The transformation of the imperialist war into a civil one. The focus of the transformation of "imperialist" into "civilian. "Ignite the proletarian revolution in the West"
Lenin on the Civil War
Anyone who claims it's a civil war
in Russia there is no conscious cause of the Bolsheviks
either cunning, or does not know his history
V. I. LENIN, VOLUME 26, July 1914 ~ August 1915, PUBLISHING HOUSE OF POLITICAL LITERATURE MOSCOW. 1969
ON THE DEFEAT OF HIS GOVERNMENT IN THE IMPERIALIST WAR
The revolutionary class in a reactionary war cannot but desire the defeat of its government.
This is an axiom.
A revolution during a war is a civil war, and the transformation of the war of governments into a civil war, on the one hand, is facilitated by military failures (“defeat”) of governments, and on the other hand, it is impossible in practice to strive for such a transformation without thereby contributing to the defeat.
ON THE SLOGAN OF TURNING THE IMPERIALIST WAR INTO A CIVIL WAR
The only correct proletarian slogan is the transformation of the modern imperialist war into a civil war. Precisely such a transformation results from all the objective conditions of the present military catastrophe, and only by systematically propagating and agitating in this direction can the workers' parties fulfill the obligations they assumed at Basel.
Only such tactics will be truly revolutionary tactics of the working class, corresponding to the conditions of the new historical epoch.
VOLUME 26, FOREWORD.
Proceeding from the imperialist nature of the war, Lenin determined the position of the party in relation to it. He put forward the slogan: turn the imperialist war into a civil war.“A revolution during a war is a civil war,” Lenin pointed out. That is why the Bolsheviks fought for the revolution in the conditions of the imperialist world war under the slogan of turning it into a civil war. This slogan flowed from all the conditions of the war, from the fact that it had created a revolutionary situation in most of the countries of Europe.
Of course, Lenin wrote, it is impossible to know in advance whether this revolutionary situation will lead to revolution, when exactly the revolution will occur. But it is certainly the duty of all socialists to work systematically and unswervingly in this direction, to reveal to the masses the reality of the revolutionary situation, to awaken the revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary determination of the proletariat, and to help it pass over to revolutionary action. The slogan summarizing and guiding this work was the slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil war.
The civil war that the revolutionary social democracy called for at that time, meant, as Lenin pointed out, the struggle of the proletariat with arms in hand for the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie in the developed capitalist countries, for the democratic revolution in Russia, for the republic in the backward monarchical countries, etc. As the first steps towards turning the imperialist war into a war Lenin outlined the following civil measures: an unconditional refusal to vote military credits and withdrawal from bourgeois ministries, a complete break with the policy of "national peace"; creation of an illegal organization; support for the fraternization of soldiers of warring countries; support for all kinds of revolutionary mass actions of the proletariat.
Along with the slogan of civil war, Lenin, in opposition to the bourgeois and social-chauvinist policy of supporting "his" government and "defending the fatherland," put forward the slogan of defeating "his" government in an imperialist war. “In every country,” wrote Lenin, “the struggle against its own government, which is waging an imperialist war, must not stop at the possibility of the defeat of that country as a result of revolutionary agitation. The defeat of the government army weakens the given government, contributes to the liberation of the peoples enslaved by it, and facilitates the civil war against the ruling classes” (p. 166). Lenin's article "On the defeat of one's own government in the imperialist war" is devoted to explaining the meaning of this slogan. In it, Lenin put forward the important fundamental proposition that "The revolutionary class in a reactionary war cannot but desire the defeat of its government." He stressed that in the conditions of the world imperialist war in all imperialist countries the proletariat must desire the defeat of "their" government and contribute to such a defeat without this it is impossible to turn the imperialist war into a civil war.
Who would have thought in the summer of 1916 that in a little over a year the Bolsheviks would establish themselves in power in Russia and soon a real civil war would break out in the country?! Meanwhile, the leader of the Bolsheviks, Vladimir Lenin, declared long before that "the transformation of the modern imperialist war into a civil war is the only correct proletarian slogan"...
31 months after the outbreak of World War I, in February 1917, the Russian monarchy fell. Eight months later, in October of the same year, the Vladimir Lenin, who has since been considered the main creator of "the greatest event in Russian history of the 20th century." True, during all this time (from the beginning of April to the end of October 1917) Lenin was in the revolutionary capital for only four months, but this fact does not seem to bother anyone. The revolution must have a leader, and it is desirable not to question the fact that all the threads of its management were in the hands of Lenin. However, according to contemporaries, Lenin in the full sense of the word “lived by revolution” ...
Internal factors
Whatever the apologists of the monarchy may say, the autocratic system caused one or another degree of protest - conscious or unconscious - in all sections of the population. Hence not only the emergence of a liberal opposition, but also the "success" of Russian socialism in its two main variants: Marxist (proletarian) and populist (peasant). It could not be otherwise: if a layer of educated people does not find a natural use for their abilities for leadership and management, then an anti-systemic community begins to take shape from its representatives, guided by postulates that are initially opposite to the existing statehood.
IN AND. Lenin: "If there were no war, Russia could live for years and even decades without a revolution against the capitalists." Photo from 1914
Is it any wonder that this community of intellectuals has adopted the "most advanced" social theories and started looking for not only legal, but also illegal ways to implement them. In such a situation, there was no guarantee that in critical circumstances the intelligentsia's doctrines would not begin to resonate with popular utopias and prejudices.
Of course, Russian Marxism was initially imitative. But it happens that students "in their youth" are much more impatient than their teachers. These were the Russian Bolsheviks. They were looking for the shortest ways to translate their ideas into reality, thinking little about the means of their implementation. It was assumed that the Russian proletariat, in alliance with the peasantry, would launch a struggle against the autocracy, and after its overthrow, with the support of the poorest part of the rural workers, would oppose the bourgeoisie in the struggle for socialism. But history has significantly corrected these plans.
With the outbreak of the First World War, Lenin turned to factors of a global order. He began to associate the war with the coming collapse of capitalism in its highest, "imperialist" stage. Now Lenin was inspired not so much by "Capital" Karl Marx how much book John Hobson"Imperialism" (1902). According to the English author, capitalism has acquired a global character, the redistribution of the world between the leading imperialist powers was on the agenda. Impressed by the picture painted by Hobson, "confirmed" by the First World War that broke out in 1914, Lenin believed in the imminence of a world revolution, in this "universal" means of defeating the autocracy, the Russian bourgeoisie, and international imperialism. Later, the leader of the Bolsheviks frankly admitted:
"If there were no war, Russia could live for years and even decades without a revolution against the capitalists."
Lenin's installation was simple:
"The transformation of the modern imperialist war into a civil war is the only correct proletarian slogan." At the same time, Lenin was not embarrassed by the fact that Russia remained the “most backward” of the capitalist countries. Moreover, he, unlike other socialists, relied on the "revolutionary creativity of the masses."
Lenin believed that Russia, allegedly breaking ahead in terms of concentration financial capital, but at the same time entangled in the remnants of the pre-capitalist era, due to the sharpest social and political contradictions accumulated in it, it is capable of playing the role of a skirmisher in the European movement towards socialism. The horrors of the war were opposed by a grandiose utopia, presented in a pseudo-scientific shell. But this could be prevented by right-wing socialists, who, contrary to Marxist teaching, were inclined to defend "their" bourgeois government.
In 1917, fraternization on the Russian-German front took on a massive character.
Back in November 1912, the Basel Socialist Congress adopted a manifesto on the threat of impending war. It said that at any moment the armies of the great European powers could be thrown against each other. The proletariat, as emphasized in the manifesto, considers this a crime against humanity, and therefore intends to oppose imperialism with all the might of its international solidarity. The manifesto recommended that the socialists use the economic and political crisis inevitable in the event of war to fight for the socialist revolution.
"Ignite the proletarian revolution in the West"
However, with the outbreak of the war, having forgotten the principles of "proletarian internationalism", the leading socialists of all the belligerent countries took the side of "their" imperialist governments. Sluggish reaction to murder in France Jean Jaurès- the main and most striking opponent of the war - fully confirmed this. However, Lenin, perhaps the only one of the European socialist leaders, did not stop the outbreak of "revolutionary chauvinism".
Since, in his opinion, only an international proletarian revolution could prevent the world imperialist slaughter, it was necessary in one way or another to provoke a chain reaction of revolutionary upheavals. From this point of view, it was immaterial in which country the first revolutionary explosion took place. That is why the socialists of the various belligerent countries were obliged to come out against "their" imperialist governments. Under these circumstances, according to Lenin, it was necessary "to carry through the bourgeois revolution in Russia in order to ignite the proletarian revolution in the West." Moreover, in the conditions of war, the second half of this task was allegedly solved simultaneously with the first.
Meanwhile, subtle, but very significant factors of a different order were already operating in Europe. The world has become too crowded and aggressive for the diplomats of the old formation to have time to agree on maintaining the usual stability. The factor of socialization of science also played its role: for the first time, scientists tried to apply their practices to social and political life.
The phenomenon of the “scientific myth” arose, which gave the utopias as old as the world additional persuasiveness. This provoked the temptation of a rapid leap forward, including through the "liberation" war. The world has become "revolutionary" from within. But at the same time, he became aggressive on the outside. In Europe, the second trend won, in Russia the situation was more complicated.
The reasons that gave rise to such a situation were distinguishable: the demographic boom led to the "rejuvenation" of the European population, industrial progress convinced of the "omnipotence" of man, the information revolution strengthened the illusory nature of mass consciousness. Accordingly, the "recklessness" has increased ordinary people. For the first time, the excited psyche of the “little man” intervened in the very course of world history. Against this background, the rulers, who thought in categories of past centuries, began - wittingly or unwittingly - to provoke wars and revolutions. The mass media played along with them, bringing the unconscious discontent of the masses to chauvinistic hysteria.
