstacles - but at the same time, tank-dangerous directions and roads turned out to be poorly covered, along which, in fact, enemy tanks preferred to move quickly. Anti-tank areas were supposed to provide all-round defense, in some areas reinforced by anti-tank obstacles. In the forest and settlements, explosive barriers were to be supplemented by anti-tank blockages. According to pre-war calculations, a rifle battalion on its own could make 1 km of blockage in 1 hour. According to the same calculations, the battalion could prepare 1 km of anti-tank ditch during the day (Inzh.P-39). In reality, the rifle units did not have such terms and opportunities. Nevertheless, both blockages and PT ditches were created locally, including by reinforcing existing natural obstacles.

In general, anti-tank defense, according to pre-war charters and instructions, was built linearly and shallowly, along lines, with an even distribution of anti-tank vehicles along the front and in depth, with a weak reserve and an anti-aircraft defense area in the rear (at positions of the second echelons) on tank-inaccessible terrain. Strongholds and positions were not connected by trenches - it was believed that fire communications were sufficient in a mobile war. Due to anti-tank ditches and scarps, cut-off positions were created, but their preparation required considerable time. The interaction between artillery, infantry and engineering troops and general management were not worked out. This clearly did not correspond to the conditions when the enemy resorted to rapid deep breakthroughs with the massing of tanks in selected directions, detours and coverage. All the more difficult and unequal was combat with tanks for the infantry, who did not have sufficient anti-tank weapons. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army had 14.5 thousand anti-tank guns at the planned 14.8 thousand, these guns then made up, in fact, the entire military anti-tank artillery. But since these guns were taken out of production just before the war, there was nowhere to make up for their losses in the first weeks of the war. Regimental and divisional guns were ineffective in the fight against mobile tanks and turned out to be more of an auxiliary tool. It is not surprising that under these conditions, anti-aircraft guns became one of the main anti-aircraft artillery weapons (however, the 88-mm anti-aircraft gun was also recognized as the most effective anti-aircraft gun of the German Wehrmacht). And the Red Army infantry itself was poorly prepared to fight tanks.

Already on July 6, 1941. The order of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command to intensify the fight against tanks demanded "immediately create companies and teams for the destruction of tanks in regiments and battalions", added "packages with explosives and ... flamethrowers of light tanks" to grenades and incendiary bottles. In addition, a directive was issued on night operations against tanks, that is, attacks by specially selected groups of fighters on enemy tanks in parking lots in front of the front line. The most experienced "grenade launchers" were allocated to fight tanks in rifle units. They were supplied with anti-tank grenades and incendiary bottles and were located in single trenches and cracks in tank-hazardous directions. Interaction with anti-tank artillery, even where it was available, was still poorly organized - batteries of anti-tank guns were rarely advanced to tank-dangerous directions. In combination with the short range of grenades and bottles, no more than 25 m, this reduced the effectiveness of the "teams to destroy tanks" and led to heavy losses. personnel.

However, already in the initial period of the war, "anti-tank units" began to be practiced in defense, in which anti-tank guns were located, covering them with rifle or machine-gun units. And in August 1941, the headquarters of the Supreme Command demanded that the troops create anti-tank strongholds (PTOP) and areas on the most important tank-dangerous directions - the linear construction of the anti-tank defense had to be abandoned. The PTOPs were supposed to dismember the massive attack of the tanks and destroy them piece by piece. Artillery commanders were appointed as chiefs of the PTOP - not least this was due to the poor ability of combined arms (infantry) commanders to organize a fire system. Anti-tank guns included 2-4 guns and anti-tank guns of rifle subunits. In the defense near Moscow, in the areas of rifle regiments, from 1 to 3 anti-tank guns were created. and in the depths of the defense of the PT areas Sometimes anti-terrorist operations were organized in settlements. Posts of reconnaissance observers and reconnaissance illuminators were set up on the approaches to the anti-terrorist operation. warning posts about tank attacks In the defense zone of the famous 316th Infantry Division of General Panfilov from October 12 to 21, 1941, anti-tank gunners destroyed up to 80 tanks Near Rostov in the Dyakovo region, in the 136th rifle division they created 11 anti-tank gunners. united in a PT node up to 6 km deep - as a result, when attacking Dyakovo, the enemy lost about 80 tanks.

In the autumn of 1941 groups of tank destroyers began to be created in all rifle units of the Red Army. The group included 9-11 people and, in addition to small arms, was armed with 14-16 anti-tank grenades. 15-20 incendiary bottles, "acted in battle together with armor-piercers - she was given 1-2 PTR calculations. The PTR calculations themselves were an example of the use of a complex of melee weapons - in position they also prepared anti-tank grenades and incendiary bottles for battle, the second number of calculations sought to equip with a submachine gun for shelling infantry escorting tanks or evacuating crews of wrecked tanks. Such measures allowed rifle subunits “during a tank attack not only to cut off enemy infantry, but also to take an active part in the fight against the tanks themselves. Documents of the Western Front testify to the importance of tank destroyers in the Battle of Moscow. The directive of the Commander of the Front, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, dated October 19, ordered to place anti-tank detachments on the rear lines and rear roads, consisting of 1-2 anti-tank guns, a platoon of fighters with grenades and bottles of KS a platoon of sappers with mines, a company of riflemen. So they tried to compensate for the weakness of the anti-tank defense of the leading edge with the extension and large intervals of the front. And two days later, the Military Council of the front ordered the formation “in each rifle regiment - one anti-tank destroyer detachment consisting of one average commander and 15 fighters, including a squad of sappers ... 150 anti-tank grenades, 75 bottles of KS. PPSh - 3, anti-tank mines, semi-automatic rifles. All cartridges for rifles are armor-piercing .. Each rifle division has two fighter detachments ... three army mobile detachments ... Detachments must be especially mobile, maneuverable to act suddenly, boldly, shortly. The detachments were supposed to be put on trucks, but there was a big shortage in transport at that time. PT areas were created in regiments. In the 316th Rifle Division, for example, regimental anti-tank areas included from 4 to 20 guns of various calibers.

circuit diagram anti-tank defense organization of a rifle division on the defensive near Moscow (December 1941)

In the order to all commanders of the armies. the commanders of divisions and regiments of the Western Front were told “PTRs are also attached to strongholds, and it must be taken into account that the greatest effectiveness of their fire is obtained when used in groups (3-4 guns) .. Tank destroyers with anti-tank grenades, bundles of ordinary fans and bottles of flammable liquid are an effective means of close combat against tanks. Groups of tank destroyers must be trained at each strong point "On November 1, the Military Council of the Front proposed encouraging fighters for destroying a tank with a grenade or a bottle of 1000 rubles, for three tanks to be awarded the Order of the Red Star, five Red Banners, ten or more - to title of Hero of the Soviet Union. PTR calculation for the destruction of three tanks - to the medal "For Courage" and a monetary reward.

The isolated location of anti-tank gunships still did not ensure proper coordination between the actions of tank destroyers and artillery. Meanwhile, the enemy changed offensive tactics, used deeper battle formations, bypassed anti-tank gunners and blocked them with artillery and infantry. in cooperation with the infantry, massaging them within the battalion defense area in the most probable directions of movement of enemy tanks. The experience of organizing anti-tank defense on the Western Front was disseminated among the troops of other fronts.

In July 1942, the General Staff developed instructions for anti-tank troops. According to it. the organization of anti-tank defense was entrusted to combined arms commanders (since then, the organization of anti-tank defense became their primary responsibility), and the basis for it in regiments was anti-tank combat in rifle companies, united in battalion anti-tank units, and in divisions and above - anti-tank lines. For defense at all levels, a categorical requirement - it had to be primarily 'Anti-tank'. Therefore, the anti-tank bases were now to coincide with company strongholds, and anti-tank nodes - with battalion defense areas. This simplified the management of the VET. increased its stability, improved the interaction of artillery and sappers with the infantry's firearms, which solved the main tasks in battle. As battalion nodes were the basis of the entire defensive position, so the anti-tank units created in them became the basis of anti-tank defense. These provisions were included in the Combat Regulations of the Red Army Infantry of 1942 (BUP -42. part 2) and into the draft Field Regulations of 1943 One of the company defense areas or a battalion knot could turn into a PT unit or area if they were in a forward position and in tank-accessible terrain.

By definition BUP-42. anti-tank defense consisted of a combination of artillery fire and anti-tank infantry weapons with extensive use of natural and artificial obstacles "-Infantry destroys enemy tanks with anti-tank rifles, grenades, mines, and incendiaries." Recognition of the role of anti-fire infantry was a very important step compared with pre-war views. Note that the BUP-42 introduced anti-tank land mines and mines into the number of means of infantry fighting.

The depth of the anti-tank defense was growing; it had to be organized throughout the depth of the area or area of ​​\u200b\u200bdefense with the concentration of the bulk of regular and attached anti-tank vehicles in the main directions ambushes of anti-tank guns and anti-tank guns were organized, reinforced by anti-tank mines, anti-tank regimental reserve was reinforced.

In 1942 the magazine "Military Thought" wrote: "Anti-tank artillery ... it is better to have groups of 2-6 guns in the so-called. anti-tank strongholds, reliably covered by anti-tank obstacles ... provided with armor-piercers and tank destroyers. Positions for anti-tank and anti-tank guns had to be chosen so that they, “without changing their place, could fire at the entire area assigned to them and tank-accessible directions, mainly with flank fire”, reinforced by artificial obstacles and anti-tank mines. The location of the anti-tank guns (AT guns, anti-tank rifles, flamethrowers) was considered the most advantageous, which made it possible to take enemy tanks into “fire bags”, allowing sudden opening of fire from ambushes when enemy tanks approached obstacles in front of the front line of defense.

PTS fired independently in designated areas (sectors). After repulsing the attack of the PTR and AT tanks, the guns that found themselves firing had to change position. Both in the offensive and in defense, part of the anti-tank rifle and 45-mm anti-tank guns could be allocated to the reserve of the regiment commander; during battles in a settlement or forest, the allocation of a reserve was considered mandatory.

Anti-tank areas from infantry and artillery units were created outside the combat formations of the infantry to cover tank-dangerous directions and roads. Anti-tank artillery and anti-tank rifles were also allocated to the anti-tank reserve, which was to be used together with the mobile engineering reserve of minefields. Let us note the strengthening of PT reserves, which contributed to the activity of PT.

These principles were tested during the Battle of Stalingrad. Company anti-tank guns here already included 4-6 guns and an anti-tank rifle platoon - this met the BUP-42 standards (rifle company, 35 guns, 1-2 anti-tank rifle platoons, mortars and machine guns). More attention had to be paid to anti-tank issues in the offensive, since the enemy often resorted to counterattacks with tanks and assault guns - especially in the battle for the second position.

Schematic diagram of the organization of anti-tank defense of a rifle division in the defense near Stalingrad in the summer of 1942.

Schematic diagram of the organization of anti-tank weapons of a rifle division in the Battle of Kursk

Armor-piercers in the counterattack. Southwestern front. Summer 1942. Let's pay attention to the 12.7-mm single-shot PTR on the left.

In each company, 2-3 groups of tank destroyers were created, usually consisting of 3-6 fighters under the command of a sergeant, sometimes with 1-2 PTR crews. Each fighter had a rifle or a carbine (later they tried to supply everyone with submachine guns), two hand anti-tank grenades, 2-3 incendiary bottles. Fighters - and even more so armor-piercers - acted under the cover of fire of submachine gunners or light machine guns, snipers. Groups of fighters were trained at special training camps in the rear of the army, during which the most determined, dexterous and quick-witted fighters were selected.

By the end of the first period of the war, anti-tank rifles became the main PTS in company defense areas, and anti-tank rifles and artillery pieces in battalion areas. On a broad front, the defense was made up of separate company districts, on which the entire burden of anti-tank defense lay. When tanks appeared, the head was first hit, then the fire was transferred to the next one (with the exception of ambushes against tank columns, when the first and last were hit first). Tanks that broke through into platoon and company strongholds were ordered to "destroy with all anti-tank weapons" (BUP-42). In winter, anti-tank defense was additionally strengthened by obstacles in the form of icy slopes, rises and embankments, reinforced by mines and land mines hastily placed in the snow, and infantry anti-tank guns were placed on skis, drags, and sleds.

The expansion of military production and an increase in the production of TCP created the basis for saturating the troops with them. Together with the experience of the first period of the war (from June 22, 1941 to November 18, 1942, i.e. the end of the Stalingrad defensive operation) this created the basis for improving anti-tank weapons in the second period, calculated from the start of the offensive near Stalingrad until December 31, 1943 until the end of the Kiev offensive operation. Since during this period the enemy increased the massing of tanks and self-propelled guns in the direction of the main attack (30-50 or more 1 km of the front), the Soviet troops had to increase the depth of the tactical defense zone and improve its battle formation. There were changes in the states of the rifle units. According to the headquarters of 1942, the rifle division was supposed to have 30 anti-tank guns and 117 anti-tank rifles.

In the defensive battle near Kursk in the summer of 1943, rifle formations created a deeply echeloned anti-tank defense. the density of anti-tank forces has increased In the practice of the troops, the organization of anti-tank defense based on a kind of "network" - a system of anti-tank strongholds, nodes and areas is becoming more and more established. The battle order of a rifle division in defense included from 4 to 8-13 anti-tank guns that had fire communication between themselves In the 15th rifle corps, for example, 24 anti-tank guns were created (15 in the main defense line and 9 in the second), united in 9 anti-tank districts . However, experience has shown that it is more correct to transfer the center of gravity of anti-tank guns to battalions, combining 2-3 company anti-tank guns into battalion anti-tank units (4-6 in the division zone), covering their anti-tank guns with barriers and obstacles. Anti-tank nodes interacted with anti-tank guns and anti-tank areas in the depths of defense. Anti-tank guns usually included 4-6 guns (in the main directions - up to 12), 6-9 or 9-12 anti-tank guns. 2-4 mortars, 2-3 heavy and 3-4 light machine guns, a platoon of machine gunners and a squad (sometimes a platoon) of sappers with anti-tank mines, sometimes tanks and self-propelled guns. Company and battalion commanders were appointed as chiefs (commandants) of the PTOP. The saturation of the Active Army with anti-tank artillery increased - if in November 1942 there were 1.7 anti-tank guns per 1000 fighters. then in July 1943 - 2.4 In addition to anti-tank guns, PTOP artillery could include 85-mm anti-aircraft guns and even 152-mm howitzers and howitzers-guns to fight new heavy German tanks. Direct fire at tanks with heavy M30 and M3 rockets was also used.

Note that the high densities of artillery and infantry PTS near Kursk were explained not only by the rather long time for organizing the defense, but also by the fact that the defense was actually occupied by offensive groupings. the formations in the direction of the main attack included heavy tanks in the first echelon and on the flanks, and medium tanks, assault guns and infantry in armored personnel carriers in the middle. the fight against heavy tanks and well-armored assault guns was taken over by guns with a caliber over 76 mm. and the anti-tank missiles and the 45-mm guns that were in the positions of the infantry were medium tanks, passing heavy areas through themselves on the anti-tank guns.

So, in the battle for the village of Cherkasskoe on July 5, armor-piercers of the 196th rifle regiment knocked out 5 enemy tanks. The calculation of the PTR, consisting of Sergeant P.I. Bannov and Junior Sergeant I Khamzaev, destroyed 14 tanks during July 7.8 and July 10. The commander of the German 19th Panzer Division wrote about the battle on July 8 with units of the 81st Infantry Division in the Melehovo area: "North of the collective farm" Harvest Day, "the Russians sat down in the trench system, knocked out our flamethrower tanks with anti-tank rifles and put up fanatical resistance to our motorized infantry. On the night of July 9, this group managed to withdraw." The most effective anti-tank missiles on the Kursk Bulge and later were against armored personnel carriers, light reconnaissance and command armored vehicles Without the support of artillery and anti-aircraft reserves, armor-piercers and tank destroyers still suffered heavy losses. , grenades and incendiary bottles 11 tanks were almost completely killed in position.

The enemy began to practice night tank attacks more widely, and this only increased the value of close-range combat vehicles and anti-tank minefields. Groups of tank destroyer sappers in all types of combat tried to install explosive barriers directly in front of advancing enemy tanks, using standard TM-41 mines, "mine belts" and other means In defense, fighter sappers often took positions near rifle units, installed anti-tank mines on sleds or boards pulled up by ropes. Although anti-aircraft mines were an engineering tool. It was not by chance that BUP-42 mentioned land mines and mines among the "infantry fighting means" The growing role of anti-aircraft mine-explosive barriers with a chronic shortage of sappers-specialists in the staff of rifle units and formations made it necessary to train infantrymen in handling anti-aircraft mines and in the construction of land mines (using mines and hand grenades). This practice justified itself and survived after the war.

BUP-42 required each fighter to be able to hit tanks. If tanks advance without infantry, it is necessary to hit them with anti-tank grenades, bottles of combustible mixture, and fire at viewing slots. throw bundles of grenades and anti-tank mines under the tracks. destroy tankers with fire ... If tanks attack with infantry, only specially designated fighters should fight tanks, and all the rest are obliged to hit infantry with fire and grenades. As you can see, the organization of anti-tank defense in units has become more specific.

In BUP-42, the actions of armor-piercers were also analyzed in detail. At night, firing at tanks was allowed only when they were clearly visible. The return in defense to a developed system of trenches and communications increased the survivability of infantry vehicles and the effectiveness of tank destroyers. They got the opportunity to quickly and covertly maneuver within the defense area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe unit and unit, without crossing under enemy fire, almost any section of trenches could become a firing position. Anti-tank rifles in trenches were hampered by the size of anti-tank rifles Positions of anti-tank rifles often became the basis of a platoon strong point Calculations of anti-tank rifles interacted in battle not only with infantrymen - tank destroyers and anti-tank artillery crews, but also with sappers and units of tank destroyer dogs The effectiveness of tank destroyers and armor-piercers was largely determined camouflage of their positions and restraint of fighters To approach tanks, fighters sometimes set up smoke screens using RDG hand-held smoke grenades or small DM-11 smoke bombs. When tank destroyers were included in assault groups to attack enemy firing points, The installation of smoke screens was almost mandatory. Flamethrowers used smoke screens even more often - chemical troops were also in charge of smoke agents.

Anti-tank areas were created within the regimental sectors. The mobile regimental anti-tank reserve included 2-3 anti-tank guns, up to an anti-tank rifle platoon and up to a platoon of machine gunners. such platoons also included the calculations of anti-tank rifles and light machine guns.

When strengthening anti-tank and anti-tank areas, much attention was paid to anti-tank obstacles, the arrangement of sheltered firing positions for anti-tank guns and rifles, positions for tank destroyers with anti-tank grenades and incendiary bottles. observers and machine gunners who covered the approaches to the positions of the PTS and interfered with the enemy in clearing obstacles. They tried to place the main part of the firing PTS on the reverse slopes of the heights. the infantry regiment was allocated a reserve of TCP. which kept on a tank-dangerous direction. especially for covering flanks and joints. When their tanks or self-propelled guns of infantry support fell behind or failed, the PTS switched to support it, destroying firing points. PTS of the enemy, but remaining ready to repel a tank counterattack Armor-piercers and tank destroyers acted in the first echelon of the landing during crossings and securing a bridgehead - they took on the main role in repelling enemy counterattacks in the most dangerous initial period of the struggle for a bridgehead. PTR crews. flamethrowers with knapsack flamethrowers. arrows abundantly supplied with anti-tank grenades, bundles of grenades and incendiary bottles, were also reduced as part of assault groups when attacking bunkers (bunkers) or fortified buildings. Groups of machine gunners with anti-tank grenades and incendiary bottles were also used to identify and destroy enemy tanks in ambush, crews of anti-tank guns and "faustniks", facilitating the advancement of their tanks.

When making a march, units of anti-tank and anti-tank guns were usually distributed along the length of the column. At the command of "Tanks", the battalion columns were dismembered by company, guns and anti-tank rifles occupied firing positions in front of the infantry, sappers laid mines in front of and on the flanks of these positions, and rifle units, using existing obstacles and shelters, were made to repel tanks with their own means. Anti-aircraft weapons, depending on the situation, were made for firing at aircraft or firing at tanks. Anti-tank and anti-tank guns were allocated to the covering groups when the rifle units left the battlefield and broke through the encirclement.

Infantry and artillery anti-aircraft weapons were brought together organizationally. In the spring of 1E42, an anti-tank fighter division was returned to the state of the Red Army rifle division, but already as part of twelve 45-mm anti-tank guns and an anti-tank rifle company (36 guns). Let's compare - at the end of the war, the infantry regiment of the US Army already had a full-time anti-tank battery (company), armed with nine 57-mm anti-tank guns and nine Bazooka RPGs, and in Korea, the Americans developed this experience, using jointly the crews of bazookas and recoilless rifles in anti-tank strongholds.

The third period of the Great Patriotic War (January 1944 - May 1945) was characterized mainly by the offensive actions of the Red Army. However, the enemy constantly carried out counterattacks with tank units, repeatedly tried to go on the counteroffensive in separate sectors (East Prussia in August-September 1944, the Balaton region in January-March 1945). During the Berlin operation, Soviet rifle units had to fight off an average of 4-5 enemy counterattacks with tanks and self-propelled guns. This required the Soviet troops to quickly create an echeloned highly stable circular anti-tank missile defense. It still relied on the TVET system and PT nodes and PT areas.

Company anti-tank guns in the Red Army in the last period of the war included 3-5 guns (both caliber 57 mm and 100-152 mm), an anti-tank rifle platoon, 1-2 tanks, a rifle unit, a mortar platoon. The battalion anti-tank guns, in addition to anti-tank weapons, had up to 12 guns of various calibers and an anti-tank rifle unit. Moreover, anti-tank rifles already played an auxiliary role in the fight against light armored vehicles, fired at viewing slots - like ordinary rifles at the beginning of the war.

A hasty transition to the defense often did not allow the organization of anti-tank gunships, and the main burden fell on the anti-tank areas, which were created throughout the entire depth of defense in the most tank-prone areas at the expense of anti-tank units. In the anti-tank area there could be up to 14 guns and self-propelled guns and up to 18 anti-tank rifles.

PTS during this period became common in assault operations - the assault group was given an anti-tank rifle squad, 1-2 anti-tank guns, and assault squads were reinforced by a platoon of sappers with anti-tank mines, a battery of 45-mm cannons, backpack flamethrowers.

The average density of tank destroyers in the tactical defense zone (including guns, tanks and self-propelled guns) by the end of the war increased to 20-25 units per 1 km of the front, i.e. 5-6 times in comparison with the initial period. The bulk of them were still artillery weapons. Moreover, the density of guns not only increased during the war, but also differentiated depending on the importance or danger of the site. The average density of anti-tank guns in the first period of the war was 2-5, in the second - 6, in the third - 8 per 1 km of the front. The depth of the fire system of anti-tank weapons in defense has increased from 2-3 to 6-8 km, and taking into account the second line of defense - up to 15-20 km. The fire of various reserves at the lines of their deployment joined the system of anti-tank fire of company anti-tank guns, battalion anti-tank units and regimental areas. At the lake Balaton, for example, anti-aircraft defense areas included 8-14 guns and self-propelled guns, 6-18 anti-tank guns, and anti-tank guns were reinforced by artillery maneuver from the depths and from non-attacked areas. This in itself showed that artillery turned out to be the only real basis for anti-tank weapons in the face of the weakness of infantry anti-tank guns. At Lake Balaton, as in the initial period of the war, the soldiers again threw themselves under tanks with grenades. The popularity of the captured Panzerfausts among the Soviet infantry is not accidental. So, in the same Hungary on December 3, 1944. two companies of the 1st battalion of captain I.A. Rapoport 29th Guards. airborne regiment, repelling the counterattack of German tanks and infantry near the city of Meze-Komar, in addition to two 45- and two 76-mm guns, they used the Panzerfausts captured the day before, knocking out 6 tanks, 2 assault guns and 2 enemy armored personnel carriers during the battle.

Schematic diagram of the organization of anti-tank weapons of a rifle division in the third period of the Great Patriotic War (Balaton operation, March 1945)

It should be noted that the anti-tank defense principles developed during the war years remained fundamental in the Soviet Army until the mid-1950s, when, in connection with the development of nuclear and high-precision weapons, a fundamental revision of the methods of combat and combat formations of offensive and defense began.

PTR, anti-tank grenades and mines were successfully used by partisans. Since June 20, 1942 to February 1, 1944 the Soviet Central Headquarters of the partisan movement handed over to partisan detachments 2,556 anti-tank rifles, 75,000 anti-tank guns, and 464,570 fragmentation hand grenades. The partisans especially made extensive use of incendiary bottles and makeshift "mobile" mines. PTR Soviet partisans used for firing at enemy trains - at locomotives or fuel tanks.