Globalization was pushing together previously alienated worlds, and it was hard to hope that they would soon come to an understanding. In a certain sense, the Bolsheviks proposed their own "universal" project for eliminating the aggravated contradictions. Of course, he was utopian, but he won over with his external humanistic component. Thus was born a grandiose revolutionary deception and self-deception.
On September 5–8, 1915, the International Socialist Conference was held in Zimmerwald (Switzerland). There were 38 delegates from a number of European countries. Since Lenin could not count on a majority, he tried to create the so-called "Zimmerwald Left" group - a small group of his supporters.
Subsequently, he continued his criticism of the right-wing socialists at the Kienthal Socialist Conference (April 1916), which, with its manifesto, addressed to the "ruined and slaughtered peoples," declared the need for the conquest of power by the proletariat. However, Lenin's slogan "turning the imperialist war into a civil war" did not meet with support here either. Nevertheless, Lenin stubbornly tried to attract supporters. He found them not exactly where he expected.
The impatient populace
During the war years, a striking phenomenon was discovered: if in Western countries they took seriously the idea of "sacred unity" of all strata of society against a common enemy, then in Russia all educated people spoke - some with fear, some with hope - about the inevitable revolution.
It is believed that the speeches of the leader of the liberals played a significant role in whipping up revolutionary sentiments. Pavel Milyukov and well-known right-wing figure Vladimir Purishkevich, who at the end of 1916 began to denounce the vices of the existing government from the rostrum of the State Duma. However, at the end of February 1917, popular indignation erupted independently of them.
IN AND. Lenin proclaims Soviet power. Hood. V.A. Serov
Under the slogans "Bread!" and "Down with the war!" the revolution seemed to have swept past all the then opposition political leaders, and to a certain extent even the socialists. Women on strike, hysterical, who had nothing to feed their children, were able to captivate men, people took to numerous demonstrations. Under the influence of socialist agitators, to the slogans proclaimed by the masses, a political one was added - "Down with the autocracy!". The situation was determined by the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison: they did not want to go to the hated war, and therefore they readily joined the indignant workers. The impatient masses began to impose their course of action on the politicians.
The Provisional Government formed after the February Revolution was headed by the Duma leaders, who hoped that getting rid of tsarism would make it possible to end the war victoriously. The Russian socialists (Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), who became the head of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, took a shaky position, formally supporting the slogan "A world without annexations and indemnities." But the masses, tired of the hardships of the war, did not agree to wait. Anarchists also insisted on Russia's immediate withdrawal from the war. Strange as it may seem, certain right-wingers also spoke of a separate peace, believing that with the fall of the autocracy, the goals of war had lost their force in the eyes of the people. Lenin, who returned from emigration in early April 1917, took advantage of this.
In essence, Lenin's calculation in his famous "April Theses" was based on the growing popular indignation at the ongoing war. His proposals were simple: no concessions to "revolutionary defencism," that is, to those "bad" socialists who support the bourgeoisie and imperialists; accordingly, the Provisional Government must leave the stage.
Lenin also expressed dissatisfaction with the leaders of the Petrograd Soviet - they should have been replaced by "real" revolutionaries. There was also no place in the new Russia for "bourgeois" parliamentarism - it was to be replaced by a "higher" form of democracy in the person of the "Republic of Soviets of Workers', Laborers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies". In addition, Lenin spoke of the need for centralization of banking and a gradual transition to "public" control over the production and distribution of products. That is how he understood "steps towards socialism."
Needless to say, Lenin's plan was unrealistic. But there are times when the troubled masses see utopia as the only acceptable reality. The British historian Robert Service compared Lenin's 10 theses with the 95 theses of Martin Luther, which the great preacher pinned to the doors of the cathedral in Wittenberg almost 400 years ago. In both cases, the bet was made on the frenzy of the people, embraced by the new faith. True, Lenin specifically emphasized:
"We must base ourselves only on the consciousness of the masses." But "consciousness", apparently, he understood in a peculiar way, being sure that sooner or later the masses would move along the path indicated by the Bolshevik party. In fact, he himself, to a certain extent, became a hostage to the growing desire among the people for peace "at any cost."
Path to power
Be that as it may, even Lenin's associates considered that his proposals were "nonsense of a madman." The Bolshevik leadership did not accept the April Theses, considering them too abstract and useless in practice. However, they were still published in Pravda, although their “corrupting influence” was opposed by Lev Kamenev. It was not until mid-April that the Petrograd City Conference of the Bolsheviks reluctantly approved Lenin's theses, and then they were supported by the All-Russian (April) Conference of the Bolsheviks, which took place from April 24 to 29.
Lenin was helped by the April government crisis. The events that broke out were a characteristic combination of provocation and anarchy, utopia and psychosis. On April 18, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government, the already mentioned leader of the Cadets, Pavel Milyukov, who had a reputation as a "genius of tactlessness", assured the doubting ambassadors of the Allied Powers that Russia would continue the war until victory.
This was not to the taste of the members of the Petrograd Soviet, who still adhered, albeit formally, to the slogan "A world without annexations and indemnities." On April 21, about 100,000 workers and soldiers took to the streets of the capital demanding peace. The soldiers started talking about how the Milyukov note was rendering a "friendly service" to the imperialists of all countries, helping them to stifle the struggle of the proletariat for world peace. Anti-Milyukov soldiers' and workers' demonstrations began, they were met by counter-demonstrations of the "pure public". Provocative shots were fired, dead and wounded appeared.
The "Decree on Peace" - the first decree of the Soviet government - was, in essence, a call for world revolution
Milyukov had to resign. A coalition government was formed, seemingly declaring its desire to end the war, but seeing the achievement of peace in the old fashioned way only "in agreement with the allies." In this situation, in private conversations, even the Cadets admitted that soon control of the government would probably pass to Alexander Kerensky, and then power might even fall to the Bolsheviks. And so it happened. It can be said that in April 1917 Lenin won a decisive victory. The Bolsheviks only had to finish off those politicians who did not agree to immediate peace negotiations.
In June 1917, the Bolsheviks offered the masses the following set of slogans: "Down with the Tsarist Duma!", "Down with 10 capitalist ministers!", "All power to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies!" Cancel orders against soldiers and sailors!”, “Down with the war!”. Curiously, slogans that hinted at the forces of reaction lurking (the non-existent "tsarist" Duma, the mythical "capitalist ministers") were combined with calls for the abolition of restrictions on the rights of soldiers. All this was summarized by the traditional anti-war slogan, the implementation of which was conceived through the transfer of power to the Soviets. On June 18, Bolshevik slogans were picked up by a 500,000-strong demonstration of workers.
The offensive of the Russian troops, which began on the same day, was thwarted. A new crisis broke out, further compromising the supporters of the "war to a victorious end." In early July, an anti-government demonstration by the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison, who did not want to go to the front, almost led to the fall of the Provisional Government. In a sense, the impatient masses outstripped the Bolsheviks.
The unwillingness to fight was associated with the agrarian issue: the soldiers, most of them former peasants, feared that being at the front would prevent them from being in time for the “fair” division of land, which was promised by representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, moreover, on behalf of the Provisional Government. Meanwhile, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, having promised a just solution to the agrarian question, hesitated with it and with the question of peace. It turned out that they unwittingly played along with the Bolsheviks. The latter had only to overtake their socialist opponents in terms of promises. And they succeeded in this despite accusations that the Bolsheviks were acting “on orders from the German General Staff.”
There is no doubt that the victory of the Bolsheviks was ensured by two slogans: "Peace!" and "Earth!" Nothing more was needed: the masses demanded both at any cost. Under the cover of these appeals, adopted on October 25-26, 1917 by the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the Bolsheviks, with the help of soldiers from the Petrograd garrison, easily seized power in the country from the gaping Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.
However, Lenin's "Decree on Peace" was, in essence, a call for world revolution. True, neither the participants in the Second Congress, nor the broad masses of soldiers wanted to notice this. As a result, Russia fell into an internal civil war - much more ruinous than the cursed "imperialist war." Such was the terrible cost of the grandiose deceit and self-deception of the socialist doctrinaires and the gullible masses.
Vladimir Buldakov, Doctor of Historical SciencesMagazine "Golden Lion" No. 149-150 - publication of Russian conservative thought
Yu.V. Zhytorchuk
Candidate of Physics and Mathematics Sciences
"National Pride" Great Russian Ulyanov
during World War I
“No one is to blame if he was born a slave; but a slave who not only eschews aspirations for his freedom, but justifies and embellishes his slavery (for example, calls the strangulation of Poland, Ukraine, etc., the “defense of the fatherland” of the Great Russians), such a slave is a lackey that evokes a legitimate feeling of indignation, contempt and disgust and boor "(Lenin, -" On the national pride of the Great Russians ").
The development of the imperialist war into a civil war.
For Lenin, the revolution is the main, all-consuming goal of his whole life. And the war that broke out in 1914 gave a real chance for its implementation, a chance that the future leader of the world proletariat did not want to lose under any circumstances.
“The transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war is the only correct proletarian slogan, indicated by the experience of the Commune, outlined by the Basel (1912) resolution, and flowing from all the conditions of an imperialist war between highly developed bourgeois countries. No matter how great the difficulties of such a transformation at one moment or another may seem, the socialists will never abandon the systematic, persistent, unswerving preparatory work in this direction, once the war has become a fact" (Lenin, "War and Russian Social Democracy").
However, the imperialist war will not escalate into a civil war on its own. For this to happen, the soldiers need to turn their bayonets against their own government. But this can be achieved only if the war causes significant difficulties for the life of the working people, and these difficulties could be multiplied precisely in the event of the defeat of the country in the war. Therefore, the socialists must do everything to achieve the defeat of their government:
“A revolution in time of war is a civil war, and the transformation of the war of governments into a civil war, on the one hand, is facilitated by military failures (defeat) of governments, and on the other hand, it is impossible in practice to strive for such a transformation without thereby contributing to the defeat ...
The revolutionary class in a reactionary war cannot but desire the defeat of its government...”.
Of course, in principle, Lenin proclaimed the slogan of the defeat not only of the tsarist, but also of all other governments participating in the First World War (WWI). However, at the same time, he cared little whether the socialists of Germany, England and France would support his call with their practical actions. In addition, only one of the belligerents can suffer defeat in a war. Therefore, the defeat of Russia, and hence the Entente, in practice means a military victory for Germany and the strengthening of the Kaiser's government. But Lenin is in no way embarrassed by this circumstance, and he insists that the initiative of defeatism must come precisely from the Russian Social Democrats:
“... The last consideration is especially important for Russia, because it is the most backward country in which a socialist revolution is directly impossible. That is why the Russian Social Democrats were to be the first to come up with the theory and practice of the slogan of defeat” (Lenin, “On the Defeat of Their Government in the Imperialist War”).
Of course, Lenin, for all the odiousness of his position, could not publicly proclaim that Russia's defeat in the war was Russia's good. And therefore he talked about the fact that such a defeat for her would be the lesser evil:
“The victory of Russia entails an intensification of world reaction, an intensification of reaction within the country and is accompanied by the complete enslavement of the peoples in the already occupied regions. Because of this, the defeat of Russia under all conditions seems to be the lesser evil ”(Lenin,“ Conference of Foreign Sections of the R.S.-D.R.P. ”).
Moreover, Lenin repeats this idea of his many times, accompanying it with the most categorical incantations:
“For us Russians, from the point of view of the interests of the working masses and the working class of Russia, there cannot be the slightest, absolutely no doubt that the least evil would now and immediately be the defeat of tsarism in this war. For tsarism is a hundred times worse than Kaiserism" (Lenin, "Letter to Shlyapnikov 10/17/14".
Thus, behind a very elegant and somewhat intricate verbal formula, Lenin hides his idea of the desirability of the defeat of Russia and, accordingly, the victory of a more progressive Kaiserism.
Lenin and Plekhanov are two socialist tactics during the First World War.
1. Lenin's position.
Lenin, of course, was never a pacifist, out of principle, protesting against any war and its cruelties. On the contrary, he directly stated the necessity and progressiveness of civil wars, despite the blood, atrocities and horrors that usually accompany such wars:
“We fully recognize the legitimacy, progressivity and necessity of civil wars, that is, wars of the oppressed class against the oppressor, the slaves against the slave owners, the serfs against the landlords, the wage-workers against the bourgeoisie...
There have been many wars in history that, despite all the horrors, atrocities, disasters and torments that are inevitably associated with any war, were progressive, that is, they benefited the development of mankind, helping to destroy especially harmful and reactionary institutions (for example, autocracy or serfdom ), the most barbaric despotisms in Europe (Turkish and Russian)" (Lenin, "Socialism and War").
But in addition to civil wars and revolutions, Lenin also recognized the legitimacy and progressiveness of defensive wars. And in this case, it was completely indifferent to him who attacked whom first. According to his ideas, in any case, the oppressed side was right:
“The socialists have recognized and are now recognizing the legitimacy, progressiveness, and justice of “defence of the fatherland” or “defensive” war. For example, if tomorrow Morocco declared war on France, India on England, Persia or China on Russia, etc., these would be “just”, “defensive” wars, regardless of who attacked first, and every socialist would sympathize the victory of the oppressed, dependent, unequal states against the oppressive, slave-owning, predatory “great” powers” (Lenin, “Socialism and War”).
It was here that another break between the Bolsheviks and most other social democratic movements took place. Since Lenin declared the war to be reactionary and predatory on the part of all its participants, while Plekhanov declared its defensive, and therefore just and progressive character on the part of Russia. But from the recognition of the war as predatory, one tactic of the working-class movement followed, and from its recognition as a defensive one, a completely different one. However, Plekhanov's point of view automatically postponed the possible beginning of a revolution in Russia for an indefinite period, which for Lenin, regardless of the degree of correctness of his theses, was absolutely unacceptable:
“In Russia, not only bloody tsarism, not only capitalists, but also a part of the so-called or former socialists say that Russia is waging a “defensive war”, that Russia is fighting only against the German invasion. Meanwhile, in reality, the whole world knows that tsarism has been oppressing more than a hundred million people of other nationalities in Russia for decades, that Russia has been pursuing a predatory policy against China, Persia, Armenia, Galicia for decades ... ".
There is clearly something wrong with Lenin's logic here. After all, even if Russia really oppressed hundreds of millions of people and previously waged aggressive wars, then it does not follow from this fact that another stronger predator cannot attack Russia itself and try to enslave it:
“…Neither Russia, nor Germany, nor any other great power has the right to speak of a “defensive war”: all the great powers are waging an imperialist, capitalist war, a predatory war, a war to oppress small and foreign peoples, a war in the interests of the profits of the capitalists, who from the horrendous suffering of the masses, they beat the pure gold of their billions of dollars of income out of the proletarian blood” (Lenin, “Speech at the international meeting in Bern”).
In polemical fervor, the future leader of the world proletariat did not stop from direct insults to the most prominent theoretician of Marxism, the founder of the first Russian Marxist organization - Plekhanov, hanging political labels on him:
“Let Messrs. Plekhanov, Chkhenkeli, Potresov and Co. now play the role Marxist-like lackeys or jesters under Purishkevich and Milyukov, go out of their way, proving the guilt of Germany and the defensive nature of the war on the part of Russia - the class-conscious workers did not listen to these jesters and do not listen" (Lenin, "On a Separate Peace").
In the dispute that broke out between the Russian socialists, Lenin's main argument was the thesis according to which all the key participants in the war are essentially bandits and robbers:
“The main, basic content of this imperialist war is the division of booty between the three main imperialist rivals, the three robbers, Russia, Germany and England” (Lenin, “Bourgeois Pacifism and Socialist Pacifism”).
The only exception was made only for Serbia:
“The national element in the present war is represented only by the war of Serbia against Austria. Only in Serbia and among the Serbs do we have many years and millions of national masses embracing the national liberation movement, the continuation of which is the war of Serbia against Austria ...
Whether this war be isolated, that is, not connected with the general European war, with the mercenary and predatory goals of England, Russia, etc., then all socialists would be obliged to wish the success of the Serbian bourgeoisie" (Lenin, "The Collapse of the Second International").
But the main robber and villain in the imperialist war, according to Lenin, was precisely Russia.
“The reactionary, predatory, slaveholding character of the war on the part of tsarism is even incomparably more evident than on the part of other governments” (Lenin, “Socialism and War”).
What was the robbery and robbery, which, according to Lenin, during the WWI was carried out by the tsarist government? It turns out that the robber plans of Nicholas II extended to Galicia, Armenia and Constantinople:
“Russia is fighting for Galicia, which she needs to own, especially in order to strangle the Ukrainian people (except for Galicia, this people does not and cannot have a corner of freedom, comparative of course), for Armenia and for Constantinople, then also for the subjugation of the Balkan countries” (Lenin, "On a Separate Peace").
Here the question arises whether tsarist Russia desire to seize Constantinople and the Straits? Yes, the Russian tsars periodically had such a desire. Only this desire arose not at all because they wanted to expand the limits of the empire, including new peoples and countries in its composition. By and large, Russia did not always know what to do with its own land. Won Alexander II actually sold Alaska to the Americans for next to nothing. And having liberated Bulgaria from the power of the Turks, Russia did not even try to annex it, although it could well have done this in 1878. By themselves, the Straits of Russia, in general, were not needed. She needed the freedom of navigation of Russian ships from the Black to the Mediterranean Sea and a guarantee that the English and French military squadrons would not enter the Black Sea again, as was the case during the Anglo-French aggression of 1854.
However, despite the desire of the Russian tsars to get the Straits, it would be the height of stupidity to say that it was because of them that Russia got involved in the war with Germany. These Straits just weren't worth it. After all, Nicholas II, and Stolypin, and Sazonov did everything to ensure the peaceful development of the empire as long as possible. Russia, unlike Germany, did not prepare for a serious war, and that is why it did not stock up in advance the number of cartridges, shells, cannons and even guns necessary for its conduct. Another thing is that already during the war in 1916, the tsar concluded a secret agreement with the allies on the transfer of the Straits to Russia after the victory over Germany. The meaning of this treaty was that gaining control over the Straits, at least to some extent, was supposed to compensate the empire for those enormous losses that the Russian people suffered to curb the German aggressors, but it does not at all follow that it was the Straits that at least to some extent least were the reason for Russia's entry into the war.
The next "robber" goal of the tsarist government, Lenin calls the desire of St. Petersburg to rob Turkey, seize Armenia from it and enslave the freedom-loving Armenian people. One might think that Vladimir Ilyich did not know that for decades a genocide of the Armenian civilian population had been systematically carried out in Turkey, that in 1909 the Turkish authorities organized a new massacre of Armenians, that during the years of the WWI, more than a million Armenians were killed and tortured by the Turks. So why couldn't Nicholas II take fellow believers under his protection, who are being severely persecuted for their religious beliefs?
Here is how the well-known Armenian public figure and writer Ter-Markarian described the events of those years in his book “How it was”:
“For the sake of historical justice and the honor of the last Russian tsar, it cannot be silent that at the beginning of the disasters described in 1915, by the personal order of the tsar, the Russian-Turkish border was ajar and the huge crowds of exhausted Armenian refugees who had accumulated on it were let into Russian land.”
Following Lenin's logic, the Russian "despot", opening the border for exhausted refugees, dragged free Armenians who trusted him into the prison of the peoples. After all, how could then still not quite bloody Lenin believe in the nobility of the "bloody" Nicholas?