As for the German army, here the PTO issues were sufficiently worked out by the beginning of the Second World War - especially since it was the Germans who happened to become the pioneers of the PTO. A characteristic feature of the German PTO was the close interaction of infantry and anti-tank artillery - the advancement of infantry by anti-tank guns was always accompanied by wheels. However, clashes with Soviet troops in 1941, sensitive, albeit scattered counterattacks Soviet tankmen in the initial period of the war, they forced the German command to clarify the statutory provisions for anti-tank weapons. So, in the fall of 1941. the troops sent instructions "On how to deal with heavy Soviet tanks." The main measures of struggle were recognized: the suppression of tanks by artillery in their initial positions, the shelling of attacking tanks by direct fire with individual advanced guns, as well as the defeat of tanks by "shock squads" of infantry, i.e. tank destroyers. VET of the German troops in the winter of 1941/42. organized inside strongholds ("hedgehogs"), created in important directions and adapted for all-round defense. Already in the spring of 1942. The Headquarters of the High Command of the Ground Forces sent out "Instructions on combat training of the infantry." They paid special attention to firing - including anti-tank - at short ranges.

In the second half of 1942 The Wehrmacht moved from focal defense to positional defense, respectively returning to the system of continuous trenches and increasing the depth of defense. Most of the firepower was located in the first position. Special soldiers with tracer bullets in the ammunition load and lighting pistols were allocated by observers to signal the appearance of tanks, illuminate the area and target anti-tank weapons. In the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, the Soviet troops had to face a densely occupied defense, consisting of strongholds connected by trenches. Artillery fire and engineering obstacles formed the basis of anti-tank defense, advanced infantry units were abundantly supplied with anti-tank vehicles. Settlements adapted to all-round defense - again, primarily in relation to the PT.

Near Kursk in the summer of 1943, the German defense was even deeper (the first position, for example, included not two, but three trenches), and anti-tank weapons were located inside the strongholds in open positions and in permanent structures, including portable shelters, etc. n. "crabs" - domed metal structures with loopholes around the perimeter. Specially appointed officers were responsible for the organization of anti-tank defense within the units - as a rule, these were artillerymen, commanders of anti-tank divisions.

In 1944-1945. the German units created rather high densities of PTS in the defense. The main line of defense consisted, as a rule, of three positions, 2-3 trenches each. Strongholds and nodes of resistance were created at the positions, in some directions - with a system of "crabs". PTS were echeloned throughout the entire depth of defense, but most of them were located in the main lane (depth 6-8 km), and up to 80% - in the first two positions. Considering the massive use of tanks by the Soviet troops, the Wehrmacht command attached great importance to the infantry PTS. In the German defense, opposing the 2nd Ukrainian Front during the Uman-Botoshansk operation, the density of close-range combat vehicles was 6.4 per 1 km of the front, against the 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian fronts during the Vistula-Oder operation - 10, Berlin - 20 per 1 km of the front.

At the last stage of the war, the Germans practiced "mobile tank destroyer groups" of infantrymen with "Panzerfausts", designed to compensate for the lack of anti-tank weapons on a stretched front. "Faustniki" became the main element of the near VET.

Strong in anti-tank defense units created German units in cities. In Berlin, for example, they included tanks or assault guns dug in near houses, anti-tank guns on the first and second floors and numerous positions of machine gunners and "faustniks" on all tiers, mortar batteries in the yards. Colonel General B.C. Arkhipov wrote later: “The paratroopers, located on the tank armor, are in a particularly difficult situation, but the tanker cannot do without them, because they protect him from grenade launchers, Faustniks and other tank hunters.”

Units were also created that combined almost all anti-tank weapons of the ground forces. So, in April 1942. in the Red Army, the formation of anti-tank brigades began. The brigade included an anti-aircraft artillery regiment (76-, 45-mm anti-aircraft guns and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns), 2 anti-tank rifle battalions of 3 companies each, a mortar division, an engineering mine and tank battalions, and a company of submachine gunners. Such brigades of three were reduced to anti-tank divisions, which served as a mobile anti-tank reserve of the fronts. In the course of the war, the idea of ​​“enlarging” both purely infantry units and tank destroyer units was repeatedly expressed, following the model of anti-tank artillery units. So, according to the memoirs of N.D. Yakovlev, in March 1943. commander of the Volkhov Front K.A. Meretskov proposed to introduce in the rifle troops special units"Grenadier", armed with anti-tank and anti-tank grenades. On the other hand, tank-destroyer brigades armed with close combat vehicles were formed in the German army. G. Guderian recalled that on January 26, 1945. Hitler gave the order to form a "tank destroyer division". With a formidable name, it was supposed to consist of companies of scooters (cyclists) with "Panzerfausts", i.e. become another improvisation of the end of the war.

Japanese troops on the islands Pacific Ocean(for example, on Guadalcanal) and in Manchuria, suicide fighters were widely used, throwing themselves under a tank with grenades or a powerful explosive charge. Although there were cases of throwing under a tank in especially tense moments of the battle in all armies, perhaps only the Japanese made "teishintai" ("special shock troops"death row") a constant element. In the Kwantung Army, the 1st separate "special forces" brigade was formed from suicide bombers. During the Japanese counterattacks in the Madayashi area on August 13-14, 200 such suicide bombers were thrown against Soviet tanks, but the results of their actions were small. More dangerous were groups of "ordinary" fighters with grenades, mines and smoke weapons.

"Panzerfausts" have become a massive infantry PTS. In the picture - a sniper and a submachine gunner of the SS troops in a trench, a pipe of the "Panzerfaust" is visible between them, March 1945)

American crew RPGM1 "Bazooka" on the defensive. Normandy, July 1944

Some conclusions can be drawn regarding the development and combat use of infantry anti-tank weapons during the Second World War:

1. The experience of combat operations showed the urgent need to saturate infantry units (squad-platoon-company) with weapons capable of effectively hitting all types of tanks and armored vehicles at ranges up to 400-500 m. The development of PTS, of course, went in parallel with the development of armored vehicles. During the war, the tactical maneuverability of tanks (speed on the battlefield, acceleration, agility, maneuverability) changed slightly, but the firepower and security increased qualitatively - the tanks became stronger, "long-armed" and "thick-skinned." The scale of the use of tanks, their massing in the directions of the main attacks, has increased. at the same time, the nomenclature of BTTs was growing, self-propelled guns entered the battlefield. transport and combat armored vehicles. Accordingly, the requirements for PTS changed - at the same ranges, they had to reliably hit much better protected targets, while having the flexibility and stealth of infantry weapons. With the growing maneuverability and dynamics of hostilities, the PTS required high combat readiness, a higher probability of hitting a target from the first shot, and maneuverability in all conditions. The weapon, which required more than two (with ammunition - three) people to maintain and carry in battle, was too bulky for the infantry. At the same time, the requirements for ease of development and handling, speed and low cost of production were tightened.

2. During the war, the range of anti-tank vehicles grew significantly - both due to special types of anti-tank weapons (PTR, RPG), and due to the adaptation of "multi-purpose" weapons (signal pistol, rifle grenade launchers, flamethrowers) to the needs of anti-tank weapons. At the same time, anti-tank weapons differed in: the principle of damaging action (the kinetic energy of a bullet, the cumulative effect, high-explosive or incendiary action), the principle of "throwing" action (small and rocket weapons, hand grenades), long-range (PTR - up to 500. RPG - up to 200, hand grenades - up to 20 m). Some tools were in service at the beginning of the war, others appeared during it and subsequently developed rapidly, while others (incendiary bottles, "sticky bombs", ampoule) were only wartime improvisations. On the other hand, they also tried to use special PTS to solve other problems - this is clearly seen in the example of anti-tank rifles and RPGs (which were also used to combat fortified firing points and fortifications) and indicates the need for a certain "universalization" of even "special" military weapons . One can see an analogy with the last two decades of the 20th century, when multi-purpose warheads (cumulative-fragmentation, penetrating, thermobaric) for RPGs and ATGMs were created. allowing them to be used as light means of fire support for small units.

In the second half of the war, German specialists most fully developed a new anti-tank weapon system for infantry (they were encouraged to do this primarily by the quantitative and qualitative growth of the armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army), but the rapidly depleting industrial resources and the rapid actions of the Red Army did not give the German army the opportunity to fully use this advantage. Regarding the system of anti-tank weapons of the Red Army, it is worth noting that by the end of the war, as at its beginning, rifle units had hand grenades as their main means, used at ranges up to 20-25 m. Until the end of the war, new means with the corresponding firing range. The fight against enemy tanks was again entrusted entirely to artillery. This was facilitated by the adoption in 1942-1943. new anti-tank guns (45 mm gun model 1942, 57 mm model 1943, 76 mm model 1943), as well as changes in the ammunition load. In 1943 accepted 45-, 57- and 76-mm sub-caliber ("special armor-piercing") shells, and in the regimental ammunition 76-mm cannon mod. 1927 and 1943 and divisional 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938 introduced cumulative ("armor-burning") shells. The sub-caliber projectile allowed the "magpies" to fight the new medium and heavy German tanks, the regimental gun could fire a cumulative projectile at a distance of up to 600 m, although its accuracy was low. However, neither the quantitative increase in anti-tank artillery, nor its closer interaction with the infantry (in 1943, for example, a platoon of anti-tank guns was returned to the state of the rifle battalion), nor the inclusion in the staff of rifle units and formations of light self-propelled guns and anti-tank batteries, nor the growth of anti-tank capabilities regimental and divisional artillery did not solve the problem of close anti-tank defense at the subunit level and did not relieve the infantry from the need to fight enemy tanks with their own means. This led to heavy losses in conditions when the enemy often resorted to counterattacks involving tanks, armored vehicles and self-propelled guns, and the time to organize defense and bring up artillery was extremely limited. An example of this is the heavy fighting in the area of ​​the lake. Balaton in February-March 1945. When artillery was concentrated in battalion defense areas or regimental anti-tank areas, advanced units were left without anti-tank vehicles.

3. The infantry anti-aircraft armament complex began to change dramatically from the middle of 1943. - the main role was transferred to models with a cumulative warhead, primarily to RPGs. The reason for this was a change in the system of armored armaments of the armies - the withdrawal of light tanks from combat units, an increase in the thickness of the armor of medium tanks and self-propelled guns to 50-100 m, heavy ones - up to 80-200 mm. The cumulative warhead not only made it possible to significantly increase armor penetration without increasing the mass and speed of the projectile, but also created high overpressure and high temperature behind the armor more often than kinetic armor-piercing projectiles, causing detonation of the ammunition load. The new infantry anti-tank system, which developed in the post-war decades, basically took shape almost by the spring of 1945: hand and rifle cumulative grenades, single-use and reusable RPGs with cumulative rounds, mounted anti-tank grenade launchers and light recoilless guns, hand-held incendiaries, still experimental experienced anti-tank systems. Melee infantry anti-tank vehicles filled niches in all levels - short-range as an individual weapon and a means of separation and with an effective firing range of up to 200 or up to 500 m in companies, battalions and special anti-tank units.

4. An increase in the saturation of troops with light close combat anti-tank vehicles operating in infantry combat formations increased the survivability, independence and maneuverability of subunits and units, and strengthened the overall anti-tank system.

* Rifle (rifle) grenade launchers are not taken into account

** The decrease in the number of anti-tank rifles in the Soviet rifle division after 1943 is associated with a decrease in their role in the anti-tank system

*** Including self-propelled guns

The significance of the infantry's PTS can be judged at least by the fact that throughout the war tanks kept forward machine guns, and tankers developed a whole range of techniques to combat tank "destroyers" and tried not to go into battle without infantry. The rates of saturation of the PTS of the combat formations of the infantry turned out to be significantly higher than envisaged before the war, which was determined by the scale and methods of using the BTT. The role of infantry PTS increased in all types of combat. These changes in the system and nomenclature of weapons and military equipment determined the beginning of the transition from "anti-tank defense" as an important type of combat support to "fighting tanks and armored vehicles" as one of the main components of hostilities, and for the infantry this task has become the most urgent.

5. The effectiveness of the PTS in battle was determined not only by their performance characteristics, but also by the complex use of these means, the organization of close interaction between infantry, anti-tank, regimental and divisional artillery, own tank units, sappers and "chemists" (flamethrowers) both in defensive and offensive combat , the degree of preparedness of the personnel of the units. Special training tank destroyers and "armor-piercers" justified itself not only in the fight against tanks, but also, say, in the assault on fortified firing points. At the same time, the presence of trained “fighters” did not remove the tasks of fighting tanks (at least with the help of grenades) from the rest of the infantrymen. The complex use of various PTS, combined with the dynamism of the battle, also required better training of combined arms commanders at all levels.