The next in this series of Lenin's accusations is Galicia, which tsarism tried to get its hands on, allegedly for the final strangulation of the freedom of Ukrainians. Here the Bosnian Serbs sought to get out of the power of the Austrians and unite with Serbia, as a result of which the Austro-Serbian war arose, which Lenin, by the way, classified as just. But the Rusyns and Hutsuls, who by the will of fate were torn away by the conquerors from their homeland and were subjected to national oppression in Austria-Hungary, could not in any way wish to unite with the Little Russians. The logic turns out strange.
And, finally, finishing the accusatory tirade, Lenin finally gets confused in his own arguments:
“Tsarism sees the war as a means to divert attention from the growth of discontent within the country and to suppress the growing revolutionary movement” (Lenin, “Socialism and War”).
But after all, Lenin himself repeatedly wrote that the difficulties of the war cause discontent among the working people and a surge of revolutionary sentiment. What Nicholas II was already convinced of from the experience of the Russo-Japanese war, which developed into the revolution of 1905. So how could the tsar start a war in order to suppress the growing revolutionary movement, if the war threatened to turn into a new, even more formidable revolution? In addition, the years preceding the WWI, the so-called reaction, tsarism drove the Russian revolutionary movements deep into the underground, from which it emerged precisely due to the outbreak of the war. So obviously do not meet the ends in the arguments of Vladimir Ilyich.
2. Plekhanov's position.
Plekhanov countered Lenin's thesis about the need to achieve the defeat of the tsarist government in the war with Germany and the escalation of the imperialist war into a civil war with the logic of a Russian social patriot:
“First, the defense of the country, then the fight against the internal enemy, first victory, then the revolution” (Plekhanov, “On War”).
At the same time, Georgy Valentinovich called for the unity of all Russian patriotic forces for the defense of the country, offering:
“Reject as unreasonable, more like insane, any outbreak and any strike capable of weakening the strength of Russia's resistance to an enemy invasion” (Plekhanov, “Internationalism and the Defense of the Fatherland”).
For Plekhanov, the war declared by Germany is a real threat to the national security of Russia, and, therefore, from his point of view, the WWI is a domestic, deeply people's war:
“From the very beginning of the war, I maintained that it was the business of peoples, and not of governments. The Russian people were in danger of falling under the economic yoke of the German imperialists, who, unfortunately, were supported by the vast majority of the working population of Germany. Therefore, in waging war, he was defending his own vital interest” (Plekhanov, “The War of Nations and Scientific Socialism,” Unity No. 5, 1917).
In this regard, the leader of the Mensheviks clearly formulates the goal of the Russian proletariat in the war with Germany:
“I have never said that the Russian proletariat is interested in the victory of Russian imperialism and never thought so. And I am convinced that he is interested in only one thing: that the Russian land does not become an object of exploitation in the hands of the German imperialists. Ah, this is something completely different ”(Plekhanov,“ More about the war ”).
During the years of WWI, the slogan of defending the fatherland was extremely popular in Russia, and this circumstance greatly worried Lenin, forcing him to scoff at the concept that is sacred to every Russian person:
“What is the defense of the fatherland generally speaking? Is it some scientific concept from the field of economics or politics, etc.? No. This is simply the most current, common, sometimes just a philistine expression denoting the justification of war. Nothing more, absolutely nothing!” (Lenin, "On the Caricature of Marxism")
To this Plekhanov replies:
Fatherland is that vast land inhabited by the working masses of the Russian people. If we love this working mass, we love our fatherland. And if we love our fatherland, we must defend it" (Plekhanov, "Speech in the Petrosoviet on May 14, 1917).
“We do not want Russia to defeat Germany, but that Germany does not defeat Russia. Let Rabochaya Gazeta tell us directly: "It doesn't matter if the German yoke falls on the Russian neck." This will be a thought worthy of the most resolute censure from the point of view of the International ... But this thought, and this thought alone, will give us a logical key to the reasoning of the author of the article, only it will explain to us his fears ”(Plekhanov,“ Anxious Fears of a Clever Newspaper ” ).
Nevertheless, Lenin, even in his thoughts, cannot admit that civilized Germans are capable of enslaving Russia, even if they capture Petrograd:
“Let's say the Germans take even Paris and St. Petersburg. Will this change the nature of this war? Not at all. The goal of the Germans, and this is even more important: the feasible policy with the victory of the Germans will be the seizure of the colonies, dominance in Turkey, the seizure of foreign regions, for example, Poland, etc., but not at all the establishment foreign oppression over the French or Russians. The real essence of this war is not national, but imperialist. In other words: the war is not going on because one side overthrows national oppression, the other defends it. The war is going on between two groups of oppressors, between two robbers over how to divide the booty, who should rob Turkey and the colonies ”(Lenin,“ On the Caricature of Marxism ”).
From the heights of history, it is funny and sad to read such Leninist opuses. And it remains completely incomprehensible why Vladimir Ilyich was so sure that the Germans could not turn part of Russia into their colony, but would be content only with the enslavement of Turkey, Serbia or Poland? Most likely, Lenin hated tsarism so much that, without any regret, he would have replaced it with the complete subordination of Russia to the will of the Kaiser. Just like now our homegrown democrats hate everything truly Russian and want to subordinate Russia to the will of their overseas masters.
In any case, all subsequent events in world history refuted Lenin's point of view that Germany had no aggressive intentions towards Russia. After all, German Nazism began to emerge at the end of the 19th century, long before Hitler's Mein Kampf. At the same time, the ideas of the Drang nach Osten campaign, which were shared by both the Kaiser and his generals, were resurrected again. Therefore, the territorial claims of Germany, presented to the Soviet government in Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, did not arise on their own from scratch, but were the natural result of the plans of conquest conceived in Berlin long before August 1914. So life itself proved that Plekhanov was right in his dispute with Lenin. And if modern communists declare that they are patriots of Russia, then they are obliged to recognize the justice of the position on this issue of the first Russian Marxist - Plekhanov and condemn antinational character of Leninist doctrinairism.
About the national pride of the Great Russian Ulyanov.
“Nowhere in the world is there such oppression of the majority of the population of the country as in Russia: Great Russians make up only 43% of the population, that is, less than half, and all the rest are deprived of rights, like foreigners. (Lenin, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination").
In order to make sure that Lenin is clearly cunning here, trying to denigrate Russia, it is enough to turn to his work “Imperialism, as the highest stage of capitalism”, from which it follows that in England the inhabitants of the metropolitan countries accounted for only 11%, and in France - 42% of the total number of inhabitants of these countries, including the natives of the colonies. So Russia did not hold the palm of the world championship in the matter of enslaving foreigners.
However, it is categorically impossible to agree with the figure cited by Lenin, according to which 57% of the population of Russia were foreigners. The fact is that even at the beginning of the 20th century, RUSSIAN was understood as all the peoples of the Eastern European Slavs: Great Russians, Little Russians, and Belarusians. Accordingly, in the encyclopedia of Brockhaus and Efron it was written:
"The Russian language is divided into three main DIFFERENCES: a) Great Russian, b) Little Russian and c) Belarusian."
The same encyclopedia states that the percentage of the Russian population according to the 1897 census was 72.5%. That is, before Lenin's opuses, it was Russians who were considered a nation, and not Great Russians, Little Russians or Belarusians, who were listed only subnational groups. However, in this situation, it was very difficult for Lenin to substantiate one of his cornerstone theses:
“Russia is a prison of peoples” and call for self-determination of Ukrainians and Belarusians.
In this regard, Lenin absolutely unfoundedly and without evidence stated that by the beginning of WWI, Ukrainians and Belarusians had allegedly reached such a stage of national community that they were already formed nations oppressed by the nation of Great Russians:
“For Ukrainians and Belarusians, for example, only a person who dreams of living on Mars could deny that there is still no completion of the national movement here, that the awakening of the masses to the possession of their native language and its literature - (and this necessary condition and a companion of the full development of capitalism, the complete penetration of exchange down to the last peasant family) - here it is still being accomplished” (Lenin, “On the Caricature of Marxism”).
In fact, it was a direct call for the withdrawal of Ukraine and Belarus from Russia. At the same time, Ulyanov completely ignored the fact that the ancestors of the Great Russians, Little Russians and Belarusians before the Tatar-Mongol invasion were a single people with a single language and a single culture. And then, for four hundred years, the once united people were artificially divided and subjected to national enslavement by foreign conquerors.
Moscow Russia was the first to throw off the foreign yoke, and in 1648 Little Russia also rebelled against the Polish invaders. However, in June 1651, the rebels suffered a severe defeat near Berestechko. Being in a critical situation, Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky turned to the Russian Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich with a request to be accepted into Russian citizenship. In the autumn of 1653, the Zemsky Sobor, which was held in Moscow, decided to include Little Russia into the Moscow State, and on October 23, 1653, the Moscow government declared war on the Commonwealth, which lasted for 13 years, during which Russia defended the independence of Left-bank Ukraine.
On January 8, 1654, a council of elders took place in Pereyaslav. During a public ceremony, the hetman and the Cossack foreman swore on the cross that "to be with the land and cities under the king's great hand relentlessly". Despite this oath, the Ukrainian hetmans repeatedly violated it and betrayed their king. In connection with the regular perjury of the hetmans to Catherine II in 1764, she abolished both the hetmanship and the autonomy of the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks.
In order to be convinced of the fallacy of Lenin's ideas about the three formed nations of Eastern European Slavs, it is enough to answer the question, when were the differences between Great Russians and Little Russians greater: at the time of their reunification, or at the beginning of the 20th century? Have these groups been moving closer together or moving away from each other over the course of two and a half centuries? After all, during this entire period of time, there was a process of linguistic and cultural convergence of parts of the ancient Russian people that were once forcibly separated from each other. Suffice it to recall the number of so-called mixed marriages between representatives of the three Russian nationalities. Or that the greatest Ukrainian writer Gogol was also an outstanding Russian writer.
However, among the Ukrainian elite there have always been and still are a sufficient number of adventurers who wanted to seize power and independently steer the independent, be it: Vyhovsky, Mazepa, Skoropadsky, Petlyura, Kravchuk or Yushchenko. Much more significant is the question of whether there actually existed in tsarist Russia national oppression of the Little Russians by the Great Russians, and if it existed, in what way was this oppression expressed? Lenin answered this question as follows:
“The dispute is about one of the forms of political oppression, namely: about the forcible retention of one nation within the state of another nation” (Lenin, “Results of the Discussion on Self-Determination”).
“The proletariat cannot but fight against the forcible retention of oppressed nations within the boundaries of a given state, and this means fighting for the right of self-determination. The proletariat must demand the freedom of political secession of the colonies and nations oppressed by "its" nation...
Neither trust nor class solidarity between the workers of an oppressed and oppressing nation is possible" (Lenin, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination").
But with the same success one could speak about the forcible retention of, say, Novgorodians or Pskovians. After all, the independent Novgorod Republic, with its traditions of veche democracy and a peculiar culture, existed for more than 300 years from 1136 to 1478, when Ivan III forcibly subordinated it to Moscow. And in 1570, Ivan the Terrible again went on a campaign to Novgorod and perpetrated a bloody pogrom there, executing more than one and a half thousand noble residents of the city and finally enslaved the Novgorodians. Yes, and the dialects of northern Russia are quite different, for example, from the dialects of the Kuban or Don Cossacks. So why not, on this basis, declare the Novgorodians a nation forcibly oppressed by the Muscovites?
After all, if you consistently follow the path proposed by Lenin, then Russia will very quickly be pulled apart into many small and unviable pseudo-national formations. However, this is precisely what the liberals were striving for in the 1990s. Remember Yeltsin's words: "Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow."
***
The obvious bias of Lenin's Russophobic approach to the national question is especially clearly visible when comparing his assessments in relation to Russia, on the one hand, and in relation to Germany, on the other:
“The war of 1870-1 was a continuation of the bourgeois-progressive (decades-long) policy of the liberation and unification of Germany” (Lenin, “On the Peace Program”).
It is worth recalling that during this war, Germany captured and annexed the two largest French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. But, let's say, the Alsatians are a people that arose on the basis of the Germanized Celtic tribes, speaking the Alemannic dialect of the German language, which differs from East German dialects much more than the Ukrainian language from Great Russian. In addition, during the period of the German annexation of Alsace (1871-1918), the Alsatians regularly opposed the Kaiser's policy of their forcible Germanization.
The German chauvinist Lench cited one interesting quotation from Engels's work: Po and the Rhine. Engels says there, among other things, that the boundaries of the large and viable European nations in the course of historical development, which have absorbed a number of small and unviable nations, have been determined more and more by the language and sympathies of the population. These boundaries Engels calls "natural". So it was in the era of progressive capitalism, in Europe, around 1848-1871. Now the reactionary, imperialist is increasingly breaking these democratically defined boundaries” (Lenin, “Results of the Discussion on Self-Determination”)
But for Ulyanov, the forcible seizure of Alsace by Germany is a progressive and quite natural phenomenon, and the result of the voluntary entry of Ukraine into Russia is an unnatural reactionary event that led to the oppression of Ukrainians by the Great Russians!
Of course, Lenin died long ago, and one could have already forgotten about him, but his deeds still live on. And one of the saddest consequences of the creations of the leader of the world revolution is the collapse of the Soviet Union, which he himself created, to a large extent, predetermined by his adventuristic, Russophobic national policy. And Lenin still got his way. The Great Russians no longer oppress the Ukrainians, the united Russian nation is split into three parts, and the contours that define their mutual confrontation are already visible. And not far off, the time when the followers of Ulyanov's ideas, obeying the instinct of self-determination, will drag Ukraine into NATO.
Lenin and the problem of peace.
There is a persistent myth that Lenin allegedly tried in every possible way to stop the world slaughter and achieve the establishment of an early peace. However, the facts say otherwise. Here, for example, is how Vladimir Ilyich treated the idea of ending the war at its initial stage:
"Down with priestly sentimental and stupid sighs about the world at all costs! Let's Raise the Banner of Civil War" (Lenin, The Position and Tasks of the Socialist International);
“The slogan of peace, in my opinion, is wrong in this moment. This is a philistine, priestly slogan. The proletarian slogan should be: civil war” (Lenin, “Letter to Shlyapnikov 10/17/14”);
“The slogan of peace can be raised either in connection with certain conditions of peace or without any conditions, as a struggle not for a specific peace, but for peace in general...
In general, everyone stands for peace in general, up to Kitchener, Joffre, Hindenburg and Nicholas the Bloody, because each of them wants to end the war: - the question is precisely that everyone puts imperialist (i.e. predatory, oppressing foreign peoples) peace conditions in favor of their own nation" (Lenin, "The Question of Peace").
In the slogan of “peace in general”, Lenin was absolutely not satisfied with the possibility of ending the world massacre before it escalated into an even more bloody civil war and world revolution. He categorically insists that the war must end only after the victory of the revolution, when the proletariat of the belligerent countries has overthrown the bourgeois governments. And until then, any attempts by individual socialists to stop the senseless bloody slaughter and make peace between the warring countries caused fits of rage and indignation in Lenin:
“We are talking about an article by one of the most prominent (and vile) Social-Democratic opportunists. Party of Germany, Quark, who, among other things, said: “We, the German Social Democrats, and our Austrian comrades, declare incessantly that we are fully prepared to enter into relations (with the English and French Social Democrats) in order to start negotiations about the world. The German Imperial Government is aware of this and does not put up the slightest obstacle…”
Whoever does not understand this even now, when the slogan of peace (not accompanied by a call for revolutionary action by the masses) has been prostituted by the Vienna Conference ..., he is simply an unconscious participant in the social-chauvinist swindle of the people ”(Lenin, “On the Assessment of the Slogan“ Peace ””).
However, after the February Revolution, Lenin's statements on the question of peace somewhat change their tone. At this time, Vladimir Ilyich no longer dared to publicly proclaim that the desire for peace was sentimental priesthood. This swearing was replaced by calls for a fight against the imperialist war, which, however, did not in the least change the essence of Lenin's position that real peace is not possible without a socialist revolution:
“The fight against the imperialist war is impossible otherwise than the struggle of the revolutionary classes against the ruling classes on a world scale” (Lenin, “Speech about the war 22.07.17”).
In order to prove that a stable peace under the rule of the capitalists is impossible, Lenin puts forward the thesis according to which the war allegedly, in principle, cannot be ended without annexations being abandoned. At the same time, he began to interpret the very concept of annexation in an extremely broad and extremely vague way: not only as the seizure of foreign territory carried out during the WWI, but also, like all seizures in all previous wars. In addition, Lenin significantly expanded the interpretation of the principle of the nation's right to self-determination, extending it not only to the nation, but also to the nationality and the people:
“The main condition for a democratic peace is the renunciation of annexations (captures) - not in the sense that all powers return what they have lost, but in the sense that all powers return what they have lost, but in the only correct sense that each NATIONALITY, without a single exception, both in Europe and in the colonies, gets freedom and the opportunity to decide for itself whether it forms a separate state or is part of any other state ”(Lenin,“ Tasks of the Revolution ”).
“The theoretical definition of annexation includes the concept of “foreign people”, i.e. A PEOPLE that has retained the peculiarity and will of a separate existence ”(Lenin,“ Porridge in the Heads ”).
At the same time, the leader of the world revolution probably understood that the difference between the Little Russian and Great Russian languages is at the level of differences between dialects of the same language, and therefore he generally abandoned the criterion of linguistic differences as a condition necessary for self-determination:
“Annexation is the annexation of any country that is distinguished by national characteristics, any annexation of a nation - it doesn’t matter if it differs in language, if it feels like a different people, against its desire” (Lenin, “Speech at a meeting of the Bolsheviks 04/17/17”).
Thus, on the one hand, the Bolsheviks took every possible care of the right of self-determination of all peoples, nationalities or nations, believing that no one should resort to violence in determining the boundaries between states:
“We say that the borders are determined by the will of the population. Russia, don't you dare fight over Courland! Germany, down with the troops from Courland! This is how we solve the issue of secession. The proletariat cannot resort to violence, for it must not interfere with the freedom of the peoples" (Lenin, Speech on the National Question).
On the other hand, the Bolsheviks were not going to observe any legality or observance of the will of the majority within their own country long before they came to power:
“We all agree that power should be in the hands of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies ... It will be precisely a state like the Paris Commune. Such power is a dictatorship, i.e. is based not on the law, not on the formal will of the majority, but directly directly on violence. Violence is an instrument of force” (Lenin, “Report on the Current Situation 07.05.17”).
However, the need for violence for Lenin's supporters is understandable, because the vast majority of the population in Russia were peasants, whose support it was difficult for the Bolsheviks to count on, which is why dictatorship was the only way for them to stay in power. That is why, already in the first Soviet Constitutions, the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat was spelled out, which, in particular, was carried out by providing the workers with a norm of representation in government bodies elected by the people five times greater than that of the peasants:
"The Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is composed of representatives of the city Soviets and Soviets of urban settlements, at the rate of 1 deputy per 25,000 voters and representatives of the provincial congresses of Soviets, at the rate of 1 deputy per 125,000 inhabitants."
So why, then, was Lenin so worried about the issue of a free, democratic solution to the problem of self-determination of all oppressed nations, if he himself elevated inequality and violence to the principle of his internal policy towards the majority of the Russian people?
The fact is that before the October Revolution, Lenin deliberately put forward provocative and obviously impracticable slogans in order to undermine the foundations of the then existing world order as much as possible. And it was hard to think of a better way to blow up the capitalist world than playing on nationalist strings and inciting ethnic hatred. After all, the implementation of the principle of self-determination, especially in areas with a mixed population, has always been a detonator, leading to explosions of popular discontent.