1. Fundamentals of Defense

369. Defense pursues the goal of stubborn resistance to break up or tie up the offensive of superior enemy forces with smaller forces in a given direction in order to ensure freedom of action for friendly troops in other directions or in the same direction, but at a different time.
This is achieved by fighting to hold a certain territory (line, strip, object) for the required time.
Defense is used to:
a) gaining time necessary to concentrate and group forces and means and go on the offensive or to organize defense in a new zone;
b) pinning down the enemy in a secondary direction until the results of the offensive in the decisive direction are obtained;
c) economy of forces in a given direction in order to concentrate overwhelming forces in a decisive direction;
d) retention of certain areas (objects) of great importance.
Defense, depending on the task, forces, means and terrain, can be stubborn, on a normal or wide front, and mobile.
370. The strength of the defense lies in the combination of an organized system of fire, counterattacks from the depths and skillful use of the terrain, reinforced by engineering equipment and chemical barriers.
The defense must withstand the superior forces of the advancing enemy, who has powerful means of suppression and attacks to the full depth. Therefore, the defense must be deep.
Modern technical means of combat allow the troops to create an insurmountable defense even in a short time.

2. Defense on a normal front. Defense Organization

371. A developed defense on a normal front consists of:
a) from the main (first) line of defense, including the entire depth of the division's battle order;
b) from a combat outpost position advanced 1-3 km from the forward edge of the main line of defense;
c) from the zone of engineering-chemical obstacles, with the removal of the obstacles closest to the enemy up to 12-15 km from the front edge of the main defense zone, and further under favorable conditions;
d) from the second defensive line created in the rear of the main line of defense.
During the transition to the defense from close contact with the enemy, there may not be an obstacle strip and a military outpost position; in this case, they can be created only if the main lane is appropriately assigned to the rear of their location.

372. The main (first) line of defense serves to decisively repulse the enemy; it receives the greatest engineering development and includes all the main forces and means of defense of the division.
In the battle for her, the advancing enemy must be defeated or stopped. Therefore, she must:
a) make it difficult for the enemy to successfully use large artillery masses by depriving him of convenient observation posts and artillery position areas;
b) to mislead the enemy as to the location and outline of the forward edge, the deployment of fire weapons, the depth of the defensive zone, etc.;
c) enable the defense to concentrate the bulk of all types of fire directly in front of the forward edge;
d) have natural obstacles both in front of the forward edge and in depth, in order, in combination with artificial obstacles, to exclude or limit the use of tanks by the enemy;
e) have natural boundaries and local objects inside, the retention of which, even with small forces, will allow the defense to conduct a successful battle when the enemy breaks into the depth of the defense;
f) give the defense the possibility of an advantageous location of artillery observation posts and layered deployment of artillery in depth; g) allow the entire battle order, and especially strike groups and artillery, to be hidden from ground and air observation.

373. The front line of defense is formed by the firing positions of infantry weapons closest to the enemy, which are included in the joint defense fire system; the rear border is determined by the depth of the strike groups of the division.
The leading edge, as a rule, should be located on the slopes facing the enemy, avoiding pronounced and characteristic local objects.
The location of the front edge on the reverse slopes can only take place in cases where the terrain in front of it is under crossfire from neighboring sectors.

374. When placing troops on the defensive, one should:
a) avoid placing them in sharply pronounced islands at sharply defined lines and points, filling the latter with false trenches;
b) select artillery position areas beyond tank-inaccessible lines and in tank-inaccessible areas: deploy strike groups in areas that provide cover from observation from the ground and from the air and ensure their ease of use.

375. Troops for defense occupy: a rifle corps and a rifle division - defensive zones, rifle regiments - sections consisting of battalion regions, the borders of which are in contact.
The battle order in the defense consists of: a rifle division and a rifle regiment - from the holding down and shock groups; rifle battalion - from the first and second echelons. The strike group of the corps is usually created during a defensive battle.
A holding group, a division may consist of two or three regiments. In the latter case, separate battalions may be assigned to the strike group.
The width of the front of defense is determined by the width of the front of the holding group.
On a normal front, a rifle division can successfully defend a strip 8-12 km wide along the front and 4-6 km deep; rifle regiment - section along the front 3-5 km and in depth 2.5-3 km; battalion - an area along the front 1.5-2 km and the same depth.
In particularly important areas, the fronts of defense can be narrower, reaching up to 6 km per division.

376. The position of the outpost serves to prevent the enemy from a surprise attack, making it difficult for him to conduct ground reconnaissance, and to mislead him about the actual position of the forward edge. The position of the combat outpost consists of a system of separate fortified points that are in fire communication and covered by obstacles and barriers.
Usually one platoon from a battalion, reinforced with machine guns and infantry guns, is posted in combat guards.
The position of the outpost should not be occupied evenly and should be stronger in the directions of a probable enemy offensive.
In those directions (sections) where it is necessary to create the impression of a leading edge, the combat outposts are strengthened, and its position is equipped with anti-personnel and anti-tank obstacles.

377. A line of engineering-chemical barriers is created to delay the advancing enemy in order to gain time necessary for the organization and construction of a defensive line.
Barrages are prepared according to a certain system, in the most important directions and on lines and terrain that are advantageous for this (forests, fashion shows, etc.).
The number and strength of obstacles are determined by the availability of forces and means for this and the time during which it is necessary to detain the enemy.
Barriers must be applied massively.
The strongest obstacles are created in the areas of the probable starting position of the enemy for the offensive and on the most important approaches to the forward edge.
The location of the obstacle strip should mislead the enemy as to the actual outline of the forward edge of the main defense line.
Barriers are covered by barrier detachments (OZ). Their task is to wear down the enemy and force him to waste time fighting for overcoming obstacles.

378. The second defensive line is created by order of the corps commander in the rear of the main defensive line.
Its main purpose:
a) block access to the depth of the enemy's moving units that have broken through;
b) stop the spread of the enemy that has broken through in separate directions;
c) serve as an advantageous starting point for delivering decisive counterattacks from the depths.
It is advantageous to place the second defensive zone behind a natural anti-tank obstacle and connect it to the main defensive zone with a system of cut-off positions covering the most probable directions of an enemy breakthrough.
Removal of the second defensive line from the forward edge of the main one should rule out the possibility of its direct attack after breaking through the main defensive line and force the enemy to regroup forces and move all artillery.
Depending on the terrain conditions, this distance will usually be up to 12-15 km.
The corps reserve is usually located in the area of ​​the second defensive zone.

379. The stability of the defense largely depends on the degree of engineering support for the troops and on the equipping of the terrain with protective structures.
The engineering support of troops and terrain equipment includes:
a) preparation together with the chemical units. obstacle strips in front of the forward edge, sections of obstacles in front of the outpost position, and if there is an open flank, then on the open flank;
b) arrangement of anti-tank areas and various anti-tank obstacles throughout the depth;
c) equipment of main and reserve positions for shooters, machine guns, artillery, clearing shelling, arrangement of command posts (main and reserve), installation of obstacles against infantry, arrangement of sheltered communications, shelters, false structures and obstacles;
d) preparation of cut-off positions, second line and rear defense;
e) restoration and construction of bridges, repair and construction of roads, arrangement of landing sites, equipment of warehouses, etc.;
f) camouflage of defensive structures, disposition of troops and institutions, roads, etc.;
g) organization of water supply to the troops (drilling wells, lifting and purifying water, equipping a water point).

380. The engineering equipment of the area is produced, depending on the situation, in the following order.
Works of the first stage:
a) by the forces of the troops - clearing the view and shelling, building trenches full of profiles for shooters, machine guns, grenade launchers, mortars and guns with slots for shelter and spare positions; the arrangement of anti-personnel obstacles, the adaptation of local objects for defense, the construction of hiding firing points for heavy machine guns and infantry artillery, the provision of sheltered communication in the most important areas;
b) by engineering units - the arrangement of the most important command and observation posts, anti-tank obstacles, the installation of searchlights, the provision of troops with water, the construction of field roads necessary for the combat and economic supply of troops, and the correction of existing ones.
Works of the second stage:
a) by the forces of the troops - the arrangement of passages of communication with the rear, the construction of spare trenches, the development of works of the first stage;
b) engineering units - the construction of various kinds of shelters and spare command and observation posts.
Works of the third stage - development of works of the first and second stages.
All engineering work is carried out in conditions of careful disguise of both the work process itself and the buildings under construction. The camouflage of the defense as a whole is checked by control shots from the ground and air.
In the case of a long-term defense, the defensive zone is strengthened with reinforced concrete structures and deep zones of artificial obstacles.

381. Particular attention should be paid to the creation of a system of anti-tank obstacles both in front of the forward edge and along the entire depth.
First of all, natural obstacles should be used - ravines, forests, rivers and streams, swamps and lakes, gorges, settlements, steepness, etc.
In areas devoid of natural obstacles, artificial anti-tank obstacles should be created - minefields, gouges, strips of subtle obstacles (MZP), ditches, etc.
Strengthening natural obstacles (bogging, increasing steepness by cutting, etc.) significantly increases their barrier properties.
From a combination of natural obstacles with artificial ones, anti-tank lines and areas can be created by the target.
It is necessary to strive to create "anti-tank bags" from anti-tank areas and lines, so that enemy tanks, breaking through into the gap between two anti-tank areas, would be met by fire from a third and destroyed in the "bag".
When creating a system of anti-tank obstacles, it must be taken into account that anti-tank obstacles can play their role only if they are under real fire from direct-fire artillery.

382. When equipping a defensive zone in terms of engineering, the commanders of military units and subunits organize and direct defensive work and bear full responsibility for camouflage and the completion of work to strengthen their section and area on time. Engineering parts. as a rule, they are used to perform complex and responsible work of sensible and divisional significance and to manage the engineering work of other branches of the military.
To create a second lane, repair, restore and build roads in the military area, units located in the rear and the local population are involved.

383. Chemical means of struggle in a defensive battle are used:
a) to create an independent UZ and to strengthen engineering barriers;
b) to infect areas in front of the outpost position and the forward edge of the main line of defense;
c) to infect probable areas of enemy artillery positions and observation posts, as well as to blind the latter with smoke;
d) to infect hidden approaches from the enemy to the front line;
e) to destroy the HE of military concentrations and suitable enemy reserves;
f) to repulse an attacking enemy with flamethrowers both in front of the front line and during the battle inside the defensive zone;
g) to mask the maneuver of strike groups with smoke;
h) to provide for their troops in the event of a chemical attack by the enemy.

384. The defense cannot be considered secure if it has not provided for the repulsion of enemy aircraft by all means available to it for this purpose, and if it has not taken measures to conceal its location.
The main task of air defense in defense is to prevent an enemy attack from the air by the strike groups of the division and corps, the main artillery grouping and the most important gorges and crossings, if they are located in the location of the defensive zone.
Air defense is carried out:
a) parts of the holding groups of the defensive zone - by their own means;
b) strike groups of a regiment, division, corps reserve and main artillery group - by the means of units and artillery anti-aircraft weapons of the division and corps. Air observation and communications patrols (VNOS) are set in such a way as to provide all-round observation.
VNOS patrols are set up: in the troops (detachments) covering the barriers, in the outposts, in each battalion, at the headquarters of regiments, divisions and corps, and in all special units.

385. Defense reconnaissance must determine the strength, composition of the main grouping, and the direction of the enemy's main attack.
While still on the way, air and ground reconnaissance should detect enemy columns and, relentlessly following them, establish the area of ​​​​concentration and deployment of them.
During the period of enemy concentration, the main attention of all types of reconnaissance should be given to the detection of groupings of artillery and tanks.
In the future, reconnaissance clarifies the area of ​​​​artillery firing positions, the waiting positions of tanks, the positions of chemical units (mortars), the main infantry grouping, as well as the location or approach of motorized mechanized and cavalry units.
In view of the fact that the enemy will strive to carry out the concentration, deployment and occupation of the initial position for the offensive (attack) at night, night reconnaissance is of particular importance.
In obtaining information about the enemy, round-the-clock command observation in all branches of the armed forces, organized by the combined arms headquarters, should play an important role.