But, having gained a foothold in power, Lenin immediately forgot that the “oppressed” Great Russians were, say, the Central Asian peoples, who were still deprived of the right to free exit from the RSFSR, although they had their own languages and, with weapons in their hands, proved their desire to self-determination. Lenin did not remember about his own principles on the right to self-determination and in deciding the fate of the Cossacks.
Ulyanov was well aware that the peace conditions he put forward, under which it would be necessary to revise the borders of the vast majority of countries, was absolutely unacceptable for all the main participants in the war, which means that these conditions, in principle, could not contribute to its end:
“Not a single socialist, while remaining a socialist, can raise the question of annexations (occupations) differently, cannot deny the right of self-determination, the freedom of secession to every people.
But let us not be deceived: such a demand means a revolution against the capitalists. First of all, in the first place, such a demand (without a revolution) will not be accepted by the British capitalists, who have more annexations (captures) than any nation in the world” (Lenin, “A deal with the capitalists or the overthrow of the capitalists?).
Therefore, the leader of the world proletariat was forced to admit that his calls for peace without annexations are only a tactical slogan, subordinated to the main goal - the struggle for world revolution:
“When we say: “without annexations,” we say that for us this slogan is only a subordinate part of the struggle against world imperialism” (Lenin, “Speech about the war 22.07.17”).
“And most importantly, it is necessary to overthrow the bourgeois governments and start with Russia, because otherwise it is impossible to get peace” (Lenin, “Letter to Ganetsky”).
long awaited world.
As we approached the point in time when the Bolsheviks could really seize power into their own hands, the slogan "peace" became one of the main theses in Lenin's speeches and articles, since he perfectly understood that only in this way could the coming revolution be protected from suppression by her army:
“For troops will not go against the government of the world” (Lenin, “The crisis is ripe”).
Although in order to achieve Lenin's main goal - the victory of the world revolution, it was not at all necessary to establish peace, but to continue the world slaughter, and, most importantly, its development into a civil war, not only in Russia, but also in Germany and France.
“We will tell the truth: that a democratic peace is impossible unless the revolutionary proletariat of England, France, Germany, Russia overthrows the bourgeois governments” (Lenin, The Turn in World Politics)
Therefore, along with calls for peace, Ulyanov continued to insist on the principles of establishing peace without annexation, in his own invented, absurd and unrecognized interpretation.
And everything would be fine, but the trouble is, the Russian soldiers from the constant Bolshevik calls for fraternization took it and began to fraternize seriously, but what kind of war could there be with the Germans if they suddenly became our brothers? It is worthless to fight with brothers, which means that the Russian peasant had nothing more to do at the front. So the soldiers began to go home, hurrying to take part in the division of the land promised to them. As a result, the remnants of the completely demoralized Russian army were literally melting by leaps and bounds. But the German troops, as they stood, continued to stand, and all sorts of fraternization there acted extremely weakly on them. It was then, realizing the sad result of his deeds aimed at disintegrating the army, Lenin suddenly remembered:
“The soldiers are just running. Reports from the front speak of this. You can’t wait without risking helping Rodzyanka’s conspiracy with Wilhelm (such a conspiracy did not exist in nature, and the rumors about him were only the fruit of Ulyanov’s sick fantasy - Yu. Zh.) and complete devastation during the wholesale flight of soldiers if they (already close to despair ) will reach complete despair (and then who will fight for the ideals of the revolution? - Yu.Zh.) and leave everything to the mercy of fate ”(Lenin, “Letter to Comrades”).
At the beginning of the war, Lenin wrote that even if the Germans take Peter, this will not change the nature of the war in any way. Now, however, it finally dawned on him that the fall of Petrograd threatens a real catastrophe. There could be only one way out - the speedy seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. And at the same time, Lenin wanted to spit on the freedom of expression of the will of the Great Russians, since the results of such an expression of will were obvious to him in advance, they could only bring the Bolsheviks a final defeat:
“It is pointless to wait until the Constituent Assembly, which will obviously not be with us” (Lenin, “Report at the meeting of the Central Committee on October 23, 1917”).
Yes, that there is a Constituent Assembly, Ulyanov was not even sure of the results of voting at the Congress of Soviets, where his supporters had the majority of votes:
“It would be a death or a formality to wait for an oscillating vote on October 25, the people have the right and are obliged to resolve such issues (however, only Lenin knew this secret desire of the PEOPLE, - Yu.Zh.) not by voting, but by force” (Lenin, “Letter to members Central Committee")
Nevertheless, without calls for peace, the Bolsheviks could not come to power and could not stay at its peak, but Lenin needed peace only after the seizure of power by his party:
“We must end this criminal war as soon as possible, and not with a separate (separate) peace with Germany, but with a general peace, and not with the peace of the capitalists, with the amir of the working masses against the capitalists. There is only one way to this: the transfer of all state power entirely into the hands of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies both in Russia and in other countries" (Lenin, "Letter to the delegates of the Congress of Peasants' Deputies).
Finally, on the night of October 24-25, the Bolsheviks arrested the provisional government and seized power in Petrograd. After that, the first decrees of the new government were adopted at the Congress of Soviets. And, above all, the decree on peace. Now Lenin acted as head of the Russian government. However, despite this, he continues to talk about the completely absurd conditions for ending the war, which would have to redraw the borders of almost all states in the world.
According to Vladimir Ilyich, to start the self-determination procedure, it was enough for someone to simply declare such a desire in the press, or for independence to be supported by any of the parties. After that, it was necessary to withdraw all the troops from the region, the desire for self-determination of which was announced in the press, and to conduct a democratic procedure for a popular vote, which was supposed to finally determine its fate:
“If any nation is held within the borders of a given state by violence, if it does not matter to it, contrary to its expressed desire - whether this desire is expressed in the press, in popular meetings, in the decisions of parties or in revolts and uprisings against national oppression - is not granted the right by free voting, with the complete withdrawal of the troops of the annexing or generally stronger nation, to decide without the slightest coercion the question of the forms of state existence of this nation, then its accession is an annexation, i.e. capture and violence” (“Decree on Peace”, adopted by the Congress of Soviets on October 26 (November 8), 1917)
However, at this the diplomatic fantasies of the leader of the revolution were suddenly interrupted, and a semblance of common sense suddenly woke up in him:
“At the same time, the Government declares that it by no means considers the above conditions of peace as an ultimatum; agrees to consider all other terms of peace, insisting only on the fastest possible proposal by any belligerent country and on complete clarity, on the unconditional exclusion of all ambiguity and all secrecy in the proposal of peace conditions ”(“ Decree on Peace ”, adopted by the Congress of Soviets on October 26 (November 8, 1917).
Russia's former allies in the Entente naturally disowned Lenin's peace proposals. So, Lenin's calls did not lead to any universal peace, and could not lead to. However, if earlier Ilyich categorically rejected even the very possibility of concluding a separate peace:
“There can be no separate peace for us, and according to the resolution of our party there is not even a shadow of a doubt that we reject it ... We do not recognize any separate peace with the German capitalists and we will not enter into any negotiations” (Lenin, “Speech about War”) ,
then, spitting on their own principles, the Soviet government signs a truce with the Germans, and on December 22 begins to conduct separate negotiations with Germany and its allies.
And here the Kaiser, like a cat and a mouse, starts a game with the Bolshevik amateurs in diplomacy. To begin with, Berlin declares its adherence to the main provisions of the Soviet declaration of peace without annexations and indemnities, subject to the acceptance of these proposals by the governments of the Entente countries. After that, Petrograd again turns to its former allies with an invitation to take part in peace negotiations. Of course, without getting any response from them.
Meanwhile, Berlin, in the territories it occupied, carried out purposeful activities to form puppet governments fully accountable to it in the former national outskirts of Russia, seeking separation from Russia. In Ukraine, not without the influence of Lenin's cries about the so-called national oppression of the Great Russians, the Little Russians came to power Shivinistic The Rada, which instantly began to seek protection from the Germans for its independence.
On January 9, the German side stated that since the Entente did not join the peace negotiations, Germany considers itself free from the Soviet peace formula, and a few days later demanded that over 150,000 square kilometers of its territory be torn away from Russia. Moreover, all this was done by Berlin in full accordance with the German interpretation of the principle of peace without annexations. Germany was simply forced to keep its troops in Poland and the Baltic states at the request of the national governments of these new states.
On February 9, Germany and Austria signed a separate peace with the Ukrainian Rada. Although at this point in time the Rada no longer represented anyone, since power in Ukraine almost completely passed to the Soviets.
On February 18, the Austro-German troops launched an offensive along the entire front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Two days later the Germans entered Minsk. These days, General Hoffmann wrote in his diary:
“Yesterday, one lieutenant with six soldiers captured six hundred Cossacks ... The most comical war I have ever seen, a small group of infantrymen with a machine gun and a cannon on the front car follows from station to station, captures another group of Bolsheviks and follows on.”
On February 21, Lenin announced "socialist fatherland in danger". Since then, in Soviet mythology, the holiday "Day of Soviet army". In accordance with this historical myth, on February 23, near Narva and Pskov, the newly created regiments of the Red Army allegedly stopped the German offensive.
However, there was no German attack on Petrograd at that time, since the fall of the Russian capital could lead to the fall of the Lenin government and the restoration of the Entente, which the Germans feared most of all. Nevertheless, since the Russian army was actually destroyed through the efforts of the Bolsheviks, at the categorical demand of Lenin, who instantly forgot about his assurances not to sign a separate peace with Germany under any circumstances, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided on complete surrender. Under the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, which was signed on March 3, Russia renounced sovereignty over Ukraine, Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and also pledged to completely demobilize the army, including the military units newly formed by the Bolsheviks.
However, Lenin did not grieve too much about the Russian territories given to the Germans, although he called the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk obscene, his much greater indignation was caused by the Entente’s rejection of the territories from Germany:
"Brest-Litovsk peace, dictated by monarchist Germany, and then MUCH MORE BEAST AND VILLAIN Versailles peace, dictated by the "democratic" republics, America and France, as well as "free" England" (Lenin, - "Imperialism, as the highest stage of capitalism") .