386. Control in a defensive battle must be based on a widely developed network of command posts. In addition to the main one, each unit and formation should have one or two spare command posts.
Technical communication in defense is established:
a) from the depths (in directions) - from the main command post of the senior commander to the main command post of the subordinate commander through the western command posts of the latter;
b) along the front (between neighbors) - from right to left through the main and reserve command posts.
General and private communications reserves are located at the main and reserve command posts.
Wire communication in the defense is, if possible, established bypassing tank-dangerous directions, directions of counterattacks of friendly troops, and, in any case, outside the areas of anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles. Wire communication lines are laid if there is time (and it is mandatory in tank-hazardous directions) in ditches, 10-15 cm deep.
The secrecy of communications, especially before the start of an enemy attack, is of particular importance in a defensive battle. All negotiations must be conducted with the obligatory use of negotiation tables, codes, radio signals, etc.
With the withdrawal of outposts and before the start of an enemy attack, even coded telephone conversations should be limited.
Radio transmission work is used with the beginning of an enemy attack and when fighting in the depths of a defensive zone in response to a failure in the operation of wire means.
Without limitation, radio communication applies:
a) in intelligence units;
b) for air defense and VNOS service.
Within the artillery for fire control and with aviation at airfields, radio communications are used only when the wire means of communication fail.
Communication between the interaction of infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation during the battle is carried out, as well as during the offensive.
Artillery communication with units of the holding down and strike groups is established in advance through advanced OPs and by the means of the divisional OSB. The call of artillery fire, provided for by the defense plan, according to pre-established infantry signals - rockets and radio signals.

387. The order of work of the command and staff in organizing defense depends on the time available to the troops for this purpose.
If there is enough time, the senior commander, having solved the problem on the map and giving preliminary orders to the troops, together with the headquarters commanders, heads of military branches and commanders of subordinate units, makes a personal reconnaissance of the main line of defense, paying special attention to the most important sectors,
During the reconnaissance, the senior commander clarifies his preliminary decision and personally assigns tasks on the ground to subordinate unit (formation) commanders, establishes the basis for the interaction of military branches, and gives instructions on the construction of the main defensive structures and the installation of barriers.
With a lack of time, the commanders of divisions and units, in any case, should be reconnoitred in the most important directions (sections) and established on the spot: the front line, the section (area) of the defense of the fettering group, the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe strike group and the most important tank-accessible sectors.
In both cases, tasks for subordinate units must be assigned in such a way that the troops, having reached the defense areas (sections) without delay, can immediately begin defensive work and organize interaction.

388. Organizing the defense, the senior commander announces the plan of his decision, sets tasks for the troops and indicates:
Rifle Corps Commander:
a) defensive lines of divisions;
b) the time by which the defensive zone must be occupied, and the time for the readiness of the defense;
c) general outline of the front edge;
d) what units of corps artillery are assigned to divisions as DD groups if a corps DD group is not created; tasks for groups of DD and, if necessary, artillery of PP divisions in the interests of the corps;
e) tasks of supporting aviation;
f) whether and where a strip of engineering-chemical barriers is being created, by what forces and means, the period of its readiness and the duration of the struggle on it;
g) the boundary of the second defensive line, its most important sections, where the support areas should be created in the first place, who is appointed by the head of engineering work, time, forces and means for the construction of the second defensive line; h) its reserve, its composition, tasks and location;
i) combat support measures;
j) own CP.
Division Commander:
a) areas for regiments, the composition of artillery groups of PP and other means of reinforcement; b) the outline of the leading edge;
c) the line of outpost and where to have reinforced outpost;
d) places of barriers, if barriers are created, units allocated to cover them, and ways to support the latter;
e) the composition, tasks, location of the strike group and the line that it adapts to the defense;
f) the tasks of the artillery to prepare the DON and sections of the NZO in the most important directions, to ensure the counterattacks of the strike group; tasks of the strike group's AP for the period of the battle in front of the front line, positional areas of the division's artillery;
g) the main anti-tank areas;
h) tank-hazardous areas and, accordingly, the tasks and grouping of anti-tank artillery, its own anti-tank reserve (if its formation is possible);
i) the procedure for the engineering equipment of the strip and the location of anti-tank obstacles, the period of readiness of the defense;
j) measures for combat support;
k) own CP,
Regiment commander:
a) battalion areas of the pinning group and means of their reinforcement;
b) the exact outline of the forward edge of the defense and the position of the outpost;
c) tasks, strength and composition of combat security units;
d) tank dangerous directions, lines of anti-tank obstacles and places of additional anti-tank areas;
e) the area of ​​location of the strike group, the probable directions of its counterattacks, local objects and points adapted by it to the defense, and fire missions inside the defensive zone;
f) organization of anti-tank artillery fire in front of the front edge of the defensive zone and in depth;
g) tasks for the PP artillery group to support the battalions of the pinning and shock groups, combat guards and areas of stationary artillery barrage on the ground;
h) organizing the engineering fortification of the defense sector, specifying where and what work will be carried out by the means of the division and regiment, and the timing of readiness;
i) what kind of work of the first stage to be carried out in the area of ​​​​the strike group of the regiment and how many people to allocate for work in the battalions of the restraining group from the composition of the strike group;
j) the procedure for transporting or bringing the necessary materials to the site of engineering work;
k) measures in case of a prolonged chemical attack;
l) measures for other types of combat support;
m) own CP.
The commander of the battalion of the restraining group:
a) on the expulsion of military guards and on the organization of surveillance;
b) tasks and areas of defense for rifle companies of the first and second echelons;
c) on the organization of a system of anti-personnel and anti-tank fire by setting fire missions for rifle companies of the first and second echelons (fields of fire), a machine-gun company (fire at long distances and direct fire), dagger machine guns, mortars and anti-tank artillery;
d) tasks of supporting artillery;
e) on the scope and timing of the readiness of work on the engineering equipment of the area;
f) measures to be taken in the event of a prolonged chemical attack by the enemy;
g) your CP.

389. The strength of the infantry in the defense lies in its courage, stamina and fire, which is destructive for the infantry of the enemy, in decisive counterattacks, in its ability and constant readiness to destroy the enemy in close combat with fire, grenades and bayonets. In order to preserve their fire resources until the decisive moment, riflemen and light machine guns must not prematurely open fire and reveal their position. Early detected infantry fire weapons are easily suppressed by enemy artillery fire, therefore, specially assigned groups (batteries) of heavy machine guns from temporary positions fire at long distances.
The infantry and its fire weapons should be dispersed along the front and in depth. The most effective infantry fire is crossfire from the front line, reinforced by fire from the second echelons of infantry.
To cut off enemy infantry from his tanks, it is necessary to have camouflaged dagger mounted machine guns both in front of the front edge and in depth.
Infantry defending against tanks must know for sure that the tank poses little threat to them as long as they are covered in the trenches. On the other hand, the infantry is capable of waging a successful fight against tanks (grenade and other means) with its own means. But she must always remember that her main enemy is the enemy infantry advancing behind the tanks. Therefore, the infantry, repulsing an enemy attack, must distribute its forces and means in such a way that, in defeating the tanks, the bulk of its fire weapons would be directed at the attacking infantry.
The infantry must take into account that the tank has limited surveillance and encounters great difficulty in maintaining contact with its infantry. This should be used for the main task of the defending infantry: to separate the advancing enemy infantry from the tanks and hit them with fire.
All commanders are obliged in defense to organize controlled fire in such a way that, starting from long distances, it builds up as the enemy approaches the forward edge and reaches its highest intensity at a decisive distance up to 400 m. Each point of the terrain in a zone up to 400 m from the forward edge should be under destructive fire - flank, oblique and frontal. At the joints, the fire should be especially powerful.
At the same time, it must be remembered that infantry fire will be especially effective if it turns out to be unexpected for the enemy. Therefore, sometimes it will be advantageous to let the enemy at close range and inflict heavy losses on him with sudden annihilating fire.

390. Artillery on the defensive, supplementing infantry fire, during all periods of combat fights enemy infantry, tanks and artillery and disrupts the work of command and control and its combat rear. It performs the following tasks:
a) carries out long-range fire attacks on enemy columns while they are still approaching the defensive zone;
b) maintains combat guards;
c) disrupts the planned deployment of enemy troops and the occupation of the initial position for the offensive;
d) but by the decision of the senior commander, performs counter-training;
e) during the offensive of the enemy, it strikes its infantry and tanks on the outskirts of the front line of defense, especially in areas inaccessible to infantry weapons fire;
f) put up fire barriers inside the defensive zone;
g) supports counterattacks of shock groups;
h) cuts off the intruding enemy infantry from his second echelons;
i) suppresses the most damaging enemy batteries;
j) violates the control and normal operation of the rear of the enemy.
Artillery in the defense is echeloned in such a way that even the most deeply located batteries hit enemy infantry and tanks on the approaches to the forward edge of the defensive zone with real fire.
The main condition for the successful operations of artillery in a defensive battle is the concealment of its actual grouping from the enemy. To this end, during the period of organizing the defense, a system of temporary firing positions (OP) is established, from which batteries (platoons, individual guns) fire during the period of the enemy’s approach and organization of an offensive. The temporary OP system should ensure the fulfillment of the main tasks assigned to artillery. If there are signs of an impending enemy attack, the batteries occupying temporary OPs are transferred to the main ones.
Artillery control in defense, as a rule, is centralized.
But when defending a division on a front of more than 8 km, and on very rough terrain - and with narrower fronts, the artillery groups of the PP of the holding group are usually subordinate to the rifle regiments. The AP of the strike group remains subordinate to the division commander for fire maneuver.
The interaction between the artillery groups of the AP and the infantry is built in the same way as during the offensive.
Corps artillery is usually distributed among divisions of the main direction, forming groups of DD or reinforcing groups of PP with separate divisions.
When defending a corps on a narrow front, corps artillery can form a corps group of DDs.
When choosing OP artillery PP and DD, every possibility should be taken into account to cover the batteries with natural and artificial obstacles. From each firing closed position of the battery, an observer is posted at the approaches to it for timely warning of the appearance of tanks.
Each OP battery must meet the requirements for firing at tanks with direct fire from direct shot distances. If it does not meet these requirements, then separate guns are assigned to repel tank attacks, which, on alarm, roll out for direct fire. In special cases, the entire battery on the limbers goes into anti-tank positions.
Anti-tank artillery is the main means of combating tanks both in front of the forward edge and in the depths of the defensive zone. Its grouping is determined by the degree of tank accessibility of individual sections of the defensive zone.
It is useful for the division commander to have a mobile reserve of anti-tank guns (and anti-tank mines) at his disposal to use them in the direction of the enemy's main tank attack.

391. Tanks significantly strengthen the defense and are a reliable means of defeating the enemy who has broken through into the depths of the defense.
The great maneuverability, firepower and strike power of the tanks must be fully utilized for active operations.
Tanks should be included in the anti-tank defense system as one of the decisive active means. The main tasks of tanks in defense are:
a) the defeat of the enemy, who broke into the defensive zone, and first of all his tanks;
b) the destruction of the enemy, bypassing the flank (flanks) of the defense.
When defending on a normal front, tanks, as a rule, are the strike weapon of the commander of a rifle division. When divisions are divided by difficult-to-reach obstacles (swamps, rivers, ravines, etc.) and when a division is reinforced with tanks, tanks can be assigned to the commanders of rifle regiments. However, even in this case, a sufficient tank reserve must remain in the hands of the division commander.
In order to ensure close interaction between tank subunits and the strike group, their commanders must take part in reconnaissance of the area and in the development of a joint action plan.
The personnel of tank units must know the locations of anti-tank obstacles, anti-tank guns and batteries designed to fire direct fire at enemy tanks.
The commanders of all branches of the armed forces must know perfectly well the distinguishing features of their tanks.
The waiting positions of the tanks are indicated by the commander of the combined arms in the depths of the defensive zone in areas that allow a sheltered location.
The initial positions of the tanks are equipped with special masks, and sometimes with ditches for their hidden placement and for firing from a place at the attacking enemy tanks. Similar camouflaged firing positions for tanks can be prepared in the most important areas in the depths of the defense.

392. Combat aviation in defense is a powerful fire reserve of the high command.
Great mobility and maneuverability make it possible to focus it on the threatened direction in the shortest possible time. It begins its combat activity with air attacks on enemy troops as they approach the defensive zone, attacks the enemy day and night in areas of concentration with the aim of demoralizing the enemy and inflicting defeat on him, and takes a direct part on the battlefield.
Combat aviation supporting combined arms formations during the battle performs the following tasks:
a) participates together with artillery in counter-preparation, destroying manpower, artillery and tanks in the initial position for the offensive, before the start of enemy artillery preparation;
b) conducts a fight against enemy aircraft opposing and attacking our troops;
c) during the offensive, attacks the second echelons, artillery and suitable vehicles;
d) during counterattacks, it directly participates in the destruction of the enemy that has broken through, together with strike groups and tanks;
e) destroy enemy tank, motorized and cavalry units that have broken through into the depths.

3. Conducting a defensive battle

393. A defensive battle with an advancing enemy begins at long distances - on the approach, during the period of the enemy's overcoming a strip of engineering-chemical barriers, and continues throughout the entire offensive of the enemy. Defensive combat reaches its greatest tension during the period when the enemy attacks the forward edge of the main line of defense, where heavy losses must be inflicted on the enemy. In the event of a breakthrough of the forward edge, the enemy must be finally destroyed by bringing into battle all the forces and means of defense.
As the enemy approaches, more and more forces and means are introduced into battle.
On the approach, the enemy is exposed to the combat effects of aviation and long-range artillery. During the period of combat on obstacles, aviation and long-range artillery are reinforced by the fire of light and medium-caliber artillery and infantry covering the obstacles.
In the initial position, the enemy is exposed to the fire of the main mass of artillery, aircraft and, in special cases, tanks.
In the battle for the main defensive zone, the defender introduces all his forces and means.

394. In order to disrupt an enemy attack, by decision of the corps commander, counter-training may be carried out. It is carried out by a powerful artillery strike that is unexpected for the enemy in cooperation with aviation and, in special cases, tanks (if attached). Counter-preparation against concentrated enemy troops (infantry in the initial position for the offensive, tanks in the initial positions, discovered headquarters, OPs and communication centers, etc.) is carried out in a sector whose width is determined by the amount of artillery involved for this. Counter-training should be directed against the main enemy grouping.
The moment of commencement and duration of counter-training are determined by the corps commander.
Artillery, as a rule, conducts counter-preparation from temporary positions and, at the end of it, moves to the main ones. Counter-preparation should be carried out before the start of enemy artillery preparation and will give the greatest results during the period when the enemy takes up the starting position for the offensive. Regardless of counter-preparation, during the same period it is advisable to systematically exhaust the enemy in various ways (poisonous smoke, fires, systematic bombardments by small aviation units, artillery fire raids, etc.).

395. The battalion commander defends his area, always ready for battle in the environment, remembering that the commander above him will be able to organize the destruction of the enemy who has broken through, relying on the stamina of the battalions stubbornly defending their areas.
The main task of the first echelon battalion is to prevent the attacking infantry and enemy tanks from breaking through the front edge of the defensive zone.
For this purpose, the battalion commander uses the long-range fire of his machine guns, trying to hit the enemy infantry while still in its initial offensive position. As the enemy infantry approaches, the battalion commander builds up the force of fire by successively introducing new fire weapons into battle and, finally, at a decisive distance, falls upon the attacking infantry with all infantry fire weapons and supporting artillery fire and, separating it from the tanks and pressing it to the ground, shoots with massive fire and beats her.
If individual enemy groups are wedged into the defense position, the battalion commander pins them down with fire, destroys them with a short bayonet strike and restores the position.
Anti-tank guns open fire on tanks on their own. Having repelled tank attacks and immediately changed firing positions, they open fire on machine guns and tank escort guns.
The battalion commander must always remember that the success of the battle of the battalion determines the success of the regiment and division.

396. The regimental commander influences the battle of the battalions of the holding group by concentrating artillery fire on the battle formations of the attacking enemy.
In the event of a breakthrough of enemy tanks through the forward edge, the regiment commander, placing the fight against them on anti-tank and additionally allocated artillery and his tanks, directs his main efforts to destroy the directly attacking and advancing enemy infantry from the depths.
If the enemy infantry breaks through the front line and moves into the depths of the defense, the regiment commander, in the sector of one of the battalions, creates a barrier with all the power of his fire in its path and counterattacks it with his strike group.
With a simultaneous breakthrough of the entire fettering group and in other cases when it is impossible to restore the situation by the forces of the regiment, the regiment commander goes over to the defensive with his strike group at the prepared line, thus ensuring the attack of the strike group of the division.

397. The division commander concentrates the barrage fire of the division's artillery on the main attacking forces of the enemy, trying to prevent them from attacking the front line.
In the event of a breakthrough of enemy tanks into the depth of defense, the division commander throws his mobile anti-tank reserve against them and attacks enemy tanks with his tanks, preventing them from reaching artillery positions. Having thrown back the enemy tanks and achieved the disorder of his infantry, the division commander, relying on the fire of the battalions and the counterattacks of the regiments, in turn, organizes a counterattack with his strike group, destroys the enemy that has broken through and restores the violated position.
All free forces of the division must be used for the counterattack.
In the event of an enemy breakthrough along the entire defense front, the division commander, depending on the situation, may abandon the counterattack and go over to the defensive at a line prepared in advance by the strike group.

398. A counterattack is carried out both on the orders of the senior commander and on the initiative of the commander of the strike group, if there is no communication with the commander during the growing crisis of the battle. The final success of the defense depends on the timeliness and strength of the strike group's counterattack.
The counterattack must necessarily be prepared with all the might of the fire and carried out secretly, decisively and quickly.
The commander of the strike group, having made a decision, immediately sets the task of both his artillery of the PP, and additionally assigned for this. Artillery concentrates fire on the enemy infantry that has broken through, and the strike group quickly moves out, deploying on the move, to the starting line for the counterattack, having security in the direction of the threatened directions.
Before an attack by a strike group, its heavy machine guns pin down enemy infantry with fire, and infantry artillery destroys its machine guns and tanks. Artillery PP with the beginning of the attack cuts off the intruding infantry from its second echelons.
In a joint strike with tanks, the strike group acts with them, as in an offensive battle.
The defensive actions of the strike group in the event of a breakthrough of the enemy along the entire front are carried out on the lines prepared by it.
Having quickly taken up prepared positions, the strike group covers the retreat of the units of the holding group with all its firepower.

399. All PP and DD artillery, as well as artillery from neighboring non-attacked sectors, takes part in repelling enemy attacks on the forward edge of the defensive zone.
The main task of light and heavy artillery at that time was to separate the attacking infantry from the tanks. Tanks approaching the forward edge are destroyed by anti-tank artillery fire. The destruction of tanks that have broken through the forward edge is completed in the depths of the defensive zone with all the means at the disposal of the defender, primarily artillery and tanks.
From the moment the tanks come within range of effective anti-tank artillery fire, the bulk of the artillery transfers fire to the enemy infantry and tank escort guns.
PP artillery batteries continue to fight enemy manpower until the moment when this battery needs to open fire on tanks for self-defense.
Immediately after the destruction of tanks in the area of ​​​​its location, the battery switches to infantry support.

400. The corps commander in most cases has only a reserve. As the most dangerous direction of the enemy's breakthrough is revealed, the corps commander, using supporting aircraft to strike, forms a strike group from his reserve, the reserves attached to him by the high command, as well as from those infantry and artillery units of the defending divisions that can be attracted in the course of the battle and which can arrive in time to the threatened area for a counterattack.
If the reserve of the corps commander is small, the reserve of the corps can be used to reinforce divisions or for independent active operations with the aim of temporarily delaying the further development of the enemy offensive.
A successful counterattack, as a result of which the enemy was defeated, the corps commander must always strive to develop it into a counteroffensive, going beyond the corps' defensive zone. The corps commander reports to the army commander about the decision to counteroffensive and informs the neighbors.

401. In the event of a breakthrough through the main defensive zone of large mechanized enemy units, the corps commander must take over the fight against them. Divisional commanders should not be distracted from the struggle for the main line of defense. All actions of the corps commander should be aimed at delaying the breakthrough area when using the second defensive line, and cut-off positions in order to prevent the enemy from spreading in depth and towards the flanks.
To fight the enemy mechanized units that have broken through, the corps commander uses all his forces and means and supporting aircraft.
All logistics establishments and units must be ready to take cover in the nearest points (regions) inaccessible to tanks and defend themselves there with their own forces.
A deep breakthrough of mechanized units is liquidated by army reserves and aviation.

402. Fighting enemy landings is carried out by mobile detachments formed by the commanders of the formations and units in whose location the landing has landed. Aviation attacks the landing force in flight and during its landing, monitors its movement and directs mobile detachments at it. To combat landings, by order of the high command, if necessary, special detachments with high mobility can be created.

4. Features of conducting a defensive battle at night

403. Night, making it difficult to observe, conduct actual fire, command and control troops, facilitates the achievement of surprise and increases the impressionability of the troops. Therefore, in passing from day to night defense, it is necessary to take a whole series of measures to weaken the negative influence of night on the conduct of a defensive battle.
At night, it is necessary to strengthen reconnaissance and security, as well as some sections of the barriers, especially on the flanks and junctions of battalion areas, in order to prevent possible surprise attacks from the enemy.
Infantry fire weapons and artillery must prepare data before daylight for firing at various lines and points at night.
Systematic illumination should ensure continuous observation of the terrain ahead of the front line and in the enemy's disposition.
The strike groups must be pulled forward and positioned in such a way that they have the best conditions for counterattacks.
To avoid losses, the machine guns of the shackling groups should be placed in new positions; machine guns located in the depths during the day should be brought closer to the front edge to increase the fire in front of it.

404. The reflection of the night offensive of the enemy is carried out according to a previously developed plan, providing for:
a) reconnaissance activities;
b) places of guarding units advanced for the night;
c) the choice of firing positions for the night installation of heavy and light machine guns and the organization of machine gun fire with and without artificial lighting;
d) places for the night location of strike groups;
e) organization of illumination of the area with searchlights and rockets;
c) measures to repel a chemical attack;
g) preparation of artillery fire on individual sectors and targets;
h) additional sections of wire and other barriers.

405. Artillery prepares during the day all the data for opening fire. Fire on the advancing enemy is opened at the request of the infantry and its signals (colored rockets, etc.), which are set by the division commander and delivered from the side of the sectors being attacked. The terrain ahead of the forward edge is divided into areas plotted on the map; data for opening fire, but artillery prepares these areas in advance (in the afternoon). It is useful to occupy open positions with separate guns for direct fire at enemy searchlights.

406. Artificial lighting is provided by flares, luminous projectiles and searchlights. Searchlights are placed in such a way as not to illuminate the location of their troops. Searchlights blind the advancing enemy and at the same time expose him to the concentrated fire of machine guns and artillery. Lighting with searchlights begins at the signals set to call for artillery fire.
Spotlights tend to have multiple positions; they are changed if necessary.

407. The success of a night defense depends on the composure of the commanders, the steadfastness of the fighters, the fire prepared before dark, and decisive counterattacks, even if carried out by small forces.
The attacking enemy must be met with organized fire, especially on obstacles, and upon further approach, shot at point-blank range, thrown with hand grenades and finished off with a bold bayonet strike.
When the enemy captures part of our positions, the strike groups and the reserve must drive him out with decisive counterattacks, preventing him from gaining a foothold.
The repulsed enemy must be pursued by fire and the advance of individual subunits in order to establish his actual retreat to his position.
Until it is definitely established that the enemy has withdrawn to his position, no unit has the right to go to rest.
The violated position must be immediately restored, reconnaissance and guards must be sent out again, the destroyed artificial obstacles must be repaired and ready to repel new attacks.
At dawn, in compliance with all camouflage measures, the units, by special order of their commanders, must move to daytime disposition.

5. Defense of fortified areas

408. Fortified areas are created in advance with the aim of:
a) keep in their hands economically, politically and militarily important points and areas;
b) provide space for the deployment and maneuver of troops;
c) cover the flanks of formations striking in the main direction, providing them with freedom of maneuver.
The task of a fortified area is to force the enemy into a frontal attack, forcing him to waste time concentrating large forces and powerful means of suppression. The stubborn defense of long-term fortifications makes it possible to inflict heavy losses on the enemy by fire and break him with a blow to the flank.
The military formations of the sector (section) of the fortified area part of the forces occupy the areas of the long-term defensive zone, part of the forces occupy the field defensive structures, creating greater strength and depth of defense, and part of the forces form the strike group.
The defense of fortified areas and the procedure for the interaction of field troops with them are provided for by special instructions.

6. Defense of the river

409. The river impedes the offensive and strengthens the defense.
The strength of the river boundary as an obstacle depends on the width, depth, speed of the current, the nature of the banks, the properties and width of the valley, the presence of fords, channels, islands, the sinuosity of the channel, the properties of the bottom, etc.
Depending on the time of the year and the state of the weather, even an insignificant river can be a serious obstacle for an attacker, especially for tanks, if it has sufficient depth, a swampy bottom, and steep banks.
The defensive properties of the river boundary can be enhanced, in addition to artificially raising the water level, by a system of artificial barriers (increasing the steepness of the banks, laying mines and wire obstacles in the water, etc.).