That is why now, when interest in the patriotic activities of the Georgian Stalin has increased unusually in Russian society, almost no one remembers with a kind word the deeds of the “Great Russian” Russophobe Ulyanov. Nowadays, only words of anathema and curses fly to Lenin's address more often.
“The transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war is the only correct proletarian slogan, indicated by the experience of the Commune, outlined by the Basel (1912) resolution and arising from all the conditions of an imperialist war between highly developed bourgeois countries. No matter how great the difficulties of such a transformation at one moment or another may seem , the socialists will never abandon systematic, persistent, unswerving preparatory work in this direction, once the war has become a fact" (Lenin, article "War and Russian Social Democracy", September 1914)
Here we must stop and pay attention to a very important feature of Lenin's plan. Ilyich was not at all going to save the Russians from the horrors of the war, he only wanted to redirect the cannons and machine guns so that the war would go against part of his own people. But to achieve this transformation of the "wrong" war into the "right" one - so that brother against brother and son against father - was easier with the defeat of "one's own" government. This defeat weakened him and made the road to revolution easier. And Lenin points out: “A revolution during a war is a civil war, and the transformation of the war of governments into a civil war, on the one hand, is facilitated by military failures (defeat) of governments, and on the other hand, it is impossible in practice to strive for such a transformation without helping those the very defeat ... The revolutionary class in the reactionary war cannot but wish the defeat of its government ... (article "On the defeat of its government in the imperialist war"). In principle, Lenin proclaimed the slogan of the defeat not only of the tsarist, but also of all other governments participating in the First World War. However, at the same time, he did not care much whether the socialists of Germany, Austria-Hungary, England and France would support his call with their practical actions. In addition, only one of the belligerents can suffer defeat in a war. Therefore, the defeat of Russia in practice means a military victory for Germany and the strengthening of the Kaiser's government. But Lenin is in no way embarrassed by this circumstance, and he insists that the initiative of defeatism must come precisely from the Russian Social Democrats: "... The last consideration is especially important for Russia, for it is the most backward country in which a socialist revolution is directly impossible. That is why the Russian Social Democrats were to be the first to come up with the theory and practice of the slogan of defeat" (Lenin, "On the Defeat of Their Government in the Imperialist War").
Admire the following quotes from the leader of the world proletariat, in which every letter and punctuation mark is saturated with terry Russophobia: "Down with priestly sentimental and stupid sighs about peace at all costs! Let's raise the banner of civil war ..." (Lenin, "The situation and tasks socialist international). "The slogan of peace, in my opinion, is wrong at the moment. This is a philistine, priestly slogan. The proletarian slogan should be: civil war..." interests of the working masses and the working class of Russia, cannot be subject to the slightest, absolutely no doubt that the least evil would now and immediately be the defeat of tsarism in this war. For tsarism is a hundred times worse than Kaiserism ... "(Lenin, "Letter to Shlyapnikov 17.10.14.) Stunning cynicism statements! And after all, not just "losing the war", but turning it into a civilian one is already a double betrayal! Lenin demands, furiously insists on the need for a civil war! It is a pity that the tsarist government did not think of sending a messenger to Europe with an ice pick for Mr. Ulyanov, who is scribbling his Russophobic libels in European coffee houses. You see, the fate of Russia in the twentieth century would have been much less tragic.
And still very important point: look at the dates of Lenin's statements. The leader of Bolshevism put forward the tasks of the defeat of Russia and the need for a civil war immediately and unambiguously, when no one yet knew the impending course of the war. N. Bukharin, who was with him in Switzerland, told the Moscow Izvestia in 1934 that the very first propaganda slogan that Lenin wanted to put forward was the slogan for the soldiers of all warring armies: "Shoot your officers!" But something confused Ilyich and he preferred the less specific formula "transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war." There were no serious problems at the front yet: no heavy losses, no lack of weapons and ammunition, no retreat, and the Bolsheviks, according to Lenin's plan, had already launched a fierce struggle to reduce the country's defense capability. They created illegal party organizations at the front, conducting anti-war propaganda; issued anti-government leaflets, appeals; carried out strikes and demonstrations in the rear; organized and supported any actions of the masses that weakened the front. That is, they acted like a classic "5th column".
Anti-war rally in a military unit 
A.A. Brusilov writes in his memoirs: “When I was the commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front during the German war, the Bolsheviks, both earlier and after the February coup, strongly agitated in the ranks of the army. During the time of Kerensky, they had especially many attempts to infiltrate the army ... I remember one case ... My chief of staff, General Sukhomlin, reported to me as follows: several Bolsheviks arrived at the headquarters in my absence. They told him that they wanted to infiltrate the army for propaganda. Sukhomlin, apparently at a loss, and allowed them to go. I, of course, did not approved and ordered them to be brought back. Arriving in Kamenetz-Podolsk, they came to me, and I told them that in no case could I allow them into the army, since they want peace at all costs, and the Provisional Government demands war until a common peace along with all our allies. And then I sent them out of the limits subject to me. "
Anton Ivanovich Denikin testifies: "Bolshevism spoke most definitely. As we know, he came to the army with a direct invitation - to refuse obedience to the commanders and stop the war, finding fertile ground in the spontaneous sense of self-preservation that gripped the mass of soldiers. Delegates sent from all fronts to the Petrograd Soviet with requests, requests, demands, threats, sometimes they heard there from a few representatives of the defense bloc reproaches and requests to be patient, but on the other hand they found complete sympathy in the Bolshevik faction of the Soviet, taking with them into the dirty and cold trenches the conviction that peace negotiations would not begin until all power passes to the Bolshevik soviets."
The tsarist regime had many shortcomings, but it was by no means "rotten", as Soviet propaganda zealously tried to convince us. The Black and Baltic Seas were controlled by the Russian fleet, the industry dramatically increased the production of ammunition and weapons. The front stabilized in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states. Losses? In total, in the First World War, Russia irretrievably lost less than 1 million people, compare with the gigantic multimillion-dollar losses in the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars. But in what the autocracy is very much underdeveloped, it is in countering people of different political colors, conducting subversive anti-state activities, including the so-called liberals. February Revolution of 1917 was a severe blow to the country's defense capability. From the memoirs of the so-called "old Bolshevik" V.E. Vasiliev "And our spirit is young" the active role of the Bolsheviks in organizing the February Revolution is clearly visible: "Late in the evening, Grigory Samoded, a Putilovite, came to our company. He brought an appeal from the St. Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks, in which , in particular, it was said: “Remember, comrade soldiers, that only the fraternal alliance of the working class and the revolutionary army will bring liberation to the perishing oppressed people and put an end to the fratricidal and senseless war. Down with the tsarist monarchy! Long live the fraternal alliance of the revolutionary army with the people!" We immediately went to all the Izmaylovo barracks to raise soldiers. Samoded went with us to the 1st battalion. As early as the morning of February 25, rallies began in the barracks. Officers, among whom Colonel Verkhovtsev was in charge , captains Luchinin and Dzhavrov, tried to interrupt the speeches. But the soldiers refused to obey the officers and began to act together with the revolutionary companies. At the rallies, the soldiers called for decisive action - arming the workers, dispersing and disarming the police, policemen ... Izmailovsky and Petrograd regiments, leaving the barracks All the streets and lanes on the Peterhof highway were reliably guarded by armed workers and our companies. That evening, leaflets of the Petersburg Bolshevik Committee were passed from hand to hand, calling for decisive action: "Call everyone to fight. It is better to die a glorious death fighting for a working cause than lay down your head for capital gains at the front or languish from hunger and overwork ... We stopped one of the cars. Let's go to the barracks. We shot the officers who offered desperate resistance."
Street fighting in Petrograd in February 1917 
We read further the curious memoirs of V.E. Vasiliev with particular attention: “On March 1, 1917, an event of great importance took place. units of the garrison. I remember well this order, which in the post-February days blocked the path of reaction, counter-revolutionary elements to arms. The order ordered the troops to obey only the Petrograd Soviet and their regimental committees. From now on, weapons were to be at the disposal of the soldiers' committees and were not subject to issue to officers even on their requirement. civil rights, which they could use out of service and order. Order 1 (the soldiers perfectly understood who initiated it) raised the authority of the Bolsheviks even higher. The nascent bond strengthened. In early March, under the St. Petersburg Committee of the Party, headed by N. I. Podvoisky, one of the most experienced organizers of military and combat work, the Military Commission was created - the core of the future "Voenka". At the end of March, a meeting of the Bolsheviks of the garrison (97 representatives from 48 military units) was held. It established, instead of the Military Commission, a permanent apparatus - the Military Organization - with the aim of "unifying all the party forces of the garrison and mobilizing the masses of soldiers to fight under the banner of the Bolsheviks."
So who actually inspired the adoption of the infamous Order No. 1 - again, these are the Bolsheviks! The situation in Petrograd was critical, huge crowds of armed soldiers rushed around the city, starting fierce battles with the junkers and gendarmes; in Kronstadt there were mass murders of officers by a mass of sailors. Uniform anarchy! In such a situation, it cost nothing to push any, even the most anti-Russian, resolution through the new authorities, if only to calm the raging "defenders of the Fatherland." And for some reason we still blame only the so-called "liberals" for the collapse of the army. General A.S. Lukomsky noted that the order of the 1st Petrograd Soviet "undermined discipline, depriving the officer command staff of power over the soldiers." With the adoption of this order in the army, the principle of unity of command, fundamental for any army, was violated, as a result, there was a sharp drop in discipline. All weapons passed under the control of the soldiers' committees. But this was to the advantage of the Bolsheviks, and during this period they became the most active defenders of the so-called "army democracy." The order to the delegates to the Minsk Soviet, drawn up by the Bolshevik A.F. Myasnikov, said: "Considering it right ... the destruction of standing armies ... we see the need to create a more democratic order in the army." Among the new Bolshevik slogans is "arming the people." It is interesting that when the Bolsheviks began to create their own - really combat-ready Red Army - they completely forgot about order number 1 of the Petrosoviet, and about "army democracy", and about "arming the people" too. In the army headed by Trotsky, without any sentimentality, they shot their soldiers even for minor offenses, achieving the strictest discipline. So, in August 1918, Trotsky used decimation to punish the 2nd Petrograd Regiment of the Red Army, which arbitrarily left its combat positions.