410. When defending a river, the forward edge of the main belt is usually chosen on its own side of the river.
If the river has a wide open valley, the front line of defense is pulled back to an advantageous line providing observation and fire, and only guards are advanced to the river bank.
Otherwise, the leading edge, as a rule, should be chosen along the river bank.
If necessary, the defensive strip along the river is equipped with camouflaged roads and a communications network, which ensure the maneuver of troops both for counterattacks and for going over to the offensive.
In the secondary sections of the river, in order to save forces, troops can receive sections and strips wider than normal for defense.
In this case, the defense of the river is organized on the basis of conducting defense on a broad front.

411. When organizing the defense of a river, it is necessary to establish areas that give the enemy the greatest advantage in forcing and allow him to carry out preparatory work covertly.
The defense must be organized in such a way that the bulk of artillery fire is concentrated along the approaches to areas of probable crossings, along areas of probable concentration of the enemy, and the main mass of fire of all types, and especially flank fire, is concentrated along the approaches to the river, at probable places of preparation and guidance of crossings and along the river itself. The fords must be mined.
The areas of possible crossings should be carefully monitored day and night.
Infantry fire must be organized in such a way that fire weapons do not reveal themselves until the main enemy forces have crossed. Special rifle and machine-gun subunits are assigned to fight small enemy groups that are crossing.
To provide artillery fire on large-scale maps or plans, the riverbed is divided into squares. Artillery must be prepared to open fire on any of them at the request of the infantry.
When organizing defense on one's own shore, all bridges are destroyed, local crossing facilities of the opposite shore are assembled and transferred to one's own shore.
The shock groups are positioned in such a way as to be able to quickly approach any point of a possible crossing and immediately throw enemy units that have crossed into the river.
In repulsing an enemy offensive, it is advantageous to use aviation to strike at enemy units, especially at the moment of their crossing, and on bridges.

412. When organizing the defense of a river, in anticipation of a transition to the offensive, on the opposite bank against existing or newly arranged crossings, bridgeheads (tet-de-pons) are firmly engaged in defense. The removal of bridgeheads and their number are determined by the number of troops assigned to defend the bridgeheads.
The smallest distance of the bridgehead should provide a crossing from enemy infantry fire and artillery observation.
The mutual arrangement of the bridgeheads should be such that going on the offensive from them would lead to advantageous tactical cooperation.
The location of the artillery should correspond to the idea of ​​going on the offensive and provide fire support for the bridgehead from its own bank.

7. Defense on a broad front

413. Defense on a wide front is used when a military formation is given a front for defense that exceeds the normal one.
It is used mainly in secondary areas.
The organization of defense on a broad front depends entirely on the extent of the front of defense and on the nature of the terrain.
On terrain that is accessible everywhere, defense on a broad front is built on the occupation and retention of tactically advantageous individual areas that are in fire communication with each other.
Depending on the length of the front, fire communication can be carried out by machine-gun and artillery fire, or only by artillery.
The areas to be defended in their totality should represent a single system of firmly occupied local points blocking the enemy's access, especially in the most important directions.
The gaps between the districts are occupied by small subunits with machine guns and filled with false structures in order to introduce the enemy and mislead the real location of the defense.
In addition, gaps between districts are blocked by engineering and technical obstacles.
Defense on a broad front and on terrain accessible everywhere is organized:
a) rifle battalion on the front 4 - 5 km;
b) rifle regiment 8 - 10 km;
c) rifle division 18 - 20 km.
On the terrain, only those areas that intercept the most important directions of a probable enemy offensive are engaged in defense that is not everywhere accessible. Under these conditions, the defense can be stable even in the absence of fire communications between areas.

414. The basis of defense on a broad front is the battalion area. The defense of the battalion area must be built in such a way that it ensures the battalion a successful fight, even when it is completely surrounded, for the entire time necessary for the senior commander to organize a counterattack.
The struggle of the battalion in the environment during the defense on a wide front is a frequent occurrence, therefore, in order to make the defense more stable and independent, it is advisable to reinforce the battalion with divisional artillery, infantry artillery guns, engineering and chemical units.

415. In defense on a broad front, the creation of a strong strike group in a regiment, and a division and a reserve in a corps, is of particular importance.
The strike group of the regiment, located 5-6 km behind the battalions of the first line in the most dangerous direction, must be constantly ready to support them. In the event of a breakthrough of the defended front or the encirclement of individual areas, the strike group of the regiment, relying on the surviving areas, with bold counterattacks on the flank and rear of the broken enemy, restores the position, and if it is impossible, delays the development of the enemy offensive until the approach of the strike group of the division.
The strike group of the regiment on the defensive on a wide front, in order to most successfully repulse unexpected enemy raids, especially at night, equips its position under all conditions for all-round defense. For the same reasons, the regimental headquarters is located along with the strike group.
The strike group of a division must have high mobility and be located at one or several points, but always near road junctions leading to all or to the most important sectors of the defense front. The strike group of the division should include infantry in vehicles, artillery, tanks and cavalry.

416. Control and selection of means of communication in defense on a broad front are of particular importance. It is difficult to prevent the penetration of small groups of the enemy and individual people into the defense positions through the weakly occupied gaps between areas. Therefore, eavesdropping on telephone conversations, gusts of wires, especially before an offensive and during a battle, will be quite frequent. In addition, there may be cases when individual areas will have to fight in full encirclement.
Therefore, the main means of communication in defense conditions on a broad front will be radio communication, duplicated by pigeons, optical and dogs. Combat vehicles and aircraft should be widely used for communications.

8. Mobile Defense

417. Mobile defense is used in those cases when the overwhelming superiority of the enemy precludes the conduct of a stubborn defense on a normal, as well as on a wide front. Mobile defense pursues the goal of gaining the time necessary to organize defense on a new line, to ensure the concentration of troops in a given direction, or to ensure freedom of action for troops in other directions, by losing space.
Mobile defense is carried out in a designated zone and is carried out in a series of successive defensive battles at predetermined lines.
The number of defensive lines in a given zone and the duration of resistance on each of them depend on the time required to delay the enemy and are established by the senior commander.
The main line is assigned by the division or corps commander. This line is the limit of the mobile defense, and as soon as the troops reach it, they switch to a stubborn defense.
Intermediate lines are usually assigned by the division commander, and in some cases by unit commanders.
The distance of intermediate lines from each other is appointed in such a way that the enemy, after capturing one of the lines, is forced to advance his entire battle formation, with a change in artillery firing positions, and organize a new offensive to capture the next line.
When choosing a frontier, the presence of hidden escape routes from it and open terrain in the direction of the enemy is of great importance.

418. A formation (unit) conducts a mobile defense, occupying intermediate lines in echelons. The strength and composition of these echelons vary depending on the mission, the nature of the enemy's actions, the terrain, etc., in the course of mobile defense.
The management of divisional artillery in mobile defense is, as a rule, decentralized, and artillery is distributed among regiments and even battalions. In some cases, it is advisable to strengthen some units with tanks. Basically, tanks are used massively and are the mobile strike means of the formation commander.
The defensive line is held by the first echelon until the second echelon is fully prepared for battle at its line.
The first echelon, having crossed the line of the second echelon, follows to the next line, where it immediately organizes defense or forms a strike group if the withdrawal is made to the main line.

419. Troops defending an intermediate line must inflict losses on the advancing enemy, force him to turn around, waste time organizing an offensive, and, without engaging in a stubborn battle with him, slip away from the blow.
Troops defending an intermediate line begin to hit the enemy at long and extreme distances with artillery and machine-gun fire. As the enemy approaches, the defense commits all of its weapons to the battle. Aviation inflicts losses on the enemy with concentrated strikes and actions of small groups and delays his movement. Tanks alone and together with cavalry and infantry inflict short blows on the enemy.

420. In a mobile defense, in order to gain the greatest amount of time for organizing resistance both on intermediate lines and on the main one, the consistent installation of engineering-chemical barriers in the zones between the lines and on the most important approaches to them is of particular importance. For this purpose, the troops conducting mobile defense are reinforced with engineering and chemical means.

421. The basis of the communication system in mobile defense is the communication axis of a military formation throughout the entire depth of the defense zone with reporting points (PS) on the axis.
Mobile defense makes extensive use of radios, vehicles, and signaling. The use of wire means is limited.
For the timely preparation of communications at subsequent defense lines, communications reserves are echeloned. Reserves must be strong and mobile. In the axial direction, it is necessary to have movable units to collapse the axis lines and at the same time to lay new ones in depth.
Report collection points (RS) are deployed in the areas designated for the CP and carry out their service on consistently defended lines until the withdrawal of subordinate headquarters (CP) to a new line.
The initial PS is established in the area of ​​​​the headquarters (CP) of the formation (unit) at the first line of defense. At the same time, the PS is deployed at the next turn.
PS departs jumps.
PS, in addition to mobile vehicles, may have a radio station, signaling means.

9. Exit from the battle and retreat

422. The decision to withdraw is made when further continuation of the battle is pointless and unprofitable, and when only by withdrawal can the threat of defeat be avoided. The decision to retreat is possible only as a last resort, when all means to achieve victory have been exhausted. In all cases, the withdrawal should pursue the goal of achieving freedom of action, gaining time and occupying the most advantageous position.
The withdrawal of a military unit can be made only by order of the senior commander. The commander of a military formation, on his own initiative, can withdraw only some parts of his formation in order to accept the most advantageous grouping for continuing the battle with the enemy, in accordance with the task previously set by the senior commander.
Only the lack of communication gives the commander of a military unit the right to make a decision to withdraw ahead of the deadline set by the senior commander.
Making an independent decision to withdraw, the commander of a military formation withdraws units to such a distance that the neighbors will not be placed in a critical situation.

423. Any retreat must be organized and carried out according to a definite plan. Withdrawal is one of the most difficult types of maneuver.
The exit plan includes:
a) the occupation of a new defensive zone with the distribution of forces and means for defense on it;
b) ways and order of withdrawal for each part of the military unit;
c) ways, order, areas of withdrawal of rear institutions, procedure for evacuation of the wounded, sick and property;
d) the appointment of units that ensure the exit from the battle;
e) the composition of the rearguard (in separate columns), the lines on which the rearguards must linger and for how long;
f) organization of air defense and chemical defense;
g) measures to combat parallel persecution;
h) measures to correct escape routes, bridges and destroy them behind them; i) communication during withdrawal and its destruction after itself;
j) general measures for the obstruction and capital destruction of the retreat; k) transfer of airfields and landing sites.

424. In case of close contact with the enemy, withdrawal from the battle is preceded by.
Exit from the battle is possible in various conditions environment.
It can be produced: under the onslaught of the enemy, during the calm of the battle suddenly for him.
Exit from the battle can be carried out in day and night conditions.
In all cases, the exit from the battle should be planned, which is most easily achieved after dark; therefore, it is necessary, even in difficult conditions, to strive to hold out on the spot until dusk.

425. When organizing an exit from a battle, a combined-arms commander, regardless of the time of day, is obliged, first of all, to ensure the separation of the troops connected by battle from the enemy. To do this, he occupies a rear defensive line, which is intended to take over the retreating units and cover their retreat with his fire.
To occupy this line, the second echelons (shock groups, reserve) are used, and in their absence, parts of the battle formation, which can be removed during the battle, and also all the artillery that can be brought in for this purpose.
In the daytime, in open areas, detachment and withdrawal from the battle of retreating units are carried out simultaneously on a wide front and in rifts, under the cover of both their own fire, and especially fire from the rear line and combat aviation.
Tank units can be used for private counterattacks against an advancing enemy.
During the night exit from the battle, you can limit yourself to cover with small reconnaissance units and patrols and individual subunits, reinforced with machine guns and individual infantry artillery guns. The left cover, in order to mislead the enemy, shows the same activity that preceded the withdrawal.

426. Having passed the rear line, the retreating troops quickly gather in designated areas, put in order, roll up into columns and, without delay, continue to withdraw, under the cover of rearguards, which are mainly created from units of the rear line.
In the event that, due to the conditions of the situation, the units that have left the battle, having passed the rear line, cannot continue further withdrawal under the cover of the rearguards, they make it by the methods of mobile defense.

427. When organizing a withdrawal, it is necessary to take measures to repulse attacks by enemy aircraft and mobile units.
For this it is necessary: ​​to regroup anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns in advance, to strengthen the air defense of the gorges on the withdrawal routes, to prevent the accumulation of troops, artillery, convoys in open areas. At the same time, anti-chemical measures should be provided. Degassing affinities follow in the head of the departing units in readiness for rapid degassing of the passages in case of encountering chemical contamination on the escape routes.
The planned withdrawal is facilitated by the absence of delays on the way, for which it is necessary to take timely measures to clear the rear routes.
The fight against parallel pursuit is carried out by the movement on the flanks of the retreating units of detachments from all branches of the armed forces, as well as cavalry and tanks, by the installation of barriers and destruction.
Combat aviation assists the rearguard in delaying the advancing enemy and ensures the withdrawal of the main forces from air reconnaissance and attack. During the withdrawal period, it attacks and delays the bypassing and parallel pursuing units. Tanks, cavalry and motorized infantry should be the main objects of air attack.

428. In order to delay the movement of the pursuing enemy, bridges, roads and structures are destroyed according to the general plan of the senior commander. The plan indicates a list of structures to be destroyed, by whose order the destruction is carried out and the time of destruction. For the destruction of railway stations and their structures, crossings and tracks, special teams are allocated from the main forces, if railway units have not been allocated or are missing. The bridges over which the rearguard must pass are left unblown, but prepared to be blown up. Teams left on these bridges produce an explosion after the rearguard crosses the bridge. Small parts can be diverted to the other side via bridges from light crossing equipment, if the bridge must be blown up in advance.

429. Departure management must be particularly flexible and requires extensive use of mobile communications equipment and communications delegates. To exit the battle, short private orders are given.
A general order may be issued to organize a general withdrawal upon leaving the battlefield.
Senior commanders and their staffs personally supervise the exit from the battle, the passage of troops through the rear line, and putting them in order.
Headquarters are removed from their places only after the withdrawal is organized and the main forces have begun to move.
In the future, depending on the course of events, the headquarters withdraw either in columns or in rolls from line to line, if the withdrawal takes on the character of a mobile defense.

430. The basis of communication when leaving the battle and during withdrawal is the communication axis of the formation (unit) with collection points and intermediate communication stations located on the axis.
Disengagement and withdrawal require the use of radio communications, mobile equipment, signaling equipment and high maneuverability of communications equipment and reserves.
Radio communication, used primarily by radio signaling, is the main means of communication.
The use of wire means is limited by the presence of a communication axis and individual directions at intermediate boundaries.
Particular attention is paid to ensuring the communication of the rearguards and flank detachments with the combined arms commander and the organization of communication of interaction with attached and supporting reinforcement units.

On the example of the domestic armed forces.

Charter of the combat infantry service. Project (1897).

Wartime company front - 200 steps (p. 181).

Wartime battalion front - approx. 400 steps with two companies in the combat unit (there may be one, two or three companies in the combat unit) (p. 228, 230).

Manual for action in battle units from all types of weapons. Project (1901).

The length of the battle formation front can be (clause 20):

For a regiment - up to 1,000 steps;
For the brigade - up to 1 verst;
For a division - up to 2 versts;
For the body - up to 3 versts.

Manual for the action in battle of detachments from all types of weapons (1904).

The length of the front of the battle order can be (clause 23):

For a battalion - approx. 400 steps;
For a regiment - up to 1,000 steps;
For the brigade - up to 1 verst;
For a division - up to 2 versts;
For the body - up to 3 versts.

Each battalion of three-battery artillery in a combat unit increases the length of the battle order by approximately 600 paces.

Infantry drill charter (1908).

The average length of a wartime chain is 250-300 steps (p. 199).

The battle formation of a battalion is made up of companies assigned to company combat sectors and companies left in the battalion reserve. All companies of the battalion can be in combat sectors (paragraph 258).

For a regiment, the order is similar to a battalion (paragraph 284)

Drill cavalry charter (1912).

The interval between people is on average 3 steps;
Platoon - 40-80 steps (p. 376).

Field Service Charter (1912).

The length of the battle formation along the front (paragraph 452):

Battalion - ok. ½ verst;
Polk - ok. 1 verst;
Brigade - ok. 2 versts;
Division - ok. 3 versts;
Housing - 5-6 versts.

General instructions for the struggle for fortified zones. Part I: the actions of all branches of the armed forces (1916).

The offensive front for the division is 1-2 versts (p. 99b).
The section of the division in the defense is 5-10 versts (p. 268).

Field Charter of the Red Army. Part I. Maneuverable war (1918).

The length of the combat sector (paragraph 477) during the offensive:

Battalion - up to ½ verst;
Regiment - up to 1-2 versts;
Brigade - 2-4 miles;
Division - 3-6 miles;
Housing - 5-10 versts.

When attacking heavily fortified positions on a division of 1-2 versts.

On defense (passive):

Battalion - up to 1 verst;
Regiment - up to 3 versts;
Brigade - up to 6 miles;
Division - up to 10 miles;
Body - up to 20 versts.

For active defense - the norms as in the offensive.

Combat infantry charter. Part I (1919).

The average length of the battle formation of a company is 200-250 steps (p. 216).

Combat infantry charter. Part II (1919).

Offensive front (p. 19):

Battalion - up to ½ verst;
Regiment - 1-2 miles.

Defense front:

Battalion - up to 1 verst;
Regiment - up to 3 versts.

Field Charter of the Red Army. Part II (division and corps) (1925).

Section along the front (p. 822) on the offensive:

For a regiment - from 750 m to 2 km;
For the division - from 1 to 4 km.

On defense:

For the regiment - from 2 to 4 km;
For the division - from 4 to 10 km.

The combat charter of the infantry of the Red Army. Ch. II (1927).

Advance front width:

Battalion - if less than 500 m, then the formation is three-echelon (one company per echelon) (paragraph 347).
Company - 300-400 m (p. 511).
Platoon - ok. 150 m (p. 611).

District defense area (p. 106):

Battalion - from 1x1 to 2x2 km;
Rota - from 500x500 m to 1x1 km;
Platoon - up to 500x500 m.

Battalion defense on a wide front - from 2 to 5 km (p. 118).

Field Charter of the Red Army (1929).

The width of the strip of action (p. 139) in the offensive:

Regiment in the strike group - 1-2 km;
The strike group of the division without reinforcements - 2 km;
Striking group of the corps - 4-6 km.

On the defensive:

Regiment - 3-4 km;
Division - 8-12 km;
Corps - 24-30 km.

The combat charter of the cavalry. Part II. Sec. I (1929).

Front on the offensive:

Platoon - up to 100 m (p. 244);
Squadron - up to 400 m (p. 398);
Regiment - up to 2 km (p. 550).

Defense area:

Platoon - up to 150x200 m (p. 244);
Squadron - up to 500x500 m; on a wide front up to 1x1 km (p. 413);
Regiment - up to 2-3 km; on a wide front - up to 4 km; dismounted entirely - up to 1-1.5 km (p. 552).

Instructions on the tactics of units and subunits of the cavalry of the Red Army. Provisional Guide (1935).

Offensive lane:

Regiment - up to 2 km (p. 232);
Squadron - 300-500 m (p. 637);
Platoon - 100-150 m (p. 745).

Area (section) of defense:

Regiment - up to 3 x 2.5-3 km; on a wide front up to 5 km; dismounted entirely - up to 1-1.5 km (p. 445);
Squadron - 0.5-1 x 0.5-1 km (p. 637);
Platoon - up to 300x300 m (p. 745).

Temporary Field Charter of the Red Army (1936).

The width of the offensive front, depending on the reinforcement (p. 175):

Battalion - 600 - 1,000 m;
The strike group of the division without reinforcement - 2-2.5 km;
The strike group of the division with reinforcement - 3-3.5 km.

The total width of the offensive zone of a division can be twice the zone of the strike group.

Front of normal defense (paragraph 229):

Battalion - 1.5–2.5 x 1.5–2 km;
Regiment - 3–5 x 2.5–3 km;
Division - 8-12 x 4-6 km.

The combat charter of the infantry of the Red Army. Part I (1938).

The platoon advance front is up to 150 m (p. 252).

Platoon defense area - up to 300x250 m, with reinforcement - up to 500x250 m (p. 297).

The combat charter of the Red Army cavalry. Part I (1938).

Platoon line in the offensive - 100-150 m (p. 351).

Platoon defense area - 200-300 x 200-300 m (p. 387).

The combat charter of the Red Army cavalry. Part II (1940).

Offensive lane:

Regiment - on the main line 1.5 km; in a secondary direction up to 3 km (p. 236);
Squadron - up to 300 m (p. 320).

Defensive area:

Regiment - up to 2x3 km; on a wide front 2-4 km; in mobile defense up to 4 km (p. 356);
Squadron - up to 600x600 m (p. 446).

The combat charter of the infantry of the Red Army. Part II. Project (1940).

Front of attack:

Company - 200-500 m (p. 42);
Battalion - 400-1000 m (p. 207);
Regiment in the strike group - 1-1.5 km; in the restraining group - 2-3 km (p. 482); When advancing on the front no more than 600 m - construction in three echelons (p. 483).

Defense area:

Rota - up to 1x1 km (p. 98);
Battalion - up to 2x2 km (p. 306);
Battalion on a wide front - up to 5 km (p. 351);
Regiment - 3-5 x 2.5-3 km (p. 542);
Regiment on a wide front - up to 8 km (p. 566).

Combat regulations of the infantry of the Red Army. Part I (1942).

Front of attack:

Platoon - up to 100 m (p. 253);
Company - up to 350 m (p. 466).

Defense area:

Platoon - up to 300x250 m (p. 291);
Rota - up to 700x700 m (p. 542).

Combat regulations of the infantry of the Red Army. Part II (1942).

Front of attack:

Battalion - up to 700 m (p. 19);
Regiment - up to 1,500 m (p. 429).

Defense area:

Battalion - up to 2 x 1.5-2 km (p. 132);
Under conditions of positional defense, the regiment receives a section of the main line of defense, the size of which depends on the tasks and on the nature of the terrain (paragraph 625).

Field charter of the Red Army. Project (1943).

Division on the offensive - approx. 4 km, but not less than 3 (p. 161).

The division on the defensive - up to 10 km along the front and 5-6 km in depth (p. 483).

The brigade is on the defensive - 5–6 km along the front (p. 483).

Combat charter of BT and MV of the Red Army. Part II (1944).

The width of the front in the offensive (p. 38, 40):

Tank brigade - 1-1.5 km;
Mechanized brigade - 1.5-2 km;
Motorized rifle brigade - 1-1.5 km;
Tank regiment - 600 - 1,200 m;
Motorized rifle battalion - 500-700 m.

The width of the front in defense (p. 38):

Tank brigade - up to 3 km;
Mechanized brigade - 4-6 km;
Motorized rifle brigade - 3-5 km;
Tank regiment - up to 1.5 km;
Motorized rifle battalion - 1-1.5 km.

Field charter of the Soviet Army (regiment - battalion) (1953).

When attacking a prepared defense (p. 129, 200):

Rifle regiment - up to 2 km;
Mechanized regiment - up to 2 km;
Tank regiment - up to 1.5 km;
Rifle battalion - up to 1 km;
Motorized rifle battalion - up to 1 km;
Tank battalion - up to 750 m.

Cavalry regiment when attacking a hastily organized defense - up to 1.5 km (p. 219).

Section (district) of defense (p. 379, 455, 464):

Rifle, motorized rifle, mechanized regiment - 4-6 x 4-5 km;
Tank regiment - up to 4x4 km;
Cavalry regiment - up to 3x3 km;
Battalion - up to 2 x 1.5-2 km;
Company - 800-1000 x 400-600 m.

Defense on a broad front (n. 438, 464):

Rifle regiment - 8-10 km;
Cavalry regiment - 4-5 km;
Tank regiment - 6-8 km;
Rifle battalion - up to 5 km;
Tank battalion - 3-4 km.

Field charter of the Soviet Army (regiment - battalion) (1959).

The offensive zone during the breakthrough of the prepared defense (p. 96):

Regiment - up to 4 km;
Battalion - up to 1.5 km.

Section (district) of defense (clause 283):

Regiment - up to 6-10 x 6-8 km;
Battalion - up to 2-3 x 2 km.
Rota - up to 1 km.

When defending on a wide front, etc.:

Regiment - up to 15 km;
Battalion - up to 5 km.
Rota - up to 1.5 km.

Combat charter of the Ground Forces (battalion - company) (1964).

Offensive front (p. 89):

Battalion - up to 2 km; without the use of nuclear weapons up to 1,000 m;
Company - up to 800 m; without the use of nuclear weapons up to 500 m.

Defense area (p. 173, 175):

Battalion - up to 5x2 km;
Company - up to 1000x500 m.

Combat Charter of the Ground Forces. Part II: battalion - company (1982).

Offensive front (p. 61):

Battalion - up to 2 km; without the use of nuclear weapons up to 1 km;
Rota - up to 1 km; without the use of nuclear weapons up to 500 m;
Platoon - up to 300 m.

Defense area (p. 173, 175):

Battalion - up to 5x3 km;
Rota - up to 1500x1000 m;
Platoon - up to 400x300 m.