The memoirs of another "old Bolshevik" - F.P. Khaustov - refer to April and May 1917: "District Bolshevik committees are being elected. This makes the regiment soldered ... The committee establishes ties with neighboring regiments and the same work is also carried out there, according to elections of Bolshevik committees. Things are expanding, and in mid-March the entire 43rd Corps was organized on the Bolshevik program. A Corps Committee was elected. The Bolshevik Committee of the 436th Novoladozhsky Regiment was almost entirely included in the Corps Committee, replenished with representatives from other regiments. From the very At the same time, the Bolshevik Committee of the 436th Novoladozhsky Regiment established contact with the Central and St. Petersburg Committees of the Bolsheviks through Comrade A. Vasiliev and received literature and guidance from there. Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party In early March, the committee organizes, contrary to the order of the commander-in-chief on the northern front, in a section of at least 40 versts, fraternization with the Germans. At that time I was chairman of the Corps Bolshevik Committee. The fraternization took place in an organized manner .... The result of the fraternization was the actual cessation of hostilities in the corps sector.
So, the tsarist government was unable to keep the situation in the country under control. Instead of reliably isolating or liquidating the organizers of anti-state activities, law enforcement agencies exiled them to well-fed Siberia, where they gained strength, ate, freely communicated with each other, making revolutionary plans. If necessary, the revolutionaries easily escaped from exile. During the war, the fight against subversive activities was also not active enough and did not meet the realities. After the attempted Kornilov rebellion, the Military Revolutionary Committees (VRC), under the control of the Bolsheviks, seized all command and administrative power in the regiments, divisions, corps and armies of the Western Front. The provisional government, like the tsarist government, was unable to promptly and harshly stop the subversive activities of the Leninists. For the sake of truth, let us once again recall that it itself did a lot to destabilize the army with ill-conceived decisions and orders. But one should not attribute too much to the Kerensky government, despite serious mistakes, it was not at all going to hand over the country to the Germans. From January to September 1917, about 1.9 million people joined the active army from the rear garrisons, which significantly blocked the increased flow of desertion. In the summer, Germany continued to keep significant forces on the Eastern Front: 127 divisions. Although their number dropped to 80 in autumn, it was still a third of the total German ground forces. In June 1917, Kornilov's army by a decisive assault broke through the positions of the 3rd Austrian army of Kirchbach to the west of the city of Stanislav. During the further offensive, about 10,000 enemy soldiers and 150 officers were taken prisoner, and about 100 guns were captured. However, the subsequent breakthrough of the Germans on the front of the 11th Army, which fled before the Germans (despite its superiority in numbers) due to moral decay, leveled the initial successes of the Russian troops. So the supporters of the defeat of Russia hit their own country in the back.
Of course, the defeatist activity of the Russian revolutionaries was received with great enthusiasm by the Germans. The German General Staff organized a massive campaign to support the subversive efforts of the Bolsheviks. Special offices were engaged in agitation among Russian prisoners of war. German intelligence financed the Bolsheviks in large sums through the left-wing political adventurer Parvus ( real name Gelfand). He settled in Stockholm, which became an outpost of German intelligence to control events in Russia. On March 2, 1917, the German representation in Stockholm receives the following instruction 7443 of the German Imperial Bank: “You are hereby informed that demands will be received from Finland for funds to promote peace in Russia. The demands will come from the following persons: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Sumenson, Kozlovsky, Kollontai, Sievers or Merkalin Current accounts are opened for these persons in branches of private German banks in Sweden, Norway and Switzerland in accordance with our order 2754. These demands must be accompanied by one or two of the following signatures: "Dirschau " or "Milkenberg". Demands endorsed by one of the above-mentioned persons must be executed without delay." After the war, Erich von Ludendorff (quartermaster general, de facto head of the German General Staff) recalled: "... Our government, by sending Lenin to Russia, assumed a huge responsibility! This trip was justified from a military point of view: it was necessary that Russia fell ...". And one more thing: "By November, the degree of decomposition of the Russian army by the Bolsheviks had reached such a level that the OKH was seriously considering using a number of units from the Eastern Front to strengthen its positions in the West. Then we kept 80 divisions in the East - a third of all available forces. "
Erich von Ludendorff: "... Our government, by sending Lenin to Russia, took on a huge responsibility! This trip was justified from a military point of view: it was necessary for Russia to fall" 
After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks first published Lenin's decree on peace. This treacherous step became a powerful and decisive impetus for the complete collapse of the front, it practically ceased to exist. Soldiers drove home in huge crowds. At the same time, a mass exodus of officers began from the army, who did not agree with the new conditions of service, with the new government, and who reasonably feared for their lives. The murders and suicides of officers were not uncommon. The guards assigned to guard the warehouses scattered, because of which a lot of property was plundered or perished in the open. Due to the mass death of the horse composition, the artillery turned out to be completely paralyzed. In January 1918, 150 thousand people remained on the entire Western Front; for comparison - in the middle of 1916 it included more than 5 million people.
General Brusilov testifies again: “I remember a case when it was reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front in my presence that one of the divisions, having driven out its superiors, wants to go home entirely, I ordered to let them know that I would come to them the next morning to talk with them "I was dissuaded from going to this division, because it was in an extreme brutality and that I would hardly get out of them alive. Nevertheless, I ordered to announce that I would come to them and that they were waiting for me. I was met by a huge crowd of soldiers, raging and not realizing her actions. I drove into this crowd in a car ... and, standing up to my full height, asked them what they wanted. They shouted: "We want to go home!". I told them what to say with the crowd I can’t, but let them choose a few people with whom I will speak in their presence. With some difficulty, but nevertheless, the representatives of this crazed crowd were chosen. When I asked which party they belong to, they answered me that used to be social revolution erami, and now they have become Bolsheviks. "What is your doctrine?" I asked. “Land and freedom!” they shouted ... “But what do you want now?” They frankly declared that they no longer wanted to fight and wanted to go home in order to divide the land, taking it away from the landlords, and live freely, not to my question: “What will happen to Mother Russia if you don’t think about her, and each of you will only care about yourself?” To this they told me that it was none of their business to discuss what will happen to the state, and that they firmly decided to live at home calmly and clover. "That is, to gnaw seeds and play the harmonica ?!" "That's right!" - the nearest ranks laughed ... “I also met my 17th infantry division, which was once in my 14th corps, who greeted me enthusiastically. But to my exhortations to go against the enemy, they answered me that they themselves would have gone, but other troops adjacent to they will leave and will not fight, and therefore they do not agree to die uselessly. And all the units that I have only seen, to a greater or lesser extent, declared the same thing: "they do not want to fight," and everyone considered themselves Bolsheviks .. ."
Lenin, in his speech at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on June 9 (22), 1917, said: "When they say that we are striving for a separate peace, this is not true ... We do not recognize any separate peace with the German capitalists, and neither in what kind of negotiations we will not enter into with them. It seemed to sound patriotic, but Ilyich impudently lied, went to any tricks to come to power. Already at the end of 1917. The Bolsheviks entered into negotiations with Germany, and in March 1918. they signed a separate peace on fantastically onerous conditions. Under its terms, a territory of 780 thousand square meters was torn away from the country. km. with a population of 56 million people (a third of the total population); Russia pledged to recognize the independence of Ukraine (UNR); indemnity in gold (about 90 tons) was transported by the Bolsheviks to Germany, etc. Now Leninists had a free hand for the long-awaited war with their own people. By 1921, Russia was literally in ruins. It was under the Bolsheviks from the former Russian Empire the territories of Poland, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Western Ukraine and Belarus, the Kars region (in Armenia), Bessarabia, etc. departed. During the Civil War, from hunger, disease, terror and in battles, from 8 to 13 million people died (according to various sources). Up to 2 million people emigrated from the country. In 1921 there were many millions of homeless children in Russia. industrial production fell to 20% of the 1913 level.
It was a real national disaster.
A few questions to fill in:
How many citizens of Russia died during the First World War (1914-1918)?
How many citizens of Russia and the USSR died during the Civil War (1917-1923)?
Losses during World War I (1914-1918)
The losses of the armed forces of all the powers participating in the world war amounted to about 10 million people. Until now, there is no generalized data on the losses of the civilian population from the impact of military weapons. Famine and epidemics caused by the war caused the death of at least 20 million people*.
Combat losses of the Russian army killed in battle (according to various estimates from 775 to 911 thousand people) corresponded to such losses of the Central bloc as 1:1 (Germany lost about 303 thousand people on the Russian front, Austria-Hungary - 451 thousand and Turkey - about 151 thousand). Russia waged a war with much less effort than its opponents and allies ... Even taking into account significant sanitary losses and those who died in captivity total losses were incomparably less sensitive for Russia than for other countries ...
Famine and other disasters caused by the war led to an increase in mortality and a decrease in the birth rate. The decline in population for these reasons alone in 12 warring states amounted to over 20 million people, including in Russia 5 million people., in Austria-Hungary 4.4 million people, in Germany 4.2 million people **.
Losses during the Civil War in Russia (1917-1923) ***
From 1917 to 1922, the population of Russia decreased by 13-16 million people, while most of them died from starvation and epidemics. Taking into account the decrease in population growth compared to peacetime, the loss of the population of Russia amounted to 25 million people ****.
Brief summary:
The human losses of Russia during the Civil War turned out to be approx. 3 times higher than during WWI ...
